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Abstract 
Abstract 
This research aims to investigate organizational commitment in the investment decision-making 
process around the themes of escalation, de-escalation and strategic control. This research involves a 
synergic chain of various methods such as narrative review, meta-analytical synthesis, archival 
analysis, case study, field experiment, and survey. The research per se follows the COAI design (i. e. 
conceptualization, operationalization, actualization and idealization) and goes through eight stages (i. e. 
8Cs): conceiving, contriving, controlling, co-or'dinating, calibrating, conducting, collecting, and 
concentering the research. The results of the review of previous research on escalation of commitment 
in the investment decision-making context reveal that the literature on the escalation and de-escalation 
of organizational commitment is discrete and quantitatively focused. The results of the meta-analytical 
synthesis of the escalating commitment literatures confirm that the escalating commitment literature is 
inconsistent. The results of the longitudinal case study via participant observation reveal that escalating 
commitment can originate from, inter alia, psychological, strategic, operational, social, political, 
institutional, ideological. and environmental dilemmas and that the processes can be cyclically 
interweaved by varying conflicting perceived utilities including, those of experimenting, persisting, 
time-biding, and withdrawing. The results of two field experiments reveal that, contrary to earlier 
research, the higher the sunk costs the less likely investment decision-makers are to authorize funds to 
continue with the string of investments and the lower their estimates are of the likelihood that the next 
investment will be productive. The results of the survey by means of semi-structured interview provide 
a statistical confirmation of the relevance of a conceptualized process model of strategic control and 
reveal that the Chinese general managers interviewed ascribed a higher level of importance to the 
idealization phase of strategic control and exposed some discernible weaknesses in the process of 
strategic control. The research concludes with an explanation of the role of strategic control over 
investments and with a tentative framework for the practical strategic control of investments. This 
research recommends that future practice should focus on the effective management of investments in 
a way which integrates differing rationalities in the full organizational context; it should address the 
dynamics of organizational commitment in a broader way which covers, inter alia, economic, 
psychological, political, operational, environmental, social, cultural and institutional perspectives; and 
it should emphasize both external and internal strategic control factors inherent in the decision-making 
process in a manner which echoes the principle of unity. It is also recommended that future research 
should include new research inquiry systems, new research frameworks, new research techniques, and 
new research dimensions in both the laboratory (e. g. virtual reality) and the real world settings (e. g. 
longitudinal observation and cross-cultural comparative studies). 
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researcher wishes to acknowledge his hugest indebtedness to Professor Richard M., S. Wilson 
for his positive, helpful, and inspiring mentorship. 
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Executive Summary 
Executive Summary 
The essence of investment management consists of planning, implementation, control, and 
improvement, all of which contribute significantly to organisations' success or failure, but the 
strategic control of investments ranks among the most important responsibilities with which top 
management are tasked. 
This research is shadowed by the Chinese wisdom of `Yi Dian Dai Mian' (i. e. `making use of 
the experience of a certain unit to promote work of the whole area'). It aims to investigate 
organizational commitment in the investment decision-making process round the themes of 
escalation, de-escalation and strategic control, so as to enhance the awareness and the 
understanding of the escalating commitment phenomenon among both academics and 
practitioners, to invoke much future research into this scenario, to provide guidance to the 
practice of effective control over investments, and ultimately, to contribute to the accumulation 
of knowledge about the science and art of decision-making. 
This research adopts a 'fishbone' design involving a synergistic chain of varying methods (i. e. 
narrative review, meta-analytical synthesis, archival analysis, mail-based field experiment, and 
interview-based survey), which is starred by case study method containing, inter alia, 
participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The research per se goes through eight 
stages (i. e. 8Cs): conceiving, contriving, controlling, co-ordinating, calibrating, conducting, 
collecting, and concentering the research. However, the main stream research activities, which is 
vividly reflected by the structure of the thesis, include methodological conceptulization, 
literature operationalization (featuring literature review and meta-analytical synthesis), 
observational actualization (featuring a case study, two field experiments and a survey), and 
theoretical idealization (featuring advancing as well as integrating theories on investment 
decision-making, organizational commitment, and strategic control of investment). 
Literature review: This research provides a review of previous research on escalation of 
commitment in the investment decision-making context, through a thorough search of both 
published and non-published work as well as extensive reading of recent literature on the subject. 
The narrative review reveals that literatures on the escalation and de-escalation of organizational 
commitment is discrete and quantitatively focused. 
Meta-analytical synthesis: this research goes beyond the conventional form of literature review 
by meta-analytically synthesising escalating commitment literatures, through an examination of 
29 usable experimental results obtained by previous researchers. It employed Pearson's r (i. e. 
product momentum correlation coefficient) as the effect size estimate. The results confirm that 
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the escalating commitment literature is inconsistent, and reveal that, though not with large 
effects, self-justification and prospect theory, along with others, remain the most powerful 
mechanisms explaining escalating commitment. 
Case study via participant observation: a longitudinal case study via participant observation, 
supplemented by some follow-up fully structured (face to face or telephone) as well as semi- 
structured interviews, was conducted at six points in time in a Sino-Korean joint venture to 
identify triggers as well as the processes of escalating commitment. The results reveal that 
triggers of escalating commitment can originate from, inter alia, psychological, strategic, 
operational, social, political, institutional, ideological and environmental dilemmas, and the 
processes are cyclically interweaved by varying conflicting perceived utilities including those of 
experimenting, persisting, time-biding, and withdrawing. 
Field experiments: two field experiments were carried out to expand the Chinese dimension of 
the study of escalating commitment with 235 subjects (line, middle, and top managers) in an 
elite Chinese firm being asked to do a real but disguised case study. It aimed to examine the 
combined effects of sunk costs and negative feedback on decisions to de-escalate organizational 
commitment to a diversifying programme with a string of investments. The research results 
revealed that, contrary to earlier research, the higher the sunk costs (i. e. the greater the number 
of investments), the less likely investment decision-makers are to authorize funds to continue 
with the string of investments and the lower their estimates are of the likelihood that the next 
investment will be productive. 
Survey: a survey by means of semi-structured interview was conducted to probe successful 
factors or practices that give rise to effective strategic control over investments. Some 64 
informants (Chinese general managers who had participated in the research in one way or 
another) had been targeted, contacted, and interviewed to rate the role of strategic control upon 
investment management. The research results provide a statistical confirmation of the 
relationship among the 16 factors and of the relevance of the four phases and eight components 
of the conceptualized process model of strategic control. It reveals that the Chinese general 
managers interviewed ascribed a higher level of importance to the idealization phase of strategic 
control and exposed some discernible weaknesses in the process of strategic control (e. g. lack of 
emphasis on the conceptualization phase, neglecting the operationalization phase, and messing 
about the actualization phase). It also reveals that, in order to achieve optimal results, all of the 
strategic control factors in the process need to be given appropriate emphasis at different times. 
It finally proposes a strategic control process framework, which, if practiced effectively, can 
lead to cyclical generation of success including identification of potential investments, definition 
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of the workable investments, search for options, selection of the optimum investments, 
authorization of the chosen strategy coupled with accountability, responsibility and authority, 
implementation of the financed investment, monitoring of the on-going investment, and 
improvement of the investment. 
Vivid evidence was found in this synergistic research that excess organizational commitment 
can be very harmful. Escalating commitment can seriously take place in all investment scenarios 
(be it foreign direct investments, joint ventures, or domestic investments; product or service 
investments; profit or non-profit investments; capital intensive or labour intensive investments; 
visionary or operational investments; mainline or sideline investments). Evidence was found of 
the strategies articulated for commitment de-escalation. Much evidence was found that 
investment commitment should be, and can be, strategically controlled, and that approaches to 
strategic control over investments can be fruitful in practice. 
The thesis concludes with an explanation of the role of strategic control over investments and 
with a tentative framework for the practical strategic control of investments. Investment decision 
making is viewed as both a science and an art. Strategic control of investments is seen as both a 
driving force, not specifically to test investment decision-makers' competencies, but to generate 
pertinent and updated information about the capability of an organization, and to articulate a 
feasible process that monitors the performance of its management, so as to wholly fulfil its 
strategic intent. 
This research draws the curtains by proposing that an investment remains a de facto function of 
escalation of commitment which can equally lead to prosperity and degeneration, de-escalating 
strategies should consider varying contexts of commitment (e. g. ideological, psychological, 
technological or cultural), future practice should focus on the effective management of 
investments in a way which integrates differing rationalities in the full organizational context, 
address the dynamics of organizational commitment in a broader way which covers, inter alia, 
economic, psychological, political, operational, environmental, social, cultural and institutional 
perspectives, and emphasize both external and internal strategic control factors inherent in the 
decision-making process in a manner which echoes the principle of unity, and future research 
should include new research inquiry systems or new research frameworks (e. g. general systems 
methodological framework), new research techniques in both the laboratory (e. g. virtual reality) 
and the real world settings (e. g. longitudinal observation), and new research dimensions (e. g. 
cross-cultural comparative studies). 
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This researcher's interest in this research stemmed originally from his practical experience in 
industry dating back to the early 1980's, and emerged again in the earlier 1990's when the 
researcher did a research project at Keele University, U. K. 
For almost sixteen years the researcher had various responsibilities for managing investments as 
a matter of routine at the bottom, middle, and top level of corporate management and got to 
know, by means of participation, consultation, or research, many an organization which had 
waxed and waned in competitive markets seemingly in parallel to the very fate of one or two 
investment projects. For top management whether or not to further commit the organization to 
its previously chosen investments becomes increasingly tormenting. Having looked around these 
organisations repeatedly, the researcher had asked: 
" Does perseverance necessarily mean victory and what else contributes to success? 
Or more enthusiastically, if not just sympathetically, 
" How can a British direct investment in Eastern China break through the Chinese market 
after years' muddling through? 
" How could a receding Sino-Korean joint venture have kept receiving increasing amounts of 
funds for 12 years before it eventually went bust? 
" How does a Sino-Japan joint venture, which was on the brink of financial disaster even 
before it was completely set-up, make itself one of the most successful manufacturing 
companies in the Eastern world in terms of market growth? 
" How can people ensure that the Three Gorges Dam (the world's biggest dam project ever) 
can be successfully built across Yanze River in China? 
" How can giant businesses thrive on crises? 
What will be the destiny of a black-hole such as the Anglo-French Tunnel? 
" What mechanisms helped pull a Sino-American Joint Stock out of the brink of ruin twice 
within 10 years? 
Why do small businesses so often fall after success? 
. Why does a conglomerate keep spending huge amounts of funds year after year in saving a 
failing hospital in an industrial area of sparse population? 
. Why does not a Xi'an-Taiwan joint business tease out the truth after a horrible honeymoon? 
" Why does a Northern China based American direct investment which has suffered huge 
losses for 5 years hesitate to pull the plug? 
`Because, ' came the simple and stupid reply, `not many organisations exercise control, and, if 
they do, it's the wrong approach. ' 
It seems bizarre that investment decision-making, which is generally thought to be the raison 
d'etre of corporate management, often turns out to be unsatisfactory. Perhaps it is because, like 
teaching or coaching a student, supervising or doing research, implementing or controlling an 
investment, competent academics and/or practitioners easily commit themselves to it all the time 
and so forget that, like most things such as sports, socialization, and family life, it can be done 
better in other ways. 
At Keele University, this researcher, inspired and supervised by Professor Richard M. S. Wilson, 
then Head of the Department of Management, had rigorously researched on the theme of 
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investment decision-making. The Keele research project, which partly led to his MBA with 
distinction, had focused on entrapment in the investment decision-making context and had 
included the Chinese dimension of investment decision-making. It had tentatively examined 
various behavioural aspects which might trigger investment entrapment, discussed plausible 
approaches to disentrapment, and envisaged ways of securing effective control over investments. 
However, it had been quantitatively focused with only marginal extension to qualitative aspects. 
It is unwise to declare that quantitative aspects do not deserve leverage in management training 
or research. Quantitative aspects are important, but they can detract from the fact that 
investment decisions are ultimately made by varying kinds of people within culturally 
differentiated organizations competing in the ever-changing economic environments. Therefore, 
what remains essential is an understanding of investment decision-making in a full 
organizational context embracing. accounting, economics, finance, history, operations, 
philosophy, politics, psychology, sociology, strategy, and technology, etc. 
This thesis seeks to meet the need for multiple perspectives on investment decision-making, the 
latter of which is operationalized by an organization's persistence of an explicit (or implicit) 
strategy over time (i. e. organizational commitment in the investment decision-making process 
featuring escalation, de-escalation, and strategic control). 
A particular feature of this research is its assiduous focus on the generation of insights instead of 
the conventional wisdom of generalization. The aim of the research, therefore, is not to create 
fail safe operations as others would ideally wish but, by virtue of studying both successful and 
unsuccessful investments, to invoke much empirical research among academics and 
practitioners in this promising but somewhat neglected area of organizational phenomena, with 
an expansion of both the methodological and contextual dimensions of the research of interest. It 
is hoped that the provision of a better understanding of escalating commitment phenomenon and 
a practical framework for strategic control over investments will facilitate organizational 
learning and so help organisations to: (a) sustain excellence in investment management, (b) 
transform certain failure into success, (c) avoid falling victim to individual, group, or 
organizational ineptitude, or (d) refresh corporate memory of their glories as well as their 
shames so as to make solid progresses. 
This researcher began working full time on this thesis, originally entitled `exploring entrapment 
/ escalating commitment in the investment decision-making process', `managing strategic 
control over investments in a full organizational context' and `strategic control of investments' 
in 1995,1996 and 1997 respectively. The completed research took far longer than the researcher 
anticipated. This was due in part to the extensive reading required by the span and scope this 
research covers as well as the extensive and continual effort required by field work and fund- 
seeking; his initial work was both far too detailed and far too broad for the level of study the 
researcher could pursue. Moreover, the researcher had originally anticipated directly following 
the positivist wisdom `off the shelf', but evolutionarily determined that it was more rightful to 
navigate by first principles; the researcher had initially expected simply using single research 
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design, but subsequently decided that it was more fruitful and interesting as well as cost- 
effective to adopt a synergistic research design. 
The extra time has been used, in part, to invoke debates about the work among academics by 
means of conference presentations, journal publications and part time lectures and among 
practitioners by means of consultation and speeches, to reconceptualize the problem again and 
again, and to deepen his knowledge of research methodology, management accounting, 
marketing, organizational behaviour, business operations, business psychology, microeconomics, 
history, philosophy, strategic management, organizational decision-making, corporate finance, 
politics, international businesses, change and innovation, sociology, and strategic control, etc. 
While the researcher started with a focus on organizational commitment, the notion has been all 
but downsized from the thesis. His focus shifted to entrapment, escalating commitment, and 
finally to strategic control. Moreover, as this research remains original in many ways, the 
researcher had to develop his own conceptual framework as well as optimizing research 
activities cost-effectively from time to time. 
To put it short, the researcher takes learning seriously; the researcher takes the research 
seriously; and as a result, the researcher conducts the research and constructs the thesis equally 
seriously. The research differs from conventional research in many ways. The research is 
systematically and strategically thought out, methodologically and practically controlled, and 
reflectively but philosophically interpreted. This is, perhaps, why the structure of the thesis also 
deserves some comment. 
The research task was functionally decomposed and localized into eight subtasks, and the 
composition of this thesis follows a similar logic in order that the rhythm of the research can be 
better savoured and the rigor of the research vividly relished. As can be seen in the thesis, the 
research remains strategically controlled instead of mechanistically programmed, in that change 
and innovation have become the second nature of the research activities. 
To highlight the research activities, it can be found in the thesis that, as reflected in Figure 0-1, 
(1) the prologue serves as a threshold of the research and the Chinese boxes game is employed 
to act as a paradigmatic framework for the research; 1 
(2) the theme of investigation is thoroughly discussed to act as a methodological base for the 
research, and an explanatory framework is employed to expand the researcher's vision; 
(3) the prospect of the research is projected to act as the operational scaffold for the research; 
(4) philosophical understanding of research is explored to act as a wisdom depository for the 
research, and the first principles are emphasized to guide the research in many areas such as 
designing the research, conducting the research and interpreting the research results; 
(5) management research methods are contextually justified and realistically debated, and the 
enhanced awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the commonly approached 
management research methods has actually contributed to the "fishbone" design of the 
research; Ii 3 
(6) the research theme is briefly introduced covering various scenarios including common 
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research pitfalls so that the research can be positioned to thrive beyond myopia and the 
synopsis of the research covering a specially devised COAI design of the research (i. e. the 
conceptualization, operationalization, actualization and idealization of the research); 
(7) a narrative review is aimed to focus on the existing literatures of escalation and de- 
escalation of organizational commitment, and the review serves as the source on which 
further quantitative analysis can be based and further theory-advancing can rely; 
(8) a meta-analytical analysis is approached to synthesize the existing literature, and the meta- 
analytical findings are employed to project research directions and research propositions for 
the escalation, de-escalation and strategic control study that immediately follows; 
(9) a longitudinal case study is adopted to speculate from varying perspectives possible triggers 
of escalating commitment, and the research results are aimed to advance research in the 
area of commitment escalation; 
(10) discussions are directed at "how to pull the plug" strategies, and two field experiments are 
designed to double-check the existing mechanisms and testify to practitioners' suspicions 
on the relevance of existing mechanisms (i. e. sunk cost and negative feedback); 
(11) efforts are made to explore plausible approaches to strategic control in an empirical setting 
as envisioned to articulate successful practices of strategic control of investments and 
advance theories of strategic control; 
(12) the concentering of the research is presented to incorporate various mechanisms explaining 
and guiding investment decision-making in an organizational context, and the newly 
conceived concepts and methods are aimed to help practitioners to better understand the 
real trick of investment decision-making; 
(13) the concentering of the research in the line of organizational commitment involves 
extracting insights from sense-data to form a paradigmatic framework of organizational 
commitment in investment decision-making, and the conceptual exploration in this vein is 
to provide practitioners with both awareness and methods of commitment management; 
(14) the concentering of the research under the theme of strategic control of investment reflects 
the hub of the research: effort is directed to explore the nature of strategy-making and of 
control in relation to investment, while specific attention is paid to successful 
controllerships vis-ä-vis varying processes of strategic control of investment in the full 
organizational contexts; 
(15) In the epilogue the research project is reflected dialectically before the thesis draws its 
curtain constructively and the research itself goes into the next round of the 8Cs, and the 
researcher treads beyond the theme of strategic control of investments and explores the 
management of investments philosophically by paradigmatically linking decision-making 
with the Chinese Boxes Game outlined in the prologue. 
When the sun finally did set on the year of 1998, the researcher had much to feel proud of in the 
research project, the insights generated from which have successfully guided many individuals 
and organizations the researcher cared about, via consultation or participation, to exercise 
strategic control over their investments of various kinds, although the investments this 
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researcher moulded round his own professions still remains far from triumphal. 
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Chapter 1 The Prologue: The Chinese Boxes Game 
STRATEGIC CONTROL OF INVESTMENTS 
An investigation into organizational commitment in the investment 
decision-making process: escalation, de-escalation and strategic control 
1. The Prologue: The Chinese Boxes Game 
One of the most interesting games this researcher played in his childhood was the Chinese 
Boxes game, in which participants open one box only to find another box inside. This perpetual 
process (Figure 1-1) can be viewed as a repetitious triangulation of boxes, except that, over tinme, 
the size, composite, shape, or content of the box varies and knowledge itself accumulates. 
Figure 1-1: The Chinese Boxes Game 
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Such a game with varying styles remains quite popular among traditional Chinese families, and 
the one being played among this researcher's family maintains a knock-out event with a set of 
rules which include that, (a) an oral prediction on what is inside the box to be opened has to be 
made before an action, (b) boxes cannot be opened by direct force, ' (c) all participants provide 
consistent physical assistance to each other throughout the lame, (d) winners in each round 
equally share the prizes available in that round but are obliged to make reasonable beneli ction, 
(e) winners in each round may quit the game, providing they had donated half the prizes found 
in that round to the benefaction, (f) losers in each round can step down to become a reserve or it 
consultant in later rounds, but the former becomes ineligible to share the benefaction, (g) half- 
way quitters without good reasons will be banned for a number of sequential games (normally 
equal to the number of the current participants), and (h) the final winners take the pride and the 
benefactions are shared among eligible participants. 
This researcher-'s late father used to spread gifts, pocket nmoney, candies, or a combination ut 
those, or even occasionally nothing but hunches of flowers, into a number of'hoxes (nornmally up 
to eight) with one containing another. The boxes ranged from a jewelry box, a toy box, a hook 
box, ..., to the 
family's game box -a wooden pavilion in the family's courtyard engraved by a 
fish pond and grows of'hanihoos (Figure I-2). 
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Figure 1-2: A sketch of this researcher's family `gante boxes' 
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A game of this kind, according to genealogical evidence, was handed down from ancestral 
generations in pursuit of training their offspring to grow better crops as well as preparing for a 
better life, although this researcher seldom Fully comprehended it at the time, in that he, having 
repeatedly demonstrated no ambition to he a farmer, was always overwhelmingly enticed by the 
gifts and pocket money rather than the game itself, ignoring that the game can he quite relevant 
to humans' professional lives. 
Ilumans are fated to live by loving boxes. For most people, life starts in one box and finishes in 
another; besides, people move from boxes to boxes day in and day out in such a (äshion that the 
man-built world is full of boxes or box-shaped things ranging from those as small as jewelry 
boxes to those as big as the rooms inside a mansion. In fact, this researcher had lived in each of 
the eight boxes of' the family house (Figure 1-2). Among the most till fn ettahle boxes arc: 
rooms two, four, six, and eight (please see Figure 1-2). Relore the age of eight, he had lived in 
the black-painted room one where he learned and practical, inter aliu, how to make and realize 
ýº dream o1' swimming; in the lake which is just (10/ens of metres away given that he had never 
been allowed to swim in it, II) to the age of 12, he had lived in the rccl-palinted -()Oil, three where 
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he learned and practiced most of his socialization skills by, among other things, inviting friends 
and school mates and organizing inter-village kids' warfare; at the age of 16 he had lived in the 
golden-painted room five where he learned and practiced achievement-oriented concentration 
and progress-oriented discipline by, for example, focusing on school work and developing wide 
interests ranging from machine-building, sports, colour-painting, speech-delivery ,... to 
entertainment such as fishing; by the age of 20, he had lived for four years in the sky-blue- 
painted room eight, based on which he learned and practiced how to expand as well as 
contracting his short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term dreams by, say, creating anew 
through imaginations and abandoning the unfit through rationales. Before he said farewell to the 
boxes in which he had lived for a substantially long time his "Shijieguan" (i. e. worldviews) 
about the nature of the world had already been formed. However, each time when this researcher 
recalls the old days his memory is always being refreshed with new reflections. 
From Figure 1-1 one can tell the Chinese boxes game remains a purposeful, principled, and 
organized investigation with an intent to find an ultimate end, and this is at least in parallel to, if 
not exactly coincident with, the definition of research - i. e. a careful investigation in order to 
discover new facts or information (Homby, 1995). Furthermore, the analogy between the 
Chinese boxes game and research reveals their similarity in that both contain systematic and 
organized attempts to achieve an end, the means for which involves a series of steps as well as a 
variety of reasoning skills. 
As the old saying goes, there is nothing worse than a thankless child, this researcher will cherish 
for ever his late father's style of cultivation and control which has greatly helped mould this 
researcher's worldview about life, nature, career and their interplay (e. g. in management 
research). It is to him that this researcher wants to dedicate this thesis, for his perfect fatherhood 
including, inter alia, his impeccable and dignified patience to play with this researcher for years 
the Chinese boxes game, the framework of which has served as a paradigm for the research task 
on which this researcher was embarked. 
Putting it bluntly, it is the Chinese boxes game that reminds this researcher of what counts as 
good research, as being viewed from at least eight perspectives (Figure 1-3): 
Qi-t. the researcher needs to be aware of the previously accumulated experience and 
knowledge which can possibly underlie the current "opening" act; 
Qt-2. the research itself must serve the purpose of experience and knowledge accumulation for 
the researcher himself or herself as well as for the society in which he or she lives as a 
whole; 
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Qt-3. the researcher needs to clearly identify three categories of research "boxes" (i. e. boxes 
opened, boxes to be opened soon, and boxes to be opened in future); 
Q1-4. the' researcher needs to generate some sound predictions which shadow the act of 
"opening"; 
Qi-s. the researcher must be aware of the variances between the "opened" and the "to-be- 
opened"; 
Q1-6. the research itself needs to be a medium which bridges the "newly opened boxes", the 
"old boxes opened" and the "the boxes to open"; 
QI-7. the researcher needs to have a set of clearly articulated criteria for performance; and, 
Q1-8. the research itself needs to involve purposeful procedures, available resources, useful 
methods and clearly defined disciplines which guide the research throughout the whole 
research process. 
Figure 1-3: Chinese boxes game and good research: the eight perspectives 
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The possible linkage among the above eight perspectives of good research demands that this 
research should cover 14 other major issues (each reflective of one chapter of the thesis), 
although the absolute number of them is not a big issue for it can be enlarged or reduced 
dependent upon how the research is framed and structured by different researchers (see Figure 
0-1). For instance, Q1-1, Q1-4, and Q1-8 jointly demand that it remains necessary to explore the 
nature of investigation and management research before one actually contrives his or her own 
research project. 
1 This means participants may have to turn to tools sucha s keys or screwdrivers if some boxes are locked. 
2 The reason why his father was always in favour of eight boxes was probably that this researcher lived in the eighth room and was nicknamed 
`Golden Eight'. 
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2. On Investigation: A Panoramic View 
2.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis aims to explore the nature of an investigation in the field of management 
studies, and it is hoped by this research that good understanding of the nature of an investigation, 
its processes, its connection to problem-solving, its operating strategies and techniques, its 
potential traps, and its commonly used rationalities will broaden the researcher's knowledge 
about research and contribute to the design of the study of this researcher. The exploration in 
this line will be initially focused on the nature and the process of an investigation, and extended 
to cover the link between investigation and problem-solving, before it finally discusses the 
practical concerns of an investigation. 
2.2 The nature of investigation 
2.2.1 Investigation at a glance 
Hornby (1995) defines investigation as the act of discovering and examining all the facts about 
something in order to obtain the truth. An investigation can be based upon hunches, experience 
and intuition, but most investigations in the domain of management studies remain the ones 
which possess a focused goal of problem solving and pursue a step by step logical, organized, 
and rigorous method to identify problems, gather data, analyze that data, and draw valid 
conclusions therefrom (Sekaran 1992). 
Thus an investigation in the domain of management studies is not only purposive in that it is 
always aiming at the accumulation of knowledge (e. g. Reaves, 1992), but also systematic 
insofar as findings are more accurately generated with confidence (e. g. Bechtal and Richardson, 
1993), and also rigorous to the extent that comparable findings can be found when independent 
research is undertaken on similar issues in similar situations (e. g. Robson, 1993). Meanwhile, an 
investigation in the domain of management studies is more objective than subjective (e. g. 
Singleton et al, 1992) in that, among other things, findings can become more useful in the light 
of problem solving in the real world. This suggests (e. g. Sanders and Pinhey, 1983) that the 
probability of drawing wrong conclusions from an investigation which is scientifically 
conducted can be much lower than that which is non-scientifically conducted. ' 
This suggests that an investigation in the domain of management studies refers to a scientific 
investigation, the essence of which lies in an organized and systematic process where problems 
are carefully identified, data scientifically gathered and logically analyzed, and conclusions 
objectively drawn (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). 
2.2.2 Investigation as a scientific approximation 
In real world research, however, not every investigation can be 100% scientific. Occasions do 
exist when a rigorous step-by-step process becomes disadvantageous (Hammersley, 1989). For 
example, an elaborate research design may prove too much of a luxury for a simple problem 
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which can be solved by past experiences; hunches may take over due to, say, exigencies of time 
or limited resources. 
It has been argued (Sekaran, 1992) that a scientific investigation enjoys eight hallmarks, namely, 
purposiveness, rigor, testability, replicability, precision and confidence, objectivity, 
generalizability, and parsimony, and that an investigation has become scientifically 
approximated when the purposiveness and the rigor of an investigation are ensured while the 
others are optimized. 
In practice, however, it is not always possible to meet all those hallmarks of a scientific 
investigation, in that comparability, consistency, and wide generalizability can be especially 
difficult to obtain in a research study that deals with subjective things such as feeling, 
perceptions, and commitment. (Sekaran, 1992). 
2.2.3 Investigation as a cyclical process 
The word "process" refers to a series of actions or tasks performed in order to achieve an end 
result (Homby, 1995). This researcher's industrial experience tells that an industrial process 
signifies the sequence of steps through which raw materials such as crude oil are transformed 
into a finished product such as gasoline, and most processes such as the oil refinery process can 
be repeated over and over again along the same lines from beginning to end. 
In the domain of management studies, by contrast, change is built into the process of 
investigation; the sequence of steps followed in one investigation is seldom repeated precisely in 
another; and the end of one investigation normally signals the start of another (Singleton, 1993). 
Figure 2-1 portrays the process of an investigation in which the space of ends (i. e. theories and 
observations) and the space of means (i. e. generalizations and hypotheses / propositions) are 
each of cyclical nature, and remain interwoven by virtue of scientific methods. In fact, human 
history exhibits that knowledge derives from a constant interplay between theories and 
observations, and the process of knowledge accumulation remains cyclical with theories 
abstracted from practice leading to predictions, predictions to investigations, and investigations 
to generalizations which have implications for new theory that serves for new practice (Denzin, 
1978). 
Figure 2-1: The cyclical process of an investigation 
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2.2.4 Investigation as logic reasoning 
Seemly, an investigation becomes a bridge between predictions which are deduced from 
existing theories and new theories which can be derived from previous predictions. An 
investigation may take place in the shape of description, explanation, prediction, or 
understanding, but the action which bridges predictions and new theories is in most cases 
scientifically carried out in a step-by step fashion via the use of reasoning methods (e. g. logic) 
aiming to find out the truth (Morris et al, 1987). 
As depicted in Figure 2-2, the space of means dictates-two major kinds of logical reasoning, 
both of which attempt to draw conclusions about the order of the empirical world on the basis of 
observational evidence. They are deductive and inductive reasoning with the former moving 
from general principles to particular instances (i. e. theories - propositions / hypotheses - 
observations) and the latter from the particular to the general (i. e. observations 
- propositions / 
hypotheses -) theories). 
It has been suggested (Singleton et al, 1993) that, in deduction (see Table 2-1), a valid argument 
is such that the conclusion (one proposition) necessarily follows 
if the premises (other 
propositions) are true, or otherwise invalid, and that, 
in induction (see Table 2-2), arguments are 
judged by their strength, as the conclusion (one proposition) probably but does not necessarily 
follow if the premises (other propositions) are true. 
Table 2-1: Deductive patterns of scientific explanation 
No. Validity Type Formula Practical example with regard to the research 
I Valid Affirming If p, then q; If firm A continues to invest after receiving negative feedback, then 
the p; firm A commits escalation; firm A does invest after setback; therefore 
antecedent Therefore q. firm A experiences escalation. 
2 Valid Denying the If p, then q; If firms B pursues de-escalation, then firm B has a de-escalation 
consequent Not q; strategy; firm B does not have a de-escalation strategy; therefore firm B 
Therefore, not p. does not pursue de-escalation. 
3 Valid Hypothetical If p, then q; If firm C makes use of strategic control, then firm C adopts strategic 
syllogism If q, then r; control methods; if firm C adopts strategic control methods, then firm 
Therefore if p, C has empirical data on them; therefore if firm C makes use of strategic 
then r. control, then firm C has empirical data on strategic control methods 
4 Invalid Fallacy of If p, then q; If investment D belongs to foreign direct investment, then it enjoys 
affirming the q; single proprietorship; Investment D enjoys single proprietorship; 
consequent Therefore p. therefore, investment D is a foreign direct investment. 
5 Invalid Fallacy of If p, then q; If firm E does not value economic rules, then firm E will throw good 
denying the Not p; money after bad; firm E does value economic rules; therefore Firm E 
antecedent Therefore not q will not throw good money after bad. 
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Figure 2-2: The logic reasoning context of an investigation 
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However, logical analysis is not concerned with actuality, and, therefore, logic itself does not 
dictate how an investigator should think (Teichman and Evans, 1991). Logic analysis provides 
the tools for analysis once an act of reasoning has taken place and this requires that both the 
validity of the arguments and the truth of the propositions must be justifiably established 
beforehand. ' 
Table 2-2: Two types of inductive reasoning' 
Item Inductive generalization Hypothesis testing 
The logic x% of the observed members of Confirming hypothesis: If the hypothesis is true, then the predicted 
p are q; fact is true; the predicted fact is true; therefore, the hypothesis is 
therefore x% of p are q. true. 
Disconfirming hypothesis: If the hypothesis is true, then the 
predicted fact is true; the predicted fact is false; therefore, the 
hypothesis is false. 
Practical 95% of the observed joint If the hypothesis that capital intensive investments are more prone to 
example ventures escalate commitment in escalating commitment than the labour intensive, then subjects in 
the face of financial setback; the field experiment under the former category will put 
therefore 95% of joint ventures significantly more funds in £ terms than those of the latter; the 
escalate commitment in the face 'capital intensive' subjects have (or have not) put statistically 
of financial setback significantly more funds in £ terms than the 'labour intensive' 
subjects; therefore, the hypothesis that capital intensive 
investments are more prone to escalating commitment than labour 
intensive investments is true (or false). 
Further Inductive generalization states It involves the formulation of a hypothesis, deduction of testable 
information something about the population of consequences from the hypothesis, observing if the consequences 
events on the basis of evidence on are true, and drawing conclusions about the hypothesis on the 
only part of the population, and basis of one's observations. The hypothesis is considered as more 
such generalizations are credible instead of being proven if it is supported by new 
strengthened by increasing the evidence, and the credibility of a hypothesis can be increased by 
number and heterogeneity of repeated and varied testing, especially when such testing 
one's observations and by limiting eliminates other hypotheses which may account for the same 
the scope and precision of the evidence due to the inductive nature of the argument underlain by 
generalization. the original hypothesis. 
2.2.5 Investigation as a process of justification 
It remains clear that both deductive and inductive reasoning can be employed, to study 
organizational phenomena (e. g. Reaves, 1992; Singleton et al, 1993; Sekaran, 1992). However, 
there is not a definitive, orderly procedure by which an investigation can follow nor is there a 
single agreed-on `method' in science at all (Popper, 1959). What does exist, especially in the 
domain of behavioural sciences, is a process of justification (Figure 2-3) as well as a set of 
principles, both of which are jointly used to generate and assess the evidence on which theories 
are based. Such a process is underlain by three key principles of scientific investigation (i. e. 
empiricism, objectivity, and control), and can be used to justify the conclusions derived from 
logical analyses (e. g. Reichenbach, 1951). 
Empiricism dictates that data are acceptable only insofar as they are observed or `sensed' in 
some way under specifiable conditions by investigators who possess intelligence and skills 
(Selltiz et al, 1976), and requires that the phenomena to be studied are observable and the issues 
to be discussed are empirically resolvable (Katzen et al, 1991). Objectivity purports that 
empirical evidence exists outside of the investigators themselves (Doherty and Sheinberg, 1978), 
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and demands that an investigation is described in detail with the logic and methods clearly 
outlined in such a manner that other investigators can evaluate or repeat the investigation 
(Singleton et al, 1993). Control posits that a set of procedures eliminating - as far as possible - 
sources of bias and error which may distort the results of an investigation have to be used in an 
investigation (Simon, 1978), and this bids for procedures which can effectively rule out as many 
explanations other than the one in which the investigator is interested as possible. Among forms 
of control are: employing several independent observers, withholding information from subjects, 
and employing instruments like systematic observational methods (Jankowicz, 1991). 
Figure 2-3: The process of justification 
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Control 
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Positivistic accounts see the process of justification in exclusively empirical terms (Bechtal and 
Richardson, 1993): the empirical evaluation of theories could be submitted to logical analysis, 
with the objective of specifying the circumstance under which a theory would be confirmed or 
disconfirmed. 
Nonetheless, no matter how convincing the process of justification is, the supporting evidence 
resulting from the process of justification, never proves or disproves a hypothesis, but merely 
increases or decreases the credibility of the hypothesis (Reichenbach, 1951). Moreover, the, 
practice of justification largely ignores, by means of pure abstraction, psychological processes, 
social contexts, and historical settings by which an investigation is actually enriched (Simon, 
1978). 
2.2.6 Investigation as a process of discovery 
So far, investigation has been arguably considered as a process of theory-using (Hanson, 1958), 
but it can also serve as theory-finding (e. g. Hanson, 1958; Simon, 1977). In fact, scientific 
investigation has been viewed as a vehicle for discovery in the form of problem solving and the 
process of discovery (Figure 2-4) can be explained in the terms which are used to explain the 
processes of problem solving (Simon, 1966). 
The notion that an investigation can lead to discovery acquires further support from the 
tendency for the process of discovery to be increasingly regarded as mystical or psychological 
rather than logical (Hanson, 1958; Popper, 1959; Newell and Simon, 1972; Bechtel and 
Richardson, 1993). For example, it is argued (Popper, 1959: 31) that `the initial stage, the act of 
conceiving or inventing a theory, seems ... neither to call for logical analysis 
nor to be 
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susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man ... may be of 
interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific 
knowledge'. 
This implies that positivistic justification is simply not enough, nor is it sufficient to explain 
theoretical relevance in that theory confirmation or disconfirmation involves more than simple 
considerations of empirical adequacy (Hughs, 1990). For example, empirical data can be 
reconciled with a favoured theory by a variety of ad hoc devices; empirical data can have 
ambiguous relevance prior to the discovery of an appropriate theory; and empirical data may be 
conceived as irrelevant even when it cannot be reconciled with a favoured theory (Mills and 
Huberman, 1984). 
Figure 2-4: The process of discovery 
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Therefore, to comprehend the process of the discovery (of facts, theories or insights) as it occurs 
in scientific practice demands a careful look into how humans solve problems (Simon, 1972). It 
means that what may remain important throughout the process of discovery is not only the 
context of justification, but also the context of others (Simon, 1966). Broadly speaking, the 
potentially relevant contexts can include psychological, empirical, practical, social, theoretical, 
historical, and technological (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). 
The above discussion illustrates that the process of justification and the process of discovery are 
not the same thing (Nickles, 1987). However, the distinction between the process of discovery 
and the process of justification remains rather artificial (Thagard 1992) and, in practice, the 
combination of both consists of the so-called scientific practice - practical problem-solving 
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). 
2.3 Investigation as practical problem solving 
problem-solving refers to constructing a desired solution for a problem in a given domain 
(Kahney, 1993). The desired solution can be, inter alia, explanatory, descriptive, analytical, or 
applied; the given domain can be pure, applied, or behavioural sciences; in the domain of 
management studies, the act of constructing can involve varying aspects ranging from context, 
techniques, to procedures. 
Theoretically speaking, problem solving has been generally regarded (Newell and Simon, 1972) 
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as a constrained search for a solution in a well-defined problem space, which itself is equipped 
with all possible states. The problem representation consists of four basic components: a goal 
state to be achieved, an initial state at which one begins, a set of operators which define 
allowable moves within the problem space, and path constraints which impose additional limits 
on what counts as a winning solution, the latter of which remains a sequence of operations 
which leads to the goal state and conforms to the path constraints (Figure 2-5). 
Practically speaking, for example, to explain an organizational phenomenon is to incorporate a 
sufficient number of variables in the full organizational context, to evaluate the constraints on 
the value of those variables, and to find the dynamic laws which are functions of those variables, 
insofar as it becomes possible to predict future states of affairs from descriptions of the universe 
at an earlier time (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). However, such an attempt at explaining what 
does and what does not happen in organizations remains a rough approximation at best in the 
absence of detailed, domain-specific restrictions. Thus problem solving evolves into structuring 
a process of the finding of variables and laws sufficient to explain the phenomenon (Philips and 
Pugh, 1987). 
Figure 2-5: Basic components of problem representation 
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2.3.1 Investigation as practical problem solving: the structure 
An important part of real world problem-solving is, often enough, imposing an appropriate 
structure on the problem (Newell and Simon, 1972). Whether well or 
ill-defined, there must be 
some means for restricting the relevant search space. One plausible way to 
do this is by 
imposing some restrictions concerning possible solutions (Kahney, 1993). That is, an 
investigator may limit the number of variables, assuming only some will make a significant 
difference. 
Limiting the relevant variables and imposing assumptions about the form of relevant laws are 
procedures for attacking problems (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993), and the procedure (which 
is 
regarded as incorporating a set of assumptions about the task domain) will fail when the 
simplifying assumptions about the task domain are not met. 
Limiting the relevant variables and imposing assumptions about the form of relevant laws also 
describe partial solutions (Newell and Simon, 1972). This suggests that heuristic assumptions 
used in constructing explanatory models would be critical in developing research programmes. 
But, on the other hand, heuristic assumptions also raise the prospect that an investigation is 
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misguided and its results are simply artefacts of the simplifying assumptions which define the 
problem (Kahey, 1993). 
In general, a more domain-specific model incorporates assumptions about the domain which are 
restrictive and consequently more powerful (Newell and Simon, 1972). For the range of cases 
which are defined by such assumptions, the model will be more efficient. On the other hand, a 
more general model which incorporates less restrictive assumptions about the domain, will be 
less powerful. The rationale for this lies in the argument that problem-solving can be understood 
as requiring applications of specialized cognitive skills and information (Mayer, 1992). Stronger 
assumptions will limit the search space more, and the more restrictive these assumptions, the 
more efficient they will be in attaining solutions, if they reach solutions at all; the weaker the 
assumptions, the more search will be necessary to reach a solution (Figure 2-6). 
Figure 2-6: The structural power of explanatory model in relation to the domain and assumptions 
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2.3.2 Investigation as practical problem solving: the process 
Human history exhibits that practical problems can be solved by both human effort and natural 
forces, and it remains axiomatic that human' problem solving is most likely to take place in a 
step by step fashion as can be seen from various theories or models describing the organization 
of activities. Current models of problem solving are mostly derived from the same source, the 
pioneering work of Newell and Simon on human problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972). 
They are all presented with a basically functional form, that is, in the form of a mechanism with 
several interconnected parts, each part serving a particular function. 
Figure 2-7 provides one of the models which is commonly used in the face of the fact that the 
theories of Newell and Simon are so comprehensive that their application becomes difficult, and 
that is the so-called IDEAL model (Bransford and Stein 1984) for finding a solution for the class 
of problems at hand. The procedure consists of five steps (Bransford and Stein 1984): namely, 
(a) identifying the problem, (b) defining and representing the problem, (c) exploring possible 
strategies for the solution, (d) acting on the strategies including the modification and the 
implementation of the strategies, and (e) looking back and evaluating the effects of the past 
activities in relation to the problem and the solution. 
It seems that the IDEAL approach to problem solving is simple but powerful. It helps ' an 
investigator to identify varying parts or components of problem solving. However, it remains 
undoubtedly not really ideal in that, for example, the boundaries between steps can be very 
fuzzy due to the model's severe lack of detailed specific restrictions. 
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Figure 2-7: The problem-solving process: an IDEAL approach 
(Adapted from Bransford and Stein, 1984: 12) 
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2.3.3 Investigation as practical problem solving: a paradigm 
It has been acknowledged (Simon, 1966) that in the absence of detailed, domain-specific 
restrictions, the solutions arrived at via a model remain rough approximations at best. This 
implies that a model is a model and it does not guarantee successful application, until carefully 
consulted (Newell and Simon, 1972) are other important aspects of problem-solving including 
the nature of the `programs' which an investigator follows in order to achieve goals (e. g., the 
context and the pattern), the ways by which an investigator performs tasks 
(e. g., the strategy and 
the technique), and the representation of knowledge about tasks and goals (e. g. the cognitive 
trap and the rationality). 
The Chinese Boxes game (see Figure 1-1) serves as a useful paradigm for understanding 
problem solving in real world settings: there are a finite number of possible gift 
boxes (e. g. from 
one to eight, or more), each consisting of a permissible gift location 
in each box (e. g. from one 
to two or three); the boxes define the problem space, and the finite permissible locations become 
the path constraints. A definite number of actions (e. g., one to two or three) at each round 
forms 
the operators. A goal state is arriving at the box which contains the gift. An initial state 
is 
starting the first box. A solution at any stage maintains a series of correct decisions 
from a given 
box terminating in finding the gifts. 
If a solution dictates at least a search through y boxes (y = 
Zb; ), and if there are x allowable 
predictions in front of each box (x = 
Ea1), then the number of paths will be x' Y. (In the Chinese 
Boxes game this author used to play (x=3 and y=8), there were 38 = 6561 paths). It will remain 
impossible for humans to carry on a search for alternatives given the fact that humans are 
limited in memory, attention and patience. This suggests that a model itself may be subject to a 
variety of constraints including that of humans and that of techniques. 
For example, the model can be reflective of the competitive context (e. g. only the winner of the 
game has access to pride), but it can fail to reflect the co-operative circumstances of the game 
(e. g. consistent mutual assistance throughout the game); the model can signify useful patterns 
for the solution (e. g. organized), but certain `gifts' such as flowers may be found in an empirical 
way; the model may dictate some promising strategies (e. g. adaptive persistence means victory), 
but it can fail to deliver its practicality (e. g. an unconscious physical absence from a specific 
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round may prove to be vital in the whole game); the model may assume that logic analysis 
dominates the game (e. g. deductive reasoning), but it can fail to reveal that mental enthusiasm 
can play a vital part in the game; the model can imply the rationality of the finding of the gifts 
(e. g. pre-set rules), but it can fail to realistically evaluate the actual performance (e. g. that which 
attributes to collective effort) 
2.3.4 Investigation as practical problem solving: the contexts 
Theories of problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) suggest that problem-solving can occur 
in varying contexts (Table 2-3), and what appears more promising for an investigation in the 
domain of management studies can be psychological, historical, empirical, practical, and social 
(Mayer, 1992). 
Table 2-1: Promising contexts in the domain of management studies 
Contexts Historical Empirical Practical Social Political Psychological etc. 
Practical context ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
For example, the psychological context may embody careful studies on human cognitive styles; 
the historical context may involve studies on the evolution of certain ideological or euphoric 
issues; an empirical context may cover hypothesis-testing involving both first hand and second 
hand data; a practical context may include actual events of individual or social practice; and a 
social context may concern studies on cultures or culture-specific knowledge. 
To consider the process of problem-solving in the psychological context specifically, one can 
argue (e. g. Johnson-Laird, 1983) that an investigation remains, at least in part, an expression of 
human cognitive style, a consequence of the typical strategies with which human beings tackle 
problems, and the cognitive limitations which necessitate these strategies. - In this sense, 
therefore, a solution to a problem is determined at least in part by investigators' cognitive 
capacities and limitations, and an investigation may eventually become a special case of human 
problem-solving, subject to all the contingencies of human problem-solving (Mayer, 1992). 
To make it more complex, practical problem solving can involve more than just one context 
(Mayer, 1992), and an ý example can be found in Scribner's (1984) ethnographic study of 
problem solving in a dairy where social, psychological and practical contexts are incorporated 
into an observation on a single managerial problem. Like a hindsight, for example, Scribner 
(1984) summarized that in the case of the arithmetic problem solving of dairy workers, 
cognition in the context of work appears to differ from cognition in less practical contexts (such 
as in supermarkets or on streets). 
2.3.5 Investigation as practical problem solving: the patterns 
In an investigation, different contexts of problem-solving can interact and may not be easily 
isolated (Newell and Simon, 1972), and this sophistication implies that a solution to a problem 
may take different patterns (Figure 2-8): organized, unorganized, empirical, or practical, etc. For 
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example, problem-solving can take place empirically, in that an investigation, for the most part, 
works within the framework of theories, from which hypotheses are derived, empirical data are 
gathered, empirical tests are conducted, and theories are modified or advanced. 
Figure 2-8: The patterns of solution to problems 
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Problem-solving can also take place by chance (e. g. serendipity) as occurred to this author most 
recently (i. e. the notion of China Mentality, Zhang & Wilson, 1995). The serendipity pattern 
(Merton, 1957) posits that unanticipated findings, which cannot be meaningfully interpreted in 
the light of prevailing theories, can give rise to new theories. 
A well-known example is found in the `Hawthorne effect' which posits that a worker's 
awareness of being under study has an effect on his / her performance (Roethlisberger and 
Dickson, 1939). It was an unanticipated finding of a series of studies which had been designed, 
planned, and carried out between 1927 and 1932 at the Western Electric Hawthorne plant in 
Chicago to determine the effects of various changes in working conditions such as method of 
payment and length of working day. 
All this suggests (Simon, 1966) not only that investigators should actually arouse their objective 
alertness to consider that the very conditions of an investigation can be both favourably and 
unfavourably affected, but also that in practice an investigator needs to nurture all the 
contingencies of problem solving so as to maximise opportunities for the accomplishment of the 
end results, and meanwhile to minimize inherent bias or errors in the design and implementation 
of the investigation, and interpretation of the investigation's findings. 
2.3.6 Investigation as practical problem solving: the techniques 
To find a way from the initial state to the goal state demands problem solving methods, and it 
can be taken as axiomatic that the use of different techniques can have different impacts on an 
investigator's performance (Kahey, 1993). In some cases, problem-solving methods can be 
regarded as fairly general in application; in others they are more specialized. Among the 
commonly tried (Figure 2-9) are (a) random trial and error, (b) hill climbing, and (c) means-ends 
analysis (Mayer, 1993). 
The random trial and error method requires that an investigator randomly choose among 
possible operators until the goal state is generated (Newell and Simon, 1972). However, this 
method does not seem to work well with complex problems in that it brings forth much wasted 
effort although it may become favourable when the investigator encounters unfamiliar problems 
or is under great stress (Mayer, 1993). 
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Figure 2-9: The commonly tried techniques of problem solving 
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The hill climbing method requires that an investigator continually tries to get from a present 
state to a state that is closer to the goal (Mayer, 1993). This method demands some state 
evaluation procedure by which evaluations can be carried out for how far any state in the 
problem space is from the goal state (Mayer, 1993); it is believed (Newell and Simon, 1972) to 
be more systematic than random trial and error although it can take an investigator to a `local 
high', a state in the problem which is closer to the goal than any adjacent state in the problem 
space. This implies that the hill climbing method would not suit problems which occasionally 
demand the investigator to move away from the goal in order to ultimately reach the goal. 
Means-ends analysis requires that an investigator always works on one goal at a time by setting 
a goal of creating the goal state or setting a subgoal of removing any barrier so as to directly 
achieve the goal (Kahey, 1993). This method requires a lot of goal setting. Among common 
questions an investigator can bear in mind are (Kahey, 1993): what is the goal, what is the 
barrier, and what operators are available for overcoming it? Means-ends analysis corresponds to 
human problem-solving characteristics; it is not as costly as the random trial and error method, 
nor as short-sighted as the hill climbing method; it still enjoys the simplicity of random search 
as well as the order of hill climbing. 
It is believed (Kahney, 1993) that means-ends analysis is one of the most powerful problem 
solving methods and becomes especially useful in complex problems involving considerable 
amount of knowledge. However, means-ends analysis may not always be the best way of 
solving particular problems such as those in which the seemingly most plausible or direct way is 
actually a dead lane (Mayer, 1993). In this sense, different methods can be complementarily 
employed, and the selection of specific methods can be situation dependent (i. e. dependent upon 
the task itself, the resources available, and especially the strategy to adopt in the course of the 
investigation (Bransford and Stein, 1984)). 
2.3.7 Investigation as human problem solving: the general strategy 
Strategy remains the science and art of effectively combining all the resources available for the 
pursuit of an ultimate end (Richardson, 1944), and a strategic way to deal with sophisticated 
situations is to analyze the complicated problem in a systematic fashion (Mayer, 1993). Three 
general strategies (Figure 2-10) have been suggested to deal with complex or ill-defined 
problems in an investigation, and they are (a) breaking a problem into parts (Newell and Simon, 
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1972), (b) working backward (Kahey, 1993), and (c) using a specific case (Bransford and Stein, 
1984). The three general strategies all remain simple and constructive, although they are also 
relatively weak in that they provide little guarantee that problems will actually be solved. 
Figure 2-10: The general strategies of human problem solving . 
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For example, a complex or ill-defined problem can be broken into simpler ones so that each can 
be clearly defined and represented; working backward can be a good strategy to use when the 
end state of a problem is clear but the beginning state is not clear; performing experiments or 
establish scaled models which simulate certain characteristics of a real world environment can 
promote the work of the complex whole. 
To relate investigations to insight-seeking, an investigator can correlate strategies for the 
investigation with its explanatory, exploratory, descriptive, applied, analytical or predictive 
purposes (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983). For example, to search for insights is likely, to serve for 
future investigation such as in the case of exploratory studies or more likely to explain, as in 
explanatory studies, why certain behaviours occur within organisations. 
To consider explanatory problem-solving (i. e. the purpose) in a psychological frame (i. e. the 
context), for example, one may seek an approximation of human cognition by robustly looking 
at (a) how an explanatory task could be conceived, (b) how the problem could be represented, (c) 
how conceptual and technical tools could be contrived, (d) how the influence of the framing of 
the problem on the resulting theories or insights could be controlled, (e) what preparation could 
be done, (f) what explanatory methods could be employed, (g) why certain tactics are used, (h) 
how explanatory strategies could be fine-tuned in the face of revised representation of the 
problem, (h) how the execution of the task can be affected by the explanatory methods and 
tactics, and (i) what analytical tools can be used to construct explanations (Mayer, 1993). 
2.3.8 Investigation as human problem solving: the specific strategy 
Von Clausewitz (1962b) once commented on strategy that `the best strategy is always to be very 
strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point. ' The general strategy for problem-solving 
tends to work well with well-defined problems in that an investigator can rely on the relevant, 
previously established work of others or even of his / her own. 
However, human history has never been short of cases in which the problem space is ill-defined. 
For example, the criteria for identifying a correct solution to a problem of interest may seem 
ambiguous; and the means for attaining a specific purpose may appear to be vague. In the face 
of such ambiguity, the general strategy which incorporates different contexts and different 
purposes may prove inappropriate, and thus specific strategies should be consulted, especially 
when the problem space is unambiguously defined. 
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One way of coping with ill-defined problems is to conduct a hierarchical analysis into functional 
components with specific sub-functions (Simon, 1969; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). This, as 
can be seen from Figure 2-11, has been termed decomposition which allows the subdivision of 
the explanatory task so that the task becomes manageable and the system intelligible, and 
localization which identifies different activities proposed in task decomposition with, the 
behaviour or capacities of specific components (Simon, 1969). 
Figure 2-11: The specific strategies of human problem solving 
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Decomposition is usually carried out by assuming that there are but a small number of 
subordinate functions which together result in the behaviour one is studying and that they are 
minimally interactive (Simon, 1969). Since the extent to which the assumption of 
decomposability is realistic cannot be known at the outset, decomposition may lead to erroneous 
explanations, or result in the understanding of the complex systems. However, the failure of 
decomposition is often more enlightening than its success in that the failure actually gives rise to 
the discovery of additional important influences on the phenomenon of interest (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 1993). 
Localization is normally carried out by either directly identifying the. physical parts of the 
system in which one can localize different component functions, or 
by first confirming that there 
are such parts with the help of functional tools and then localizing the component 
function 
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). However, one need not assume that a single part is a spatially 
contiguous unit, but localization does demand a realistic use of appropriate techniques to show 
that something is performing each of those component functions (Simon, 1969). 
In essence, to decompose a problem is to impose an assumption about the nature of the system 
the activities of which an investigator aims to explain: the system is assumed to be 
decomposable and each component operates primarily, according to its own intrinsically 
determined principles (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). To localize a problem is to presuppose 
that the components of the decomposable system can be subjected to separate investigation and 
that the components have discrete intrinsic functions intelligible in isolation (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 1993). 
Forms of decomposable systems include (a) the aggregative system which indicates a simply 
decomposable system in which system behaviour is a linear or aggregative function of 
component behaviour (Levins, 1970) and (b) the composite system which itself is composed of 
component systems in which the behaviour of parts is intrinsically determined and integrated 
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systems in which systematic organization is significantly involved in determining constituent 
functions (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). 
Forms of localization include (a) direct localization which indicates that a single component 
within the system remains responsible for some range of phenomena exhibited by the system, 
and (b) indirect localization which indicates that an investigator has to localize a set of 
component functions and assume that linear interaction explains the behaviour of the system 
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). 
One of the strengths of decomposition and localization as a problem-solving strategy lies in the 
fact that it facilitates an increasingly realistic representation of the explanatory domain even 
when the initial representation is seriously distorted: failures of localization can be as revealing 
as successes (Simon, 1969). One of the weaknesses of decomposition and localization as a 
problem-solving strategy lies in the fact that the separation of systems into isolated components, 
with the attendant minimization of interactive importance, ' may blind an investigator to the 
importance of systematic interaction (Simon, 1969). 
2.4 Towards the reality of an investigation 
2.4.1 Investigation as human problem solving: the cognitive traps 
An investigation has been regarded as a cyclical process involving human cognition, and the 
animated dynamic is well reflected in the Chinese Boxes game (please see Figure 1-1) in that 
the consequence reflects at least in part the cognitive realization of the strategy with which an 
investigator attacks problems (e. g. tit-for-tat). This indicates nothing but that an investigation is 
subject to the investigator's cognitive capacities and limitations. Thus, it becomes unsurprising 
that problem-solving in practice evolves into cognitive problem solving which is surrounded by 
internal, external, social and psychological contingencies (Mayer, 1993). In other words, an 
investigation can be haphazardly ruined by cognitive limitations. 
Among possible cognitive traps (Table 2-4) are that (a) an investigator may tend not to conduct 
exhaustive searches even when it is feasible and simple to do so (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), 
(b) that an investigator may tend not to operate with axiomatized structures but just to search the 
consequence set for confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses (Wason, 1966), (c) that an 
investigator may tend to favour pattern matching rather than analysis and deduction (Cartwright, 
1983), (d) that even a statistically sophisticated investigator may tend to violate fundamental 
rules of probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), and (e) that an investigator may tend to 
guide an investigation by heuristics with local applications (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Table 2-2: Cognitive traps in relation to problem solving 
1. An investigator may tend to guide an investigation by heuristics with local applications 
2. An investigator may tend to favour pattern matching rather than analysis and deduction 
3. Even a statistically sophisticated investigator may tend to violate fundamental rules of probability 
4. An investigator may tend not to conduct exhaustive searches even when it is feasible and simple to do so 
S. An investigator may tend not to operate with axiomatized structures but just to search the consequence 
set for confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses 
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2.4.2 Investigation as human problem solving: towards rationality 
Philosophers of sciences, like most epistemologists, normally present their endeavours 
normatively (such as the eight hallmarks of a scientific investigation), but positivist analysis as 
discussed previously maintains necessary but insufficient to rationalize explanations in the face 
of human reasoning (Teichman and Evans, 1991). Thus what constitutes an adequate scientific 
explanation and what remains necessary for scientific justification, independent of limitations on 
decision-making or decision-makers, becomes important in assessing the validity of the 
resulting explanations (Hughs, 1990). 
It becomes acceptable that one simply cannot decide what it is right to do by what is actually 
done (Patton, 1987). To avoid this, one can either settle for a description of actual practice, or 
adopt utopian norms. The former heads for historical relativism by regarding normative 
standards as themselves constituted by particular theories and research traditions; the latter 
comes closer to historical idealism by ignoring the theorists and research traditions. The two 
extremes both enjoy some advantages but neither appears practical. 
Seemingly, a practical approach to take account of the reality of rationality for insight-seeking is 
the one which not only insists on standards which are contextually realistic but also admits a 
distinction between these standards and actual performance (Morris et al, 1987). Such an 
approach can be found in the unbounded systems rationality (Mitroff, 1993) which postulates 
that the rationality for modelling, representing, or solving a problem should contain both 
considerations of conventional logic and rationality, and considerations (with regard to both 
standards and actual performance) of justice and fairness as perceived by various social groups 
and those of personal ethics or morality as perceived by distinct persons. 
Practically speaking, one can actually describe the strategy he or she uses while being clearly 
aware of its limitations; one can evaluate actual performance and the strategy by simultaneously 
and ethnographically identifying the context (e. g. technical, organizational, or personal) where it 
succeeds and where it fails; and one can reveal which context constraints (e. g. technical lead, 
objectivity, culture, charisma, intuition, leadership, or operating assumptions) are sufficient and 
which are not. 
Historically, it remains a natural consequence of a shift away from abstract models of rationality 
to ones which are sensitive to a demand for realism (Selltiz et al, 1976; Mitroff, 1993). If 
rationality is to be understood in terms of problem-solving capacities and skills, then insofar as 
human problem-solving capacities and skills are specialized to particular task domains, 
rationality should be understood as a matter of the application of specialized abilities. This 
application, in turn, is a matter of incorporating assumptions about the structure of the domain 
under investigation (Hughs, 1990). 
2.4.3 Investigation as a compromise between ideal and reality 
Given the fact that scientific models of investigations unify and guide the activities of an 
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investigation, an investigation in practice can still easily fall short of the ideal in that the ideal 
simply does not always match the reality (Zhang, 1988). Thus, it is worth mentioning some of 
the more important realities of an investigation, especially those which appear more relevant in 
an organizational context. 
The first reality lies in the fact that theoretical knowledge may not be well developed in the very 
area in which an investigation is carried on (Jankowitz, 1991). For example, instead of being a 
set of interrelated propositions from which testable hypotheses can be deduced, theories may 
refer to varying sorts of speculative ideas which are offered as explanations for phenomena. 
Moreover, there are occasions existing from time to time when theories and hypotheses are even 
interchangeable. 
The second reality lies in that scientific predictions are seldom exactly confirmed in that there is 
always some degree of ambiguity (Robson, 1993). This suggests that it could be wasteful for 
theories to make precisely accurate predictions so as to be judged as scientifically useful. In 
practice, compelling theories can be evaluated and compared not only in terms of the accuracy 
of their predictions but also with respect to their explanatory scope and logical coherence. 
The third reality lies in the fact that it is unavoidable that theoretical models can foster distorted 
impression about the practice of investigation (Singleton et al, 1993). This implies that 
investigations seldom, proceed along a smooth and steady path from theory to hypothesis to 
observation to generalization, and so on. For example, an investigator may begin with a 
theoretic deduction and carry on to test it, or begin with a problem from everyday life and carry 
on to make an educated guess about a suspected relationship and then to investigate the 
relationship, but end up with revising the original theory or idea, testing a new theoretical 
deduction or formulating a new hypothesis, and so forth. 
The fourth reality lies in the ever-changing nature of the process of an investigation (Wallace, 
1971). For example, the process itself may occur quickly or slowly, formally or informally, self- 
consciously or unselfconsciously, rigorously or intuitively; it can involve the effort from one to 
many investigators (e. g. principal investigator, research director, interviewer, methodologist, 
statistician, etc. ); and it can derive from investigator's imagination or actual facts. This suggests 
that to carry out an investigation demands not only commitment but also imagination and 
insights (especially around themes such as the development of theory, the formulation of 
hypotheses / propositions, and the application of methods). An investigation could be 
tremendously delectable, or extremely miserable, or even both of them over time. 
The fifth reality lies in the fact that human perversity and subjectivity are inherent in 
investigations (Kuhn, 1962). This is because it is not possible for an investigator to remain 
detached and impartial in observing the world, thus the investigator's intensive commitment 
may naturally facilitate the overlooking or the rejection of evidence which is contrary to his/her 
own ideas. According to Kuhn (1962), humans have so far witnessed numerous cases in which 
the major theories tyrannize over much contradictory evidence until a prolonged scientific 
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revolution -occurs. For example, the deviations in the orbit of Mercury were observed and 
recognized, but largely ignored before the advent of the theory of relativity. 
The sixth reality lies in the fact that the appropriateness of the positivist approach upon which 
most western investigations are based is under severe attack (Hughs, 1990). The main argument 
is that it is simply impossible to exterminate completely the influence of individual values and 
biases, despite scrutiny or scepticism from the scientific community fostering objectivity 
The major rival which challenges positivism goes to the phenomenological school of thought 
(e. g. Gurwitsch, 1974) which posits that investigations dealing with human beings should aim to 
understand human behaviour from the subject's frame of reference only in that the objects of the 
investigations interpret and act on their own interpretations of the world. This implies that if an 
investigator seeks to identify the external causes of phenomena under a positivist framework, his 
or her interpretations of the phenomenal world would be bound to be erroneous. 
Other contenders include critical theory (e. g. Agger, 1991) which declares that investigations 
well reflect an investment in the status quo and fail to promote change, historicism (e. g. Gergen, 
1973) which disavows the possibility of general laws to the extent that observed regularities are 
always tied to time and space, and the discourse school (e. g. Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987) 
which emphasizes that language actually structures and limits knowledge. 
2.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
In conclusion, an investigation is, by and large, a scientific approximation; a cyclical logic 
reasoning process; a process of justification; a process of discovery; a process of practical 
problem solving with structures, contexts, patterns, techniques, and general and specific 
strategies; a process of human problem-solving featuring cognitive traps and rationalities; and a 
compromise between ideal and reality. 
The generic linkage between Chinese boxes games and practical problem solving highlights that 
what contribute to the success of an investigation can include more than the physical activities 
of an investigator and can involve more than one method. Thus, it remains necessary for any 
investigators who are engaging themselves in doing research to broaden their methodological 
considerations before they plan, implement, and control their research projects. 
' This is because non-scientific investigations ask questions which are not subjected to verifiable observations (e. g. philosophical ones such as 
essence, existence, or morality). 
2 if the argument by which a testable conclusion is deduced from a theory is invalid, it is, then, pointless to investigate the truth of the conclusion 
3 Technically speaking, both confirmation and disconfimiation of hypothesis ultimately entail probabilistic conclusions and it can be mistaken to 
infer that these two types of evidence enjoy an equal bearing on hypotheses (Salmon, 1973). In practice, given equally compelling evidence, 
disconfirming evidence tends to be more convincing than confirming evidence, in that the underlying logic argument of confirming a hypothesis is 
based upon an inductive argument (which is similar to the deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent, while that of disconfirming a hypothesis is 
based upon a valid deductive argument (if the hypothesis is true then the prediction is true). 
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3. Towards The Investigation Of This Researcher: The Prospect 
3.1 Introduction 
Having been greatly influenced by numerous leading researchers or theorists in such fields as 
science, psychology, politics, sociology, philosophy and economics, this researcher, while trying 
to remain innovative, intends to integrate existing concepts and ideas of others relating to 
investigation. The purpose of this part of the thesis is to build anew a few frameworks which can 
be used to facilitate the research of this researcher. It seems that there are four levels of 
methodological considerations which are worthy of attention in undertaking an investigation: 
namely, preliminary, intermediate, advanced and operational. 
3.2 Preliminary methodological considerations 
The investigation (i. e. strategic control of investments - an investigation into organizational 
commitment in the investment decision-making process: escalation, de-escalation, and strategic 
control) aims to be "purposive" (Reaves, 1992), "systematic" (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993), 
"rigorous" (Robson, 1993) and "objective" (Singleton et al, 1992), or in another, (summarizing) 
word, "scientific" (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983). The investigation is to be disseminated in the 
form of a PhD thesis. 
Based on this, the investigation corresponds with the belief that boosting methodological 
understanding of an investigation in a critical way can prepare an investigator for the 
"haphazard", "exhilarating", "frustrating", and/or "exciting" moments in the investigation 
(Singleton et al, 1993). Thus, the investigation is treated as a developmental stage of a "cyclical 
process" of the research of interest (Singleton et al, 1993). "Theory-finding" (Hanson, 1958) is 
as equally valued as is "theory-using" (Simon, 1977) by the researcher (Figure 3-1). The 
scientific approximation is consolidated by means of a "purposive focus" and a "scientific rigor" 
(Sekaran, 1992) as well as a good theoretic base and an interdependent methodological design 
influenced by the vision (Collin, 1989) that it is always best to use a variety of methodological 
approaches. 
Figure 3-1: The purposive framework of the investigation 
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3.3 Intermediate methodological considerations 
On the one hand, supported by Reichenbach-style (1951) process of justification, Salmon-style 
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(1973) logical analysis is employed to draw conclusions from empirical evidence. The research 
is underlain by Selltiz et al-style (1976) empiricism, Doherty and Shemberg-style (1978) 
objectivity and Simon-style (1978) control so that empirical evidences on which findings are 
based can be justifiably generated and assessed. Related actions include "research training" 
(Selltiz et al, 1976) and "debates among professionals" (Katzer et al, 1991), detailed "research 
protocols" (Jankowicz, 1991) and detailed "methodological descriptions" (Sanders and Pinhey, 
1983), together with "withholding information from subjects" (Sekaran, 1992) and using 
"systematic observational methods" (Jankowicz, 1991). 
On the other hand, "heuristic rather than logical techniques" are used to seek insights (Popper, 
1959; Hanson, 1958; Newell and Simon, 1972; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993); empirical 
confirmation or disconfirmation is viewed not as a means for proving or disproving hypotheses 
but as an "indicator of the credibility of the hypotheses" (Reichenbach, 1951, Simon, 1978); it is 
accepted in this investigation that the process of insight-seeking covers not only the context of 
justification (Hughs, 1990) but also that of other contexts which broadly include psychological, 
empirical, practical, social, theoretical, historical and technological (Bechtel and Richardson, 
1993); the challenge (Kahey, 1993) is also accepted that an investigation can be incorporated 
into the frame of problem-solving, and the common terms and conditions with respect to 
practical problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) are used to structure the process of finding 
relevant variables, the constraints on the value of those variables, and the dynamic laws which 
arc sufficient to explain the phenomenon of interest (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Philips and 
Pugh, 1987). 
In terms of implementing the investigating activities, much effort is to be made to continuously 
improve the quality of the investigation (Pike and Barnes, 1994). For example, effort is made to 
avoid or minimize cognitive traps, and its related actions include: to do a more extensive search 
for relevant literature (Kahncman and Tvcrsky, 1982), to operate with axionmatiied structures 
(Wason, 1966), to use different analytic tools (Cartwright, 1983), to explain findings statistically 
thoughtfully (Kahneman and Tvesky, 1982), and, to use heuristics critically ('I'versky and 
Kahnoman, 1974). Particular attention is paid to the constructing of possible causal explanation 
models (Figure 3-2) which may simultaneously satisfy a complex array of changing constraints 
Figure 3-2: An explanatory framework for the proposed investigation 
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(Mitroff and Linstone, 1993; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993): an explanatory framework for the 
investigation is hoped to serve as (though at best) a rough indication of the general categories to 
be included or exemplified in any causal / explanatory models, dependent upon the kinematics 
which constitute the phenomenon of interest. 
3.4 Advanced methodological considerations 
Limiting the relevant variables and imposing assumptions about the form of relevant laws are 
regarded in this investigation as applicable procedures for attacking problems (e. g. from Bechtel 
and Richardson, 1993; Newell and Simon, 1972); existing models of problem solving are 
constructively used as the preliminary framework which describes the organization of different 
activities (e. g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Brandford and Stein, 1984); the Chinese boxes game is 
employed as a useful paradigm for understanding and solving complex problems such as that of 
this researcher; it is accepted that problem solving can involve different contexts (Newell and 
Simon, 1972), and effort has been made to incorporate different contexts (e. g., psychological, 
historical, empirical, practical and social (Mayer, 1993) in an integrated way (Scribner, 1984); 
different patterns (e. g. the serenity) of practical problem-solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) are 
to be taken account of, although particular attention is to be paid to the organized, empirical, and 
practical ones (Merton, 1957); and the reality of rationality is to be taken account of by not only 
insisting on standards which are contextually realistic but also admitting a distinction between 
these standards and actual performance (Morris et al, 1987). 
Two major general strategies of human problem solving are to be adopted to analyze the 
complicated research problem in a systematic fashion (Mayer, 1993); through the correlation 
between strategies and specific research purposes (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983), the problem is to 
be broken into parts (Newell and Simon, 1972), and a specific case (e. g. field experiments) is to 
be used to deepen and specialize an inquiry (Bransford and Stein, 1984), in the face of a 
complex or ill-defined problem (Newell and Simon, 1972). 
Different tactics in relation to problem-solving are regarded as complementary (Kahey, 1993); 
the means-ends analysis (Newell and Simon, 1972) is considered as the main method to cope 
with the mainstream research; random trial and error method (Newell and Simon, 1972) is used 
to deal with the acquisition of resources; the hill climbing (Mayer, 1993) method is used to cope 
with the composition of the thesis. 
It is assumed, in the light of systems thinking (Mitroff and Linstone, 1993; Simon, 1969), that 
there are but a relatively small number of subordinate and minimally interactive functions which 
together result in the behaviour of the system - i. e. the theme this researcher is studying (Simon, 
1969); the system is accordingly decomposed into subsystems which are more manageable and 
intelligible; component functions are localized after identifying or confirming the functional 
parts with the help of functional tools (Betchtel and Richardson, 1993); it is presupposed that the 
systems may take the form of an integrated rather than aggregate or composite system with 
indirect rather than direct localization (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993; Levins, 1970). 
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In terms of structuring the investigating activities, the project is broken into eight parts each 
with subordinate functions (Newell and Simon, 1972; Ackoff, 1995; Mitroff and Linstone, 
1993), and they are (a) conceiving the research, (b) contriving the research, (c) controlling the 
research, (d) co-ordinating the research, (e) calibrating the research, (f) conducting the research, 
(g) collecting the research and (h) concentering the research (see Figure 3-3). 
Figure 3-3: A structural framework for the proposed investigation 
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3.5 Operational considerations 
This researcher, influenced by Simon's (1969) work on problem-solving, goes beyond, while 
falling in, the positivism orthodoxy, by establishing mechanisms of control over the whole 
process of the investigation insofar as `unavoidable ' bias and errors (due to empiricists' 
`admissible evidence only' mindset) can be minimized (Popper, 1959) and the `avoidable' ones 
can be as far as possibly controlled (Hanson, 1958). 
In terms of controlling the investigating activities, a simple control framework (Figure 3-4) is 
established to assure control over the proposed investigation by focusing on four aspects 'of each 
investigating activity: (a) the goal (or sub-goal) of the activity, (b) the plan for the activity, (c) 
the execution of the activity, and (d) the measure of the activity. This control model assumes 
that control can be carried out throughout the whole process of an investigation (Pike and 
Barnes, 1994), and that an investigating activity (both mental and physical) can be controlled by 
identifying the goal or determining the sub-goals of the activity, establishing the plans for the 
activity which are based upon assessment of the future and the availability of resources, 
executing the plans after mature preparations, and measuring the performance in comparison 
with the goal in the light of experience. 
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3.6 Conclusion and recommendation 
A brief account of the purpose, nature, procedure and control of this researcher's investigation 
has yielded four frameworks which are hoped to serve as a rough indication of the general 
research activities to be undertaken. As can be seen from the texts, Figures 3-1,3-2 and 3-4 are 
relatively straight forward and do not require much explanation. 
Figure 3-4: A simple control framework for the proposed investigation 
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The explanatory framework, Figure 3-3, however, can be problematic in that it can be deadly 
easy for an investigator to claim a cause for an effect without knowing that, by 
doing so, he or 
she has already relied on certain notions or beliefs which may be 
facts but may not be 
knowledge. In fact, for any model being aimed to serve as causal framework for a phenomenon, 
it has to satisfy both the kinematics which constitute the phenomenon of interest and a complete 
set of criteria which justify the causal-effect relationship. Therefore, 
it remains fruitful to 
explore, in a philosophical fashion, causation in reference to necessity, power, universality, 
uniformity and actuality, all of which have long been heated discussions among philosophers 
throughout the centuries during which civilisations have been incrementally cultivated and 
developed. In addition, a broader philosophical exploration in this line could also help 
disambiguate some research concerns such as Q1-1,4,6,7&8 (please see Figure 1-3) and 
generate some valuable insights about the principled ways of doing quality research. 
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4. Philosophy And Research: The First Principles 
4.1 Introduction 
In this part of the thesis, this researcher sets off to explore the philosophy of research in order 
not only to facilitate methodological disambiguation about this researcher's research project but 
also to raise some issues worthy of consideration as well as to highlight some meaningful and 
workable methodological considerations (relating to escalation, de-escalation and strategic 
control) derived from philosophic meditation. This research quickly treads over the nature of 
philosophy, intellectual authority, and various disciplines of philosophy so as to yield a clear 
understanding of the first principles of research, then it philosophically de-mystifies research 
processes, research methods, and cause-effect relationships, and finally, it highlights the value 
that philosophy can add to this researcher's research project in terms of proposition-like 
philosophic meditation. 
4.2 The nature of philosophy 
Since Socrates there have been many definitions of philosophy varying from style to style, and 
there are special difficulties about defining philosophy before one examines philosophical 
problems about definition in general (Honderich and Burnyeat, 1979). This is because 
philosophical questions hang on quality and typically start to assume an interminably circular 
quality by relying on so many other matters even before one can begin to see what an answer 
could be like. This indirectness usually disables one from knowing what kind of answer is 
required for a simple, inoffensive, and straightforward question such as `what is reality? ' 
(Wittgenstein, 1958). Thus, there is no unambiguous answer to what makes a question a 
philosophical question, nor can one be sure, with philosophical questions, what kinds of answers 
will suffice which, in turn, makes one doubtful about the character of the questions themselves. 
4.2.1 Philosophic thoughts: a review 
A careful study of great philosophers and their philosophical thoughts (Table 4-1) tells that 
philosophy remains the expression of debate - which has a very long history and can be traced 
back as far as Aristotle and Plato and as recent as Popper and Kuhn - about the most 
fundamental and general kind of things (such as reality, other minds, the nature of knowledge, 
matter, truth, morality and more) in such a special way that philosophic questions, though they 
can look simple enough, are not the kind of questions many professions such as physicians, 
psychologists, and economists can comfortably answer. For example, William James, as both a 
psychological behaviourist and philosophical pragmatist, could not have answered questions 
about `other minds' had he devised experiments to explore them. 
Table 4-1: Philosophy as chronologically demystified 
Philosopher Year Major interests, or contributions 
Socrates 469- Who philosophized about the nature and possibility of knowledge, especially knowledge about virtue. 
399 However, his thought came to us from the writings of his pupil Plato, who made Socrates the major 
BC protagonist of most of his works. 
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Plato 427- Who philosophized about knowledge, perception, grammar, paradoxes, and immortality and 
347 constructed the theory of Forms which is used to explain many things including the possibility of 
BC knowledge. 
Zeno the 342- Who philosophized about desire and held that one should reduce one's desires as much as possible in 
Stoic 270 that the objects of earthly desire remain only relatively good. 
BC 
Aristotle 384- Who philosophized on matters - which later became mechanics, metaphysics, ethics, and psychology, 
347 more or less invented logic, and invented the idea of a research programme by encouraging his 
BC students to collect material for him. 
Euclid 300 Who philosophized about methods, especially through the influence of his geometry. 
BC 
Peter 1079- Who philosophized about theology, logic, ethics and meta-physics, and was regarded as one of the 
Abelard 1142 most prominent thinkers of the age. 
St. Thomas 1225- Who philosophized about theology, and his work Summa Theologiae was intended to be a complete 
Aquinas 1274 system of theology. 
William of 1300- Who philosophized about logic, commented on Aristotle, and his famous dictum, 'Ockham's Razor' 
Ockham 1349 states 'do not multiply entities beyond necessity. ' 
Thomas 1588- Who philosophized about politics and Hobbes' theory of government posits that the king or other 
Hobbes 1679 head of state must be allowed absolute power because divided power can lead to civil war. 
Rene 1596- Who, also the inventor of Cartesian geometry, philosophized about methodology and his 
Descartes 1650 'methodological scepticism' has a great influence on modern thought. 
John Locke 1632- Who philosophized about other minds and politics and founded British Empiricism which bases 
1704 theories on experience. 
Gottfried 1646- Who philosophized about polymaths, invented a calculating machine, was famous for his dictum 
Wilhelm 1716 ' this is the best of all possible worlds', and held that matter exists but what appears as matter is 
Leibniz really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds. 
George 1685- Who was a British Empiricist and held that human ideas are fleeting and impermanent. A well-known 
Berkeley 1753 slogan of his is that to exist is to be perceived. 
David 1711- Who philosophized about causation as can be seen in his Treatise on Human Nature, and was one of 
Hume 1776 the three prominent British Empiricists. 
Immanuel 1724- Who philosophized about causation, and tried to prove that causal necessity rules the empirical world 
Kant 1804 and that freedom and morality rule the world of the human will. 
Georg 1770- Who philosophized about history and dialectics. He invented the conception of 'dialectic' and 
Wilhelm 1831 claimed that history remains a progression inaugurated by a dialectical clash of 'thesis', and 
Friedrich 'antithesis' followed by 'synthesis'. He is also the most prominent system builder in the history of 
Hegel philosophy. He argued that all knowledge can be systematically organized under the headings of 
Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind. 
Arthur 1788- Who philosophized about mind and reality, and claimed that the mind and the will are real but the 
Schopenha 1860 reality is bad rather than good, because desires and the will cause only misery and pessimism remains 
uer the only rational philosophy of life. 
John Stuart 1806- Who philosophized about education and suffrage and was best known for his works entitled 
Mill 1873 Utilitarianism, System of Logic, and the Subjection of Women. 
Karl Marx 1818- Who philosophized about economic history and radical politics, and claims that states and rulers are 
1883 instruments of oppression and the dialectical forces of history are material rather than a clash of ideas 
(Hegelianism). 
Williams 1842- Who philosophized about psychology and remained both a psychological behaviourist, claiming that 
James 1910 emotions are the perception of physiological changes and a philosophical pragmatist, arguing that 
beliefs do not work because they are true but remain true because they work. 
Friedrich 1844- Who set out to substitute traditional moral value with aristocratic egoism and to undermine 
Nietzsche 1900 metaphysics, logic, rationality as well as morality, claiming that all systems of thought including 
religion, philosophy and science are nothing but fraudulent attempts by various professions to seize 
power. 
Gottlob 1848- Who philosophized about meaning and introduced a complete system of symbolic logic as well as 
Frege 1925 drawing a distinction between sense and references. 
Edmund 1859- Who philosophized about phenomenology (which seemingly has little to do with empirical 
Husseri 1938 phenomena), initially presumed that the laws of logic remain merely psychological, but eventually 
embarked on the belief that phenomenology' actually means just a defence of 'the purity of logic'. 
Bertrand 1872- Who philosophized about logic and his Principia Mathematica remains a milestone in modern logic. 
Russell 1970 
Vienna 1920- The logical positivists consisted of a group of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers including 
Circle 1936 Morris Schlick, Kurt Godel, Rudolf Camap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Freiedrich Waismannm and 
Philip Frank, who believed that they were doing philosophy in a 'scientific' way and seemingly 
thought the point of philosophy in such a scientific way is to provide science with sound foundations. 
Simone de 1908- Who philosophized about feminism and her book The Second Sex became a fundamental work of 
Beauvoir 1986 modern philosophical feminism 
Singer 19? Who philosophized about experimentalism and his book Experience and Reflection became the 
Edward foundation of nonrelativistic pragmatism, which indicates that all knowledge of law implies 
knowledge of fact and all knowledge of fact implies knowledge of law. 
Alfred 1910- Who popularized logical positivism through his book Language Truth and Logic and is best known 
Jules Ayer 1989 with the concept of scientific verification pinnacled by the 'verification principle', which posits that 
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no proposition has meaning unless it either (a) pertains to mathematics or logic, or (b) can be verified 
by the scientific method on the basis of direct sense experience. 
Karl 1902- Who philosophized about science, and, with the invention of the falsification theory, he remains the 
Popper most famous thinker in science in the 20' century. His account of scientific reasoning holds that 
scientists formulate and then test 'highly falsifiable' theories in that every theory is ultimately merely 
a hypothesis and therefore permanently open to the possibility of refutation. 
Thomas 197 Who, philosophizing about science, became famous for his distinction between normal science and 
Kuhn revolutionary science, and claimed that what Popper and the like have described is not the real 
methodology of science but a fictional states of affairs existing only in the pages of textbooks. 
Roughly speaking, philosophy can be crystallized into a debate on two things: ontology and 
epistemology. Ontological questions are concerned with the kinds of things which exist in the 
world and epistemological questions are related to the character of humans' knowledge of the 
world. For researchers in the domain of management studies, however, it seems that 
epistemological issues remain more relevant, although ontological and epistemological issues 
are not unconnected in that ontological issues inevitably give rise to epistemological issues. 
Epistemological issues are about what are to count as facts, and closely relate to philosophical 
claims about the way in which the world is known or can be known to human beings, and 
clearly involves discussions about the nature of knowledge. That is, epistemology deals with 
how one knows certain things, how one knows things to be true or false, what constitutes 
evidence, what inferences one applies to evidence, and so forth. 
To illustrate, for example, one can turn to the Chinese boxes game; a person who sees the first 
(outer) box might assume that it is a container of material things such as books and toys, that it 
is a magic brand which brings about gifts or joy, that it is a box which contains other boxes, that 
it is a weapon to sharpen one's worldview, or so on. Now the questions lie in the person's 
knowledge accumulation in relation to the box: what kind of claim his or hers is, how can he or 
she be sure about the claim, what contributes to the claim (i. e. 
believing or seeing), and more. , 
Seemingly, it can be argued that no amount of individual beliefs or reasoning are sufficient until 
one opens the last of a series of boxes, but there are so many things which 
become simply 
impossible for humans to `open', to see visually, or to experience physically. Thus raising 
philosophical discussion in relation to the game of Chinese 
boxes may not have much bearing 
upon one's social, professional, or personal 
life, but it does not mean that philosophical 
questions are not important at all. 
4.2.2 Intellectual authority 
Philosophical questions, for example, may appear far from clearly relevant to the life of varying 
professions such as management researchers 
in that, at the root of the matter, philosophical 
questions are to be resolved by reasons 
instead of empirical enquiry, simply because the 
question of whether or not there are empirical facts cannot be empirically inquired. 
However, philosophical questions can be important as far as questions of intellectual authority 
are concerned in that varying professions do resolve problems on varying premises which are 
explicitly or implicitly derived from philosophical arguments. For instance, to make a 
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knowledge claim such like that the Chinese boxes are a magic brand which brings about gifts or 
joy, indicates a preparedness of whoever claims it to justify that claim by referring to ways of 
knowing such as methods, analytical procedures, authoritative sources, spiritual inspiration, 
experience, and so forth. 
This stresses that the reasoned nature of human knowledge has an authoritative status even if it 
may be subjected to its feasibility in that reasons may simply turn out to be wrong (Toulmin, 
1972); and this intellectual status is most likely to be represented by a framework which allows 
factual evidence and such like to be dealt with practically, although there is much evidence (e. g. 
the above-mentioned nine PhD theses this researcher had examined) showing that many 
professionals simply construct or borrow, and then, accordingly use a framework without further 
exploring why a specific framework is preferred to others and what is the nature of the 
framework. 
Philosophically, humans learn frameworks as humans learn about the world for they could be 
temporally correct but historically wrong, or contextually systematic but universally discrete; 
and thus, it becomes necessary for researchers to involve a critical account of the logical order 
of justification for the objectivity of certain forms of belief which might masquerade as 
knowledge (Quinton, 1973). That is, epistemologically, a researcher needs to find arguments 
against persistent scepticism, or to search for those beliefs upon which other sets of beliefs rest 
and can be justified (i. e. the first principles which themselves evolve historically). 
For example, in the seventeenth century, Descartes and Locke (see Table 4-1) posited that the 
principles of human knowledge consisted of three commonplaces (Tulmin, 1972): that nature 
was fixed and stable, that a dualism existed between mind and matter, and that (Cartesian) 
geometry remained the criterion of knowledge for judging all other claims to knowledge; this 
authoritative framework had guided how the world should be investigated until the invention of 
new non-Euclidian geometries which themselves were progressively challenged by new 
conceptions. 
This poses not only the issue of the relativity of the criterion of knowledge or, in another word, 
the sources of human intellectual authority, but also the issue that it is the first principles which 
have intellectual authority in that they set the context of debate within which varying theoretical 
schools, even within a single discipline (e. g. functionalism, teleologism, radicalism, rationalism, 
empiricism, positivism logical empiricism, logical positivism, criticism, symbolism, pragmatism, 
experimentalism, and corpuscularism), fight their disagreements and their selected versions of 
the world. In short, philosophical exploration remains of great importance in helping a 
researcher to understand what he or she is doing, why he or she is doing it, and what alternative 
ways can be equally applicable if not equally beneficial. 
4.2.3 Philosophy as disciplinarily classified 
Philosophy has been studied in at least two broad ways: analytic and continental. The analytic 
approach came down from Socrates (who normally began his discourse by asking for definitions 
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of the ideas of interest) and Aristotle (who usually proceeded by listing and discussing possible 
alternative theories and interpretations). The continental approach has been associated with 
Hegel (who often grounded his theses on the belief that history remains a spiritual progression 
brought about by a dialectical clash of thesis and antithesis followed by synthesis) and Marx 
(who consistently reasoned on the premise that the dialectical forces of history which consist of 
a clash of ideas are material). 
From the perspective of how people know, how people learn facts and laws, and the 
relationships between these, major philosophies can be divided into four classes (Singer, 1959): 
rationalism, empiricism, criticism, and experimentalism. 
Empiricism posits that all knowledge of laws implies knowledge of facts and some knowledge 
of fact does not imply knowledge of laws. The empiricists - who are best represented by the 
British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume - maintained that all our knowledge is derived 
from experience and that some facts depend on laws of inference but some do not. 
Rationalism posits that no knowledge of laws implies knowledge of facts and all knowledge of 
facts implies knowledge of laws. The rationalists - who are best represented by the continental 
philosophers of the 17`x' century such as Descartes and Leibniz - maintained that, in addition to 
what humans know by experience, there are certain `innate ideas' and `innate principles' which 
humans know independently of experience. The rationalists assume that mental laws are given 
and that the use of simple ideas and the laws can result in a complete deductive scheme. 
Therefore, facts depend on laws but laws do not depend on facts. 
Criticism posits that some knowledge of laws implies knowledge of facts and some knowledge 
of facts does not imply knowledge of laws. The criticists - who are best represented by Kant - 
assume that there are some laws (e. g. a priori sciences such as geometry, logic, and kinematics) 
which are given prior to any experience, and that there are also some laws (e. g. a posterior laws) 
which are generated as a result of experience. 
Experimentalism posits that all knowledge of law implies knowledge of fact and all knowledge 
of fact implies knowledge of law. Experimentalists - who are best represented by Singer, 
Churchman and Ackoff - maintain that there is no fundamental truth, that some laws have to be 
assumed in order to learn the facts, and that some facts have to be known in order to generate 
knowledge of laws. Experimentalism assumes a teleological worldview and holds that facts and 
laws are inextricably intertwined and remain inseparable. In essence, experimentalism remains a 
nonrelativistic synthesis of modern rationalism and logical positivism (Churchman and Ackoff, 
1950). 
To compare and contrast these classes of philosophies, one finds that the commonality among 
empiricism, criticism, and rationalism is that they all claim that there are some fundamental 
truths which are given to form the starting point of scientific inquiry; while experimentalism 
claims that there is no fundamental truths which is given and that truth is not the starting point, 
but the end point, of an inquiry. Experimentalism seems to be a modem synthesis of rationalism, 
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criticism, and empiricism (Churchman and Ackoff, 1950): for example, experimentalism echoes 
a modem rationalist notion that some knowledge cannot be proven but must be accepted on faith, 
incorporates criticist notions of `ideal pursuit' and of the interplay of observation and concepts, 
and accepts the modem empiricism notion that all scientific statements can be reduced to a basic 
thing-language, the predicates of which are taken to be directly observable. 
4.3 Philosophy and research: the first principles 
,ý 
Broadly speaking, research is carried out to discover something about the world by means of a 
method or a corpus of procedures vested with the power to produce knowledge about the world. 
Philosophy, on the other hand, remains a study which aims to solve ultimate, abstract and very 
general problems concerned with the nature of existence, knowledge, morality, reason, and 
human purposes (Russell, 1912). 
4.3.1 The first principles of philosophy 
It seems true that behind the veil of varying philosophies there lie the first principles which set 
the context of debate within which varying theoretical schools fight their disagreements and 
their selected versions of the world, but even those first principles have been challenged from 
time to time. Some of them have been outdated and 'some of them have evolved. However, 
among those most influential and still powerful are: 
The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions (Russell, 
1912): Every proposition which one can understand must be composed wholly of constituents 
with which one is acquainted. 
The principle of induction (Salmon, 1973): (a) when a thing of a certain kind A has been found 
to be associated with a thing of a certain kind B, and has never been found dissociated from a 
thing of the kind B, the larger the number of cases in which A and B have been associated, the 
greater is the probability which they will be associated in a fresh case in which one of them is 
known to be present; and (b) under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of cases of 
association will make the probability of a fresh association nearly a certainty, and will make it 
approach certainty without limit. 
The logic principles (Salmon, 1973): (a) suppose it is known that if this is true, then that is true. 
Suppose it also known that this is true, then it follows that that is true; (b) suppose it is known 
that if this is true, then that is true. Suppose it also known that that is not true, then it follows 
that this is not true; and (c) suppose it known that if A is true, then B is true. Suppose it known 
that if B is true, then C is true. Suppose it also known that A is true, then C is true. 
The principles of inference: ' (a) causation involves necessity (Mill, 1884), (b) causation 
involves power (Gasking, 1955), (c) causation is universal so that every event has a cause 
(Aristotle, 1962), and (d) causation is uniform so that like causes yield like events (Hume, 1951). 
The laws of thought (Russell, 1912): (a) the law of identity: `what is, is'; (b) the law of 
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contradiction: `nothing can both be and not be'; and (c) the law of excluded middle: everything 
must either be or not be. ' 
The general principles of science (Ackoff, 1962): 2 (a) the belief in the reign of law, and (b) the 
belief that change is in perpetuity. 
The commonly used laws in economic, fatalistic, facetious, and scientific disciplines which 
might or might not be relevant to conducting research (Pass, 1991)': (a) Gresham's law (i. e. 
`bad money drives out good') which dictates that when money of a high intrinsic value is in 
circulation with that of less intrinsic value, it is the inferior currency which tends to remain in 
circulation, while the other becomes either hoarded or exported; (b) Heisenbergs uncertainty 
principle which dictates that energy and time or position and momentum cannot both be 
accurately measured simultaneously with the product of their uncertainty being Planck's 
constant h; (c) Hooke's law which dictates that the stress imposed on a solid is directly 
proportional to the strain produced within the elastic unit; (d) Murphy's law which dictates that 
anything that can go wrong will go wrong; (e) Parkinson's law which posits that work expands 
so as to fill the time available for its completion; ' (f) the Peter principle which dictates that all 
members of a hierarchy rise to their own level of incompetence; (g) Say's law of markets which 
dictates that the supply of goods generates a demand for the goods; (h) Utz 's laws of computer 
programming which include that any given programme when running is obsolete, that a 
programme will, if it is useful, have to be changed, and that any given programme will expand 
to fill all available memory. 
4.3.2 Philosophy and the research process 
It can be argued that human discoveries, though many of which have been achieved in an 
unintended or accidental ways, have been accredited as if they arose through a research process 
involving the application of one or more methods, as well as a set of procedures vested with the 
power to produce knowledge which remains, in effect, collective agreements as to how specific 
versions of the world can be generated. 
To relate philosophy to a specific research project, one can simply invite answers on what the 
superiority is of the procedures and methods which are to be employed or, more fundamentally, 
on where the basis of their claim to intellectual authority lies. Apparently, researching a problem 
remains a matter of using the skills and techniques appropriate to accomplish a task up to the 
limits of resources, or a matter of finely judging the ability of a particular research instrument to 
generate the data required (Hughes, 1990), but this judgement which treats research methods as 
a technology can be open to mistakes which are derived from epistemological incompetence 
(Kuhn, 1962). 
Specifically speaking, the relevance of the epistemological issues lies in the fact that every 
research tool or procedure is an implied expression of particular versions of the world as well as 
an inextricable commitment to knowing that world (Hughes, 1990). That is, for example, to use 
a questionnaire, to take the role of participant observer, to conduct interviews, to employ 
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experiments, to measure the degree of escalation of commitment in terms of funds added to an 
ongoing project, or so forth, an investigator needs to get himself or herself immersed in 
conceptions of the world which permit these instruments to be effectively (but not necessarily 
efficiently) used for what is purposively conceived. This suggests that there is no technique or 
method which is self-valid in facilitating an investigation, and that the effectiveness of any 
method or technique is ultimately dependent upon its epistemological justifications: as a 
research tool, it operates only within a given set of assumptions about the nature of society, the 
nature of human beings, the relationship between the two and ways by which these can be 
known (Hughes, 1990; Hospers, 1967) 
4.3.3 Research methods as philosophically demystified 
It can be argued that science has been responsible for vast and far-reaching changes in human 
history. Although it still remains arguable whether the success of science is largely due to its 
method or methods, most modern scientists or philosophers would probably agree that, among 
the most vital methods are the use of observations and experiments. For example, it is usually 
held that intellectual progress occurs at times when scientists of any discipline conduct 
experiments rigorously and examine the results critically. Examples of this can include the 
Greek physician Galen's (130-201 AD) discovery of the structure of muscles by dissecting 
bodies. 
Historically speaking, methods which have facilitated the advance of science include more than 
experiments and observations. Theories have been formulated to explain experimental results 
and predicted future observations (Hempel, 1965; Popper, 1959; Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975). 
Hempel (1965) proposes that science is based upon the hypothetico-deductive method, which 
means that a researcher is supposed to begin by making and recording observations in whatever 
fields he or she is investigating, then to formulate a hypothetical covering law and, at last, to 
employ the hypothetical law as a premise in a deductive argument. However, Hempel's covering 
law model does not offer a complete account of scientific thinking at all (Singleton et al, 1993). 
It leaves out or minimizes the roles played by unobservable (theoretical) entities and does not 
seem suited to explaining particular phenomena which involve so many aspects that no covering 
law can be successfully formulated. 
Popper's (1959) falsification theory posits that scientists formulate 'highly falsifiable' theories 
which they then test, which means that researchers are said to spend much of their time trying to 
show that their own theories are false, that when all attempted theories have shown to be false 
except one then the researcher can conclude - at least for the time being - that the remaining 
theory is the correct one, and that every theory is ultimately only a hypothesis and therefore 
permanently open to the possibility of refutation. However, there have been a few objections to 
Popper's (1959) account of scientific reasoning. It is argued that it is simply impossible to test 
each and every theory (e. g. Teichman and Evans, 1991),, that the falsification theory cannot 
really explain why exactly it is that some theories are rejected as obviously false and not worth 
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testing at all, and that the falsification theory appears to rule out from science too much that 
scientists themselves want to keep in. For example, the doctrine that every event has a cause 
cannot be allowed to be falsified; even when causal descriptions seem to be inapplicable such as 
in the case of quantum physics, scientists say only that the ideas of cause and effect lack 
explanatory power. 
Kuhn (1970) suggests that there are two different varieties of scientific enterprises: normal 
science and revolutionary science. Normal science, according to Kuhn, does not construct new 
theories, nor does it test the adequacy of older ones; existing theories are simply assumed to be 
true and science proceeds by determining known facts or true facts with more precision, by 
researching unexplained happenings with the purpose of fitting them into existing theory and by 
solving small theoretical ambiguities. Thus, the methodology of normal science remains a 
matter of forcing nature into currently accepted frameworks. Scientific revolutions, though 
extremely rare, occur when existing theories turnout to be unsatisfactory. The triumph of a 
theory can be attributable to various factors which include its capacity for explaining unruly 
facts, its usefulness in solving problems and making accurate predictions, and the prestige and 
support of the inventor (Kuhn, 1970). 
Feyerabend (1975), concentrating on what Kuhn (1970) called revolutionary science, the 
enterprise which leads to the birth of new theories and the death of old ones, claims that 
scientists have no special methodology in that science has anarchistic features and has no rules 
of procedure which are used in all cases. It implies that the human mind is tremendously 
creative and it responds to intellectual challenges in ever new and unpredictable ways; even 
methods like observation and experiments can be inapplicable because what counts as relevant 
observation partly depends upon what theory an investigator is working with; new theories can 
force scientists to reinterpret their observations; and sometimes a new theory can be used in the 
absence of any supporting facts at all. Feyerabend (1975) also suggests that empirical 
observation can take precedence over theory, and vice versa. 
To conclude, one might agree that the best way to look at investigating methods is to see 
through Kuhn's perspective that there are at least two varieties of scientific activities (i. e. 
normal and revolutionary) and to act either revolutionarily (Feyerabend, 1975) by being creative, 
open-minded, and not especially rational, or normally by being a Hempelian, a Popperian, or 
neither. 
4.3.4 Causation 
A cause has been variously defined as that which produces an effect, or as the origin or trigger 
of something which happens, or that which explains why a certain thing comes into existence 
(e. g. Honby, 1995; Procter, 1978). Although the word cause may not crop up frequently in daily 
conversations, people do ask or get asked about why something has occurred? and then they are 
asking about causes. For example, when an investigator asks why escalating commitment 
happens in an organization, he is inquiring into the causes of the phenomenon. 
4-9 
Chapter 4 Philosophy And Research: The First Principles 
In general, it has been held among most philosophers that effects are events, that events instead 
of persons or things are causes, and that the ordinary idea of cause always refers to the idea of 
change in existing things, viz., causal explanations always indicate changes in, rather than the 
creation of, things. However, there is some ambiguity in the meaning of cause: things and 
persons as well as events and changes can be perceived as causes, in spite of philosophy, and 
this ambiguity remains at the root of some of the philosophic problems in relation to causation 
(Russell, 1912). 
For example, Aristotle (1962) held that there are four kinds of causes which jointly effect an 
action, and they are: (a) efficient causes which brings about changes, (b) material causes which 
are the stuffs in which changes occur, (c) formal causes which are the distinctive shapes or 
forms or properties pertaining to the final results, and (d) final causes which are purposes or 
ends or aims. Common sense tells us that (a) refers to what the word cause stands for nowadays, 
that (b) and (c) are archaic nowadays, and that (d) can be problematic, though may still be of 
some use in explaining behaviours. 
Specifically speaking, discussions about causation have focused on a few notions or beliefs with 
respect to necessity, power, universality and uniformity (Hume, 1978; Honderich and Burnyeat, 
1979). For example, it has been argued that the very idea of cause involves necessity (Mill, 
1884), that humans may feel that they have certain powers to bring things about (Gasking, 1955). 
It has also been argued that causation is universal so that every event has a cause (e. g. Aristotle, 
1962; Lloyd, 1968), and that causation is uniform so that like causes yield like events (e. g. 
Hume, 1951). 
4.3.4.1 Causation in reference to necessity 
Hume's (1951,1978) theory of causation, which explains away the element of power and 
necessity, posits that cause and effect remains: (a) a matter of an observed constant conjunction 
of events of one kind with events of another kind, (b) a matter of contiguity in space and time, 
and (c) a matter of that which cause must precede effect. For instance, Hume (1951) holds the 
constant conjunctions of similar events induce humans to expect that the same things can 
happen over and over again, viz., some particular event A causes some particular event B only if 
every similar A is followed by a similar B. In this sense, therefore, the idea of necessity (which 
humans cannot see or feel) refers to humans' induced expectation (which humans can feel), viz., 
similar effects are expected to follow similar causes; it also implies that the effects must 
necessarily follow the cause and that the cause has forced the effect to come about. Furthermore, 
Hume (1951) also holds that there cannot be causation at a distance, viz., causation demands 
that either the cause and effect (e. g. event A and event B) be adjacent in space and time, or that 
the space and time between A and B be filled with a causal chain of events in which one link 
adjoins another. 
However, Hume's (1951) theory has received severe criticisms. For one thing, strict contiguity 
(in terms of space and time) can be too exorbitant for the operation of cause and effect in that 
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causal actions can take place at a distance (Russell, 1917). For another, constant conjunction of 
events does not sufficiently leads to causation (Russell, 1917). For example, the fact that day is 
constantly followed by night does not show that day causes night, or vice versa; it is the rotation 
of the earth that functions as the external cause to both night and day. Moreover, there are cases 
in which a constant conjunction of events does not lead to causation (e. g. some conjunctions can 
be coincident rather than causal); there are also cases in which causation takes place without a 
constant conjunction of events (e. g. the arrival of the Manchu people caused the fall of the Han 
empire in China). ' 
Mill (1884) expands Hume's (1951) account of causation by first accepting the three conditions 
of constant conjunction, contiguity and the temporal precedence of cause before effect and then 
adding a fourth dimension, viz., that the cause and the effect must be constantly conjoined not 
only in actual circumstances but also in all possible circumstances. The justification for the 
fourth dimension lies in the objectivity that laws of cause and effect have to be discovered by 
means of experimentation or observation, and that the necessity of cause and effect must be 
different from logic or mathematics necessity, given that the conclusions of logic or 
mathematics are deduced from axioms and other premises from, which the conclusions 
themselves follow necessarily. 
Mill's (1884) approach becomes useful in that it insists on a more solidly-based constant 
conjunction and hence emphasizes necessity indirectly. For example, Mill's rules for 
experimental testing of causal hypotheses can help distinguish genuine cause and effect from 
coincidences and other sequences not representing causal regularities. Among the rules are (a) 
that experimenter should try to prevent the supposed effect from following the supposed cause 
insofar as to reduce the possibility of the occurrence of the supposed cause without the supposed 
effect following, and (b) that the experimenter should try to yield the supposed effect by means 
of other than the supposed cause insofar as to determine whether or not the supposed effect can 
possibly occur without the supposed cause having preceded the supposed effect. 
In short, the concept of cause consists of the concept of necessity. Necessity goes with events. 
Events as causes are connected with necessity which, in the light of Mill's refinement of the 
concept of constant conjunction, is itself reflective of the idea of uniformity as constant 
conjunction in all physical possible circumstances. 
4.3.4.2 Causation in reference to power 
It seems to be undeniable that ideas of cause correlate with the idea of power; observers feel 
themselves certain powers to bring things about. One can sometimes induce others to change 
their minds or their ways with regard to decision-making; one can turn things around by 
insisting on principles. All this suggests that the concept of causation may well involve power 
which enables human manipulations of events. 
Gasking's (1955) theory of causation proposes that causation is essentially connected with 
4-11 
Chapter 4 Philosophy And Research: The First Principles 
human manipulative techniques: the concept of the cause and effect has to do with the general 
rules which humans employ for doing things (i. e. recipes), and the cause and effect enjoys the 
`producing by means of ... ' relation. This suggests that, based upon the understanding that 
events (instead of things or persons) are causes, event A causes event B when event A itself 
either is, or could have been, a human manipulation. 
Critically put, Gasking's theory of causation may appear to be inefficient when it is used to cope 
with the complexities of historical events (such as the USA's escalating commitment in Vietnam) 
in that it can be extremely difficult to provide a recipe for manipulating human affairs, which, as 
they exist, remain hit and miss. On the other side of the coin, however, the inefficiency of the 
theory implies that humans observing complex events can be wrong in the first place to speak of 
the causes of the events or that alternative explanations may be needed.,, That is to say, for 
example, to effect de-escalation of commitment with respect to such complex problems as the 
USA's military involvement in Vietnam, as Gasking's theory hints, one should not focus 
questions about causes on how the USA could make de-escalation happen, but on how and why 
this de-escalation happens, because to make de-escalation happen largely depends on chance. 
In short, the concept of cause consists of the concept of power. Power goes with persons. 
Persons and things, along with events and changes, are all regarded as causes although persons 
and things are fundamentally different from events and changes. Moreover, modem thinking on 
causes still remains a hangover from Aristotelian thoughts so that purposes, aims and functions 
still count as types of causal explanation in many contexts; human control and manipulation of 
the environment also generates causes which can take the form of human ideas as well as of 
experience of the exercise of power. However, there is no room for the notion of power face to 
face with events and changes as causes: events and changes do not manipulate environments nor 
do they exercise power. 
4.3.4.3 Causation in reference to universality and uniformity 
Universality and uniformity, as principles of causation, have been taken for granted although 
they still remain simply unproveable. In fact they play a vital role in humans' actual reasoning 
which incorporates both induction and deduction (see Tables 2-1& 2-2). Induction involves 
collecting particular facts and then generalizing from those facts and appears not to be truth 
preserving in that the resulting generalizations pretend to be universal (see Table 2-1). 
Deduction involves drawing conclusions which follow with certainty from their premises and 
appears to be truth preserving in that the conclusion of a sound deductive inference is 
guaranteed to be true providing that its premises are true (see Table 2-2). 
This universality means that the generalizations which resulted from observed facts are applied 
to the past, the present and the future. On the one hand, generalizations based upon observations 
of facts often are true, as far as one knows; on the other hand, the truth of a finite number of 
statements about particulars (e. g. joint venture A got entrapped, joint venture B gets entrapped, 
and joint venture C is also getting entrapped, etc. ), remains compatible with the possible 
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falsehood of a universal generalization based on those particulars (e. g. all past, present, and 
future Joint ventures get entrapped). Because, no matter how representatively superior the facts 
are in terms of the number and the heterogeneity of the observations, collecting facts does not 
guarantee the truth of the resulting generalizations, once the latter of which become open-ended 
or universal; and this gives rise to the criticism held by many philosophers that inductive 
reasoning leading to universal generalizations can be unsound (Hume, 1951; Russell, 1912). 
This problem of induction lies in its attempt at predicting future events"in the light of a belief 
that the future will resemble the present because the present has resembled the past and past 
pasts had resembled past futures. Apparently, inductive reasoning can be very risky in 
circumstances under which the future may differ from the past. 
Russell (1912) pinpoints this problem as a dilemma, in which either inductive reasoning is 
circular (which is regarded as unsound) or it can be reduced to deduction (which is no longer 
regarded as induction), and outlines as well as criticising a number of approaches which 
appeared to solve the problem. Among them are: the `laws of nature', the `uniformity of nature', 
the `probability', and `reliabilism'. 
The `laws of nature' approach indicates that generalizations formulated by the `laws of nature' 
cannot be easily overturned and do not seem to be shaky. For example, the expectation that the 
sun will rise tomorrow is generated from the fact that it always has risen every day; and people, 
when challenged, may appeal to the laws of planetary motion (viz., the orbit of each planet is an 
ellipse with the sun at one of the foci of the ellipse; the radius vector of each planet sweeps out 
equal areas in equal times; and the squares of the periods of the planets are proportional to the 
cubes of their mean distances from the sun). However, Russell (1912) maintains that the fact 
that `laws of nature' have always held so far remains compatible with them not holding 
tomorrow. 
The `uniformity of nature' approach (Russell, 1912) insists that the reason why inductive 
inference is unsound is that it is incomplete, and that inductive inference could be turned into 
something similar to deductive inference which is truth preserving, by adding the uniformity of 
nature premise. However, to add another premise is to abolish induction altogether; the 
uniformity of nature premise is extraordinarily ambiguous in that it fails to state how uniform 
the nature is and what is to account as uniformity; and the uniformity of nature premise is more 
complicated in that the premise is not self-evidently true even if it is true and that there is an 
element of circularity remaining in the reasoning even when inductive inference has been 
reduced to deductive inference. 
The `probability' approach introduces a general premise about probability into the reasoning 
(viz., when something has occurred a certain number of times - e. g. N times - in certain 
circumstances, then there is a probability that that thing will occur again in the same 
circumstances). The probability approach imitates that of the uniformity of nature in that both 
supply the inductive inference with an extra premise. Therefore, it has flaws similar to those of 
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the uniformity of nature. Besides, the idea of probability is not clearly defined; and even if 
mathematical or statistical probabilities (expressed as percentages or fractions) are employed as 
the precise concept of the probability one still needs to know the size of the population so as to 
know whether the sample is typical and whether it is large enough to rely on. 
The `reliabilism' approach proposes that there is need to justify the belief that it is really 
possible to generate accurate predictions from experience, that the future is bound to resemble 
the past in many ways, and that induction, therefore, becomes a reliable way of acquiring 
knowledge. However, the reliabilists could not suggest which are the unreliable methods of 
acquiring knowledge if induction becomes the reliable one. This is because there is a 
compendium of all the methods, rather than just a method, which exists as well as appearing to 
be successful for the time being. Therefore, the reason why induction could not be given up lies 
in the fact that it is inconceivable to give it up for it is a compendium of everything. Furthermore, 
induction is not always reliable and historically it becomes so noticeable that many 
generalizations turn out to be false in the long run. Given that induction is a vague word, which 
can refer to any method of enquiry which is not deductive in nature, the reliabilities of an 
investigation have to be put in a comparative context: particular methods can be comparatively 
reliable or unreliable relative to one another, and particular investigators can be more or less 
reliable (successful) vis-ä-vis one another. 
4.3.4.4 Causation in reference to actuality 
Experience tells that life is full of surprises, and it no longer surprises experienced investigators 
that things which were thought to be connected are not connected. In actuality research can 
discover that certain generalizations are false: for example, there is a lack of connection or a 
certain generalization seems just impossible. This shows not that induction is a not reliable 
method but that investigators need to completely rethink their methods; this shows not that the 
universe is truly in chaos due to the perpetual nature of change, 
6 but that humans fail to discover 
uniformity. 
This can be further illustrated by linking causation with varying images of nature (i. e. mechanic, 
probabilistic, and teleological)'. In actuality, it has been argued (e. g. Singer, 1924,1959; 
Sommerhoff, 1950) that there are several kinds of relationships with regard to causation (Table 
4-2). 
Table 4-2: Causation in reference to actuality 
Image of nature The basis of the systems Is the preceding Is the preceding Functionality between events is 
event necessary? event sufficient? defined by 
Mechanical One natural mechanical Q Q Cause-effect relationship 
system' 
Probabilistic One natural mechanical Q p Producer-product relationship 
system 
Extrinsic Sets of natural mechanical QO Qx A set o producer-product 
Teleological function systems relationships 
Intrinsic Sets of natural mechanical Qx Q Two or more producer-product 
function system relationships in sequence 
The first is a cause-effect relationship in which a preceding event is necessary and sufficient for 
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a following event (Singer, 1924), and it is more appropriate within a mechanical image of nature. 
The second is a producer product relationship in which a preceding event is necessary but 
insufficient for a following event (Singer, 1959), and it is more appropriate within a probabilistic 
image of nature. The third is a set of extrinsic producer-product relationships in which a 
preceding object or event in an extrinsic functional class is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the following object or event (Sommerhoff, 1950), and it is more appropriate within a 
teleological image of nature featuring extrinsic functions. The fourth is a set of intrinsic 
producer-product relationships in which a preceding object or event in an intrinsic function 
remains sufficient but not necessary for the following object or event (Ackoff, 1971), and it is 
more appropriate with the teleological image of nature having an intrinsic function". 
4.4 The link between philosophy and management research 
In search of linkage between philosophy and management research, one can easily find that 
research is inextricably embedded in commitments to particular versions (or views) of the world 
and to knowing that world, because there is no method or procedure which maintains self- 
validation, viz., the effectiveness of any research method or procedure, at least from an 
epistemological vantage-point, ultimately relies on philosophical justifications. Therefore 
management research inevitably relates to a certain set of philosophical assumptions or theories 
about the nature of the world, the nature of human beings, the relationship between the two and 
how they can be known. 
4.4.1 The relationship between philosophy and research 
The relationship between philosophy and research has a long history, dating back to 300 BC 
when Aristotle invented the idea of a research programme shortly after his invention of logic, by 
encouraging his students at the Lyceum, a school he founded in Athens, to collect material for 
him. The development of the relationship bears some resemblance to the parable of the prodigal 
son: with research as the son, having been born and nurtured, rejecting its parentage, 
squandering its inheritance, only to return for refuge and succour when surrounded by crises. 
Indeed, there is much evidence showing that many management researchers (e. g. Storey, 1992) 
have been forced to look passively at fundamentals and especially the philosophic bases of 
varying disciplines of interest when tried and hitherto trusted methods no longer seem to justify 
the faith which has involved investments, when researchers have lost confidence in the 
significance of their findings, or when taken-for-granted principles no longer seem quite so 
obvious (Hughes, 1990). 
However, this does not mean that philosophical issues are only useful in periods of intellectual 
crisis. Indeed, philosophy (as the search for knowledge and understanding of the nature and 
meaning of the universe and of human life (Honby, 1995)) can tremendously affect one's 
research in terms of thinking, reasoning and discovery: failure to think through philosophical 
issues such as the relationship between data and theory can seriously (while not necessarily 
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fatally) affect the quality of the research (Silverman, 1985); and philosophically sound 
researchers can simply emulate themselves or others by proactively examining, seeking support 
from, or even invoking ideas from the basic principles insofar as their inquiries can be 
significantly improved (Wittgenstein, 1958). For example, Marx's research into Ricardo's 
economics was deeply influenced by Hegel's philosophy (e. g. Phenomenology of Spirit), 
innovatively armed with which Marx had generated some penetrating insights into English 
nineteen-century capitalism. 
Seemingly, philosophy is concerned with problems which are `ultimate, abstract, and very 
general' (Teichman and Evans, 1991) and management research remains a study of specific 
problems which need a solution (Sanders and Pinhey, 1983), but the relationship between 
philosophy and management research heavily involves, inter alia, the dimension of application 
of philosophy in research. Specifically speaking, for example, philosophical understanding can 
prove very useful for undertaking management research in that it can help clarify research 
designs, recognize workable designs, and create new designs (Smith et al, 1991). 
In short, research mirrors an investigator's philosophical view about the world (Britton and 
McCallion, 1994), in that all mental or physical activities to be incurred in research (e. g. the 
goal, the plan, the execution, and the measure of research) are reflective of the investigator's 
worldview about, say, which methods are more or less workable, which data to collect, how 
evidence is interpreted, and which out-of-past-experience designs are employable, etc. 
4.4.2 The value of philosophy to research 
To examine whether philosophy is relevant to management research is to ask whether 
philosophy is valuable in resolving real life problems in that research itself is a real life problem 
looking for a solution (Newell and Simon, 1972). The answer is positive in several ways. First, 
philosophy helps disambiguate research questions and disambiguation is practically useful in 
solving problems; second, philosophy helps analyze complex ideas and the clarification of 
complex ideas gives rise to rational decisions; third, philosophy helps explain possible abstract 
things such as value, rationality, and commitment, which in turn can facilitate improved 
understanding of the problem; and fourth, philosophy helps raise questions new and old alike, 
which may bring about more rigor to problem-solving. 
However, philosophy may also have long term effects on the research field of interest as a whole 
as well as some short term effects on the process of a specific research project. Therefore, the 
relevance, or irrelevance, of philosophy to a specific management research study 'cannot be 
clearly decided in advance of a careful look at the nature of the specific research. 
4.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
To conclude, the above discussions about the philosophy of research not only facilitates 
methodological disambiguation about research but also raises some issues worthy of practical 
consideration and highlights some workable methodological considerations. 
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Among those most plausible methodological considerations are: 
Q4-i. A logical positivist view of the world can be employed to analyze the escalating 
commitment phenomenon, and an experimentalism viewpoint (perhaps from a systems 
perspective) can be added to reconsider the phenomenon as well as optimizing problem 
solving (e. g. planning and controlling). 
Q4-2. The experimentalist viewpoint (or more precisely, an adapted version of the Hegelianist 
notion) that process is critical to any inquiry can be employed to assume that 
investigation into the investment decision-making process is of great importance vis-ä- 
vis decision inputs and outcomes. This partly justifies Figure 3-1 which epitomizes the 
very process of the research. 
Q4-3. The experimentalist viewpoint (or more precisely, an adapted version of the criticist 
notion) that some laws - can be assumed to - imply knowledge of fact, can be taken to 
assume that geometric quadrants can be employed to imply the escalating commitment 
phenomenon. This justifies Figure 4-2 which remains the fundamental means for the 
research and partly justifies Figure 3-1 which also serves as the structural framework for 
the research. 
Q4-4. The experimentalist viewpoint (or more precisely, an adapted version of the British 
empiricism notion) that activities should be goal (aim, desire, or objective) orientated is 
taken to assume the great importance of goals and subgoals of the research. This justifies 
Figure 4-3 which serves as a simple control framework for both mental and physical 
activities as occurs in the investment decision-making process as well as in the research 
process. 
Q4-5. The experimentalist viewpoint (or more precisely, an adapted version of the Kantian 
notion) that `ideal pursuit' remains a measure of progress is taken to assume that total 
quality management can be effectively applied to the research programme and that this 
research itself remains a cyclical stage of `ideal pursuit' route from a long term 
perspective,. This justifies Figure 2-9 which serves as a theoretical framework for the 
research and Figure 3-3 which serves as a whole process interactive management 
framework. 
Q4-6. The principle of analyzing descriptive propositions is assumed to consolidate research 
propositions so that working propositions are really and definitely descriptive. This helps 
to eradicate ambiguously described propositions and to promote only `so-and-so' 
descriptive propositions (Russell, 1912). This greatly facilitates the use of `memory' as 
acquaintance (as in the case of oral history and interviews) in the light of sensation 
consisting of data of both the inner and the outer senses such as what one has heard or 
seen, the use of `introspection' as acquaintance (as in the case of participant observations) 
in the light of sensation consisting of data of the inner senses such as thoughts, feelings 
and desires, and the use of `self-consciousness' as acquaintance (as in the case of practice 
study) in the light of sensation in respect of self such as self-awareness of things or self 
desires towards things. 
Q4-7. The three step method (CSA method) (Table 4-3) can be `normally' employed by 
`normal' researchers to produce insights which may serve again as new philosophical 
insights by virtue of testing consolidated propositions (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975; 
Popper, 1959; Hempel, 1965). 
Table 4-3: The CSA methods for `normal' researchers (up to necessary entity multiplication) 
Conducting observations, perhaps as well as experiments, and recording the data and the results. 
Scrutinizing the data and the results carefully. 
Acknowledging that if a large body of facts turns out to be inconsistent with the current theory, then 
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everything including the theory itself has to be checked. 
Q4-8. An action plan with respect to the useful application of philosophically conceiving the 
research can be employed to supplement the CSA method so as to avoid or minimize the 
`unavoidable' bias and errors due to empiricists' `admissible evidence only' worldview. 
The action plan includes: (a) that first attention goes to explain why the topic is important, 
(b) that effort is directed to list and classify various ways in which the research can be 
conducted, (c) that attention is paid to analyze a lot of relevant subsidiary ideas so as to 
improve understanding, and (d) that final effort goes to consider the means needed to put 
into effect what is conceived as necessary. 
Q4-9. The action plan and CSA method jointly form the skeleton of the proposed research, and 
this also partly justify Figure 3-1 which serves as the operational procedure (i. e. 8C's) for 
the research. 
Q4-1o. The principle of induction is employed to facilitate the application of the 8C's approach. 
Q4-11. The principles of inference (especially the doctrine that every event has a cause) are also 
employed to facilitate the application of the 8C's approach. 
Q4-12. The logic principles are employed to facilitate the application of the 8C's approach. 
Q4-13. The laws of thought are employed to facilitate the application of the 8C's approach. 
Q4-14. The laws of fatalistic, economic, facetious and scientific use are employed to facilitate 
the application of the 8C's approach. 
Q4-15. The general principles of science (especially that change is in perpetuity) is employed to 
supplement certain principles of inference (e. g. uniformity and universality) when the 
latter lose accountability. 
Among those sceptic but meaningful issues relating' to escalating' commitment and strategic 
control as derived from philosophic meditation are: 
Q4-16. Should effort be made to rigorously conduct and examine experiments - along with 
observations - in order to gain insights? 
Q4-17. If so, what is the applicability of Mill's (1884) two rules (vis-ä-vis experimental testing 
of causal hypotheses) which aim to distinguish genuine cause and . effect 
from 
coincidences and other sequences not representing causal regularities?,. 
Q4-1S. Should attention be paid to employ existing scientific theories to explain experimental 
results and predict future observations (Popper, 1959; Hempel, 1965; Kuhn, 1970; 
Feyerabend, 1975)? 
Q4-19. Is it possible to construct or borrow (from other disciplines) a framework which allows 
factual evidence and such like to be practically dealt with? 
Q4-20. Are existing mechanisms, which were devised to explain escalating commitment 
phenomenon, permanently open to the possibility of refutation (according to Popper, 
1959)? 
Q4-21. Is it possible that previous accounts of the escalating commitment phenomenon 
misdescribe what managers actually do (according to Kuhn, 1970)? 
Q4-22. Is it feasible to employ existing mechanisms explaining the escalating commitment 
phenomenon as hypotheses or propositions in the proposed research (according to Popper, 
1959)? 
Q4-23. Is it feasible to conduct a falsificationist approach to falsify instead of confirming 
existing theories by conducting some logically possible, imaginable set of observations 
which would prove the statement false (Popper, 1959; Reaves, 1992)? 
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Q4-24. Should previous observations be reinterpreted in the light of new mechanisms or via the 
use of new methods or procedures? 
Q4-25. Is it profitable to construct a covering law model which is based upon first principles to 
bridge observation and theory (according to Hempel, 1965)? 
Q4-26. Should this research (a) be coloured with open-mindedness and creativity in resolving 
problems (e. g. structuring the research and constructing the explanations) (according to 
Feyerabend, 1975), or (b) proceed by determining `known' fact with more precision, by 
investigating unexplained happenings with the aim of fitting them into current theories, 
and resolving tiny theoretical ambiguities (according to Kuhn, 1970)? 
Q4-27. Can triggers (or causes) of escalating commitment be events, as well as persons, things, 
and changes (according to Russell, 1912)? 
Q4-28. Can triggers of escalating commitment be evolutionarily different over stages - according 
to Darwin's theory of evolution which remains unfalsifiable (Kuhn, 1970)? 
Q4-29. Is it possible that previous accounts of the escalating commitment phenomenon remain 
merely elements or parts of human manipulation (according to Gasking, 1955)? 
Q4-30. Is it possible that certain accounts of causation claimed by previous researchers remain 
only a coincidence (according to Russell, 1912 and Hume, 1951)? 
Q4 31. Is it possible that some escalating commitment studies have been just by design fitting 
into existing prevailing theories? 
Q4-32. Should both old and new questions in relation to escalating commitment phenomenon be 
addressed through the help of philosophy? 
Q4-33. Should varying approaches (i. e. the `laws of nature', the `uniformity of nature', the 
`probability', and the `reliabilism') which aim to resolve the problems associated with 
induction be selectively employed (Russell, 1912) to better facilitate the use of the 8C's 
approach? 
To recommend, the above thirty three considerations (i. e. from Q4-1 to Q4-33), along with the 
previously mentioned eight paradigmatic considerations (i. e. from Q1-1 to Q1-8), necessitate a 
critical review of management research before one could actually "borrow from the shelf" a 
research design as is done by most inexperienced researchers and go to implement it. Besides, to 
maximise the utilities of the available resources, discounting concurrent ways of doing 
management research covering methods, processes and the philosophic assumptions underlying 
them, this researcher thinks, will be much more. fruitful in that it not only facilitates the work 
which immediately follows but also facilitates self-learning and accumulates knowledge. 
' These principles remain ones which cannot be proved or disproved by experience but are frequently employed in 
arguments which start from what is experienced 
2 Such general principles are believed in that mankind has witnessed innumerable instances of their truth and no 
instances of their falsehood, even if they afford no evidence for their truth in the future, unless the inductive 
principle is assumed to make it a deductive principle. 
Other useful laws include: (a) Boyle's law which dictates that the pressure of a gas varies inversely with its 
volume at constant temperature; (b) Grimm's law (originally concerning mutations of the consonants in the various 
Germanic languages) which dictates that Proto-Indo-European voiced aspirated stops, voiced unaspirated stops and 
voiceless stops become respectively voiced unaspirated stops, voiceless stops and voiceless fricatives; and (c) 
Wolfe's law of journalism which dictates that one cannot hope to bribe or twist the western journalist, but seeing 
what the man will do unbribed, there is no occasion to. 
Parkinson predicts that the staff increase in any public administrative department not actually at war may be 
expected to follow the following formula: X= (2K'+p) / n, whereas, K is the number of staff seeking promotion 
through the appointment of subordinates, p stands for the difference between the ages of appointment and 
retirement, m is the number of hours devoted to answering minutes within the department, n is the number of 
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effective units being administrated, and X is the number of new staff required each year. The percentage increase 
has been expected to be invariably between 5.17 to 6.56. 
s However, one can always argue that a constant conjunction of events can be discovered whenever causation takes 
place by widening one's viewpoints. 
6If the universe were truly chaotic there could be no language in which humans could say so and language per se 
depends upon things and qualities which have enough persistence in time to be written down and this persistence is 
itself a kind of uniformity. 
By image of nature, it is meant to be different views of reality rather than different realities. 
8 Natural mechanical system refers to what is formed by the time-slice and mechanical laws (Ackoff, 1971), the 
latter of which stand for the deterministic relationships which can be used to predict the changes in the values of the 
properties over time. 
9 For example, computers, people, and tigers are examples of systems enjoying intrinsic functions. 
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5. Discounting Management Research 
5.1 Introduction 
A careful look at Q1-8 and Q4-1,2,3,4,5,6,10,11,12,13&15 suggests that it remains necessary to 
discount management research. "Borrowing from the shelf' does not necessarily lead to research 
success in that no research methods are wholly effective nor are they safe for all operations. 
Following this logic in this part of the thesis, this researcher aims to compare and contrast 
various management research methods and procedures so that a clear picture of which method(s), 
procedure(s) and process(es) can serve the purpose of the research of this researcher can emerge 
before this researcher actually selects the research method(s), procedure(s) and process(es) for 
the study. It is hoped that by the end of this part of the thesis a mental map of the study of this 
researcher will be set out for the benefits of the next step of the research. Functionally speaking, 
this part of the research will focus on four main themes of management research: namely, 
methods, procedures, processes and practices. 
5.2 The nature of management research 
Management research incorporates studies ranging from employee attitudes, organizational 
behaviour, operations management, strategy formulation, information systems, human resource 
management, to management control practices and the like (Sekaran, 1993). Needless to say, not 
only is management research into these areas related to many factors, but it has also to be 
conducted in the context of the external environment facing the organizations of interest. For 
example, economic, political, demographic, technological, competitive, operational, and other 
relevant factors may impinge on some of the dynamics which operate in the organization (Smith, 
1975; Singleton et al, 1993). Thus, it seems obvious that the pursuit of management research 
inevitably demands that any investigation has to be carefully thought out, viz., that, at least, the 
process of the research (e. g. methods and procedures) has to be carefully scrutinised before one 
embarks on it. 
5.2.1 What is management research? 
It has been argued (e. g. Serakan, 1992) that management research remains distinctive from 
other business research such as that in marketing, finance, and accounting in that management 
research is more likely to pose unusual problems and thus invites rethinking of general research 
approaches as derived from disciplines such as sociology, psychology and education (Robson, 
1993). There are four things which make management research distinctive from others 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). 
Firstly, the practice of management research involves many disciplines, thus an investigation 
needs to go across varying boundaries (e. g. technological, cultural, and functional) and to make 
use of knowledge developed by other disciplines such as anthropology, economics, statistics, 
psychology, and politics. Secondly, the practice of management research is, more likely to 
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involve people who can be powerful- and/or busy- enough to easily jeopardise research access 
to organisations, especially when commercial or even personal advantage remains invisible, and 
this poses operational difficulties such that access for fieldwork can be turned down (e. g. for 
preternatural reasons). Thirdly, the practice of management research involves both thought and 
action and thus an investigation needs to incorporate the potential for taking action and to take 
account of the ensuing consequences. Finally, the practice of management research involves a 
continuous modification or improvement process which dictates, among other things, that 
theoretically desirable research questions may not be feasible in actuality, that plausible research 
designs may be subject to modification from time to time, and that research dissemination may 
be confined to confidentiality, publication rights, and more. 
5.2.2 Management research as a triangulation 
Although none of these remains absolutely unique to management research, the possible 
combination of all implies that traditional assumptions and practices in relation to research as 
accepted in other disciplines may well need rethinking, viz., management research not only 
needs to consider the inputs as well as the outputs of an investigation, but also needs to pay great 
attention to the process of the investigation. 
If one draws an analogy between management research and the Chinese boxes, one can see that 
research relates to three things: (a) the inputs (i. e. men, knowledge, an opened box, and a box to 
open), (b) the outputs (i. e. prizes within the boxes that have been opened, new knowledge, and a 
new box to open), and (c) physical and mental interfaces between inputs and outputs (i. e. the 
transformation between men with knowledge, an opened box, a box to open and a new box). 
With respect to management research, the most influential inputs can include: (al) all people 
involved in the research such as directors or supervisors of the research, investigators, 
interviewees, and subjects in experiments, (a2) supervisors' and investigators' knowledge about 
methodology and about the problems to be studied such as existing theories, research methods, 
and research propositions / hypotheses, (a3) abstract concepts such as time, quality, objectivity, 
empiricism and control requirements, and / or (a4) substantial matters such as the firms being 
studied, word processors, funds, and stationery. 
The most symbolic outputs can include: (bi) research data base, (b2) research report, (b3) 
modified theories, and / or (b4) practical implications. However, the research outputs can also 
be further classified. For instance, the research report can closely relate to the forms of research: 
pure research (e. g. the mathematical computation in relation to the Chinese boxes game) is 
likely to be disseminated through books, journal articles, conference papers or theses for degrees; 
applied research (e. g. the work undertaken by the participant-turned consultants in the Chinese 
boxes game) is more likely to serve the clients for the solution to specific problems and to be 
aimed at practitioners; and action research (e. g. the Chinese boxes game itself as an educational 
programme set by the organiser) which incorporates change into the research process itself is 
more likely to be a narrative recording about how the understanding of these involved changes 
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The most meaningful interfaces can include: (cl) the interface between initial inputs such as 
investigators defining the research propositions through the interaction between investigators, 
the problems to be studied, supervisors' guidelines, the first principles of research, textbook 
formulas for research, and relevant theories in relation to the problems, (c2) the interface 
between initial inputs and intermediate outputs (the latter of which serve in turn as sequential 
inputs) such as investigators' collecting evidence, analysing resulting data, and composing the 
reports after cross-case analyses, and / or (c3) the interface between certain initial inputs and 
certain advanced outputs which serve as a new or higher level of inputs such as investigators' 
new definition of problems, modified principles of research, revised guidelines, and new 
assumptions in relation to resolving the problems. 
In short (Figure 5-1), to do management research is to open the Chinese boxes, with 
management researchers opening a box only to find another box inside. In this sense 
management research becomes a problem looking for a solution (be it theoretical, practical, or 
educational), and it remains a repetitious triangulation among investigators (i. e. men with 
knowledge), problems (i. e. inputs) and solutions (i. e. outputs), in spite of the fact that over time 
the magnitudes of problems and solutions (i. e. the size of the inputs and outputs, and the 
sophistication of interfaces) vary and knowledge itself accumulates. 
Figure 5-1: Management research as a triangulation -a metaphor 
Solution W new bov to opcn) 
Interface C3 
IMCI facc C2 
MCI) with 
knowledge ---- _____. ___: Q Problem (an opened bux) 
Interface CI 
5.3 Management research methods 
Evidence (e. g. Easterby-Smith et al, 1991) shows that some management researchers tend to 
favour- certain research method(s) and hold bias against other methods. This is perhaps because 
they are trying to probe similar level of understanding which they regard as being possible in the 
management environment, suffering from community groupthink so as to (unintentionally or 
even deliberately) avoid other methods, naively believing that some techniques (e. g. the 
structured) are always `better' than others (e. g. the unstructured), not willing to learn or try new 
things, or simply behaving like I lou yi multiplying their entities beyond limits. ' 
Nonetheless, over decades the conduct of management research has seen a dramatic change (e. g. 
Stein, 1952; Campbell, 1966; Lucas, 1974; Yin, 198 1; I lamel, 1992; Potter, 1996) in that many 
new methods have emerged to challenge conventional ones such as surveys (in Western lýurope), 
observations (in Far East), and experiments (in North America). It becomes quite clear if one 
browses through what has been written up in today's journals and hooks that not as much 
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management research as before follows the conventional practices. In other words, the so-called 
qualitative methods have gained considerable acception among current management researchers, 
nearly catching up their quantitative counterparts (Jankowicz, 1991; Potter, 1996). 
Proven methods of management research as a whole include (Gummesson, 1991): (a) 
experiments, (b) surveys, (c) case studies, (d) archival analyses, and (e) histories. It has been 
well argued (e. g. Pattern, 1980; Yin, 1994; Potter, 1996; Jankowicz, 1991) that various methods 
are not mutually exclusive, and the most important task for investigators is to identify some 
research method(s) the distinctive advantages of which best fit the research requirement 
(Jankowicz, 1991). 
Table 5-1 serves as a brief summary of management research methods, which considers three 
crucial aspects of an investigation, namely ways of inquiry, control over behaviour, and 
investigating focus (in which o stands for capability while o stands for incapability). 
Apparently, each of the above-mentioned methods enjoys certain peculiar advantages while 
suffering from some disadvantages (Easterby-smith, et al, 1991). 
Table 5-1: Research methods at a glance 
Major research 
methods in 
Ways of inquiry (4W3H) 
operationalized by research questions 
Focus 
on contemporary 
social sciences What Where Who Why How How many How much 
Met 
events? 
Archival analysis 0 CSI 21 0 0 
Case study 
Experiment Iý D 
History 0 0 
Survey El El 21 El El O 0 
5.4 Management research procedures 
Literature on research methodology has exhibited that there is a variety of research procedures 
available to management researchers ranging from the three step CSA method (see Table 5-2), 
the four step conservatism approach (see Figure 4-1), the 5 step IDEAL approach (see Figure 2- 
5), the 7 step social research approach (Singleton et al, 1993)2, the 8 step 8C's model (see Figure 
3-1), to the 10 step building block approach (Sekaran, 1992)'. 
In practice, the selection of research procedures is often reflective of a management researcher's 
preference which can be framed in terms of, say, usefulness, objectivity, and manoeuvrability. 
But, in essence, the adoption of a certain set of research procedures reflects the management 
researcher's worldview of inquiry and in fact the divergence between sets of procedures derives 
from the interplay of the first principles, namely, the principles of inference, the principle of 
induction, the logical principles, and the laws of thought. For example, the positivism logic will 
persuade some management researchers to consider a research process operating within the 
positivist paradigm as depicted in Figure 5-2 - which happened to be this researcher's previous 
choice. It remains a process which parallels that of Singleton et at (1993), and a process which 
fails to acknowledge openly the difficulties leading to epistemological stance which include, say, 
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in this researcher's work prior to the modification of research designs, a lack of a clear 
conceptual framework and a lack of measurement for certain concepts such as desires which 
emerged during the research. 
Figure 5-2: A sample of positivist research procedures 
Hypotheses generation 
Data 
I Comparison of data and hypotheses 
Confirmation/modification of hypotheses 
Typically, in comparison, the approach of Singleton et al (1993) well reflects the logic 
principles, the approach of Sekaran (1992) mirrors both the logic principles and the principle of 
induction, the conservatism approach remains a simpler version of what is illustrated in Figure 
5-2, the IDEAL approach emphasizes general practicability, the CSA method remains the 
simplest and the most flexible, and the 8C's method paradigmatically incorporates all others 
and remains most systematic. Seemingly, there is perhaps a simplest set of procedures of 
management research (e. g. the CSA method) but there is not a best-for-all set of procedures 
which is flawless - definitely not the one as depicted in Figure 5-2. Besides, the simpler the 
procedures are, the more powerful they are, but the fuzzier the relationship can be between 
procedures. 
Moreover, the selection or establishment of the research procedures can also, at least in part, 
reply to the nature of the investigation of interest, namely, inter alia, the purposes of the research, 
the information to obtain, and the analytic techniques to employ, viz., the orientation of the 
research. 
5.5 Management research processes 
5.5.1 The debate between quantitative and qualitätive research 
Research has been catalogued into two types of orientation (e. g. Sandy, 1979; Sekaran, 1992): 
quantitative and qualitative, although it has been broadly argued (e. g. Jankowicz, 1991; 
Shipman, 1973; Hughes, 1990) that there is no research which is entirely quantitative or 
qualitative. In a narrow sense, however, it is widely acknowledged (e. g. Reaves, 1992) that 
research is quantitatively-oriented if it involves measuring (usually numerical) quantities of 
things, or qualitatively-oriented if it involves assessing the quality of things. This distinction 
dictates differing features of quantitative or qualitative research. For example, while quantitative 
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research (Reaves, 1992) may report numerical data and focus on generalizations, qualitative 
research (Sandy, 1979) can feature narrative descriptions and concentrate on insight-seeking. 
On the one hand, advocates of quantitative research adopt a definition of which closely follows 
the defined `scientific method' of the natural sciences, normally being a Hempelian or 
Popperian. They are normally statistically-sophisticated and frequently use methods which can 
be rather mechanical. Advocates of quantitative research often argue for 'positivism and will 
usually assume (e. g. Reaves, 1992) that research, as can be seen in Figure 5-2, should start with 
the specification of hypotheses, proceed with the design and execution of an experiment or a 
survey, the measurement of the results, the testing of the hypotheses and, though rarely, the 
identification of any natural law. 
Furthermore, quantitative research is further enticed by an ever increasing abundance of social 
statistical data as well as fast computerised statistical analysis, and in such cases the hypothesis 
specification may even be omitted so that data from public or private sources can be 
electronically sorted and tested in a more or less random fashion so as to identify correlations 
and regressions of various kinds. 
On the other hand, promoters of qualitative research remain neither Popperian nor Hempelian, 
and normally uphold (e. g. Potter, 1996) that a hypothesis (as is prioritised in Figure 5-2 by 
positivists) is not a prerequisite of research, though indeed it may arise or be developed during 
the research process itself. It has become common for qualitative researchers to employ 
unstructured forms of data collection such as interviewing or observation and rely heavily on 
verbal descriptions and explanations (Hammersley, 1989). 4 For example, Geertz's (1973) 
research entitled The Interpretation of Cultures which features thick description and involves no 
hypothesis at all, remains probably one of the most qualitative of qualitative research studies. 
In addition, different views exist as to the criteria for assessing effective research. Quantitative 
research can be assessed in terms of its validity and reliability, while qualitative research may be 
best judged by whether the research communicates the rules for proper and predictable conduct 
as judged by the people being studied (Sandy, 1979). Moreover, there also exists sound 
justification for researchers' commitment towards qualitative or quantitative orientation (e. g. 
Reaves, 1992; and Potter, 1996). The key question here lies in whether the quality of experience 
or the frequency of opinions and events remains more important in an investigation, viz., which 
features of the researchers' view about the world remain more significant and more relevant to 
the research enterprise? 
Between the two extremes comes a compromised orientation (e. g. Bailey, 1978; Sanders and 
Pinhey, 1983) which defines research as involving four or five stages as similarly depicted in 
Figure 2-7. Bailey's (1978) approach, for example, supports the view that a researcher, firstly, 
chooses the research problem and states the hypotheses, secondly, formulates the research 
design, thirdly, gathers, codes, and analyzes the data, and finally, interprets the results so as to 
test the hypotheses. Nonetheless, it has been well argued by qualitative researchers that effective 
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research does not necessitate hypotheses, and it has been soundly reasoned by quantitative 
researchers (e. g. Shipman, 1973) that a compromise is achieved at the very expense of precision. 
In practice, however, researchers often simultaneously exploit both the soft, subjective and 
speculative nature of qualitative research, and the hard and rigorous nature of quantitative 
research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in that both approaches are not mutually exclusive (Van 
Maanen, 1979), although the distinction between quantitative data and qualitative data tends to 
be too polarised (Burgess, 1984). In fact, as can be seen in Figure 5-3, qualitative and 
quantitative research can be highly complementary, especially in circumstances under which 
either the measurement of qualitative variables has been prioritised (Yin, 1994) or the 
quantification of quantitative variables has been hampered (Reaves, 1992). 
Figure 5-3: Qualitative vs. quantitative research 
Qualitative 
Conversation 
Individual interview 
Focus group 
Key informant interview 
Repertory grid 
: 
History 
:> 
Archival analysis 
Insight :; ` Case study 
Validity Survey '° r Reliability 
Experiment ' Generalizability 
Structured Structured Telephone Structured Attitude Field 
observatior interview interview questionnaire scaling experiment 
Quantitative 
This leads to a commonly practised approach, the emergent orientation, which holds that the 
strength of almost every measure is more or less flawed in some way or other, and therefore 
recommends that best research designs emerge when strengths of varying plausible methods are 
counterbalanced to produce the most desirable effects. There have been four mechanisms 
(Abrahamson, 1983; Todd, 1979; Smith, 1975) that have emerged to promote the use of 
multiple, but independent measures, namely known as (a) theoretical triangulation which 
involves borrowing models from one discipline and using them to explain situations in another 
discipline, (b) data triangulation which involves collecting data over different time frames or 
from different sources, (c) investigator triangulation which involves different people collecting 
data on the same situation, and (d) methodological triangulation which involve both quantitative 
and qualitative methods of data collection. 
For example, speaking from Kuhn's (1970) perspective, qualitative orientation can serve for 
insight seeking - in the light of Feyerabend's (1975) notion of no rules of research procedures, 
Chapter 5 Discounting Management Research 
and quantitative orientation can serve as theory verification or falsification - in the light of 
Hempel's (1965) hypothetic-deductive method or Popper's (1959) notion of permanent theory 
refutation; and this becomes especially useful on occasions where theories or insights can only 
be generated in a qualitative manner (Gummesson, 1991). In this sense, combining methods per 
se is not an end in itself, but a means by which the amount of data to be collected can be 
maximised, or otherwise insufficient to represent the richness of the debates or controversies 
about the problems to be studied. 
The debate between qualitative and quantitative research can be endless, and much of the debate 
can be seen as following the logic of what is summarised in Table 5-2.5 This table provides a 
brief comparison and contrast of the polarising views about research and is constructed in the 
hope of facilitating the research design of this researcher, who agrees on the concept (e. g. 
Jankowicz, 1991; Yin, 1994; Jones, 1995; Potter, 1996) that the best approach to research is that 
which best relates to not only the kinds of questions the researcher wishes to ask in the sort of 
environment, but also the sorts of thesis which the researcher is advocating. That is to say, 
successful management research involves careful consideration not only in relation to what to do 
and how to do it, but also in relation to what to believe. 
Table 5-2: Qualitative and quantitative research - comparison and contrast 
(Source: various books, articles, and doctoral training material at Loughborough, UK) 
Vantage-point Quantitative Qualitative 
ý _77 Investigators' stance in Outsider Insider 
relation to research problem 
Measurement Quantity of things Quality of things 
Nature of data Hard, numerical, reliable Deep, descriptive, rich 
Relationship between Distant Close 
investigators and the subject 
Relationship between Confirmation Emergent 
theory and research 
Research purpose Analytical Exploratory 
Research strategy Structured Unstructured 
Validity of the research Lack of internal validity Lack of external validity 
View of change Different behaviours are achieved by Different behaviours are achieved 
by altering the 
altering patterns of structure. systems of knowledge which comprise the basis for 
organised actions. 
View of control An organized action which is realised An organized action which is realised through the 
through specified procedures for achievement of shared meanings. 
getting thing done. - 
View of managers' role Decision makers, analysers, and Framers of contexts, makers and shapers of 
controllers of contingencies of interpretative schemes, who deal with multiple 
reinforcement. realities. - 
View of organisations An open system instrumentally related A social construction expressively related to 
its 
to its environment context 
View of social reality External and static Processual and socially constructed 
View of strategic Strategic task is to maintain congruence Strategic task 
is to create and maintain a system of 
management between environmental constraints and meaning which 
invokes specific values and objectives. 
organizational needs. 
5.5.2 Challenges to management research 
In the field of management, it seems impossible to conduct research which is 100% scientific, 
and evidence shows management researchers can well get investigations down to fine art. This 
is because management research is frequently encountered not only with theoretical issues such 
Chapter 5 Discounting Management Research 
as research philosophy, but also with subjective issues such as feelings, perceptions, and 
emotions all of which tend to be difficult to measure and evaluate, with technical issues such as 
methods and operating procedures, and with contextual issues such as politics and ethics. 
This suggests that management research encounters at least six major challenges: philosophical, 
political, technical, operational, ethical and psychological (Table 5-3). The philosophical 
challenge involves the possible clash between differing worldviews held by researchers in that 
the reality of management research remains more or less a compromise between positivist, 
rationalist, criticist and experimentalist worldviews on the accumulation of knowledge. The 
political challenge involves a possible clash in power relationships between individual 
researchers and the institutions they are working for in that, say, senior people can exert pressure 
on junior people to employ designs or methods they don't believe in or are not familiar with, 
that stakeholders can exert pressure on researchers to ensure that the aims, forms, and other 
requirements meet with their interests. The technical challenge 
involves a possible clash in 
criteria for choice of management research methods in that the 
design of an investigation can be 
a matter of the personal preference of the researchers themselves, a matter of the aims or context 
of the investigation to be carried out, or a matter of the avoidance of the 
fear that the 
investigation has to stand up to outside scrutiny. The operational challenge involves possible 
clash in research interests between researchers and subjects of study 
in that organisations to be 
studied may pursue their own commercial interests, that research access can 
be denied, or that 
individuals may avoid cooperation. The ethical challenge involves a dilemma vis-ä-vis how 
much deception in a situation is acceptable and how 
far the researcher should go in not 
betraying the trust of the subjects in that certain research methods such as participant 
observation are essentially deceitful (Ditton, 1977). The psychological challenge 
involves a 
possible clash in perception about the purposes of an 
investigation in that researchers and 
subjects of study can perceive and react differently 
if they frame the research questions 
differently. 
Table 5-3: The major challenges to management research 
Challenges Major concerns Typical factors Practical examples 
Political A clash in Researchers, Research panel or institutions itself may exert pressure on 
power and stakeholders degree candidates to adopt unconventional research 
relationships approach or methods. 
Philosophical A clash in Research Researchers can be faced with a dilemma of whether to 
worldviews framework, and confirm or falsify an existing theory, or of whether to seek 
inquiry systems for generalization or insights. 
Technical A clash in Methods, Researchers can employ survey instead of archival 
criteria for statistics, and analysis despite the fact that both can be used to deal with 
choice of procedures what, where, who, how many and how much questions in 
methods relation to contemporary events. 
Operational A clash in Researchers, The conduct of an investigation can be limited or 
practicability resources, and entangled by the availability of resources, support and 
organisations competence in research. 
Ethical A clash in codes Researchers, Researchers may not release what is the real research 
and subjects of purpose to subjects of an experiment or to informants of a 
study participant observation study. 
Psychological A clash in Researchers, Subjects of study can try to shorten an investigation or 
interests and subjects of avoid answering some questions while the researchers may 
study try to smoke more out of it. 
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5.5.3 The prerequisites for succeeding in management research 
Apparently there is no simple way of ensuring that an investigation in the field of management 
will be successful. However, there are a number of factors which contribute to the success of 
management research. As Suntzi (1992) argues, knowing the researchers themselves (e. g. 
strengths and weaknesses) and knowing the problems well before the search for solutions (e. g. 
challenges vis-ä-vis research inputs, outputs, and processes) can render little peril to 
management research. Table 5-4 provides a brief summary of major prerequisites for succeeding 
in management research, which are catalogued into two levels with the intermediate level 
factors making a substantial contribution and the advanced level factors making warranting 
contribution towards the success of a management research project. 
Table 5-4: Major prerequisites for succeeding in management research 
Factors Intermediate level Advanced level 
Motivation Research for the research's sake (e. g. a Research as a vehicle for learning; 
(Philips, PhD degree, an assignment, and a solution Research as a basis for personal growth; 
1984) to a problem). Research as a means of dealing with real problems 
at work. 
Support Physical (e. g. technical training and Mental (e. g. from supervisor, institution, employers, 
(Jankowicz, individual endurance); and family); 
1991) Visible (e. g. funds and equipment). Invisible (e. g. encouragement, operational 
toleration, and spiritual aspiration). 
Personal Exterior (e. g. managerial style, leadership, Interior (e. g. creativity at work, aptitude, will to 
qualities assertiveness, and interpersonal skills). win, commitment, and ability to cope with stress). 
Continuity Research in motion (e. g. earlier start and Focus (e. g. in thinking, ideas, and writing up). 
continuous improvement). 
Understandi Knowledge of immediate subject of study, Knowledge of varying worldviews, of varying 
ng of the of research procedures, and of key methods of data collection and analysis, and of 
problems contacts in the specific research area. related disciplines. 
Operational Research in action (e. g. growing interests Awareness of chances (e. g. blind luck, and 
approaches in people, organisations, and other meticulousness); 
(Austin, disciplines); Prepared mind (e. g. alert mental processes of causal 
1978) Research in motion (e. g. increasing relationships, and open but critical system of 
curiosity, resilience, and persistence). thought and data). 
5.6 Management research practices: towards a mental map 
In the field of management, research questions are by no means as straightforward as in other 
fields such as natural sciences and psychology. This is because management research in practice 
remains a process (seriously) involving politics in that management per se is essentially a 
political process of co-ordinating, structuring, controlling, or influencing the awareness of others 
(Mintzberg, 1973). This is also because management research in practice is most likely to be 
carried out on people who are most powerful within a community circle or society. 
5.6.1 Management research in practice: questions and answers 
In fact, management research into corporate decision-making demands a lot of skills as well as 
experience of dealing with a management hierarchy because the subjects of research are often 
found within organisations which are fairly structured and controlled; gaining access to the 
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highest of the hierarchy can be exceedingly difficult for investigators; the subjects of research 
are adept enough at handling face-to-face interaction with investigators; and that many a subject 
of research can become too aware of the significance of information as well as the importance of 
determining what use it might be put to and by whom. 
On the one hand, this implies that for management researchers to succeed in research they can 
be easily entangled in political and ethical dilemmas when they have to adopt methods of deceit, 
concealment, lure, or subterfuge. On the other hand, this also implies that it remains more an art 
than a science to determine what should be researched, what can be researched, what is worth 
researching, and what can be achieved by the research, viz., the research questions have to be 
theoretically scrutinised, realistically chosen, diplomatically addressed, and systematically 
utilised. 
Broadly speaking, factors which can influence the research question include (a) contexts, (b) 
problems to be studied, (c) researchers, (d) resources, and (e) stakeholders. Table 5-5 produces a 
summary of major factors influencing the research question. Practically speaking, however, 
research questions have to be narrow, specific, answerable, and practically meaningful, viz., that 
research questions have to be conceptually clarificable and operationally observable 
(Robson, 1993). 
Table 5-5: Influences on research questions 
Factors Practical considerations 
Contexts Constraints on what is possible and what is desirable such as cultural differences 
(e. g. local problems and cultures); opportunities for varying research models which 
remain specifically plausible in certain contexts such as the military model , the 
private agent model, the investigative journalism model, and the appropriate 
technology model. ' 
Problems to be Debates in relation to the nature and direction of the research enterprise such as the 
studied significance of 
the problems to be studied in terms of how close they are to what is 
currently seen to be important (i. e. fads and fashions); influence from influential 
practitioners and academics on the appropriateness of certain research questions (as 
in the case of pilot studies). 
Researchers Motivations such as career aims, ideological reasons, political agenda; ability to 
identify questions which are being significant; the worldview; past experience; 
personal background; leadership and decision-making styles; flexibility and 
synergy in terms of team work; conflicting expectations between the principal and 
agents. 
Resources Availability of funds, time and effort; the nature of resources such as secured or 
insecure, sufficient or insufficient grant, full time or part time contract, and whole- 
time or half-time research; the coordination and control of resources such as 
operational tactics, budgetary control, and time management so that the use of 
varying resources can be optimised. 
Stakeholders Encouragement or pressure from academic community in that he who pays the 
pipes not only calls the tune but also defines the tune; influence from supervisors, 
from panel members, and from `gatekeepers'; the one-sided perception of subjects 
of study on the commercializability of research; material support from academic 
institutions; control gained by organizational community such as access to 
organisations; support or limit from the top of the management hierarchy. 
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Chapter 5 Discounting Management Research 
For example, an investigation into strategic control of investment projects has to take into 
consideration organisations' cultural differences (e. g. risk taking or risk aversion, market or 
central planning economy); the investigation has to consider current debates on escalating 
commitment as well as fine-tuning itself to the findings based upon pilot studies; the 
investigation has to be operationalized (e. g. in terms of the amount of funds allocated to an 
investment project) if the investigator takes an empiricist viewpoint; the investigation has to be 
confined within financial limits or time limits; and the investigation has to be undertaken under 
the banner of satisfying, say, the university's degree requirements, the doctoral panel's 
expectation, the external and internal examiners' preference, and the research subjects' 
perceived utility. 
5.6.2 Towards a mental map of the study of this researcher 
Obviously, as can be seen in Table 5-5, answers to research questions can vary depending on the 
methods adopted in the investigation, but whether certain answers (or sense data) obtained from 
the investigation are desirable and sufficient enough to solve the problem of interest relies 
heavily, in the light of the control process of an investigation (see Figure 5-3), on the goals, the 
plan, the execution, and the measurement of the research. Consider the plan, for example, there 
are occasions in which some questions cannot be answered adequately via certain methods no 
matter how good the design of the study. 
Table 5-6 provides a practical illustration of this in relation to the inquiries into the escalating 
commitment phenomenon (please see Figure 4-2), viz., the match between questions (i. e. from 
Q5-1 to Q5-18) which are condensed from issues raised in the previously parts of the thesis (e. g. 
from Q1-1 to Ql-8 and from Q4-1 to Q4-33) and the answers generated from different research 
methods, namely, archival analysis, case study, experiment, oral history, and survey. 
Seemingly, each method enjoys certain unique strengths and can be prolific when used in certain 
preferred circumstances and, as proposed 
by Todd (1979), the use of different methods from 
within the same research paradigm (e. g. empiricism) as well as a careful move across research 
paradigms can actually activate a `triangulation' process, viz., the cross check of the results from 
one method by the results from another. Table 5-6 goes beyond the work of others to highlight 
some key operational aspects of an 
investigation, namely, preferred circumstances, unique 
strengths, major weaknesses, sources of evidence, variants, and practical examples. 
5.7 Conclusion and recommendation 
Discounting management research leads to the conclusion that no management research 
methods are wholly effective and safe 
for all operations (see Table 5-1), and nor are any 
research procedures (see Figure 5-2). 
As far as the study of this researcher is concerned, 
probably the emergent research orientation makes more sense than does the merely quantitative 
or qualitative in dealing with complex and 
dynamic management research problems (see Figure 
5-2). It seems that to succeed in his management research this researcher needs not only to pump 
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up an investigation with considerable motivation, support, continuity, quality, knowledge about 
the research, and operational skills, but also to cope with political, psychological, operational, 
technical, philosophical and ethical challenges emerging in the research process (see Table 5-4). 
As a recommendation, it seems plausible that the approach of this researcher stays within the 
positivist paradigm (see Figure 5-2) - i. e. how to act - but moves into experimentalism paradigm 
later on (see Figure 3-1) - i. e. what to believe - in order to ensure the success of the research 
process. Detailed work needs to be done in the next step of the research to cover research 
questions in relation to the problems, the contexts, the subjects, the resources, and the 
stakeholders by means of a series of control mechanisms (see Tables 5-5&6, Figure 4-3 and 
Figure 3-3). Further effort needs to be made to decide whether the research is to be 
accomplished by the use of varying research methods and by the triangulation of theories and 
data. 
I Houyi was an extremely powerful character in a Chinese fable who had practiced shooting an arrow from a bow everyday in 
order to shoot down the sun. 
2 Singleton et al (1993) argue that social research consists of (a) selection and formulation of the research problem, (b) 
preparation of the research design, (c) measurement, 
(d) sampling, (e) data collecting, (f) data processing, and (g) data analysis 
and interpretation. 
3 Sekaran (1992) proposes that scientific inquiry consists of 10 building blocks: (a) observation, (b) identification of problem 
area, (c) theoretical framework or network of associations, 
(d) hypotheses, (e) operational definitions, (f) research design, (g) 
data collection, (h) analysis of data, (i) interpretation of 
data, and (j) refinement of theory (pure research) or implication (applied 
research). 
4 However, interviewing and observation can, of course, be highly quantitative. 
3 This table is a piece of work of this researcher and academic staff who lectured on the Management Consulting courses at 
Loughborough University Business School in the year 1996. 
6 According to Beynon (1988) and Easterby-Smith et al (1991), the military model favours team research, involves substantial 
planning and preparation and abounds 
in resources; the private agent model encourages independent operations, utilizes 
individual resources and makes the best of whatever opportunities are available; the investigative journalism model legitimates 
deception, gains access, gathers data, and publishes findings regardless of consequences, and the appropriate technology model 
adjusts research to the realities and makes most of the research despite the lack of research support facilities such as easy 
communications, transport and photocopiers. 
T Quasi-experiments refer to situations in which the experimenter cannot manipulate behaviour but in which the logic of 
experimental design might still 
be applied (Cook and Campell, 1979). 
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6. Introducing The Research: The COAI Design 
6.1 Introduction 
Most doctoral research in business schools, as an approach to bridging predictions and theories 
via observational events (Denzin, 1978), has come from the functionalist paradigm which is 
predominated by positivist methods although there are considerable pressure to avoid interpretist 
approaches to research (Jones, 1995). For example, a browse through recent doctoral theses both 
in the UK and in the USA (e. g. Afred, 1982; Binder, 1984; Bowen, 1987; Jelfrey, 1989; Pearson, 
1989; Decker, 1992; Broady, 1993; Ryan, 1994; Dawson, 1995) by this researcher reveals that 
research leading to a doctoral degree in the domain of management studies imitates the 
methodology of the natural sciences although none of the researchers concluded that his or her 
research was of scientific nature, 
' nor had any tried to carry out his or her research outside the 
dominant paradigm: they all followed the same procedures as depicted in Figure 6-1. 
Figure 6-1: Commonality in methodology among doctoral business research 
(Source: A sample of doctoral theses in the business domain in the UK and the USA) 
A description of `results' 
'I The `generation' of a number of `hypotheses' 
Data gathering 
An account of the sample and the method 
The above-cited conservatism not only gives rise to this researcher's philosophic inquiry about 
ways by which management researchers select their theoretical 
/ philosophic framework- i. e. 
`off the shelf, `from experience', `from first principles', or deliberately `avoiding Velikovsky's 
fate'2, but also arouses this researcher's enthusiasm in critically understanding research 
methodology in the domain of management studies. 
Consider the research work this researcher 
undertook in 1993 which partly 
led to an MBA degree at Keele University, U. K. The project 
proceeded along a typical positivist route: problem 
definition, literature review, hypotheses 
generation, sample selection, 
fieldwork, data analysis, comparison of data and hypotheses, 
confirmation / modification of 
hypotheses (Zhang, 1993). Research rigor as well as statistical 
sophistication produced research excellence, 
but it relied too heavily on correlations and 
statistical analyses to convince the researcher that the results revealed the rich nature of 
behaviour in organisations. Among fourteen hypotheses seven were confirmed and seven were 
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disconfirmed after a series of statistical tests including both parametric statistical analyses (e. g. 
ANOVA, F statistics, the protected t-test, linear regressing, and x2 test) and non-parametric 
statistic analysis (e. g. Spearman rank correlation, Kruskal-Wallis H test, and Mann-Whitney U 
test) (Zhang and Wilson, 1995). The research carried on well with the confirmed hypotheses. 
But how about those disconfirmed ones, given the axiom that it is even less risky (see Tables 2- 
1& 2-2) to disconfirm than to confirm a hypothesis? Apparently the empiricist paradigm did not 
encourage this researcher to pursue the other aspect of the correlation coefficient! Other 
justifications could go to the availability of resources, the requirement of the university, the 
exigencies of time, ..., and, perhaps more 
importantly, the conceiving of the research at the very 
beginning. As research experience tells, an investigator reaps what he sows. In the example, the 
research could have been different had the researcher - before actually contriving, controlling, 
co-ordinating, calibrating, conducting, collecting and concentering the research - further 
conceived of, among other things, alternative approaches, the segmentation of the research 
theme, the necessity of the research, the sufficiency of the research, and the feasibility of the 
research more carefully. 
This part of the thesis aims to challenge the above conservatism - partly due to discussions 
previously undertaken (i. e. in Chapters 1,2&3 and especially in Chapters 4&5) and partly due to 
this researcher's own research experience - by staying within the positivist paradigm but 
treading into the experimentalist paradigm so as to create anew a research design which is hoped 
to guide the study of this researcher through the somewhat exciting but challenging research 
process. It is hoped that by the end of this part of the thesis, a macro-view of the new research 
framework (i. e. COAI design) is to be presented in a practical way. As for the structure of this 
part of the thesis, therefore, it would not seem surprising to see that this part goes the COAI way: 
i. e. it follows the sequence of the letters combining the word COAI. 
6.2 The COAI design: towards a new research framework 
To recall the research work this researcher as well as other doctoral candidates undertook in the 
past, what appears intriguing 
is a question of whether those research studies could have been 
done better, given the same amount of commitment in resources (e. g. time, effort, funds, 
people's assistance). Bearing this 
in mind and referring to the Chinese boxes games, the 
researcher decided not to 
borrow from the shelf but to devise a cyclical COAT mechanism 
particularly designed to this research. As can be seen 
from Figure 6-2 which partially reflects 
Figure 3-3 (i. e. the 8C framework of research) in Chapter 3 and partially paves the way for 
Figure 12-5 (i. e. the integrated model of investment decision-making) in chapter 12, the process 
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of this research is broken into four phases, namely, conceptualization, operationalization, 
actualization and idealization. 
Figure 6-2: The COAI design: towards a new framework for research 
Conceptualization 
Idealization Operationalization 
Actualization 
The phase of conceptualization typically refers to conceiving and contriving the research (i. e. 
the first and second C in the 8C framework) in terms of, inter alia, the identification of a 
problem, the definition of the problem, normative solutions to the problem, common practices in 
the real world setting, the severity of the problem, the current position of the research, the 
relevancy of the research in the empirical setting, and the originality of the research. The phase 
of operationalization regularly involves the controlling and the co-ordinating of the research (i. e. 
the third and fourth C in the 8C framework) in terms of, inter alia, the topic of the research, the 
aims to be achieved, the themes of the 
investigation, the determination and justification of the 
variables to be employed, and the pre-supposed criteria to identify a case base. The phase of 
actualization normally involves calibrating and conducting the research (i. e. the fifth and sixth C 
in the 8C framework) in terms of, inter alia, the establishment of a case base, pilot studies, the 
refinement of the research hypotheses or propositions and 
implementation of the research 
featuring problem-solving oriented activities. The phase of idealization usually involves 
collecting and concentering the research 
(i. e. the seventh and eighth C in the 8C framework) in 
terms of, inter alia, the interpretation of the results, the convergence of the insights obtained and 
the advancement of theory in the hope that the perceived benefits of the research can be 
accordingly derived and that research 
in the next round can be better conceived, contrived, 
controlled, co-ordinated, calibrated, conducted, collected and concentered. 
6.3 The C: the conceptualization of the research 
Industrial experience (Zhang, 1993) tells that although investment decisions may have been 
made largely in isolation, with most capital proposals being assessed purely in terms of their 
economic attractiveness, the management of investment has seldom followed suit; in fact, 
evidence suggests many corporations 
have over-committed themselves in situations where a 
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course of action is not working as expected or a loss has resulted from an earlier decision. That 
is, not all subsequent managerial decisions follow the path suggested by economic rationality. It 
has frequently been noticed that managerial decision-makers, after suffering set-backs, 
irrationally'throw good money after bad' and become caught'knee deep in the big muddy' (Staw, 
1976) when the termination of projects may seem more logical. 
The problem: It is typically suggested that managerial decisions (other than non-profit ones) to 
select investment projects should be made according to the rules of economic rationality. For 
example, the hypothetical project H in Table 6-1 is very likely to be selected because of its 
positive net present value (NPV). 
Table 6-1: The initial stage of a hypothetical example of investment appraisal 1998-2003, £ million 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 NPV(10%) 
Project H 0 -10 -3 +15 +20 0 +13.36 
Rationale: Accept project H because its Net Present Value NPV=+13.36 > 0. 
A simple question relating to the above problem could be whether an enterprise should commit 
additional resources, regardless of other promising opportunities, to an ongoing project that has 
suffered set-backs following start-up. To illustrate let us assume that, at the beginning of 2001, 
two years after start up, project H (see Table 6-2) has failed to yield any profits and requires 
additional investment: should the hypothetical enterprise allocate additional resources to this 
initially promising but now receding project? Should the enterprise continue to commit 
resources to this project in 2002 if an even worse situation is reported at the end of 2001? 
Table 6-2: The sequential stage of a hypothetical example of investment appraisal 1998 - 2003, £ million 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 NPV(10%) 
Project H 0 -10 -3 -5 -8 ? ? 
Rationale: Reject project H because of its seemingly negative NPV. 
The theoretical exploration of the problem: In essence the above-mentioned problem deals 
with decision-making in escalation situations. To illustrate, if a decision is made at the 
beginning of 2002 to continue its commitment towards the previously chosen but now 
seemingly ineffective project H, the enterprise continues to play a waiting game (Ws) - i. e. 
delaying the termination of the heretofore ineffective project H- and will again find itself, as it 
did in each previous year, subject to four possible decision outcomes as depicted in Figure 6-3: 
(a) a correct commission if further commitment progressively brings forth success (C, ), (b) an 
error of commission if further commitment leads to failure (E), (c) a correct omission if 
abandonment saves the enterprise from an otherwise unavoidable failure (C2), and (d) an error of 
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omission if abandonment irreversibly excludes the enterprise from an eventually profitable 
outcome (E, ). 
Figure 6-3: Decision-making quadrants 
(Source: Adapted from Zhang, 1993) 
Withdrawal Continuation 
Error of omission Correct commission Successful 
El C1 
Correct omission Error of commission 
C2 E2 Unsuccessful 
O 
Subjective value 
Normative solutions to the problem as can be suggested by management theorists, 
consultants, and practitioners: It has become axiomatic that an organization needs 
to control 
the destiny of its investment projects once they are under way, but research experience suggests 
to this researcher that strategic aspects of control of investments have received relatively little 
attention from an organizational vantage-points 
despite some effort. In the face of uncertainty 
and ambiguity, for example, the 
lack of a practical and effective control model can put an 
investment project at the frontier of a state of chaos: investment decision-makers may not have 
been able to revise their beliefs, organizational values along with the temporal success or 
momentary failure of the 
investment, or to remain open to feedback and new information about 
the investment project after it was implemented. Graphically speaking (Figure 6-4), this chaos 
calls for effective control over 
both mental and physical investment activities, and necessitates 
that control mechanisms should consider, inter alia, the 
dimension of time? 
Answers to the problem randomly gathered from practices of investment decision-making: 
In the practical world there are many different answers to the problem illustrated above. 
Seemingly, the most astonishing answers to the above problem lie in what can be crystallized 
into an ineffective waiting game over time 
in which investment decision-makers who find 
themselves 'muddling through' among various conflicts, until eventually becoming financially 
lost 'in no man's land'. That is, as depicted 
in Figure 6-3, investment decision-makers, averse to 
the most reasonable choice C2 and in the 
distant hope of Cl, persist in avoiding errors of 
omission El at the risk of making errors of commission 
E2, and find themselves muddling 
through among various conflicts, until eventually they became lost in no man's land. This issue 
Error of omission Correct commission 
El Cl 
Correct omission Error of commission 
C2 E2 
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refers to one major theme in the study of organizational commitment. Famous examples can 
include Euro-Disney, Channel Tunnel, British Library, Concorde, Expo'86, Sydney Opera 
House, Three Gauge Dam, and Japan's military expansion in the second World War, 
American's involvement in the Vietnam war. 
Figure 6-2: A simple control framework for investment decision-making 
...................................... Evaluation 
...................... Standards 
'I he past 
I he present 
the future 
Goal 
Preparation 
The severity of the problem: Commitment escalation in investment decision-making raises 
problems for the control of a project. It invalidates the usual financial models and complicates 
conventional control processes. It raises questions regarding effective management control such 
as 
(a) Do financial models of project appraisal offer sufficient guidance I'm- the overall 
organizational control of an ongoing project? 
(b) Do investment decision makers always behave in an economically rational way when 
making sequential decisions? If not, what drives them to behave in the way they do? (e. g. 
The human 'ego', the project itself, the design of the organization, or the complex 
competing environnlent. 
) 
(c) What kinds of managers / accountants are most likely to behave economically irrationally 
in such situations as illustrated in Table 6-2? 
(d) What are the underlying causes o1- this phenonIenon'? (e. g. Retrospective rationaliiifL or 
proshcctivc rationing, or both. ) 
(e) Is the escalating commitment phenomenon an issue or a problem? Is it always unhealthy as 
IS Suggested in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2? 11' not, when is it plausible and in What 
circunmstanccs? 
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(f) Should this phenomenon be cured? If so, how? Are there any guide-lines or frameworks for 
managers / accountants to follow? I, 
(g) How can managers and accountants exert effective control over ongoing projects? Which is 
the best way of managing commitment? 
The current position of research concerning investment decision-making: In the past, a 
good deal of research on investment decision-making has been undertaken, but most has 
concentrated on financial analysis and on initial evaluation rather than on the monitoring and 
post-auditing stages of the investment process as reflected in Neale & Holmes' (1991: 7) Capital 
Budgeting System (Figure 6-5), in which five stages of the investment process have been 
postulated. 
Figure 6-5. A sam ple capital budgeting system 
(Source: Neale & Holmes (1991: 7)) 
1. D eterm Instion of the budget 
How much is available to spend? 
2. Search 
What project ideas have emerged? 
What costs and benefits will they generate? 
3. Evaluation 
W hat is the value of the projected costs and benefits? 
W list is the target rate of return? 
Does the project's IRR exceed this? (i. e. does it have a positive N PV ?) 
How risky is the project? 
4. M onitoring 
During im plern entation: --- is the project on schedule? 
--- will costs exceed the budget? 
ongoing: --- is the project performing to budget? 
--- if not, why not? 
S. Post-A u diting 
is the project performing to initial expectations? 
How justified were those expectations? 
W hat lessons can we draw to assist future appraisal? 
This gives rise to a concern whether more attention should 
be paid to the researching of 
investment potential, to the re-evaluating of new and old opportunities, or to the monitoring and 
the post-auditing of on-going projects. 
All this, in essence, relates to the following questions when a project is implemented: 
" Do managers 
/ accountants realistically analyze the costs incurred against budget when the 
project is in progress? 
Are managers / accountants open to feedback and new information about the project? 
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Are they still as firmly committed to the project as when initiating it? 
Do they research and re-evaluate new and/or old project opportunities during and after the 
initial evaluation and the implementation of an on-going project? 
Do they revise their beliefs or organizational values in line with the success or failure of the 
project? 
A number of studies of escalatory commitment have been conducted in the past 20 years. 
However, most studies have been based purely upon laboratory experiments, and little real 
world investigation has been undertaken, hence the findings, qua findings, of previous research 
do not explain causality and are of questionable external validity. What is more, nearly all the 
previous research has concentrated on psychological factors such as self-justification, self- 
presentation, and information processing. Less emphasis has been placed on project, social and 
structural factors. Strategic aspects have received some attention, but relatively little has been 
done from an organizational vantage-point. 
As a result, very few practical frameworks for effective commitment management have emerged, 
and there is no available framework embracing multiple managerial perspectives, e. g. economic, 
environmental, operational (product designing, engineering, planning, financing, implementing, 
pricing, promoting, distributing, servicing), organizational, philosophical, political, 
psychological, societal, strategic, and technological. Thus, 
it is felt to be not only desirable but 
also timely to seek to bridge these gaps and to explore 
both effective and ineffective investment 
decision-making in an organizational context. 
The relevancy of this research in the empirical setting: In both Britain and China, the theme 
of escalating commitment 
has received much less attention than in North America. In the late 
1970s Likierman did a study on cost escalation and suggested ways of avoiding cost escalation, 
emphasizing factors to be considered 
before an investment project starts and how to control the 
'in progress' phase by means of variance analysis 
(Likierman, 1980). From a British study 
focusing on different methods of investment appraisal, Dugdale (1991) suggests that social 
factors are as important as financial analysis. As regards the control aspects of the investment 
decision-making process, it is argued that techniques such as post-completion audit (PCA) 'are 
relatively ignored (e. g. Kim & Farragher, 1981). Surveys of UK enterprises have revealed that 
post-auditing is less popular 
in Britain than in the USA, and that less than half of those 
enterprises which are practising 
PCA use it on a regular basis (Scapens & Sale, 1981; Pike, 1982; 
Pike & Wolfe, 1988; Neale & Holmes, 1988). Mills and Kennedy's (1992) analysis of PCA 
practices also offers some 
insights into the dynamic managerial decision-making process in the 
UK setting. China is economically advancing rapidly. While there 
is little research conducted to 
examine the Chinese practice regarding 
investment management, China's managerial 
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professions are becoming intensively interested in utilizing Western management concepts 
while preserving their own managerial wisdom. Thus pioneering research in this vein can not 
only help improve understanding between the two parts of the world, but also help promote 
future co-operative investment opportunities. 
The originality of the research in the context of existing relevant literature: The research of 
this researcher is original at least within both the British and the Chinese context. Literatures 
covering escalating commitment tend to be very discrete and no sound syntheses have been 
produced. The use of meta-analysis maintains a novel as well as a promising approach for 
assessing the literature. ' Although many surveys have been conducted to investigate the use of 
investment evaluation techniques, few investigations have been carried out to show how and 
why various techniques (e. g. NPV, payback period, and PCA) are used by enterprises at 
different stages of the project life cycle. ' 
This study employs a unique set of approaches to offer unbounded outside-in as well as inside- 
out views, whilst nearly all previous research concerning escalating commitment only provides 
bounded outside-in views and is of little help in revealing causality. Empirical study being 
involved in this research will help reveal the triggers of escalating commitment in investment 
decision-making in the full organizational context and enrich the existing literature by extending 
studies on investment decision-making, organizational commitment, and strategic control into a 
wider area embodying a broader perspective on the investment decision-making process. 
6.4 The 0: the operationalization of the research 
The topic of the research: The puzzle of investment decision-making in practice as being 
depicted in Figures 6-3,4&5 entices this researcher to explore investment decision-making in a 
full organizational context. More specifically, this muddle inspires this researcher's interest in 
exploring the role which strategic control plays in the investment decision-making context. 
Therefore, this research, being strengthened by organizational commitment which in turn 
functions as a thread to link all of the bit together, sees strategic control as the hub of all 
research oriented activities; and strategic control of investments actually becomes, after several 
rounds of evolution, the topic of the research as well as the title of the thesis. 
The determination of the research variables: Approaches to strategic control vary non- 
significantly with most previous studies mainly concentrating on control mechanisms such as 
premise control, special alert control, implementation control and strategic surveillance (Preble, 
1992). However, previous studies of strategic control (e. g.; Coad, 1995; Glueck and Jauch, 1979; 
Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Harrison, 1991; Stacey, 1991; Kellinghusen and Wubbenhorst, 1990; 
Wilson, 1995; Schreyogg and Steinmann, 1987), perhaps except Neale and Holmes's (1990) 
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post-completion auditing and Roush and Ball's (1987) reporting system, have, despite effort, 
exhibited a lack of a meaningful as well as operationalizable concept or framework which 
enables academics and practitioners to unify the existing approaches to strategic control and put 
them into strategic control practices. This research aims to bridge the gap by employing 
organizational commitment in resources (e. g. time, effort, funds, people's assistance) as a 
medium through which the study of strategic control of investment can be meaningfully 
operationalized. Since this research focuses on exploring organizational commitment in the 
investment decision-making process - especially, commitment escalation, commitment de- 
escalation and strategic control of an investment, organizational commitment is therefore further 
localized into and operationalized by the amount of resources allocated to an investment project, 
viz., the amount of resources committed to an investment has been chosen as the dependent 
variable in the studies of this researcher. Accordingly, critical factors influencing organizational 
commitment in the investment decision-making process have been targeted as independent 
variables in the studies of this researcher. For example, the four conflicting perceived utilities 
(e. g. Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) are employed as the independent variables to portray escalation 
of organizational commitment in Chapter 9; sunk cost and negative feedback (e. g. Arkes and 
Blumer, 1985) are jointly employed as the independent variables to portray de-escalation of 
organizational commitment in Chapter 10; and some 16 strategic control elements ranging from 
intensive SWOT analysis to timeliness for corrective surgery are employed as the independent 
variables to portray strategic control of organizational commitment 
in Chapter 11. 
The justification for using commitment as the medium of the study lies in the assertions that 
organizational commitment remains construct-wise multi-dimensional with as many as possible 
different forms and foci (Morrow, 1983) and that organizational commitment continues to 
matter a lot in modem organizations 
(e. g. Meyer and Allen, 1997), despite the fact that people 
have been advised not to become too attached to the organizations in which they work or live 
(e. g. Hirsch, 1987) due to the rapid changes 
in the world of work (e. g. Cascio, 1995) including 
global competition (Black et al, 
1995), business reengineering (Hammer and Champy, 1993), 
replacement of jobs with roles 
(Bridges, 1994), and organizational emphasis on flexibility and 
efficiency (Meyer and Allen, 
1997). Furthermore, research into organizational commitment has 
been inspired by several other factors (Meyer and Allen, 1997): first, organizations may become 
bigger by upsizing or smaller by down sizing, but they are not disappearing in that they always 
maintain a core of people who are the organization; second, organizations may contract out 
work to individuals or 
firms outside of the organizations but they still become concerned about 
the commitment of these others although the 
focus and duration of which may differ from case 
to case; third, commitment 
develops naturally in that people need be committed to something, or 
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otherwise, the opposite of commitment, alienation (e. g. powerlessness, meaninglessness, 
normlessness, and isolation), will effect, -perhaps imposing unhealthy implications on the 
organization (Seeman, 1959; Dean, 1961; Clark, 1959). ' 
The research themes: To decompose the research focus, this researcher incorporates different 
research issues relating to the study of this researcher into three workable macro-themes (i. e. 
escalation, de-escalation, and strategic control) which each range from simple to complicated 
questions generated from previous discussions (e. g. Q1-1 to Q1-8; Table 2-2; Figure 3-1,2&4; 
Q4-1 to Q4-33; Q5-1 to Q5-18; ) as well as from the researcher's own industrial experience: 
Q6-t. Do project (or other) factors, such as closing costs and salvage values, always dictate 
escalation of commitment in the receding project? If not, when does the role of project 
factors wane and wax, and what else matters?. What is the relative importance of differing 
factors (such as project, psychological, operational, cultural, political, social, and 
ideological) upon escalation of commitment in investment decision-making over time? Is 
there any causal relationship between corporate strategy (such as expeditionary marketing, 
cost leadership, and differentiation) and investment escalating commitment over time? 
Q6-2. What promising ways of de-escalation at different stages of the escalating commitment 
process are adopted in practice? Are those proposed mechanisms relevant in practical 
decision-making? Is it really managers responsible for the receding project who are to 
blame for the repeated failure? If not, at what stage of the project life cycle or in what 
situations is the organization itself or society itself more likely to be responsible for 
repeated failure? 
Q6-3. What are the effective strategic control mechanisms 
leading to success for investments? 
Does the control process described by Neale & Holmes (1991) or the newly 
conceptualized strategic control framework by this researcher differ over time along the 
project life cycle? That is, are some steps usually 
ignored or over-emphasized at different 
stages of the escalating commitment process? What are the principles 
of strategic control? 
What are the most effective strategic control factors in investment decision-making? 
The pre-supposed criteria to identify ineffective commitment in investment decision- 
making: Possible criteria 
for the identification of escalating commitment in investment 
decision-making may include the following: 
Qc6-t. increasing investment 
becomes a strict function of a waiting game over time; 
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QC6-2. at the outset the probability of attaining prior expectations from an investment project is 
uncertain or, alternatively, an investment outlay which is completely disproportionate to 
the enterprise's available resources is required; 
QC6-3. both the costs associated with continuing and the presumed proximity (as indicated by 
economic rationality) to the desired goal increase as additional resources are invested; 
Qc6-4. conventional mechanisms guiding investment decision-making appear incomplete or 
ineffective; 
QC6-5. there is a conflict between the empowerment (flexibility, innovation, and creativity) of 
business opportunities and the control of the management processes; 
QC6-6. there is a lack of any strategic control framework to synthesize multiple perspectives on 
control within an organizational context; and, 
QC6-7. there is an important shift in the decision-maker's perception of his/her motivation to 
invest over time (i. e. from rational to rationalizing). 
6.5 The A: the actualization of the research 
Bearing in mind the initial state of the problem, the goal state of the problem, the operators of 
the research and the path constraints of the research, this researcher decides to accomplish the 
research goal by the use of varying research methods (Abrahamson, 1983) so as to prevent the 
research from becoming method-bound and to exploit Smith's (1975) notion of triangulation so 
as to use the strengths of one method to overcome 'the weakness of another as well as 
maximising the amount of data (see Table 5-1, Table 5-2, and Table 5-6). It is also decided by 
this researcher that the research goal is to be achieved by triangulation of theories - viz., the 
heuristical use of frameworks from different disciplines to explain complex situations (see, say, 
Table 5-2, Figure 4-2, Figure 2-5, Figure 3-2 and Figure 1-1), by triangulation of data - viz., the 
collection of primary data over different time frames or from different sources (see Table 5-6), 
and especially by Todd's (1979) methodological triangulation - viz., the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods (see Figure 5-3) and by Bechtel and Richardson's (1993) systematic 
process of discovery - viz., the use of debates via conferences and publications with both 
academics and practitioners so as to clarify the conceptual definition of the research themes and 
enhance the feasibility of the research, and the use of pilot studies (see Appendix A) and a case 
base (as being reflected in Acknowledgements) to sharpen the focus of the research, (e. g. the 
refinement of research hypotheses as can 
be reflected in each individual study of the research or 
in Appendix A for an example) and probe profitable tactics in relation to the implementation of 
the research. 
The research activities: Among major research activities to be involved in this research include: 
4 Identifying relevant literature via a manual search to identify suitable material including 
reference books, journals, and monographs and a computer search to identify suitable 
material including books and journals published world-wide using BIDS-ISI & BIDS- 
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UnCover, OCLC FirstSearch (including Articlelst, BusPerInd, Contend ist, FastDoc, 
GenScilndex, GPO, ReadGuideABs, SocSciInd, and Worldcat), CD-ROMs (including 
ABI/Inform, Psychlit, ASSIA Plus), and WWW (NCSA Mosaic); 
-0- Summarizing and integrating research findings on escalating commitment via a narrative 
review of existing literature, and a synthesis of previous research (using meta-analytical 
procedures). 
+ Identifying, calibrating and conducting a series of studies vis-ä-vis escalation, de-escalation 
and strategic control (see Appendices A, B&C for samples or detailed designs), by empirical 
examinations of some investment projects which have evolved over time from escalatory 
conflicts into either final success (Cl), plausible abandonment (C2), mistaken rejection (EI), 
or irrevocable error (E2) (see Figure 6- 2). 
4 Searching for ways of effective management of investment by concentering insights into 
frameworks or theories which can be applied in practice to help disentangle practitioners 
from decision-making dilemmas in the jungle of world investments. 
The micro-themes of the research: The main enquiry activities involve observational case 
study, mail-based field experiments, interview-based survey. In addition to the questions raised 
earlier, micro-themes to be covered will include: 
Q6-4. Managers' / accountants' career progression. [e. g. Is promotion, as well as reward and 
penalty systems, short-term performance -oriented? Is there any tendency in practice, as 
agency theorists have suggested, for managers /accountants to act in their own self- 
interest, at the expense of the sponsors of the project, and, if so, how can the information 
asymmetry that leads to private information be cured? Do enterprises have contingent 
incentive systems that align the interests of the alleged agents and principals (e. g. junior 
managers versus senior managers, or senior managers versus the financial sponsors of the 
project)? ] 
Q6-5. Problems and successful practices - especially regarding the 
implementation and control 
of investment projects. (Are decision-makers well informed about an investment project 
before a decision is made? Is enough attention paid to the control process in practice? 
Q6-6. The political, social, economic, operational, inter-personal, organizational, strategic and 
technological context of an organization. [e. g. Is an investment decision made before the 
economic appraisal has been conducted? Is the design of the existing accounting system 
appropriate? Is the emphasis in capital budgeting really misplaced as suggested by writers 
such as Kim & Farragher (1981)? Are certain industries more likely than others to exhibit 
escalating commitment? ] 
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Q6-7. The relationship between the strategic, financial, environmental and psychological 
dimensions of organizational behaviour. [e. g. Is there any size effect of a project -in 
financial terms? ] 
Q6-8. To what extent are managers / accountants aware of the escalating commitment 
phenomenon and how do they view it? How does escalating commitment emerge and 
evolve, and in what forms? What are the possible consequences of escalating commitment 
and do they always reduce performance? ) 
Foreseeable problems of data access and likely consequences: Anticipated problems in data 
gathering include the following: 
QP6-1. Data access relating to enterprises facing fierce competition may be very difficult in that 
enterprises might not be willing to reveal details of their success/failures. 
QP6-2. Given data access, findings may not be comparable due to the differing characteristics of 
investment projects (e. g. capital intensive or labour intensive) and other enterprise- 
specific or contextual factors such as the marketing environments and the stages of the 
business life cycle in which the targeted enterprises are located. 
QP6-3. Managers / accountants to be interviewed might disguise their true feelings for various 
reasons. 
QP6-4. Subjectivities due to the interaction of interviewer and interviewees may also affect the 
reliability of data from case to case. 
QP6_5. The accessibility of targeted enterprises in that enterprises approached might refuse to 
participate. 
QP6-6. The built-in subjectivity inherent in techniques (both qualitative and quantitative) 
adopted to analyze data and represent research findings can also be somewhat 
misleading. 
6.6 The I: the idealization of the research 
The interpretation of the results: This research combines qualitative analysis and quantitative 
analysis to generate insights from investment decision-making processes as well as collecting 
non-quantifiable data so as to advance research and theories under this theme. 
However, this researcher considers that (a) the results from qualitative analyses (such as the 
narrative review of existing 
literatures and the `thick' descriptive case studies) can only be seen 
as being tentative since deep 
insights are gained at the cost of a loss in generality, (b) the results 
from quantitative analyses (such as meta-analytical synthesis, experiments and surveys) can 
only be seen as being tentative since an integration of existing literatures can be gained only at 
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the cost of neglecting non-quantifiable literature, and (c) the ending of this research actually 
initializes the next round of research except the fact that, via cyclical observing and theorizing, 
organizational (as well as individual) learning is fostered and knowledge on research and 
strategic control of investments is improved. 
The concentering of the insights: This research goes beyond theory-using by fostering theory- 
finding in around three themes: investment decision-making (which leads to Chapter 12), 
organizational commitment (which is discussed in Chapter 13), and strategic control (which is 
dealt with in Chapter 14). Original effort is made in the line of investment decision-making to 
integrate the existing theories of investment and investment decision-making in the full 
organizational context in order to advance the theory of investments and to help practitioners to 
better understand the real trick of investment decision-making. Original effort is also made in 
the line of organizational commitment to extract insights from sense-data to form a paradigmatic 
framework of the management of organizational commitment in investment decision-making 
and to provide practitioners with both awareness and methods of commitment management. A 
larger portion of original effort is made to synthesize different theories of strategy, control and 
strategic control, to build frameworks leading to successful controllership of investments, and to 
establish a set of criteria for successful strategic control of 
investments in the full organizational 
context. 
The benefits of the research: Among the practical benefits to be derived are: 
QB6-1. A better understanding of investment escalating commitment phenomena and strategic 
control of investments (including definitions) to enhance managers' / accountants' 
awareness that qualitative factors (whether psychological, social or structural) influence 
investment decision-making. 8 
QB6-2. A clarification of what managers and accountants actually do when making investment 
decisions, as opposed to what both management and escalating commitment theories 
predict-9 
Qß6-3. A valuable insight into the 
dynamics of the managerial decision-making process which 
might improve the quality of investment decisions. 
" 
Qß6-4. Improved effectiveness of managers' and accountants' control of projects,, especially 
in 
the implementation and control stages of the process. 
QB6-5. The provision of better training and education 
for present and future managers / 
accountants. 
Q136-6 . 
The provision of means by which both managers / accountants and organizations can 
balance financial, strategic, environmental and organizational aspects of investment 
decision-making. 
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QB6-7. The provision of strategies for organizational control over projects before, during, and 
after their completion, as well as guide-lines on what managers can do and what 
organization can do to avoid unhealthy escalating commitment at different stages. 
QB6-8. The provision of various hypotheses for future theoretical and empirical research 
concerning effective investment decision-making. " 
6.7 Conclusion and recommendation 
The COAI design partially corresponds to five out of the eight perspectives regarding a quality 
research (i. e. Q1-l, Q1-2, Q1-4, Q1-7, Q1-8) by concentrating on the conceptualization, 
operationalization, actualization and idealization of the study of this researcher. The COAL 
design has also highlighted the work to be done in the COAI fashion. It is expected that, by 
doing so on his way to explore three macro-theme related issues (i. e. Q6-1 to Q6-3) 
supplemented by five more micro-theme related issues (i. e. Q6-4 to Q6-8), the researcher is to 
achieve at least eight sub-goals (i. e. from QB6-1 to QB6-8) if he could manage to overcome at 
least six generic research problems (i. e. from QP6-1 to QP6-6). 
To recommend, the COAI design typically arouses the researcher's interest in corresponding to 
the rest of the eight perspectives on a quality research. (i. e. Q1-3, Q1-5, Q1-6). In fact, Q1-3 (i. e. 
identifying three categories of research "boxes") clearly demands that a literature review to be 
thoroughly undertaken in the next part of the thesis otherwise further correspondence to Q1-5 or 
Q1-6 in the rest part of the thesis can be meaningless as well as aimless. 
' This finding belongs to the serendipity pattern as this researcher was originally 
interested in the possibility of the 
inclusion of the preliminary data of original authors 
in his meta-analytical study of previous studies on 
organizational behaviour 
involving the concepts being employed in this study. The target had been the unpublished 
phD theses of those who had 
been cited in the literature of organizational decision-making. 
2 The case of Velikovsky illustrates the strong reaction of 
those operating in a `normal' scientific paradigm to 
`revolutionary' ideas. According to 
McAulay (1979), Dr. Velikovsky's attempt to publish his book Worlds in 
Collision though many of the hypotheses in which were subsequently 
found to be accurate, was greatly unwelcome 
and prevented by the scientific 
community in that the work of Velikovsky was founded on the premise that meta- 
physics, religion, and politics provide an 
`infrastructure' which influences scientists' evaluation of ideas. 
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3 This chaos also gives rise to this researcher's curiosity to explore various aspects of commitment over investments 
from the organizational vantage-point. More precisely, this chaos stimulates this researcher's search for a theory of 
strategic control of investment projects. 
Project factors could involve strategic considerations such as technological innovation and expedient marketing, 
as well as economic considerations such as sunk cost, the probability of goal attainment under uncertainty, and the 
availability of investment alternatives. Social factors could involve face saving, competition, external binding, 
modelling processes and norms. Structural factors could involve economic and technical side-bets, political support, 
and organizational inertia (e. g. Brockner, 1992; Ghemawat, 1991; Staw & Ross, 1987; Wilson et al, 1992). 
3 Meta-analysis can be used to assess the current state of knowledge, identify directions for future research, guide 
policy decision as well as advance theory (Staw, 1987). In this research, meta-analysis will assess mechanisms 
explaining escalating commitment, identify moderating variables worthy of empirical research, and highlight 
directions for future research. 
6 For example, do enterprises use NPV to appraise and/or re-appraise a project at every stage of the project life 
cycle? If not, why not? What technique replaces NPV? And at which stage(s) of the project life cycle does the 
replacement occur? 
Alienation refers to a psychological state of individuals which reflects individuals' feeling of lacking in means to 
eliminate the discrepancy between their definition of the role they are playing and the one they feel they should be 
playing in a specific situation. The concept of alienation has been identified in four commonly accepted forms: 
powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, and isolation. Powerlessness (Seemen, 1959) relates to the 
expectancy or probability held by individuals that their own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the 
outcomes, and it implies that people in organizations may have the feeling of not being able to influence business 
behaviour in order to protect their interests as members of the organizations (e. g. the feeling of powerless when top 
management do not respond to line managers' requests for corrective action due to the failure of a product or 
service to meet their reasonable expectation). Meaninglessness (Seemen, 1959) relates to a low expectancy that 
satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behaviour can be made, and it implies that people in organization 
may have a feeling of meaninglessness when they find themselves not able to make wise decisions on purchases 
because of lack of self-confidence, insufficient information about alternative products, or intelligence. 
Normlessness (Dean, 1961) relates to the absence of values which might give purpose or direction to life, and the 
loss of intrinsic and socialised values (i. e. purposelessness), or the difficulties of individuals who incorporate 
conflicting norms in their personality (i. e. conflict of norms), and it implies that people working in organizations 
can have the feeling of normlessness if they believe that they have been deceived or cheated by top management or 
stakeholders who are engaged in unethical and unjust business practices. Isolation (Clark, 1959) relates to the 
feeling of separation from the group or from group standards, which can give rise to many behaviours such as low 
social participation, spatial mobility, 
lower percentage of voting, greater unemployment, and a higher rate of job 
turnover, and it implies that the feeling of isolation occurs when people working in organizations are not able to 
understand the real meaning of advertisement, to 
identify with business practices or to experience pleasant decision 
conditions. 
' For example, Expo' 86 showed that political support could overwhelm all other factors which lead to escalating 
commitment. Meanwhile the 
Sydney Opera House experience illustrates how technological considerations might 
also dictate escalating commitment. 
9 For example, a field study could test the assertion made by Staw (1976) that those personally responsible for the 
initial investment decision are very likely to become entrapped when exposed to negative decision consequences. 
However, responsibility for the initial decision may not necessarily result in escalating commitment. The 
underlying causes of escalating commitment could also be other factors, such as long term strategic consideration 
[e. g. 'the locking out effect' (Ghemawat, 1991)], social bindings, and organizational inertia. 
10 For example, by realizing that project factors can possibly dictate escalating commitment earlier in the project life 
cycle, but that their role could wane 
later on, and it could also become overwhelmingly important in the decline 
stage of the project life cycle, 
investment decision-makers could have a yardstick to guide their control over a 
project at different stages of 
its life cycle. Also, an awareness of which of the five steps of investment appraisal 
(Figure 5) could have been ignored or over-emphasized at different stages of the project life cycle might promote 
more effective control over that project. 
" Exploring the integration of f inance, strategy and organization behaviour will provide a bird's eye view of how to 
balance the project, psychological, social, and structural utilities of a project the interactions of which could directly 
contribute to escalating commitment. 
12 For example, the analysis of analysis 
(i. e. meta-analysis) can highlight causal relationships between escalatory 
behaviour and specified variables by moderating various factors contributing to escalating commitment, and direct 
the dimensions of future research by distinguishing variables including explanatory mechanisms with large effect 
(e. g. possibly prospect theory) 
from those with median and small effect. This analysis of analysis can either test, or 
synthesize, or evaluate, or advance theories 
by comparing and contrasting discrete literatures as well as providing 
new hypotheses to 
be tested via further empirical research. 
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7. Escalating Commitment In Investment Decision Making: A Review 
7.1 Introduction 
This part of the research seeks to explore one subset of the "wasteful" face of commitment 
within investment decision contexts, i. e. the "escalating commitment" phenomenon in an 
investment decision making context, and provide a review of investment decision making and 
escalating commitment studies. The research is primarily aimed to summarize existing 
literatures of escalating commitment in the investment decision-making context so as to provide 
a better understanding of the escalating commitment phenomenon as well as identifying 
quantifiable sources on which further quantitative analysis of the phenomenon can be based and 
further theory-advancing can rely. Structure-wise, this part of the thesis, first looks at the 
escalating commitment phenomenon in general before locating it within the investment 
decision-making context, then focuses on the mechanisms attempted to explain the 
phenomenon, and finally comments on the previous approaches to the study of escalating 
commitment. 
7.2 Escalating commitment phenomenon: an overview 
As depicted in Figure 7-1, a managerial decision may effect any of the four possible decision 
outcomes: Cl, C2, El, and E2. Traditional or economic rationality dictates that managerial 
decision-makers should only pursue propositions with positive perceived performance (Cl) in 
economic terms, and forgo those with negative perceived performance (C2). 
Figure 7-1: Decision-making quadrants 
(Source: Adapted from Zhang, 1993) 
Continuation Withdrawal 
Correct commission Error of omission Successful 
Cl. El 
0+ 
:. " Error of commission Correct omission 
E2 C2 Unsuccessful 
.a 
0 
Subjective value 
Evidence suggests that not all subsequent managerial decisions are made according to the rules 
Correct commission Error of omission 
Cl El 
Error of commission Correct omission 
E2 C2 
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of organization-specific (e. g. economic) rationality. It has frequently been noticed that decision- 
makers, exposed to negative feedback, irrationally "throw good money after bad" (Staw, 1976) 
and become overcommitted to a chosen course of action. That is, managerial decision-makers, 
averse to the most reasonable choice C2 and in the distant hope of Cl, persist in avoiding Type I 
error E1 at the risk of making Type II error E2 (Figure 7-1), and find themselves "muddling 
through" among various conflicts, until eventually they became lost "in no man's land" 
(Brockner, 1992). 
The topic of commitment has been explored extensively. It is commonly noted that consensus 
over the definition of commitment does not exist but, primarily, commitment has been divided 
into two types, attitudinal and behavioural (Coopey, 1991; Mowday, 1982). The most frequently 
adopted definition is that coined by Porter et al (1974: 604) as the "relative strength of an 
individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization ". However, a more 
operational definition is given by Ghemawat (1991: 14): commitment refers to "the tendency of 
strategies to persist over time. " 
Most explorations, however, have been based upon the assumption that high levels of 
commitment are good. For example, Lawrence (1958: 208) claimed: "Ideally, we would want 
one sentiment to be dominant in all employees from top to bottom, namely a complete loyalty to 
the organizational purpose. " In fact the admiration for individuals, such as Winston Churchill 
and Tzedong Mao who were each highly committed to a chosen course of action, borders on 
worship. 
Not until recently have references to the possible dangers of high levels of commitment surfaced 
'(e. g. Brockner, 1979,1985,1986,1992; Staw, 1976,1978; Staw & Ross, 1987b; Tegar, 1980; 
Whyte, 1986,1993; Wilson et al., 1992; Wilson & Chua, 1993; Wilson & Zhang, 1995a, 1995b, 
1995c, 1997; Zhang & Wilson, 1995; Zhang, 1993). Research about the dangers of high levels 
of commitment still remains sparse, sporadic, and scattered throughout various disciplines 
(Randall, 1987). Findings from discrete literatures indicate that high commitment may be linked 
to a lack of creativity and resistance to change (March et al., 1958; Thompson, 1965), over- 
zealous conformity (Hoffer, 1963), a willingness to engage 
in corporate crime for the benefit of 
the firm (Clinard & Yeager, 1980), and an ineffective use of resources (Rowan, 1981; Staw, 
1976). 
In short, it can be summarized that commitment has two faces (e. g. Statman, 1987; Randall, 
1987). The first is a motivating face that helps generate the force needed to surmount obstacles 
that seem insurmountable and accomplish goals that seem impossibly remote. The second face 
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of commitment is wasteful. Commitment can easily turn into escalating commitment where 
good money is thrown after bad in the pursuit of impossible goals (Statman, 1987: 11). 
7.3 Escalating commitment in investment decision-making 
Investment Decision Making: Investment decision contexts are considered broadly as 
"situations in which resources are allocated to one decisional alternative over others, and in 
which the level of resources can be increased or decreased at the discretion of decision makers" 
(Staw, 1976: 28). Until recently investment decisions have been considered largely in isolation, 
with most capital proposals being assessed purely in terms of their economic attractiveness. For. 
instance, as exhibited in Table 7-1, a firm exposed to the rationalization of project investments is 
very likely to accept projects A, B, C, D, and E purely because of their positive NPV, and reject 
project F because of its negative NPV. 
Table 7-1. A Hypothetical Example of the Rationalization of Project Investments, 1999-2002 
Projects A B C D E F 
Outlay (year 1999),; C 1,000 million 150 160 100 340 130 110 
NPV (discounted at 10%), £ 1,000 million +90 +48 +120 +68 +13 -33 
Benefit-cost ratio +0.6 +0.3 +1.2 +0.2 +0.1 -0.3 
Ranking 2 3 1 4 5 6 
Capital available in 1999, £ 1,000 million 815 
Rationing Accept C, A, B, D, and 50% E; Reject F. 
Total NPV, £ 1,000 million 332.5 ( _ £90 + £48 +£ 120 + £68 +£ 13 *50%) 
Methods of investment appraisal include the discounting techniques (eg. NPV, IRR, MIRR), risk 
analysis techniques (e. g. sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis, 
Monte Carlo analysis) and 
management science techniques 
(e. g. game theory, decision theory, computer simulation, critical 
path, linear programming, probability 
theory). Table 7-2 serves as an example of the above- 
mentioned investment appraisal methods: 
by means of linear programming, the hypothetical 
firm will optimize its allocation of capital resources 
in a way that maximizes the total NPV. 
It has been suggested that, for many organizations, good investment decision-making is not 
necessarily synonymous with 
formalized capital budgeting procedures or the application of 
textbook appraisal techniques (Pike & Dobbins, 1986; Tomkins, 1991; Neale et al. 1992). Effort 
has been made to interlink accounting & finance with corporate strategy as well as 
organizational behaviour, and 
it has been suggested that they are complementary (Barwise et al., 
1989; Ghemawat, 1991; Pike et al., 1986; Tomkins, 1991; Argyris, 1990; Emmanuel et al., 
1992; Handy, 1985; Otley, 1987). For instance, investment decision-making has been 
considered as the natural extension of 
the strategic planning process (e. g. Neale et al., 1992). 
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Table 7-2. A Typical Linear Programming Solution to Capital Rationing for a Hypothetical Firm 
1994-1999, £ million, (Source: adapted from Lumby, 1988: 155) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 NPV(10%) 
Project G -10 -5 -2.5 +10 +10 +10 +3.94 
Project H -5 -7 +10 +10 +4.41 
Project I -10 -3 +15 +20 +13.36 
Project J -1 -2 +5 -10 +10 +10 +6.84 
Project K -10 -10 +20 +10 +5 +8.36 
Project L -20 +30 +10 +10 +19.05 
Assumption: External finance raised in any one period must not exceed £15m , and the internally raised 
cannot be used. 
Objective function: 3.94*g+4.41 *h+13.36*i+6.84*j+8.36*k+19.05*1 Max. 
Whereas g, h, i, j, k, &1 represent the proportion of projects G, H, I, J, K, &L undertaken. 
Constraints: 1). 10*g+5*h+1*j+10*k 5 15 (Year 1994); 2). 5*g+7*h+10*i+2*j+10*k 515 (Year 1995); 
3). 2.5*g+3*i + 20*k 5 15 (Year 1996); 4). 10*j: 515 (Year 1997). 
5). 0: 5 g, h, i, j, k, 15 1. 
Results: g=0; h=0; i=1; j=1; k=0.3; 1=0.6. Total NPV=£ 34.14 in. 
Rationing: Accept project 1 and J, plus 30% project K and 60 % project L; Reject project G and H. 
However, as Argyris (1990) noted, investment decision-makers, when facing embarrassing or 
threatening situations, often become entrapped, activating a personal human theory of control in 
order to remain "in control". This has given rise to a renewed research interest among academics 
and practicioners in escalating commitment in investment decision making contexts. 
Escalating commitment: The escalating commitment phenomenon refers to the tendency to 
continue an endeavour, regardless of 
its merits, once any investment in time, effort, or resources 
has been made, and the common element across terms is the recognition that people often 
consider sunk costs relevant 
in decision making (Whyte, 1993: 431). Escalating commitment has 
several names: "knee deep 
in the big muddy" (Staw, 1976), "too much invested to quit" (Teger, 
1980), "the sunk cost effect" (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), "the dead loss effect" (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984), "putting off the evil day" (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c), and "entrapment" 
(Brockner & Rubin, 1985). 
Escalation situations possess at least the following common properties: (a) a series of behaviour 
linked into a course of action to achieve a goal-state; (b) feedback suggesting that the course of 
action is not achieving the goal-state; and 
(c)an opportunity to commit further time, effort, or 
funds to achieve the goal-state (Staw, 1982). On the one hand, the above-mentioned approaches 
often are related, 
for at least they share with each other what has been called the "ego 
involvement", a tendency that individuals are likely to attach psychological importance to their 
behaviour (Brockner et al., 1986: 110). On the other hand, they are analytically separable 
(Wilson et al., 1992: 601) or contextually different (Wilson and Zhang, 1997). A good example 
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of this is that some sunk cost situations do correspond to escalating commitment situations, and 
that, whilst entrapment can exist in the absence of escalation (Wilson et al., 1992: 601), 
entrapment also can be irrelevant to some sunk cost situations (Arkes & Blumer, 1985: 138). For 
instance, to quit waiting for a bus implies the nullification of all the time one has already spent 
waiting, viz.,, time already spent waiting is the sunk cost. 
Famous cited examples of escalating commitment in investment decision making contexts 
include: Concorde, Sydney Opera House, the Channel Tunnel, the Chicago sewage system, the 
Humber Bridge, Expo' 86, Shanghai Baoshan Steel Mill, Trans-Alaskan pipeline, and BP's 
involvement in North Sea oil exploration (e. g. Ross & Staw, 1986; Wilson & Chua, 1993). 
Table 7-3 provides a brief summary of some vivid examples of escalating commitment, covering 
the type of escalation as well as the extent to which an investment project has become entrapped. 
Table 7-3: Vivid examples of escalating commitment (Source: Various journals & books) 
Investment Projects Estimated costs Eventual costs incurred Type of escalating commitment 
Concorde £80 million £700 million Inter-governmental 
Humber Bridge £19 million £120 million Economic 
Expo' 86 C$ 78 million C $1.5 billion Political 
Sydney Opera House A $2 million A$ 102 million Technological/Political 
7.4 Mechanisms Explaining Escalating Commitment 
Theories that attempt to explain escalating commitment have mushroomed in the past 20 years. 
Although some effort has been made to explain escalating commitment in terms of economic 
rationality (e. g. Tang, 1988), the most plausible explanations 
have concentrated on 
psychological rationality 
(e. g. Brockner, 1985,1992; Staw, 1977; Staw & Ross, 1987a; Teger, 
1980; Wilson et al., 1992, Wilson & Chua 1993, Wilson and Zhang, 1995b, Wilson and Zhang, 
1995c). 
Brockner (1992: 40) believes that most, though not all, of the explanations of escalating 
commitment (Table 7-4) can 
be summarized in two broad categories covering complementary 
Table 7-4. A list of mechanisms employed in the literature to explain escalating commitment 
Agency theory 
Attribution theory 
Decision dilemma theory 
Self-justification theory 
Logical incrementalism 
Organizational inertia 
Reactance theory 
Learned helplessness theory 
Modelling process 
Prospect theory 
Self-presentation 
Uniformity pressures 
Reinforcement theory 
China mentality 
Conflicting perceived utilities 
The illusion of invulnerability 
Sunk cost effect Group polarization 
Expectancy theory 
aspects of human nature: 
(A) decision-makers, according to cognitive dissonance theory (e. g. 
Festinger, 1957), rationalize or self-justify their commitment to the course of action initially 
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chosen; and (B), as expectancy theory implies (e. g. Vroom, 1964), decision-makers focus on 
information related to the expectancies and values associated with continued commitment to the 
course of action. 
Agency theory: Agency theory postulates that the availability of information and incentives 
influences agents' decision making, and predicts that non-sponsor decision makers (a) may act 
in their own self-interest and (b) be more risk-averse than sponsor decision makers (Harrison et 
al., 1993: 635). Every investment project has sponsors (owners or shareholders) who may hire 
the Chief Executive Officer to act as their agent to manage the project. But of equal or more 
interest may be the agency relationship between senior management and junior management 
(acting as agent). Thus agency theory can be relevant to escalating commitment study within the 
investment decision making context. Agency theory implies that escalating commitment is more 
likely to take place when non-sponsor decision makers have both (a) private information (e. g. 
the projects' projected future performance) and (b) an incentive to shirk, or to act in their own 
self-interest at the expense of the sponsors' interests (Harrison, 1993: 636). Proponents of agency 
theory have also suggested ways leading to de-escalation through developing (a) more complete 
information systems or (b) contingent incentive systems (Harrison, 1993: 641). For example, 
Harrison's (1993: 641) findings indicate that non-sponsor decision makers tend to make 
decisions that are in the best interests of the sponsors of the projects. 
Attribution theory: Attribution theory postulates that individuals (a) try, to explain why they 
behaved as they did by identifying the cause of the behaviour in terms of their motives, 
intentions, personality and even situational features (e. g. Gross, 1991: 208) and (b) eventually 
learn they must abandon an investment when set-backs occur repeatedly (e. g. Gross, 1991: 211). 
This theory implies that uncertainty results in escalating commitment and that the escalation can 
be largely reduced later on. For example, investment decision makers after suffering a set-back 
may, rely heavily on subjective 
impressions that could be influenced by their own choice of 
action especially when 
information vital to the attribution process is unobtainable, viz., 
escalating commitment 
is very likely to occur. But over time, the problem as well as the 
prospects of the chosen 
investment can be clarified by the information obtained afterwards, viz., 
de-escalation is also very likely to take place. Indeed, Both Staw & Fox's (1977: 448) and 
McCain's (1986: 283) findings have provided support for this contention. It is claimed that 
attribution theory can explain 
both escalation and de-escalation (McCain, 1986: 281); using 
attribution theory alone, 
however, cannot predict that escalating commitment will necessarily 
occur. Nor does it tell when and 
how de-escalation will take place. For instance, Bateman 
z, I 
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(1986: 47) shows that the communicated attributions of powerful others regarding the success or 
failure of the decision outcome also affects decision behaviour. In fact, male subjects in his 
second experiment, unlike female subjects, did not vary their responses when prior failures were 
attributed to internal causes or external causes (Bateman, 1986: 45). 
China mentality theory: Zhang (1993) proposes that escalation can come from decision- 
makers' deep inner certainty which espouses the confidence to look at things in a new light, to 
push beyond the usual answers in order to get to the bottom of things, to understand the 
underlying causes and connections when others have not, and finally to apply this new 
understanding to build and create anew. As Ohmae (1991) noticed, not having the China 
mentality, individuals will eventually stop with average answers and half-done attempts. Having 
China mentality, individuals tend to believe that the insurmountable are surmountable and 
therefore they are more likely to run the risk of being wrong and of making mistakes (Zhang, 
1993). In fact, Wilson and Zhang (1995b) have found in their experiments that individuals under 
low personal responsibility conditions may also exhibit a commitment as great as those under 
high responsibility conditions. 
Decision dilemma theory: Bowen (1987: 64) propounds that escalating commitment can result 
from a dilemma triggered by the interplay between the degree of commitment to a course of 
action and the amount of equivocality perceived in feedback on prior investments and in 
expectations for the future. This theory suggests that escalating commitment stems from any of 
the following motives: (a) economic considerations; (b) curiosity; (c) the need to see whether 
greater effort will bring the project to fruition, and (d) the desire to learn about the phenomenon. 
This "dilemma rather than error" approach has shed new and unexpected light on the escalating 
commitment study. However, Bowen's (1987: 63) implication that self-justification is largely 
irrelevant to escalating commitment can be misleading (Bracken, 1992: 41). Further, several 
studies (e. g. Brockner & Rubin, 
1985; Garland, 1990) have obtained results contrary to Bowen's 
theory. For example, Garland (1990: 731) found that "incremental costs... had absolutely no 
effect on subjects' willingness to make 
further investment in the [receding] project. " 
Expectancy theory: Expectancy theory (e. g. Vroom, 1964) postulates that decision makers will 
assess the probability of, as well as the value of, goal attainment of alternatives available to them 
and choose the course of action which has the greatest subjective expected utility. According to 
this theory, investment decision makers, even after suffering a set-back, will continue focusing 
on future outcomes and the probability of achieving them with future behaviour. For example, 
Rubin & Brockner (1975: 1062) found that decision makers show greater entrapment when they 
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sense that they are drawing ever closer to their goals and when the value of attaining the goals is 
high. It is also recorded that decision makers are more likely to become entrapped when positive 
persistence-performance relation is seen as "relatively smooth and continuous" rather than 
"discrete" (Sandelands, Brockner & Glynn, 1988: 212), and when the reasons for the negative 
feedback are viewed as unstable rather than stable (Brockner, 1992: 40). It seems that this 
mechanism is most relevant to escalating commitment when there is a possibility of recouping 
one's losses through a future course of action (Staw, 1978: 43). However, expectancy theory 
alone, while providing an examination of sources of future utility in explaining the actions of 
decision makers, does not offer the content necessary for predicting the occurrence of escalating 
commitment (Staw, 1978: 43). 
Group polarization: Group polarization literature (e. g. Myers & Lamm, 1976) suggests that 
when group members have, on average, a moderate preference for a particular point of view, 
group discussion will strengthen this preference. Polarization implies that, given an initial 
preference for escalation among group members, groups that decide to escalate will do so to a 
greater degree than would their average individual members (Whyte, 1991: 413). Indeed, in his 
experiment, Whyte (1993: 446) found that groups, rather than making fewer "errors", become 
more frequently entrapped than individuals. 
Learned helplessness theory: Learned helplessness predicts that, when individuals have been 
attacked by repeated failure in their previous decision making, they may deduce that no 
relationship exists between action and consequences and tend to make type I errors (i. e. ignoring 
the very relevant information in subsequent decision making). Learned helplessness (e. g. Gross, 
1991; Wortmau and Brehm, 1975) has been widely used to explain human depression. For 
example, Gross (1991: 441) maintains that 
learned helplessness explains why the original state of 
anxiety is replaced by depression when the 
individuals realize that concussion cannot be 
controlled and are said to be 
in a state of inaction (or inhibition of coping behaviour) that places 
them in a highly vulnerable biological position. In general, it is believed that learned 
helplessness is less likely to arouse escalating commitment when repeated negative 
consequences are recorded 
(Bateman, 1986). For example, Bateman (1986: 45) revealed that, 
under failure conditions, the 
behaviour of female subjects is consistent with the predictions of 
learned helplessness. However, the learned helplessness individual can also be extremely low in 
prospective focusing and 
be more inclined to make type II errors by repeating the same 
behaviour which could be inappropriate for the new set of circumstances (Staw, 1978: 45). 
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Logical incrementalism: Incrementalism (or the science of muddling through) presumes that 
decision makers favour moving, not so much towards a goal as away from trouble, trying this or 
that small manoeuvre without any grand plan or sense of ultimate purpose (see examples cited 
by Mintzberg & Quinn, 1991: 800-807). Logical incrementalism implies that decision makers 
will simplify the complexities of the decision situation by, say, concentrating on a few key 
thrusts, in the face of making type I errors (Proctor, 1992: 5)., The reason why logical 
incrementalism might facilitate escalating commitment lies in the tendency that incrementalism 
invariably has for choosing a direction close to the prevailing action (Etzioni, 1989: 124). 
Modelling process: Social comparison theory (e. g. Festinger, 1954) postulates that individuals 
are concerned with assessing the appropriateness of their attitudes and behaviour. This theory 
implies that individuals initially attempt to compare themselves to objective standards of 
correctness, and adjust their attitudes and behaviours accordingly. More explicitly, individuals 
continually compare themselves 
with others in order to put their abilities and achievements into 
some sort of perspective (Gross, 1991: 234). For example, it has been reported (Brockner, 
1992: 56) that individuals with low self-esteem are more likely to imitate the behaviour of 
models than are those with high self-esteem. The reason why modelling can relate to escalating 
commitment lies in the fact that, (a) modelling represents a fundamental learning and adapting 
process, and (b) entrapping dilemmas per se provide a fertile ground for modelling processes 
(Brockner et al., 1984: 80). Thus, on attempting to decide whether persistence or withdrawal is 
wiser in an entrapping dilemma where objective or physical yardsticks of comparison do not 
exist, decision makers are especially 
likely to consider the behaviour of others as a model for 
their own behaviour. Indeed, Brockner et al's (1984: 96) four experiments unanimously confirm 
that modelling processes can affect the entrapped decision maker. 
Organizational inertia: Organizational theory presumes that organizations have a built-in bias 
towards inertia. Organizational inertia refers to "a particular sort of durable, specialized, 
untraded factor that the organization 
is supposed to be stuck with, its culture, broadly construed" 
(Ghemawat, 1991: 25). This approach predicts that organizational inertia can (a) magnify the 
costs to the utility of withdrawal and 
diminish the likelihood of change in a course of action and 
(b) moderate resource allocation 
in a way that loosens the relationship between investment 
decision making and subsequent withdrawal actions (Staw, 1987b: 62). This implies that 
organizations may espouse a withdrawal 
from the entrapping conflicts but never really 
implement it. Bias that is likely to heighten escalating commitment in the light of organizational 
inertia includes: (a) the sunk cost fallacy, (b) vividness of action not taken, and (c) the excessive 
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discounting of future consequences (Ghemawat, 1991: 24). For instance, Ghemawat (1991: 23) 
believes that some measure of organizational inertia can be invoked to explain General Motors' 
escalations of commitment in the 80's (eg. the J-cars and the Saturn project). 
Prospect theory: Prospect theory posits that: (a) decision makers perceive outcomes as positive 
or negative in relation to some neutral reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, - 1979: 286), and 
(b) the continuing acceptability of an option can depend, on whether, a negative outcome is 
evaluated or framed as a cost or as an uncompensated -loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984: 342). 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979,1984) has also been widely used to explain the 
phenomenon of escalating commitment (e. g. Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Bateman, 1986; Garland, 
1991; Harwood, 1991; Whyte, 1986; Wilson & Chua, 1993). For example, Whyte (1986: 311) 
suggests that prospect theory provides a more compelling explanation of escalating commitment 
than self-justification. 
To illustrate (Figure 7-2), risky behaviour is much more likely at point B where a decision is 
framed as unsuccessful with a convex value function (as opposed to concave in the domain of 
gains) than at point A, the outset of the decision. Further, as can be seen in Figure 7-2, let us 
assume that an investment decision maker has expended on a prospect in the absence of any 
return, he or she is now (at point B) open to either abandoning the prospect and realizing a 
Figure 7-2: A hypothetical value function 
(Source: Adapted from Kahnemann & Tversky, 1984: 342) 
Subjective value 
Objective losses $ 2X XA Objective gains $ 
B YI 
C 
Y2 
disutility of Y1 units, or investing further to continue with the prospect. Abandoning carries no 
risk, but continuing investment will result 
in either a potential gain in utility of Y1 units (should 
the entire investment be recovered and he or she wind up at point A), or an additional loss of Y2 
minus Yl units (should he or she 
fail to receive any return and wind up at point Q. The convex 
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shape of the value function under loss assures that Y2 minus Y1 will always be less than Yl. 
Thus given an even chance of additional loss or complete recovery of the entire investment, he 
or she ought to choose continuation rather than abandonment. 
Reactance theory: The theory of psychological reactance (e. g. Wortman and Brehm, 1975) 
propounds that when individuals initially expect but subsequently fail to have control over the 
outcomes of their action, they will become motivationally aroused to take action to improve 
their fate. This theory implies that, after suffering a set-back, decision makers (a) may intensify 
their efforts to act rationally in the prospective sense rather than getting locked into a losing 
venture (Staw, 1978: 45), and (b) may also become motivationally aroused to re-establish his 
competence (Wortman and Brehm, 1975: 277). For example, both Bateman (1986: 41) and Staw 
(1978: 59) use reactance theory (i. e. a competence motive) to explain the "higher investment" by 
male subjects when success is followed by a threat of failure. Staw (1978: 55) further indicates 
that "there was a much greater effect of causal information following a failure as opposed to a 
success experience, [and] psychological reactance (i. e. heightened/prospective rationality) is the 
only model [among six psychological theories] which explains the obtained data... ". Variables 
that could strengthen decision makers' psychological reactance include: (a) the history of 
personal control, (b) previous role autonomy, and (c) a strong need for self-competence (Staw & 
Ross, 1978: 7 1). However, like expectancy theory, reactance theory has little predictive power as 
to whether escalating commitment will necessarily arise or decline (Staw, 1978: 45). This is 
because, with reactance theory, as with expectancy theory, commitment to a course of action is 
dependent upon the relative utility of the various courses of action available to the individual at 
the time of his decision. 
Reinforcement theory: Reinforcement theory (e. g. Skinner, 1969) suggests that, (a) negative 
consequences of an investment project lead the decision maker to commit fewer resources to the 
prior course of action, and perhaps allocate more resources to some new project, and (b) 
commitment to a course of action 
is a function of one's previous reinforcement history (Gross, 
1991: 55). This implies that escalating commitment is less likely to occur unless the decision 
makers have either experienced an earlier success 
in a similar situation or received positive 
outcomes resulting from similar 
behaviour on an intermittent schedule (Staw, 1978: 41). 
Evidence in support of reinforcement theory has also been found elsewhere. For instance, Singer 
& Singer (1986: 203) found that individuals who are responsible for negative consequences tend 
to either reduce or maintain their commitment to the previously chosen course of action. 
Bateman (1986: 45) also discovered that under failure conditions, the behaviour of female 
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subjects is consistent with the predictions of reinforcement theory. However, like expectancy 
theory, reinforcement theory per se does not provide much explanation (other than a whim that 
there might be a long individual reinforcement history) on how decision makers can become 
locked into an elusive project (Staw, 1978: 43). 
Self-justification theory: Self-justification (e. g. Aronson, 1972) or dissonance theory (e. g. 
Festinger, 1957) posits that individuals possess a potent need to restore the "appearance" of 
rationality to their own behaviour. In addition, Staw (1978: 44) has proposed a revised self- 
justification theory by adding that "individuals may also increase their commitment of resources 
to a course of action in order to protect themselves from suffering the psychological costs of 
failure. " As a result, the theory predicts that individuals will cognitively re-evaluate decisional 
alternatives after an important choice (e. g. Vroom, 1966), or actively distort the characteristic of 
a behavioural task (e. g. Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). It indicates that the joint presence of (a) 
negative feedback concerning the outcomes of initial resource allocation and (b) a high need to 
justify the correctness of the initial resource allocation should lead to the greatest likelihood of 
escalation (Brockner, 1992: 43). It has been suggested also (Staw & Ross, 1978: 71) that 
variables which might heighten a self-justification effect could include: a) visible responsibility 
for negative consequences; (b) public advocacy of a losing course of action; (c) side-bets; (d) 
political vulnerability; and (e) individual differences. 
Self-justification theory has been widely accepted as one of the most important forces explaining 
escalating commitment (Rubin et al 1975; Staw, 1976; Tegar, 1980). For example, as 
Sandelands, Brockner & Glynn (1988: 208) noted, "it has become fashionable among 
organizational scholars to explain ... escalating commitment through mechanisms of self- 
justification. " The major theoretical contribution of a self-justification mechanism is that it 
posits a form of retrospective as opposed to prospective rationality. Self-justification theory is 
typically applied to explain cognitive rationalization or behavioural inaction (Staw, 1978: 44), 
though it could also apply to situations in which decision makers have encountered a set-back 
but still have an opportunity to recoup their losses (eg. the USA's earlier involvement in the 
Vietnam War). 
However, self-justification notions have received severe attacks. For example, Bowen (1987: 54) 
argues that "prior escalation studies, having not met the criteria for demonstrating the 
phenomenon, should be questioned regarding the theoretical value of the reported results. The 
findings of prior research [notably the self-justification mechanism] may be vulnerable to 
alternative interpretations. " Meanwhile, other explanations -such as prospect theory and 
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expectancy theory at the individual level, group polarization and modeling processes and self- 
presentation theory at the interpersonal and group levels, and theories of organizational inertia at 
the organizational level -have been designed to replace or supplement' self-justification (e. g. 
Bazerman, 1984; Bowen, 1987; Staw & Ross, 1987b; Whyte, 1986; Wilson & Chua, 1993). 
Self-presentation: Self-presentation theory proposes that employees generally behave in a 
manner consistent with the organization's shared values, or put differently, tend to reflect 
employees' self-presentational motives (e. g. Brockner, 1992: 56). In the light of this theory, 
proponents of self-presentation theory assert that an organization's culture affects entrapped 
decision makers (Brockner et al., 1981; Staw & Ross, 1987(b). For instance, Staw & Ross 
(1987b: 55) suggest that escalating commitment is more apt to occur in a culture that (a) makes 
decision makers unwilling to admit failure, or (b) values consistency in behaviour, than in one 
that favours experimentation. More promisingly, as Brockner (1992: 56) noted, future research 
on self-presentation processes within escalating commitment context can help elucidate whether 
entrapped decision makers' self-justification derives from external or internal need, or both 
(Brockner & Rubin, 1981; Staw, 1981). 
Sunk cost effect: the sunk cost effect (e. g. Arkes & Blumer, 1985: 124) posits that individuals 
show a greater tendency to continue an endeavour once an investment in funds, effort, or time 
has been made. Sunk cost has been defined elsewhere. For example, Kohler's Dictionaryfor 
Accountants (Cooper and Ijiri, 1983) defines "sunk cost" as "a past cost which cannot now be 
revised and hence cannot (or should not) enter into current decisions for increasing or decreasing 
present profit levels. " This approach implies that sunk cost can possess relevance in decision 
making under risk and ignorance (Mepham, 1987: 304). For 
instance, the sunk cost effect relates 
closely to two features of prospect theory: 
(a) value function - i. e. the concave utility function 
for gains and convex for losses (see Figure 7-2), and (b) the certainty effect - i. e. the over- 
evaluation of absolutely certain gains, and the under-evaluation of certain losses 
(Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985: 132; Garland, 1991: 57). Thus escalation can occur because of the sunk cost effect 
- especially when 
decision makers have the desire not to appear wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985: 137). For instance, Arkes & Blumer (1985: 137) refer to Rubin & Brockner"s (1975: 1054) 
example of bus waiting as escalating commitment that corresponds to the sunk cost effect in that 
time already spent waiting is the sunk cost. However, sunk cost does not necessarily induce 
escalating commitment, and it provides a strong 
impetus to escalating commitment only when 
continuous losses are endured in the hope of later rescue by a further investment (Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985: 138). 
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The CPU theory: The conflicting perceived utility model (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) maintains 
that escalation of commitment is a result of a shift in the decision-maker's reference point 
regarding the conflicting perceived utilities in the full organizational context such as the project- 
related, psychological, social, structural, ideological, strategic, operational, technological. It 
tends to explain escalating commitment by conflicts among experimenting, persisting, time- 
biding and withdrawal in terms of perceived utilities such as face, NPV, power, advantage, and 
positioning. It is also proposed that the CPU theory can be used to provide a paradigmatic 
service for integrating existing mechanisms explaining escalating commitment. However, 
although effort has been made to examine this theory from the project perspective of an 
investment, this theory is still in its infancy stage, and its validity and generalizability is still 
subject to further tests. 
The illusion of invulnerability: The illusion of invulnerability posits that a set-back does not 
necessarily arouse realistic prospective focusing if the decision makers have experienced an 
extended series of successes (Nutt, 1991: 100). Contrary to the predictions of learned 
helplessness, the illusion of invulnerability implies (a) that decision makers who have 
experienced great successes may become too over-confident to make full use of critical 
decision-making skills, and (b) that high invulnerability to negative consequences may result in 
escalating commitment. It is believed that the illusion of invulnerability could be fairly relevant 
in explaining the escalating commitment phenomenon (Staw, 1978: 45). 
Uniformity pressures: Whyte (1993: 434) noted that mutual influence, via the sharing of 
opinions, information, and arguments, 
leads ultimately to consensus. This uniformity looms 
larger when there is (a) an uncertainty about the appropriate response, and (b) a need to maintain 
good relationships among group members. 
It is proposed (with experimental support) that 
groups are more likely to become entrapped when the majority of group members initially 
advocate increasing commitment to a failing course of action, 
because uniformity pressures 
facilitate conformity to the majority view and ensure that the group decision is resonant with the 
majority preference (Whyte, 1993: 446). 
In short, each mechanism mentioned above can play an important role in explaining the 
escalating commitment phenomenon. 
Of all, self-justification theory appears to be one of the 
most plausible. Nevertheless, as Brockner 
(1988: 208,1992: 41) proposed, "self-justification 
notions may offer some insight into the nature (and possibly dysfunctional consequences) of 
persistence, we believe that these theories 
do not account for all (or nearly all) of the variance in 
[project managers'] persistence behavior. " (Sandelands et al., 1988: 208). Self-justification 
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theory provides one explanation of escalating commitment. Prospect theory, decision dilemma 
theory, group polarization, organizational inertia, and numerous other perspectives (mentioned 
or not mentioned above) are also likely to provide important explanations of escalating 
commitment (Brockner, 1992: 53). For example, that greater sunk costs in a failing course of 
action induce escalating commitment may well be explained by prospect theory rather than self- 
justification (Garland, 1990: 728). 
7.5 Previous Research On Escalating Commitment: A Summary 
Research findings of investment escalating commitment have been attained mainly by means of 
simulated laboratory games. For example, in their "approach-avoidance conflicts" experiment, 
Rubin and Brockner (1975: 1061) found that escalating commitment is more likely to occur 
when information about costs are less salient. Staw (1976: 40) also discovered that decision- 
makers are likely to become entrapped when they are responsible for making the initial 
investment which has hitherto not met with success (the personal-responsibility condition) rather 
than their predecessor in the organization (the no personal-responsibility condition). 
Some effort has been made to explore ways toward de-escalation (e. g. Staw & Ross, 1987a; 
Brockner et al., 1979; McCain, 1986; Simonson & Staw, 1992; Whyte, 1991; Schwenk, 1988, 
Drummond, 1995). For instance, Staw & Ross (1987b: 71-74) propose to reduce escalation by: 
(a) recognizing overcommitment; and (b) changing the organization (via rotating administrators, 
or separating decision makers, or reducing the risk of failure, or improving the information 
system). In addition, Simonson & Staw's (1992: 424) experiment, comparing the effectiveness of 
several de-escalation strategies, does provide support for some of the de-escalation techniques 
proposed by Brockner et al (1979) and Staw & Ross (1987(a). Simonson & Staw (1992: 419) 
have compared several de-escalation strategies and found that among the most effective are "(a) 
making negative outcomes less threatening, (b) setting minimum target levels that, if not 
achieved, would lead to a change in policy, and (c) evaluating decision makers on the basis of 
their decision process rather than outcome. " Nevertheless, the solution to escalating commitment 
can be situation-dependent. 
It can depend upon the stage of the escalation cycle in which the entrapped investment project is 
located (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c). Based upon their escalation cycle that contains four conflict 
variables (i. e. experimenting, persisting, time-biding and withdrawing), Wilson and Zhang 
(1995c) suggest that to escalate or to de-escalate remains a function of the optimizing 
comparison among the perceived utilities of the receding investment which may include, inter 
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alia, psychological, cultural, operational, strategic, economic, cultural, organizational, 
ideological, environmental and political. It can also depend upon the very nature of the 
entrapped project (e. g. Northcraft & Wolf, 1984; Wilson and Zhang, 1995c). Northcraft & Wolf 
(1984: 233) suggest that investment decision makers can react differently to cost overruns as 
opposed to revenue shortfalls: "revenue shortfalls may be seen as gains foregone, but cost 
overruns [may be] felt as losses out of pocket". But unfortunately, many escalation studies have 
not yet clearly specified whether set-backs result from higher than expected costs or from lower 
than expected revenues (McCain, 1986: 283). 
Moreover, little empirical research on investment escalation and de-escalation exists. One 
exception is Barton et al's (1989: 541) test which used employees with managerial experience as 
subjects, by which Staw and Ross's (1987b: 71) prescriptions for de-escalation based on research 
using students in controlled settings have received conditional support. Barton et al's (1989: 541) 
test conditionally supported Staw & Ross's (1987a) recommendations to decouple responsibility 
for initial and subsequent decisions in a failing situation to reduce escalatory behaviour, but their 
findings did not support a reduction of project failure risk as a means of minimizing escalation 
of commitment to a failing course of action. Even less empirical research on investment 
escalation / de-escalation in a full organizational context exists. The single exception is Ross and 
Staw's (1993: 723-728) exploration that provides some additional grounding for an 
organizational theory of escalation and Drummond's (1995) test of existing de-escalation 
models which provides us with a possible new dimension of research. 
Table 7-5 summarizes some previous research on escalating commitment over the past 20 years. 
This review involves a computer search of the literature by using three key words (i. e. 
entrapment, escalation, & commitment). A manual search of selected journals (mainly 
management and psychology journals) 
dating back to 1975 has also been conducted. This 
literature search identifies 45 articles and book chapters on escalating commitment. However, 
Table 7-5 contains only about 35 studies covering both escalation and de-escalation research. It 
is exclusive of studies that are not based upon 
data (e. g. Bowen, 1987; Drummond, 1995; 
Bracken, 1992; Wilson and Zhang, 1995c; Wilson and Zhang, 1997; Staw and Ross, 1987). 
Moreover, the findings of each study listed in Table 7-5 have been based upon laboratory 
experiment(s) and are thus of questionable external validity. 
As a result, it is unwise to conclude 
that Table 7-5 offers a paramount view of the past research on escalating commitment in the 
investment decision-making context. 
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Table 7-5. Summary of experimental research on escalating commitment 
(Sources: various journals from 1975 to 1998) 
No Author Year Findings of each study 
1. Rubin & Brockner 1975 The degree of entrapment (in Rubin and Bracken's (1975) study) varied as a 
function of three factors: salience, queue position, and decrement. 
Staw 1976 Individuals tend to commit the largest amount of additional resources when they 
have been personally responsible for negative consequences. 
Staw & Fox 1977 There were immediate effects of personal responsibility and efficacy of resources 
upon escalation behaviour, but these two variables interacted with the time factor. 
Staw & Ross 1978 Individuals may process information differently after a failure as opposed to a 
successful experience, and that this differential processing may account for 
differences in commitment to policy decisions. 
5. Brockner, Shaw, & 1979 The degree of entrapment may indeed be determined, at least in part, by cost 
Rubin salience: subjects are more entrapped when cost salience was low, and when in 
the "control" rather than the "public" condition 
6. Colon & Wolf 1980 Supported are both the theory that trends in allocation behaviour demonstrated by 
Staw (1978) are contingent on the intervening cognitive process that develops a 
rationale for the allocation, and the notion that situational variables and personal 
styles in coping with problems affect allocations. 
7. Brockner, Rubin, & 1981 The instructions had a greater effect on subjects with high rather than low social 
Lang anxiety, and individuals with high social anxiety who participated in front of a 
large audience were more influenced by the instructions than were those with low 
social anxiety but participated in front of a small audience. 
8. Brockner, Rubin, & 1981 Subjects invested more when cost importance was low rather than high, and 
Lang reward importance had no effect. 
Brockner, Nathanson, 1984 Modelling process can affect the entrapped decision maker. Individuals who 
Friend, Harbeck, witnessed entrapped models became significantly more entrapped than those who 
Samuelson, & Houser did not. 
10. Arkes & Blumer 1985 Those who had incurred a sunk cost inflated their estimate of how likely a project 
was to succeed compared to the estimate of the same project by those who had 
not incurred a sunk cost. 
11. Bateman 1986 Prior failure sensitizes subjects to those aspects of incoming information 
pertinent to economic rationality. Reactance is the arousal of a competence 
motive and males are distinguished from females by a cluster of competence- 
related traits 
12. Bateman 1986 There is no indication that the escalation of commitment to a failing course of 
action is a general phenomenon, but decision-maker gender consistently 
influenced decisions through interactions with success/failure feedback and 
through the communicated attributions of "powerful others" regarding the causes 
of previous decision outcomes. 
13. Brockner, House, 1986 Decision-makers are more prone to entrapment to the extent that they view the 
Lloyd, Birnbaum, negative outcomes associated with prior resource allocations as reflective of their 
Deitcher, Nathan- self-identity. 
son, & Rubin 
14. Brockner 1986 Individuals' identification with outcomes markedly affects escalation decisions, 
and a moderator variable (i. e., performance feedback) can affect the overly 
simplistic view that identification with outcomes will inevitably lead to 
heightened commitment to an ineffective course of action. 
15. Singer & Singer 1986 Individuals who are responsible for negative consequences may either reduce (in 
the case of sensitizers and externals) or maintain (in the case of repressors and 
internal) their commitments to the previously chosen course of action. 
16. McCain 1986 Escalation occurs during the first stage of investment, a process of de-escalation 
may be typical later on. The availability of alternative investment also limited 
escalation. Commitment may not be the dominant process in escalation and de- 
escalation. 
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17. Northcraft & Neale 1986 Making opportunity costs more explicit alters the framing of such decisions and 
leads to decisions which more closely mirror traditional cost/benefit prescriptions 
18. Sandelands, 1988 Persistence was greater in continuous than in the discrete condition. Task 
Brockner, & Glynn variables (e. g. ego-involvement) and dispositional (e. g self-esteem) factors 
moderate the effect of contingency perceptions on performance. 
19. Hollenbeck, 1989 Commitment to difficult goals was higher when (a) goals were made public 
Williams & Klein rather than private, (b) when locus of control was internal rather than external, 
and (c) when subjects were high in need for achievement. 
0. Harwood, Pate, & 1991 There was a shift to greater risk-taking when framing was shifted from positive to 
Schneider negative. 
1. Garland 1990 Strong, positive linear sunk-cost effects were observed in the groups who were 
asked to authorize additional resources for a threatened R&D project. 
2. Garland & Newport 1991 Relative rather than absolute magnitude of sunk costs had a significant impact on 
subjects' reported likelihood of committing additional funds to some action. This 
supported the idea that a topical organization of mental accounts underlies sunk 
cost effects in decision-making. 
23. Brockner, Tyler & 1992 The most negative reactions were exhibited by those who previously felt highly 
Cooper-Schneider committed but who felt that they were treated unfairly by the organization. 
24. Whyte 1993 Escalating commitment occurred in both individual and group decision making. 
Group decision-making amplified trends apparent at the individual level in terms 
of the frequency with which escalation occurred and its severity. 
5. Harrison & Harrell 1993 Subjects in adverse selection tend to continue unprofitable projects, but 
conditions associated with adverse selection had more influence on continuation 
decisions when projections were not strongly negative 
6. Schwenk 1988 Experts' report can promote escalating commitment and that devil's advocacy 
may be effective in reducing it. 
27. Barton, Duchon, & 1989 Decision-makers who were initially responsible and received negative feedback 
Dunegan (US) were least likely to escalate, and the amount of risk perceived by the subjects 
may be more important to escalation behaviour than feeling of responsibility or 
disappointment. 
g. Whyte 1991 Subjects in the individual-responsibility condition were more likely to escalate 
commitment than those who were in the group-responsibility condition, who in 
turn were more likely to escalate commitment than were subjects in the no- 
responsibility control condition. 
9. Simonson & Staw 1992 The most effective de-escalation procedures are 1) making negative outcomes 
less threatening, 2) setting minimum target levels, & 3) evaluating decision- 
makers on the basis of their process rather than outcome. 
30. Schaubroeck and 1993 Global type A behaviour pattern and the underlying dimension of achievement 
Williams are positively related to the desire to continue the chosen course of action in the 
high prior-responsibility conditions but not in the low prior-responsibility 
conditions. 
31. Beauvois, Joule and 1993 Subjects who were asked to cognitively justify their act tended to commit less 
Brunetti resources into a chosen course of action while the subjects to whom the cognitive 
rationalization was blocked for the previous costly act were more likely to 
commit an even more costly act. 
2. Schaubroeck and 1994 Salient information concerning relative risk dominates the effect of prior 
Davis performance information when alternative investments are considered in that 
responsible subject demonstrated classic escalation tendencies while non- 
responsible subjects exhibited a significant tendency to avoid reinvestment. 
33. Bobocel and Meyer 1994 Escalating commitment was not significant in conditions of public or private 
justification but choices may be necessary for escalating commitment 
34. Wilson and Zhang 1995b Subjects under 
high responsibility committed more resources to a chosen course 
of action but certain group of subjects under low responsibility also exhibited 
escalation in commitment (nearly as great as that under high responsibility 
conditions). 
35. Rutledge 1995 Groups are subject to escalating commitment when they are responsible for a 
prior related investment decision. 
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7.6 Conclusion and recommendation 
To sum up, escalating commitment is very likely to occur when an investment decision maker 
has the need to justify to himself or to others the previously chosen investment project. 
Every mechanism that has emerged may typically explain one or more situations. Self- 
justification notions provide major explanatory power in some circumstances, and so does 
prospect theory, etc. However, neither self-justification nor, prospect theory, nor any other 
mechanism entirely explains investment decision-makers' escalating commitment decisions, 
although the CPU theory attempts to integrate all other theories. 
Apparently, it can be concluded that the findings of previous escalating commitment studies 
(please see Table 7-5) that are mainly based upon laboratory work are of questionable external 
validity. Hence, it seems necessary that the discrete escalating commitment literatures be 
critically synthesized and tested (e. g. via meta-analysis), that escalating commitment study be 
extended into real world settings (e. g. case study, field experiment and survey), and that the 
antecedents of escalating commitment be studied in different dimensions (Brockner, 1992: 58), 
including marketing, financial, strategic, and behavioural aspects. In addition, it may seem very 
desirable and timely to conduct longitudinal research that concentrates on the investment 
decision-making process rather than the decision-making outcome, that considers more than one 
stage of the entrapping investment decision-making process (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c), and 
that includes variables covering different perspectives (e. g. individual, interpersonal, 
organizational, and environmental). 
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8. Escalating Commitment In Investment Decision Making: 
A Meta-analytical Synthesis 
8.1 Introduction 
The purposes of literature reviews include assessing the current state of knowledge, identifying 
directions for future research, guiding policy decisions, and advancing theory. Meta-analysis has 
been regarded as a useful technique for achieving these purposes (Guzzo, 1987: 407). By 
extending Wilson and Zhang's (1995b) original work, this study of the researcher aims to apply 
meta-analysis to assess existing mechanisms explaining escalating commitment, identify 
moderating variables worthy of , future research, and highlight directions for future research. 
Structure-wise, this part of the thesis first focuses on the method, then the emphasis is placed on 
the coding of studies presented in the previous chapter (i. e. Table 7-5), and finally the research 
results are presented and discussed before further recommendations along this line of research 
are constructively made. 
8.2 Method 
Meta-analysis is an analysis of analysis -a methodology for quantitatively accumulating, 
integrating and evaluating findings across studies. ' A sound meta-analytical study is said 
(Zhang, 1993) to consist of five sequential steps: identifying appropriate studies, calculating 
effect sizes, testing effect size estimates, detecting moderating 
factors, and classifying effect 
sizes. 
Therefore, in this study, 29 studies (i. e. 27 for escalation studies, and two for de-escalation 
studies) that are appropriate 
for meta-analysis were identified (Table 8-1 & Table 8-2), then 
effect size estimates were calculated 
by employing and computing the preferred Pearson's r 
(product momentum correlation coefficient), effect size estimates & significance levels were 
tested by assessing escalating commitment studies via six types of meta-analytical procedures as 
well as evaluating de-escalation strategies via 
four types of meta-analytical procedures (Table 8- 
I& Table 8-2), and then moderators were detected by categorizing variables employed by 
authors of the original articles into several groups, 
' and finally, literatures were synthesized by 
classifying effect sizes of 
interest. 
Table 8-1: Six types of meta-analytical procedures applied to escalation study 
(See Rosenthal, 1984: 64) Results Defined in Terms of 
Analytical Process Significance Testing Effect Size Estimation 
Comparing studies: Diffuse tests Type A Type 13 
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Comparing studies: Focused tests Type C Type D 
Combining studies Type E Type F 
Table 8-2: Four types of meta-analytical procedures applied to de-escalation study 
(See Rosenthal, 1984: 64) Results Defined in Terms of 
Analytical Process Significance Testing Effect Size Estimation 
Comparing studies Type G Type H 
Combining studies Type I Type J 
There are 12 hypothese involved in the study (Table 8-3). Among statistical methods involved in 
the study are (i) parametric statistical ones (e. g. ANOVA, F statistics, the protected t-test, linear 
regressing, and x2 test) and (ii) non-parametric statistical ones (e. g., Spearman rank correlation, 
Kruskal-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U test). 
Table 8-3. Hypotheses employed in the meta-analysis 
Hypothesis H1: The p values of the 27 studies being compared are significantly heterogeneous. 
Hypothesis H2: The effect sizes of the 27 studies being compared are significantly heterogeneous. 
Hypothesis 113: There is a significant linear relationship existing between the statistic significance of the 
27 studies and certain moderating variable(s). 
Hypothesis H4: The 27 effect sizes either increase or decrease linearly with the number or amount of 
certain moderators. 
Hypothesis H5: The p values of the 27 studies being combined are obtained when there was an overall 
relationship existing between variables employed by original authors. 
Hypothesis H6: The effect sizes of the 27 studies being combined are obtained when there was an overall 
relationship existing between variables employed by original authors. 
Hypothesis H7: Theories explaining escalating commitment differ significantly in terms of the mean 
effect sizes. 
Hypothesis H8: Independent variables moderate escalating commitment significantly differently in terms 
of the mean effect sizes. 
Hypothesis H9: The p values of the two de-escalation studies differ significantly so that a different 
inference should be drawn from the results of the two studies. 
Hypothesis 1110: The effect sizes of the two de-escalation studies differ significantly so that it is possible 
that the results of the two studies are heterogeneous 
Hypothesis H11: The p values of the two de-escalation studies are obtained when there was a overall 
relationship existing between variables employed by original authors. 
Hypothesis H 12: The effect sizes of the two de-escalation studies are obtained when there was a overall 
relationship existing between variables employed by original authors. 
8.3 Coding Studies 
This research measures and codes study characteristics by relating the properties of the studies to 
the studies' findings so as to learn whether the findings differ depending on the characteristics of 
the studies (Table 8-4 & Table 8-5). The total of N=27 observations is ranked from the lowest 
(rank=l) to the highest (rank=27) (Welkowitz, 1982,301). Only those statistics both reflecting 
the independent variables and applicable to the meta-analysis are included in this meta- 
analytical study. This extraction is subjective and is open to type II error (i. e. failing to detect 
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some existing relations). Future research of similar sort should either re-analyze the raw data or 
cover all independent variables in the analysis. 
Table 8-4. Coded Studies on escalation and de-escalation of Commitment 
No Author Year N Explaining Cat Independent Foc Category Relevant Statistics Pearson' p value Corre Come is 
Theory variables us sr ted ted r rank 
I Sandelan 1988 60 Expectancy EX Task infor., Ego M Others F(1,52)=4.52, p<0.04, F -0.318 0.025 -0.324 -0.313 l 
ds theory Invol, Self- (1,52)=7.39, p<0.01 
esteem 
2. Brockner 1979 81 Self justi- SJ Cost salience R Salience F(1,75)=5.39, p<0.025 -0.259 0.025 -0.262 -0.25 2 fication 
3. Brockner 1981 61 1 Face saving OT Cost & reward M Salience F(1,57)=4.00, p<0.05 -0.256 0.05 -0.258 -0.252 3 importance 
4. Northcrat 1986 20 Prospect EX Opportunity cos P Others t(I9)=-4.96, p<0.001 -0.253 0.001 -0.245 -0.241 4 
t theory & Options 
5. McCain 1986 100 Attribution EX Investment M Others F(1,96)=0.17, p=0.05; -0.240 0.025 -0.242 -0.238 5 
theory alternatives, F(1,96) 
commitment 22.64, p<0.0001 
6. Staw 1978 120 Reactance SJ Feedback R Responsib F(1,116)=4.19, p<0.05 -0.187 0.05 -0.188 -0.185 6 
(S-J) ility 
7. Staw 1977 96 Self-justi- SJ Time M Responsib F(1,92)=O. l, p=0.05 -0.033 0.05 -0.033 -0.033 7 
fication ility (assumed) 
8. Singer 1986 93 Reinforcem SJ Control, repr. " R Others t(9I)=2.551, p<0.02; -0.022 0.035 -0.022 -0.022 8 
ent sensitization t(91)=1.34, p=0.05 
9. Schaubro 1993 100 Type A OT Responsibility, P Others X2(1, N=94)=3.97 p<0. +0.067 0.05 0.084 0.065 9 
eck behaviour type A constant 
, 05 
Williams pattern 
10. Garland 1991 36 Prospect EX SunkCost(amoun R Sunk-cost F(1,102)=3.02, p+0.05 +0.097 0.05 0.095 0.094 10 
theory t& proportion) (assumed) 
IT Harrison 1993 78 Agency OT Adverse M Others F(1,176)=24.38, p<0.0 +0.122 0.0001 0.121 0.12 11 
theory selection, 01 
Case 
12. Stave 1976 239 Self-justi- SJ Responsibility, R Responsib F(1,235)=5.56, p<0.01 +0.152 0.019 0.153 0.151 12 
fication decision ility 
outcome 
13. Harwood 1990 257 Prospect EX Domain, framing, M Informati X2(l, N=257)=7.04, p< +0.166 0.01 0.167 0.165 13 
theory Alternative on 0.01 
14. Beauvois 1993 604 Self- OT Act R Responsib x2(1, N=600)=7.83, p< +0"111 0.01 0.174 0.171 14 
, Joule 
justificatio rationalization ility 0.01 
Brunetti n 
15. Schaubro 1994 195 Prospect EX Responsibility, R Sunk X2(I, N=190)-5.53, p< +0.261 0.02 0.265 0.25 15 
eck and theory riskness o costs 0.02 
Davis alternative 
16. Wilson 1995 64 China OT Responsibility, R Responsib F (1,60)=5.698, p<0.05 +0.262 0.05 0.26 0.257 16 
& Zhang mentality decision ility 
outcome 
17. Bateman 1986 99 Reactance SJ Feedback M Informati F(1,83)=5.983, +0.260 0.017 0.263 0.258 17 
theory feedforward on p+0.017 
18. Bateman 1986 99 Prospect EX Feedback M Informati F(1,83)=8.195, +0.300 0.005 0.30( 0.297 18 
theory feedforward on p+0.005 
19. Rubin 1975 72 Conflicts EX Salience(queue, d M Salience F(1,64)-10.16, p<0.005 +0.378 0.005 0.392 0.373 19 
ecrement) 
20. Bruckner 1986 45 Self- Si Feedback, R Others F(1,45)-7.76, p<0.01 +0.384 0.01 0.39 0.377 20 
identity Identification 
21. Garland 1990 407 Sunk cos SC Group condition M Sunk-cost F(1,122)=47.26, F(1,14 +0.450 0.0001 0.48 0.44 21 
effects &S unk costs 5)=26.17, p<. 0001 
22. Whyte 1993 325 Group pola OT Decision frame R Group F(1,59)=22.7, p<0.0001 +0.527 0.0001 0.584 0.52 22 
rization Performing unit 
23. Bruckner 1984 52 Modelling OT Model's M Others F(1,4ß)=25.81, +0.591 0.001 0.668 0.583 23 
processes influence p<0.001 
24. Arkes 1985 108 Prospect SC Sunk cost R Sunk cost X2(1)=50.6, +0.684 0.001 0.83 0.681 24 
theory p<0.001, N=108 
25. Whyte 1993 325 Uniformity OT Decision frame R Group F(l, 59)=83.5, p<0.0001 +0.765 0.0001 1.006 0.764 25 
Performing unit 
26. Rutledge 19 55 213 Self- OT Responsibility, R Group 1(1,219) 6.79 +0.265 0.0001 0.262 0,259 26 
ustification information p<0.0001 
framing 
27. Bobocel 1994 137 Self justi OT Choice K. Others F(1,133)=6.83, p<0.01 +0.270 0.01 0.278 0,274 27 
& Meyc fcation 
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8.4 Results 
Table 8-5 summarizes the meta-analytical results of 27 studies of escalating commitment. It 
indicates that average effect size (Pearson's r) =0.20, the sample standard deviation of effect 
sizes =0.33, and correcting for sample size influence raises the average effect size to 0.32. 
Table 8-5. Stem and Leaf Plot and Statistical Summary of Correlations between Findings of the Escalating commitment Research 
Correlations r' Summary Statistics (Based on r, not on Zr) 
Stem leaf Mean 0.20 
0.7 6,6 Maximum 0.76 
0.6 8 Quartile 3 (Q3) 0.37 
0.5 8,3,3 Median 0.26 
0.4 5 Quartile I (Q1) -0.11 
0.3 i7,0 Minimum -0.31 
0.2 6,6,7,6,6 Q3-Q1 0.48 
0.1 7, -5.2 d' [0.75(Q3-Q1)] 0.36 
0.0 9 Standard deviation (SD) 0.33 
-0.0 2,3 
N 27 
-0.1 9 
Range (from -0.31 to 0.76) 1.07 
-0.2 6,5, 
-4,4 Skewness [72(Q3+Q1)-2Median)/(Q3-Q1)] 0.00 
-0.3 1 
Proportion of positive sign 0.70 
The Results of the Six Types of Tests 
" Type A (comparing 27 studies): diffuse test-significance level. df=26, X2(1)=67.013, p<0.0002. The 27 p values compared are clearly 
significantly heterogeneous. HI is accepted. 
" Type B (comparing 27 studies): diffuse test-effect size estimation. 
df=26, X2(1)257.028, p<0.0008. The 27 effect sizes (r's) compared are 
clearly significantly heterogeneous. H2 
is accepted. 
" Type C (comparing 27 studies): focused test-significance testing. Z=3.134, p<0.0003, one-tailed. The 27 p values compared tend to grow 
linearly more significant as the number or degree of some 'moderators' increases. H3 is accepted. 
" Type D (comparing 27 studies): 
focused test-effect size testing. Z=3.474, p<0.0008, one-tailed. The 27 effect sizes (r's) compared tend to 
grow linearly more significant as the number or 
degree of some moderators increases. H4 is accepted. 
" Type E (combining 27 studies): significance testing. Z-weighted=5.936, p<0.0001. 
The 27 p values combined show the greatest 
heterogeneity. H5 is accepted. 
" Type F (combining 27 studies): effect size testing. 
Zr0.179, r=0.169 (if corrected by sample size, Zr-3.173, x=0.321). The 27 effect 
sizes (r's) combined produce a new r 
(based on substantial sample sizes) that tends to show a somewhat moderate relationship between 
dependent and independent variables employed in different experiments. H6 is accepted. 
The Results of Further Statistical Analysis 
" Correlation between effect size 
(r) and Z value: 0.846, r= 0.058 + 0.163*standard ised value Z. t=7.35, p< 0.001), which shows a strong 
positive relationship as expected. 
" Correlation between effect size 
(r) and the sample size of each study: r= 0.4259, Effect size(r)= -0.0807 + 0.003 *sample size(N). A t-test 
(t--2.37, p<0.05,2-tailed) shows the correlation does exist in the population. 
" When effect size (r) is classified 
by independent variables in terms of Information, Salience, Responsibility, Sunk cost, Group 
consideration, and Others, a one-way ANOVA shows that six variables share with each other the equal means (SSwithin- 
1.567, 
SSbetween=1.370; MSbetwwen 0.294, MSwithin 0.134; F=2.897, p<0.05). [However, a protected t-test shows conditional support. 
Further, a non-parametric test (Kruskal-Wallis H-test) confirms that the above six groups have the equal means (SSb=362.120,11=8.973, 
p< 0.001). 
" When effect size (r) is classified 
by the focus of independent variables, a two-population variance test is indicative of the same variance 
among Retrospective and Mixed 
focus of independent variables (F=1.89 , p<0.0001, SI0.413 Ss 0.675), but the former have a larger 
average effect size (r1-0.2345 > rs 
0.218). A t-test also confirms that two populations have the same means (Spooled=0.236, t=1.237, 
p<0.05). Moreover, Mann-Whitney 
U- test also confirms that two samples are from symmetrical populations with equal means (U=37, 
1.96 > Z=-1.254 > -1.96, at a=0.05). 1-18 is rejected. 
" Relationship between effect size and the explaining mechanism, when characterised 
by Self-justification, Expectancy, Sunk cost and 
Others (when assigned with a descending rank accordingly): Spearman's correlation coefficient rs=-0.7, which shows a weak correlation. 
The t-test (6.314 > t= -1.29 > the critical value -6.314, at a=0.05) implies that the actual and pre-assigned rankings do not differ 
significantly. Further, a one-way ANOVA also shows 
that the means of the effect sizes of the explaining mechanisms do not differ 
significantly from each other (SSwithin=1.456, 
df=17; SSbetween=1.023, df=3; MSbetwwen 0.371, MSwithin=0.121; F=3.17, p<0.05). 
[A protected t-test shows moderate support]. 
Moreover, a non-parametric test (Kruskal-Wallis II-test) confirms that the above four -- 
groups have the equal means (SSb=256.986, df=3, 
H=6.05, p<0.05). 117 is rejected. 
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Table 8-6 Summary of the meta-analytical evaluation on de-escalation strategy 
Author Year N De-escalation Independent Reported statistics Pearson' p value Z value Fisher's Zr 
Strategy Variables sr 
Schwenk 1988 112 Devil's adversity Reducing Selfjusti- F(1,108)=0.333, p<0.565 -0.044 0.329 0.44 -0.044 fication, Simulating 
accurate decision F(1,108)=0.111, p<0.739 
making 
Simonson 1992 193 Gender & Treatments Task conditions (7 F(l, I 83)=5.49, p<0.05 -0.07 0.04 1.75 -0.07 
levels) F(1,183)=3.94, p<0.05 
F(l , 18 3)=4.07, p<0.05 
F(1,183)=12.41, p<0.0I 
" Type G (comparing 2 studies): significance testing. Z=-0.926, p 0.177, one-tailed. The 2p values compared do not differ statistically 
significantly. H9 is rejected. 
" Type H (comparing 2 studies): effect size testing. Z=0.031, pß. 012, one-tailed. The 2 effect sizes (r's) compared differ statistically 
significantly. H10 is accepted. 
" Type I (combining 2 studies): significance testing. Z-weighted=1.614, p=0.053. This test shows that the overall significance level might 
be non-significant. Hl1 is rejected. 
" Type J (combining 2 studies): effect size testing. Zr=-0.061, r-0.06. This combination produces a new effect size that is indicative of a 
very small effect. H12 is rejected. 
Dividing the studies on the basis of independent variables employed in the 27 studies as shown 
in Figure 8-1 results in an average effect size of -0.05 for'Salience', an average effect size of - 
0.06 for Responsibility, an average effect size of 0.24 for'Information', an average effect size of 
0.37 for 'Sunk cost', an average effect size of 0.52 for 'Group consideration', and an average 
effect size of 0.07 for'Others'. 
Figure 8-1. Effect size (mean) classified by independent variables 
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15% 
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3% ® pýhers 
  Stink cost p Group consideration 
Dividing the studies on the basis of explaining mechanisms used by the original authors of the 
27 studies as shown in Figure 8-2 results 
in an average effect size of 0.042 for 'Self-justification', 
an average effect size of 0.049 
for 'Expectancy theory' (Prospect theory included), an average 
effect size of 0.567 for'Sunk cost effects', and an average effect size of 0.201 for 'Others'. 
Dividing the studies on the basis of the focus of independent variables employed in the 27 
studies as shown in Figure 8-3 results in an average effect size of 0.24 for 'Retrospective focus', 
an average effect size of 0.13 for 'Mixed focus', and an average effect size of -0.09 for 
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'Prospective focus'. 
Figure 8-2: Effect size (mean) as classified by explaining mechanism 
52.00% 
V. V I 
Sunk costs m Expectancy [3 Self-justification 
30% 
Others 
Figure 8-3: Effect size (mean) as classified by focus of independent 
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8.5 Discussion 
This meta-analysis accumulates, synthesizes, and evaluates the research findings on escalating 
commitment in order to provide 
information for theory development and future research on 
escalation. Among confirmed Hypotheses are 
H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, and H10; and those not 
proven are H7, H8, H9, H11 and H12 
(Refer to Table 8-4). The results can help answer some old 
questions and point out some new 
directions for research. 
Qs-i. Is escalating commitment a general phenomenon 
(e. g. Bowen, 1987; Zhang, 1993)? The 
results of this meta-analysis (Type F test) reveal 
that the overall effect of escalating 
commitment is not large at all (effect size r=0.169, corrected r=0.321). 
' However, this 
does not mean that the escalating commitment phenomenon should be ignored since, 
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depending upon the costs and benefits of an investment decision made, effect sizes much 
smaller than this can still be of practical significance (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982). 
Meanwhile, given the small observed effect size of escalating commitment, its effect will 
more likely be washed out by the random error inherent in the real world than would have 
occurred had the effect'size been larger. Further, this analysis fails to consider escalating 
commitment in the light of the stages of the entrapping process. Variables yielding little 
effect in the earlier stage might exhibit large effects later in the process. " 
Q8-2. Is escalating commitment literature consistent (e. g. Brockner, 1992; Wilson and Zhang, 
1995a; Wilson and Zhang, 1997)? This meta-analysis confirms the discreteness of current 
escalating commitment literature (eg, Brockner, 1992: 40). Two diffuse tests (Types A& 
B) exhibit that the findings of the 27 studies are obviously significantly heterogeneous. 
Moreover, the overall significance level of 27 studies (Type E combining test) shows the 
greatest heterogeneity. However, this heterogeneity could be due to the heterogeneity of 
effect sizes and/or sample sizes. 
Q8-3. Is self-justification relevant to escalating commitment decisions (e. g. Bowen, 1987: 54)? A 
controversy resulting from this meta-analysis further complicates the answer. The results 
of this meta-analysis imply that self-justification has been most widely used to explain 
escalating commitment but it does not tend to possess a large effect. When classified by 
research strategies (e. g. independent variables), the mean effect sizes of variables 
favouring Self-justification such as Salience and Responsibility still tend to be rather low 
and indicative of a rather small effect. But several separate tests indicate that all strategies 
share with each other the same mean effect size (see Table 8-5). This controversy could 
derive from the inconsistency of the previous literature or result from random sampling 
errors. The lack of sufficient data and the incompleteness of the design' of this meta- 
analysis could also contribute to this controversy. What is more, the small mean effect 
size of self-justification could also be due to the possibility that the laboratory settings are 
not overly conducive to studying self-justification processes, thus underestimating the 
role of the self-justification motive in the entrapping process. Last, lack of consideration 
of the stage of the entrapping process might also contribute to the smaller effect of self- 
justification. 
Q84. Can we identify the strongest determinants of escalating commitment (Stäw, 1978; Wilson 
and Zhang, 1995c)? The results of this meta-analysis tend to provide a positive answer. 
The results of the two focused comparing tests (Types C& D) confirm the existence of 
8-7 
Chapter 8 Escalating Commitment in Decision Making: A Meta-analytical Synthesis 
some moderating variable(s) which linearly affect(s) escalating commitment. Although 
the mean effect sizes of independent variables (as coded in this meta-analysis) do not 
differ significantly (see Table 8-5), some variables tend to attract more attention. 
However, this result could have resulted from contradictory data that prevails in previous 
literatures. The identification of the strongest determinants can be realized either by 
further moderation of variables when supplemented by sufficient accurate data, or by 
empirical research focusing on the particular context in which escalating commitment 
appears, or both. However, there is always a danger that analyses showing a simple 
correlation between escalatory behaviour and a set of variables may not specify the causal 
relationship between them. 
Q8-5. Should sunk cost be irrelevant' in decision making (Arkes, 1985; Wilson and Zhang, 
1997)? The results of this meta-analysis tend to confirm the belief (Mepham, 1987: 304) 
that sunk cost could be relevant in some investment decision making situations. All 
studies concerning sunk cost effects indicate an effect size that is positive (see Table 8-5). 
Further, when the effect sizes are classified by explaining mechanisms, 'Sunk cost effects' 
possess a large effect, the highest of all (see Figure 8-2). When the effect sizes are 
classified by independent variables, 'Sunk cost' also possesses an above 'median' effect 
(See Figure 8-1). Although it is far too early, partly due to insufficient data, to conclude 
that sunk cost plays a very important role in explaining escalating commitment, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that sunk cost can be relevant in some entrapped investment 
decision making situations. 
Q8-6. Are other mechanisms "replacing" (e. g. Bowen, 1987; Whyte, 1986) "supplementing" 
(Brockner, 1981,1984), or "unifying" (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) self-justification? This 
meta-analysis has not yielded much evidence yet. The results imply that self-justification 
might still provide the most important explanation of the escalating commitment 
phenomenon, ' and that other theories can also be promising. 6 However, the lower mean 
effect sizes of 'self-justification', as compared with others enjoying a large effect (see 
Table 8-5), could be due to, inter alia, the heterogeneity of effect sizes. ' In addition, apart 
from the insufficiency of data and random sampling errors, the definition of effect size as 
well as the artificial categorisation of theories per se, does not seem complete! Although 
effort has been made to moderate some variables in order to, detect some causal 
relationships between escalating behaviour and research strategies, less convincing results 
have been reached. Further exploration. is restricted by the discreteness of the previous 
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literature as well as insufficient data. Future research of a similar sort could extend the 
analysis into moderating research strategies that are replacement or supplement oriented, 
and/or moderating variables covering both decision outcomes and the stages of entrapping 
processes. Thus effort needs to be directed to either longitudinal empirical research or 
further meta-analysis equipped with sufficient data and a complete design, before one can 
conclude that self-justification is being replaced or supplemented by other mechanisms. 
Q8-7. Is de-escalation accessible (Simonson & Staw &, 1992)? The results of this meta-analysis 
reveal that de-escalation strategies might provide converging evidence in favour of de- 
escalation but the solution is by no means universally accessible. Two comparison tests 
(Type G& H) indicate that although the results of different strategies are heterogeneous a 
similar inference can be reached. The combining test (Type J), however, illustrates that 
the two de-escalation approaches coded in this analysis only possess a very small effect, 
although the combining test (Type I) moderately supports the view that different de- 
escalation strategies tend to provide converging evidence in favour of de-escalation (see 
Table 8-6). However, this meta-analytical result can only be viewed as tentative, partly 
because of its small sample size (two studies only), lack of empirical testing and its high 
subjectivity. 
Q8-8. Is the current research heading in the right direction (Northcraft, 1984, Brockner, 1992, 
Zhang, 1993)? The results of this meta-analysis call for invoking empirical research in a 
real world setting. This meta-analysis leaves several old questions still unanswered. 
Further deepened analysis demands more laboratory thinking focusing on specific areas 
that might help clarify those unanswered questions. ' It is also necessary to invoke a wide 
variety of alternative interpretations to account for results that could result from different 
research strategies. 1° But the real solution to the escalating commitment problem might 
well lie in empirical research aimed to test and advance the existing theories within a full 
entrapped investment decision making context covering different stages of the entrapping 
process. 
8.6 Conclusion and recommendation 
In spite of the limitations previously mentioned, this meta-analytical work generally supports 
current wisdom about escalating commitment. First, the meta-analysis provides some support 
for the conclusions reached by various organizational theorists including, inter alia, (a) 
escalating commitment literature is inconsistent (e. g. Brockner, 1992; Staw & Ross, 1987), (b) 
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self-justification explains escalating commitment, and so does prospect theory and other theories 
(e. g. Brockner, 1992; Wilson, 1993), (c) sunk cost relates to escalating commitment (e. g. Arkes & 
Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1991), (d) the strongest determinants of escalating commitment can be 
identified (e. g. Staw & Ross, 1978), (e) different de-escalation strategies yield converging 
evidence favouring de-escalation (e. g. Sandelands & Staw, 1992). Second, the meta-analysis 
further confuses escalating commitment scholars on (a) whether or not escalating commitment is 
a general phenomenon (Bowen, 1987), (b) whether or not self-justification is relevant to 
escalating commitment situations (Bowen, 1987), and (c) whether or not self-justification is 
being replaced or supplemented by other mechanisms (Whyte, 1986, Brockner, 1992). 
Though highly open to inconclusiveness, these meta-analytical results provide `some clear 
avenues as well as directions for future research. First, it is important for organizational and 
investment control scholars to conduct research that can specifically test the causal structure of 
relationships between entrapping behaviour and its determinants. Second, it is necessary to 
conduct longitudinal empirical research that considers more than one stage of the entrapping 
process and includes variables covering different perspectives (e. g. individual, interpersonal, 
organizational, environmental). Finally, the meta-analytic procedure itself could be usefully 
extended to allow for the testing of escalating commitment literature as well as detecting causal 
relationships between specific facets of research strategies and entrapping behaviour. 
" 
Based upon the fact that research on studies of escalating commitment shows inconsistent 
results, this study provides three recommendations: 
QR8-1. future escalating commitment research be directed toward empirical research into real 
world situations, involving different stages of the entrapping process, as well as different 
perspectives (e. g. financial, strategic, psychological, operational, social, ideological, 
organizational, and environmental); 
QR8-2. further meta-analysis with complete design and sufficient data be carried out to detect the 
causal relationships between entrapping behaviour, and specific facets of research 
strategies; and, 
QR8-3. more laboratory or field experiments be conducted to compare and contrast, as well as 
advancing existing mechanisms explaining the escalating commitment phenomenon. 
Putting it in practical terms, all this means that, 
QR8-1, Q6-1, and Q1-6, along with Figure 3-2, Q4-10, Q4-22, Q5- 
2,9,10,12,14,15,16,17&18, QC6-1,2,3,4,5,6&7, QB6-1,2,3,4,5,6&8, Q6-4,5,6,7&8, and Q8- 
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1&2 would indicate that a longitudinal case study be undertaken in Chapter 9 to examine the 
escalation of commitment to an investment project involving different stages of the 
entrapping process as well as different perspectives of decision-making; 
QR8-3, Q6-2, and Q1-5, along with Figure 3-2, Q4-7,10, Q4-23, Q4-20&21, Q5- 
2,6,9,10,11,12,14,15,16,17&18, QC6-1,2,3,4,5,6&7, QB6-1,2,3,4,5,6&8, Q6-4,5,6,7&8, and 
Q8-5&7 would suggest that field experiments be undertaken in Chapter 10 to examine de- 
escalation mechanisms; and, 
QR8-1, Q6-3, and Q1-3,4,5&6, along with Figure 2-8, Table 2-2, Figure 3-2&4, Q4-10, Q4- 
21, Q4-31, Q5-1,3,4,5,6,7,13,14&18, QB6-1,2,3,4,5,6,7&8, Q6-4,5,6,7&8, and Q8-5&7 
would suggest that a survey study-be undertaken in Chapter 11 to probe effective practices of 
strategic control and factors influencing strategic control in the investment decision-making 
process. 
I However, this approach like any others has some limitations such as internal, external, statistic, or construct validity and / or 
usefulness. 
2 For example, explaining mechanisms are categorized into four groups: Self-justification, Expectancy theory (covering 
prospect theory), Sunk cost effect, and 
Others. Independent variables are grouped into six categories: Responsibility, Salience, 
(Prospective) Information, Sunk cost, Group consideration, and Others. Research focuses are classified into three types: 
Retrospective, Prospective, and Mixed focuses. 
3 Cohen (1977) proposes the following commonly used guide-lines for interpreting r: r=0.1 (small effect), r=0.3 (median 
effect), and t=0.5 (large effect). 
4 For example, Brockner et al (1982) find that face-saving variables 
have no effect on individuals' resource allocation behaviour 
earlier in the process but show significant effects on 
investment decision-making behaviour later on. 
5 For instance, three separate statistical tests unanimously conclude that the mean effect sizes among four categorises of 
explanatory mechanisms (namely, self-justification, expectancy, sunk cost effect, and others) 
do not differ statistically 
significantly (Table 8-5). 
6 However, contrary to the overall results, a protected t-test indeed shows that the mean effect size of 'sunk cost' does differ 
statistically significantly from that of'Self-justification'. 
(See Table 8-5). 
7 For example, Self-justification shows the greatest 
inconsistency in terms of the sign of correlations observed (See Table 8-5), 
and the sign of effect sizes contributes greatly to the 
lower average effect sizes of'Self justification'. 
8 For example, the sunk cost effect itself has been considered as 
being under the umbrella of prospect theory (Arkes, 1985; 
Garland, 1991). Future meta-analysis could involve, say, Glass et al's (1981: 29) D as effect size to further compare the variance 
in mean effect sizes of both 'control' and 
'experimental' groups. 
9 For example, when effect sizes are classified 
by independent variables, 'Group consideration' ranks as the highest in terms of 
mean effect size, with a very 
large effect, although the mean effect sizes of all independent variables do not differ statistically 
significantly (see Figure 8-1). Further study on 
the effect of the group cohesion variables (e. g. Whyte, 1990) can help evaluate 
the efficacy of group polarization theory 
in accounting for escalating commitment. 
10 For example, effort made to moderate variables reflecting the effect of self-justification as well as that of prospect theory and 
self-presentation theory on entrapping 
behaviour could help elucidate what status should be assigned to the self-justification 
explanation of escalating commitment. 
II It is possible that, by identifying the statistically significant and nonsignificant 
determinants of escalating commitment, the 
meta-analytical results could guide the selection of research strategies 
(e. g. independent variables). For example, future research 
could direct comparatively less effort to replicate the results 
for strong and significant determinants of escalating commitment 
such as'sunk costs'. 
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9. Escalation: A Longitudinal Study Of An Entrapped Strategic Alliance 
9.1 Introduction 
Research around the theme of escalation of commitment has increased over the past two decades. 
Most research has concentrated on replicating or testing previous results. Two things seem 
neglected: vertically, little effort has been made to clearly define and redefine escalation; 
horizontally, little effort has made to identify new potential territories or to search for new 
themes of escalation study. This study of the researcher tries to make some contribution to these 
two dimensions. It aims to examine the escalation of commitment to an entrapped strategic 
alliance involving different stages of the escalatory process as well as embracing different 
perspectives of decision-making. To achieve the goal, this part of the thesis first reconsiders the 
escalating commitment phenomenon, then it contrives the study of escalation, before it 
consequently describes the case and finally interprets the results. 
9.2 Escalating commitment reconsidered 
It has been well recognized that cost overrun and revenue shortfall exert different effects on 
investment decision-making (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984), and that not every cost overrun should 
be regarded as cost escalation, nor should every revenue short-fall be attributed to an escalation 
of cost (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c). In a similar vein, not every resource overrun should be 
regarded as commitment escalation, nor should every achievement short-fall be attributed to an 
escalation of commitment (Zhang, 1993). For example, some apparently certain resource 
increases such as cost overruns may not, by definition, be commitment escalation at all. 
Expanding on the original work of Zhang (1993) and Wilson and Zhang (1995c), a new 
framework has been developed here to describe the relationship between resource allocation and 
resource escalation. This point is further illustrated in Table 9-1 wherein K(>1) is a hypothetical 
number used to represent the realistic estimation (as compared to over-estimate or under- 
estimate) of resource requirement and J (O<J<K) is a hypothetical number representing the pre- 
established tolerance for deviation. K is operationalized by budget, J is operationalized by 
operating standard for deviation, and the unit resource is held constant, all being used purely for 
the simplicity of illustration. 
In short, resource escalation should mean unanticipated resource increases against realistically 
needed resources, the difference between expended resources and the resources realistically 
required. To illustrate, among the 25 cells depicted in Table 9-1, only 10 out of 13 cells which 
apparently involve overruns can be regarded as instances of resource escalation. The principle of 
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Table 9-1 is also applicable to the relationship between achievement shortfall and resource 
escalation although further analysis needs to be done (such as calculating the variance of unit 
resource and the quantity of inputs, and that of the unit price and the quantity of sales). Thus, for 
it to be meaningful, commitment escalation in the investment decision-making context should 
mean an unanticipated increase in commitment of resources against a realistically needed 
commitment of resources (be they time, funds, effort, etc. ). 
Table 9-1: Relationship between resource allocation and escalation of commitment in resources 
Unit (e. g. $, Highly under-estimated Slightly under-estimated Realistic estimation Slightly over-estimated Highly over-estimated 
year), l <J<K budget :5 (K-J) K>budget >K-J budget =K (K+J) > budget >K budget > (K+J) 
Resource Apparently neither saving Apparently small saving; but Apparently big Apparently bigger saving; Apparently biggest 
expended :5 or escalation; but biggest big saving, really saving and big but small saving really saving; but bigger 
(K-J) saving, really saving, really saving, really 
(K-J)< Apparently small Apparently neither saving Apparently small Apparently bigger saving; Apparently bigger 
resource escalation; but small nor escalation; but small saving and small but small saving, really saving; but big saving, 
expended <K saving, really saving, really saving, really really 
Resource Apparently big escalation; Apparently small escalation; Neither saving nor Apparently small saving; Apparently big saving; 
expended -K but neither saving nor but neither saving nor escalation, both but neither saving nor but neither saving nor 
escalation, really escalation, really apparently and really escalation, really escalation, really 
K< resource Apparently bigger Apparently big escalation; Apparently small Apparently neither saving Apparently small 
expended < escalation; but small but small escalation, really escalation and small nor escalation; but small saving; but small 
(K+J) escalation, really escalation, really escalation, really escalation, really 
Resource Apparently biggest Apparently bigger Apparently big Apparently small Apparently neither 
expended > escalation; but big escalation; but big escalation and big escalation; but bigger saving nor escalation; 
(K+J) escalation, really escalation, really escalation, really escalation, really but big escalation, 
really 
Relations between entrapment and escalation: The escalating commitment phenomenon has 
several names: "knee deep in the big muddy" (Staw, 1976), "too much invested to quit" (Tegar, 
1980), "the sunk cost effect" (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), "the dead loss effect" (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984), "putting off the evil day" (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c), and "entrapment" 
(Bracken & Rubin, 1985). All this refers to the tendency to continue an endeavour, regardless of 
its merits; once any investment in time, effort, or other resources has been made. The common 
element across terms is the recognition that people often consider that the resources expended 
remain relevant in decision-making (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c). 4a 
While `knee deep in the big muddy', `the sunk cost effects', `too much invested to quit' and `the 
dead loss effect' each reflect a branch of the same line of research on escalating commitment, 
"entrapment" and "putting off the evil day" represent one independent line of research on the 
escalation of commitment in situations where decision-makers tend to persist with failing 
courses of action (Zhang, 1993). Simply put, E2 epitomizes entrapment and E2 plus Cl 
epitomizes escalating commitment. E2 and Cl cannot co-exist at a given point of time but 
remain interchangeable over time. That is, E2 and Cl each can beget Cl, E2, C2-and E2 (see 
Figure 9-1). 
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Figure 9-1: Decision-making quadrants 
(Source: Adapted from Zhang, 1993) 
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To illustrate this, it is necessary to further distinguish entrapment from escalation of 
commitment in a broader context. Figure 9-2 which approximates the flow of investment 
escalating commitment is used here to provide a metaphor for the relations between escalation 
and entrapment. Escalation refers to a continuing strategy to carrying on a course of action 
which contextually contains both "carpe diem" (make the most of the present) and "putting off 
the evil day" while entrapment exclusively accords with "putting off the evil day" (Wilson and 
Zhang, 1995c). 
Figure 9-2: The flow of escalating commitment of an investment 
(Source: Adapted from Wilson and Zhang, 1995b) 
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Entrapment and escalation are analytically separable (Wilson et al, 1992) but are often related 
because they share with each other what has been called the `ego involvement' (i. e. a tendency 
by which individuals are likely to attach psychological importance to their behaviour (Bracken 
et al, 1986)). More specifically, entrapment typically refers to situations in which decision- 
makers incur small, continuous losses as they seek or wait for an eventual goal (Bowen, 1987; 
Bracken et al, 1982; Bracken & Rubin, 1985; Proctor, 1992; Zhang, 1993; Rubin & Bracken, 
1975; Wilson & Zhang, 1995a). Despite the fact that in most commitment escalation studies it 
has been found that persistence in pursuing a goal magnifies losses, an entrapment study 
distinguishes itself from others by a major operational difference in that, whereas others have 
made the amount of investment an independent decision (e. g. McCain, 1986; Staw, 1976), an 
entrapment study has made increasing investment a strict function of a waiting game, i. e. 
delaying the economically-sound actions in the hope of acting more effectively later (Zhang, 
1993). 
Commonalties of escalating commitment: Previous research results (Bracken et al, 1984; 
Zhang, 1993) suggest that escalating commitment can be found in many situations which 
contain the following features: (a) the same parameter may be seen as both an investment or an 
expense; (b) both the cost associated with continuing and the presumed proximity to the desired 
goal increase as additional resources are invested; (c) the decision-makers must believe at the 
outset that the probability of attaining the goal is uncertain or, if it is certain, an investment 
completely disproportionate to their available resources is required; (d) the decision-makers 
must always have alternatives which lead them to either continue or withdraw from the 
escalating conflicts; (e) decision-makers' perceptions of their motivations for the course of 
action change from being rational to rationalizing over time; and (f) escalating commitment is 
behaviourally self-perpetuating, at least up to a point. 
Escalating conflicts: After the clarification of the meaning of entrapment and of escalation, it 
becomes more sensible to tease out, by means of logical reasoning, the root from which 
escalating commitment phenomena 
derive, so as to provide a thematic description and / or 
explanation of the phenomena. Wilson and 
Zhang (1995) extract from the above-mentioned 
presumed commonalties of escalating commitment and the research 
findings of Zhang (1993) 
and posit that investment escalating commitment can 
be better mirrored by investment decision- 
makers' continuously augmenting resource allocations to a 
failing project after experiencing 
,a 
series of conflicts occurred in the 
decision-making process. This certainly includes self- 
justification (Staw, 1978), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), CPU theory (Wilson 
and Zhang, 1995c) and China mentality 
(Wilson and Zhang, 1995b). It has also been posited 
(Wilson and Zhang, 1995c; Zhang, 1993) that there are at least eleven foreseeable and 
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unforeseeable major conflicts occurring in the decision-making process which include (a) a set 
of three conflicts during the justification of the correctness of the initial decision, (b) a set of two 
conflicts on whether or not to withdraw from the investment, (c) a set of two conflicts on 
whether or not to persist in the investment, (d) a set of two project-specific-factor related 
conflicts, and (e) a set of two organization-specific-factor related conflicts. 
Antecedents of escalating commitment: It would seem that investment escalating commitment 
can remain a function of many conflicting factors which change over time and space, and that 
business uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity around investment decision-making are 
responsible for various conflicts occurring in the investment decision-making process. Wilson 
and Zhang (1995c) propose that there are foreseeable investment-related conflict factors which 
specifically contribute to escalating commitment and they are, among other things, (a) the costs 
already incurred, (b) any further investment required, (c) the probability of attaining the goal, (d) 
the probability of the investment's failing, (e) the perceived future probability of both the 
ongoing and opportunity investments, and (f) the `stickiness' of the project such as the salvage 
value of both the amount of funds already spent and the remaining resources. Zhang (1993) 
proposes that unforeseeable investment-related conflict factors which directly or indirectly 
influence escalating commitment include (a) mental gains and losses which can induce error in 
investment decision-makers' financial calculation such as reinforcement traps, self-justification, 
self-inference, and information processing, (b) cultural norms about gains and losses which can 
distort investment decision-makers' economic calculations and foster inappropriate decision- 
making (e. g. face-saving, external justification, external, binding, competition, modelling, 
pressure for uniformity, norms), and (c) constitutional contingencies about gains and losses 
which can exceedingly complicate accounting concepts and methods (e. g. economic and 
technical side-bets, political support, administrative inertia and institutionalization). 
Conflicting utilities of an ongoing investment: Zhang (1993) conceives that, for any decision 
resulting in either actions or non-action, there are four possible utilities (persisting, withdrawing, 
time-biding, and experimenting) all of which jointly constitute a utility collectivity. As can be 
seen in Figure 9-3, the utilities (be they project, psychological, environmental, social, 
ideological, operational, etc. ) of persisting, withdrawing, time-biding, and experimenting 
interlink as well as conflict with each other. 
Wilson and Zhang (1995c) further propose that, the utilities of withdrawing from an investment 
include certain loss of start-up as sunk costs, certain gain of start-up as salvage value, possible 
loss due to future gain and possible gain due to future loss; the utilities of persisting include 
certain loss of return from diversion as opportunity cost, certain gain from diversion as salvage 
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value of diversion, a high probability of further loss and a small probability of recouping initial 
investment; that the utilities of time-biding include possible loss due to neither withdrawing nor 
persisting, possible gain due to neither persisting nor withdrawing, certain gain due to neither 
persisting nor withdrawing, and certain loss due to neither persisting nor withdrawing; and the 
utilities of experimenting include possible gain by experimenting, possible loss by 
experimenting, certain gain by experimenting and certain loss by experimenting. 
Figure 9-3: The utility collectivity of an investment 
Time-biding 
Withdra%f ing 
A careful look at the major concerns regarding both actions and non-action which contribute to 
the escalating commitment syndrome tends to reveal that escalating commitment reflects a 
compromise among the perceived utilities of withdrawing, persisting, time-biding and 
experimenting, with escalating commitment occurring particularly when the utility of persisting 
eventually outranks that of others even though the utility of others (especially of time-biding and 
withdrawing) once outranked that of persisting in the decision-making process. 
Escalating processes: Escalating commitment can be triggered by various forces and the 
antecedents of escalating commitment can also change over time. In order to acquire insights 
into the nature of investment escalating commitment, Zhang (1993) employs the product life 
cycle to approximate the investment life cycle (Figure 9-4) to suggest that escalating 
commitment occurs and begets further escalating commitment only when the driving forces 
overwhelm the constraints at different stages of the escalating process or when the utility of 
persisting somehow overwhelms that of others. 
Wilson and Zhang (1995c) further explore the escalating process by arguing that, highly positive 
economic utilities strongly influence the start of the 
investment, that economic utilities often 
play an important role 
in facilitating escalating commitment in the growth stage of the 
investment life cycle, that both economic and psychological utilities associated with the 
investment play a significant role in facilitating escalating commitment in the maturity stage of 
the investment life cycle, that both psychological and social utilities of the investment play an 
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important role in facilitating escalating commitment in the saturation stage of the investment life 
cycle, and that economic, psychological, social and structural utilities all play an important role 
in causing escalating commitment in the decline stage of the investment life cycle. 
Figure 9-4: Escalating processes via an approximation of the investment life cycle 
(Source: Adapted from Wilson and Zhang, 1995b) 
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Theories of escalating commitment - an integration: Most discussions of the escalating 
commitment phenomenon aim to explain rather than describe it (Zhang, 1993). Little effort has 
been made in the literature to formulate a definitive framework which integrates all other 
theories that have emerged to explain the escalating commitment phenomenon. Staw and Ross 
(1987) describe the escalatory process of the phenomenon by dividing it into four factors (i. e. 
project, psychological, social, and structural). Wilson and Zhang (1995c) attempt to go the 
opposite way by integrating all factors into perceived utility which, by definition, embraces 
varying factors affecting the decision-making process. Staw and Ross's (1987) approach 
describes the phenomenon but fails to unite the varying explanations of other mechanisms. 
Wilson and Zhang's (1995c) CPU theory can be useful not only in explaining the escalating 
commitment phenomenon, but also in unifying other mechanisms. 
According to the CPU theory (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c), designed to integrate the existing 
theories which attempt to explain escalating commitment, escalating commitment represents a 
decision-making phenomenon resulting from a dilemma caused by the interplay between 
perceived utilities of persistence, withdrawal, waiting or experimenting (reflecting structural, 
operational, strategic, environmental, cultural, psychological, social, and project characteristics) 
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across various conflicting decision-making processes (Figure 9-5). In the light of the CPU 
theory, escalating commitment occurs when decision-makers mentally magnify the probability 
of sequential success (i. e. p1 in Figure 9-5) and diminish the probability of sequential failure (i. e. 
p4 in Figure 9-5). For example, one can easily infer whether escalating commitment is going to 
occur by comparing the decision-makers' perceptions about an investment with the CPU 
theory's underlying logic - i. e. (a) the up (or down) shift of the reference point from Re to Ra 
(or Rb for the `down-shifting') indicates that the decision-maker perceives a lesser (or greater in 
the `down-shifting' scenario) likelihood of his or her goal attainment and (b) the left (or right) 
shift of the reference point from RE to RA (or RB for `right-shifting') dictates that the decision- 
maker has become less (or more in the `right-shifting' scenario) willing to continue with his or 
her unproductive endeavours. 
Figure 9-5: The CPU theory: investment decision as the shift of reference point(s) 
(Source: Adapted from Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) 
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Note: pl, p2, p3, p4 are the perceived probability of CI, C2, El and E2, respectively, pt+ p2+ p3+, p4 - l; 
Ra, Rb, Re, RA. Re. Re are psychological reference lines, Aa, Bb, Ee are mental reference points. 
Since CPU theory considers that escalating commitment derives from an opposite but unifying 
paradox consisting of subjective value(s) and objective value(s) and that 
it is the shifting of the 
reference point that triggers escalating commitment, 
it actually makes it easy to relate CPU 
theory to other theories. Taking prospect theory as an example, under uncertainty, a decision- 
maker's judgement about a 
future event tends to be at least partially influenced by the 
immediate feedback from an initial decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Negative feedback 
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can dictate a possible down and right shift of reference point from Ee to Bb which, in turn, 
produces a relatively high pi and a relatively low pa; positive feedback can result in a possible 
shift of reference point from Ee to Aa which, in turn, produces a relatively low pi and a 
relatively high pa. 
9.3 Contrivance of the research 
Research objectives: In essence, the foregoing theoretical formulations suggests that it is the 
shifting of the reference point that triggers escalating commitment. The objective of the present 
study is to forward research on escalating commitment (in terms of projecting new research 
propositions and advancing theories) by means of examining the interplay between perceived 
utilities of persisting, withdrawing, time-biding and experimenting and the escalating process of 
an investment by studying the case of an entrapped Sino-Korean strategic alliance. The case 
concerns an investment project which, having lasted for 12 years, has never reported any net 
profits, but still has not yet been finally dissolved by the end of 1998. 
Guiding propositions: There are two guiding propositions which are subject to examination: (a) 
the interplay between perceived conflicting utilities of persistence, withdrawal, waiting or 
experimenting across various phases of decision-making processes which induce investment 
decision-makers to escalate more resources to an on-going investment, and (b) investment 
decision-makers tend to magnify the probability of sequential success, diminish the probability 
of sequential failure and consequently their shift of reference points gives rise to escalating 
commitment. 
Method: In this study, multiple sources (e. g. four investment decision-makers who were also 
the board members, four failing general managers who each on their turn held total 
responsibility for the investment, and nine consulting experts who once directly participated in 
advising on the revitalizing of the investment) were approached to provide multiple perspectives 
upon the same phenomenon so that the risk of bias could be highly reduced. Multiple methods 
of data gathering were utilized (i. e. direct observation 
in formal and informal meetings, informal 
and formal interviewing, diary keeping, content analysis of documents and unobtrusive methods) 
to generate insights into the phenomenon as well as enriching the researcher's learning 
processes. 
The researcher was urgently called upon in the late 1980s by the Chinese side investment 
decision-makers to lead a group of 9 experts to examine the investment, was headhunted by the 
(Chinese) holding company to carry out an official assignment by undertaking a research-based 
consultation on the staggering investment in the early 1990s, was commissioned by the parent 
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company of the (Chinese) holding company of the strategic alliance to consult on the operations 
of the investment in the mid-1990s, and was invited to offer advice on the destiny of the 
investment in the late 1990s. Therefore the researcher was able to conduct enquiries 
unobtrusively, observe events first hand, be party to sensitive information unconditionally, and 
have access to investment decision-makers conveniently. Events prior to and after the 
researcher's appearance at the strategic alliance were investigated by- informal interviews and 
some other data were gathered via documentary sources. However, the researcher had no 
personal interest in the outcome of events, nor was he involved in any of the decisions to 
escalate. Data were initially recorded by notes made unobtrusively during and immediately after 
the event or interview and afterwards transcribed into a diary style report in the form of 
highlights of contextually critical evidence and paradigmatically unbiased advice. 
Matching data to the propositions: Data collection in this study focuses on a series of crucial 
events over a period of twelve years around each of which an opportunity existed for the joint 
venture either to re-invest or to divest. Each time the researcher aimed to elucidate the reasons 
for decisions to persist, withdraw, wait, or experiment as well as determining how much, and 
why, they match or differ from what was prescribed. This was done from as wide as possible 
decision-making context. The present study concentrates on reporting critical facts by means of 
first-hand accounts corroborated by some other first-hand evidence; other material is introduced 
as complementary and illustrative only. 
9.4 "Putting off the evil day": the case of an entrapped Sino-Korean strategic 
alliance 
Literature on strategic alliance: Research on strategic alliance has mushroomed (e. g. Hamilton 
et al, 1995; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Lorange et al, 1992; Glaister and Buckley, 1994; Cravens 
et al, 1993) since Williamson's (1986) work on the general theory of organizational form. 
Strategic alliance has been defined as "a durable relationship established between two or more 
independent firms, involving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a mechanism 
(corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or activities of strategic importance 
to one or more of the partners for their mutual economic advantage" (Hamilton et al, ' 1995: 15). 
In essence, there are four criteria by which strategic alliance might be defined, identified, or 
justified (Table 11-1): (a) the form of the relationship (Lorange and Roos, 1992), (b) the nature 
of the relationship (Williamson, 1986), (c) the purpose of the relationship (Glaister and Buckley, 
1994), and (d) the strategic importance of the relationship (Hamilton et al, 1995). 
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Table 11-1: The characteristics of strategic alliances (Source: Various kinds of material) 
Criterion 1 Non-strategic alliances Strategic alliances Non-strategic alliances 
Form Market-based 
transactions, 
relations 
Informal 
cooperative 
ventures 
Formal 
cooperative 
ventures 
Joint 
ventures 
Joint 
ownership 
Strategic 
investment in 
partner 
Intra-firm transactions, relations 
Criterion 2 Non-strategic alliances Strategic alliances Non-strategic alliances 
Nature Classical 
contractual 
Neo-classical 
contractual 
Relational contractual 
Obligational-contractual M-form U Unified 
governance 
U- 
form 
High degree of certainty; Infrequent 
transactions; Low requirement for 
idiosyncratic investments. 
----------°"-"-"--------- 10 
High degree of uncertainty; Frequent 
transactions; High requirement for 
idiosyncratic investments. 
Criterion 3 Non-strategic alliance Strategic alliances Non-strategic alliance 
Purpose Market-based transactions Avoidance of transactions costs; Securing sources of supply, 
market outlets; Achieving economies of scale and scope; Retaining 
flexibility of sources of supply, market outlets; Avoiding 
diseconomies of scale; Avoiding (financial, cultural, etc) costs of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Intra-firm transactions 
Criterion 4 Non-strategic alliances Strategic alliances 
Strategic 
Importance 
Low (absolute and relative) resource commitment; Short 
term relationship; Ad-hoc relationship; Peripheral activity; 
Speculative or opportunistic activity. 
High (absolute and relative) resource commitment; Long-term 
relationship; On-going relationship; Core activity; Strategically 
committed activity. 
Background: This is a typical `cooperate and win' scenario. The case concerns a strategic 
alliance between a giant Korean textile company (KG hereafter for brevity) and a giant Chinese 
conglomerate (SG hereafter). The joint venture (SK hereafter) is the biggest textile company in 
Northern China and is situated in a superb suburb of a northern Chinese industrial city. SK has 
a splendid office building, and two well-equipped workshops which totally exceeded 32000 
square meters. It had two holding companies: the Chinese holding company was SH (under SG) 
operating all over China, and the Korean 
holding company was KH which operated in Hong 
Kong, Europe, the Middle East, America, and Africa. SK's initial investment totalled Y20m and 
each partner possessed 50% of the company's assets. 
The general manager of SG, Mr SA1 served as SK's first Chairman. The Chairman and 
President of KG, Mr KA2, acted as SK's first deputy chairman. Both SH's general manager (Mr 
SA3) and KH's CEO (KA4) served as SK's vice-chairmen. The director of the local branch of a 
major Chinese bank (Mr CB5) served as a non-executive vice-chairman. SK's top management 
mainly included a general manager of 
Korean nationality nominated by KG, Mr. KA6i, a deputy 
general manager of Chinese origin nominated by SG, Mr. SA71, two vice-general managers of 
Chinese nationality nominated by SH, Mr SA8 and Mr SAIO, and two vice-general managers 
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nominated by KH, Mr KA9 (of Korean nationality) and Mr KA11 (of Korean origin). SK's 
middle management consisted of a group of young bicultural talents. 
SK was officially approved by the state in early 1986. In early 1987, for the purpose of better 
administrative cooperation as well as better cultural understanding, all SK's managerial and 
technical staff not familiar with the Korean language received training in Korea for half a year, 
and all SK's staff from Korea were organized to tour the relevant industries in Northern China. 
In late 1987, the ceremony marking the completion of implementation of the strategic alliance 
went on extremely well with joy and happiness showing on every attendee's face, and it hit the 
media, providing the bosses of CB, SG and KG with a long lasting memory. Immediately after 
the celebration, follow up activities were all carried out in peace: experimental productions went 
well, the quality of the products was high, sales went well, so mass production started. The 
establishment of SK marked the turning points of SG as well as of KG, because both could 
stretch their own strengths in business operation and overcome their own weaknesses by 
utilizing others' competencies. 
The first crucial (starting) event in 1987: Since its introduction in early 1987, SK had been 
running smoothly. By the. end of 1987, however, one thing started to annoy SK's top 
management. A special material (hereafter Ms) which happened to be extremely expensive and 
which could only be bought from a Korean company was required for approximately four fifths 
of the purchase orders. The top management decided to let the Korean holding company KH 
deal with the imported material. A strange decision situation loomed: SK could run at full 
capacity and dominate the market but record losses, or wait by doing nothing but risk losing 
market share, or experiment but risk losing current customers, or stop but lose what had been 
invested. Everything had been tried but to no avail, so SK's top management chose to continue 
at full swing by borrowing more 
from the bank. Since the market competition did not slow 
down as expected, SK's market share was high, but losses incurred grew higher and higher. 
Revenues generated by its non-Ms segments was just good enough to pay the overheads. SK 
chose to borrow from the bank 
in order to continue investing in new technologies (i. e. 9 needle- 
and 12 needle- machinery as reflected 
in Figure 9-6) which could enable it to compete in 
premium textile segments, 
despite the fact it had recorded significant losses. 
Analysis of the first crucial event: 
' Since its start, SK copied the then famous Korean practice 
of Chaebao the main 
idea of which is to link the enterprise closely with financial institutions. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that SK acquired a substantial amount of loan capital from CB, and 
the loan served as the major source of SK's working capital and SK's further investment. What 
really surprised the researcher 
is how SK was going to manage its account at CB because banks 
9-12 
Chapter 9 Escalation: A Longitudinal Study Of An Entrapped Strategic Alliance 
do not lend for nothing. Obviously the loan and the interest payable could cause SK to fail 
overnight. Research results revealed that CB gave SK a beneficial policy that, as long as it pays 
the interest, SK need not start to pay the loan until the fifth year of operation. Said a CB officer, 
"it is our policy to support new things, we would normally provide a loan to a promising 
investment if it is approved by a financially strong holding or parent company, besides we 
normally offer a better policy if the investment-related properties such as equipment and 
buildings are mortgaged (as deposits) in the bank". However criticisms from SK and its holding 
company also loomed large although the voices were low: "to borrow from the bank is going to 
be terrifying experience", "to borrow money to produce and to sell below the cost is more 
terrifying", and "how could they manage if they do not sell well later on? " 
Figure 9-6: SK's decision situation around 1987 
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Escalation theory (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) suggests that investment decision-making at the 
introductory stage is primarily dominated by economic rationalities such as NPV and ROI. This 
explanation, however, can 
be surely partial, at least in the international management context. As 
the SG's chief economist put it, "... a 
joint venture theoretically marks that SG starts to go 
international. We have better projects which enjoy higher expected financial returns and less 
risks, but we like to go 
for it [i. e. SK]... ". SK's deputy general manager commented, "we don't 
like to run business with debts all over the comers,..... [but] we 
have to meet challenges from 
time to time, it is a go-for-it or disappear situation... 
". To most managers at SG and SH, "no 
working capital is dangerous... 
" but SG is a "laboratory experiment... [which] offers, if put right 
later on, exciting opportunities 
for people to see the new world of management.. . [and provide] a 
new horizon for organizations 
to follow... ". For the bankers, "[SK is a].. . complete new things 
which enable us to participate 
in real world manufacturing decision-making", and "... [it] is 
good for us to lend this company whose parent companies are 
big and strong". However, SK's 
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Korean managers commented, "... it is common in Korea to borrow to produce and to sell to 
return and make a profit". 
It seems that strategic considerations and organizational learning are considered first. SG's 
general manager commented, when he was interviewed about SK, that "it is not always enough 
for a `go' [i. e. as in the game of chess which resumed its popularity very recently in China] 
player to go for challenging moves, he has to learn to place strategic moves, otherwise he is 
soon to be out-raced". SH's general manager once delivered a briefest speech to celebrate the 
first sales of SK by saying "we all come to cooperate with each other and we all come to learn 
from each other, so let's take more daring actions". One SG group accountant and one SG 
business development manager told the researcher: "[the accountant thinks that SK] provides an 
excellent opportunity for me and my people to know how people in the other part of the world 
manage their accounts... ", and "[the development manager] surely, nothing ventured nothing 
gained,.. . 
it [i. e. SK] can be the base for us to leap". 
It seemed that economic considerations (e. g. high positive economic returns) play a very 
important role in initiating an investment project as well as fostering a trembling investment, but 
they can be outranked by technology-determinism or other organization-specific factors such as 
competitive advantage and knowledge accumulation. The deputy general manager, SA7, said 
that "technology is the no. l element of SK's productivity and prosperity". SK would not have 
been the option for SG if economic rationalities took charge in 1987. SG had another alternative 
which it re-considered 
in 1993 (a joint venture among domestic companies which has so far 
been a very successful story). When asked why SK was given more strategic and financial 
leverage this time, SA3 replied that "numbers are numbers and it will be unusual if numbers 
always beat senses..., 
besides, numbers are useless without a context but mind is the absolute 
boss, thus, we need to listen more to our boss". SA1 maintained that "the company [i. e. SG] 
believes that innovation and creativity at business is the core for future success,... SK, along 
with our other moves such as 
JHL and Fiveloop [i. e. two other joint ventures] is just an example 
of that,.... [and] those moves 
[including SK] was hoped to improve our knowledge about 
international business so that we can better increase our companies' [i. e. the SG group] 
competitiveness". 
It also seems that psychological or political 
factors (e. g. hidden agenda) can play a big role in 
initiating an investment. Every structure serves a purpose. However, a structure can also be used 
to serve both an explicit purpose and 
implicit purpose. A strategic alliance works well only if 
mutual trust and common purpose are 
held by both parties (Zhang, 1988). Cooperation means 
better utilizing each other's unique advantage for the benefit of both partners rather than one 
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party's taking advantage of the other (Zhang, 1988). As one of the Korean appointed engineers 
disclosed later on, "in Korea we have to go high-tech because of the increasingly high cost of 
labour.... [So] we shipped to SK as a part of direct investment many of the used items of 
equipment which we needed to get rid of ... ". One of the Chinese appointed SK chief engineers 
echoed on another occasion that "it is on earth a good project, -... [but] what really matters to me 
is that getting this project quickly continued means I could go abroad sooner to buy equipment 
for the firm as well as seeing how firms function elsewhere,... [this could be the only chance in 
the foreseeable future] ... so I voted strongly 
for this project's continuance rather than others". Is 
all fair in love and war? 
In brief, it seems, to this researcher, that SK's ventures in the introductory phase of its life cycle 
more or less indicate that the utilities of continuance can outrank those of others such as 
experimenting, withdrawal and time-biding, and that escalatory behaviour happens when the 
utilities of continuance appear to be superior to others especially from the strategic, 
technological, organizational and economical perspectives along the consideration of some 
psychological and political factors. A careful examination of 
SK's flow of business operation 
can raise a sharp question, as being raised 
by this researcher after he was first called to examine 
the investment in 1989 (Figure 9-7): "Is this strategic alliance going to be ended up with, a life- 
long successful marriage, an expected one-sided sale, an unexpected disappearance in the early 
stage of its life cycle, or a non-ending 
disastrous trap? " 
Figure 9-7: A bird's eye view of SK's life route (from 1986 onwards) 
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The second crucial event 
in 1989: In early 1989 SH called for an urgent board meeting 
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regarding SK's operations in that SH's request for exchanging financial information with KH 
encountered repeated silences. Rumours spread over SK that KG's brands were used for SK's 
products, that KH is selling SK's products at unreasonable prices to rescue KG's operations in 
Korea due to emerging competition and recession, and that SK had recorded losses ever since it 
started. Besides, staff at SK started to complain that the top management do not communicate 
with the middle management and take little care of shop floor workers. Numerous complaints 
went to SH, and SH's general manager SA3 called a special board meeting on behalf of SH to 
examine SK's performance and its policies. In the board meeting SK's general manager KA61 
confirmed the rumours. The board realized that SK had entered a strange but vicious syndrome 
in that the more it produces the heavier the losses will be. KG's KA2 apologized for the Korean 
speaking general manager's incompetence and for the mismanagement of SK's brand, but 
praised his contribution to the establishment of a new technology-based production line. It was 
decided that SK should continue to survive, but several changes occurred as the result of the 
meeting: (1) the first general manager of SK was asked to resign 
from SK; (2) SK should further 
invest on developing its own brand under the joint leadership of SH and KH as well as trying its 
best to help KG out of its recessional operations in Korea; (3) a new Chinese-speaking Korean 
general manager KA62 was nominated 
by KG; (4) information is set to be shared among the 
three companies, SH, KH, and SK; (5) a new post was created by SK to recruit a female vice 
general manager (i. e. SA12) to concentrate on 
improving staff welfare, working conditions and 
other environmental and cultural 
issues; (6) SK was empowered to build its own sales force for 
domestic sales while still relying on KH's distribution channel for export; -and, (7) last but not 
the least, more funds were injected into the business from both parties. The board meeting ended 
with peace and SK was set to restructure 
its business operations after the new general manager's 
arrival. 
Analysis of the second crucial event in 1989: 
2 It can be arguably held SK was at the time in 
the growth stage of its life cycle: 
"orders flooded in, staff did not have holidays because of the 
demand... ". Commented the Korean general manger, "our workers are working by' the same 
machine they were working 
back to early 1987 when they received training in the South Korean 
factory,... We believe that it is the training that really facilitated our growth... ", and "Chinese 
workers are highly productive, 
disciplines and rewards help you meet the deadlines of 
impending orders... ". 
A close look at SK's operational activities 
from the start up to 1989 reveals (Figure 9-8) that SK, 
by the nature of its business operation, actually acted as a manufacturing 
base for KG, perhaps 
partly due to SK's 
being a novice in the world textile exporting market, or perhaps partly due to 
KG's cultivation, or perhaps 
due to the design of SK from the very beginning. 
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Figure 9-8: The flow of business operation in SK from 1987 to 1989 
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As one of the Chinese vice-general managers SA7 said, and "... [SK is actually] an advanced 
manufacturing machine which is remote controlled 
leaving its operators not knowing how good 
or bad it has performed, thus, we all work absolutely 
for orders". However, further research 
revealed that there was actually an organizational 
inertia surrounding SK. "Let the Koreans 
worry about acquiring sales orders while we canhave a cup of tea 
because everything is in the 
contract that the Korean 
holding company is responsible for acquiring orders and we just 
produce what is asked 
by the Koreans". As for the people in KH, the picture is quite different, 
"we have been doing this [marketing] job for years and we know what we are doing, if we go 
bust they [i. e. SK] will just follow suit". 
SK's actual situation appeared to be more interesting: SK has recorded losses ever since its 
production lines started and the more 
it produced the more losses it recorded. In the last two 
years "the production 
is nearly up to its full capacity, workers have been working on shifts... ", 
"we are informed that we are the only enterprise 
in this city which earns foreign currencies in 
this industry,... this year's earning 
is reported to be double last year's...., [and it is] impossible 
that we do not make any money out of 
it [i. e. SK]". The reasons for that are many - as members 
of the top management team at 
SK, KH, and SH indicated. First, "... the Korean general 
manager insisted that the 
firm has to import some core material from Korea... " because "... the 
quality of local substitution 
is under suspicion". Second, "the competition is extremely high in 
the world market [especially 
in Korea] so that it is not unreasonable to sell at a price which is 
just above the unit non-variable cost". 
Third, "... Chinese workers will and have to have salary 
regardless of the organization's 
financial situations in that they are the masters of the 
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organization... [as in the case of many organizations when the holding company or parent or 
grand or even great grand parent company financially subsidizes the loss-making 
subsidiaries],.. . so we took that under consideration 
in pricing [SK's product]. Fourth, "a friend 
in need is a friend indeed... and we need to help our parent company [i. e. KG] to overcome its 
temporary obstacles... ". Fifth, "things will get better later on..., so let us [i. e. SK] just focus on 
the work we need to do today and tomorrow will be fine... ". Sixth, "we [i. e. KH] pre-pay for the 
core material in non-Chinese currency, and you get US dollars from us [i. e. KH] without 
borrowing it from the Chinese bank... ". Sixth, "... we [i. e. SH] suspected but we did not really 
[think] things could go that far.. . they [i. e. KH] should 
have let us know much earlier... ". 
Seventh, "we should have built our own marketing force if we could know the situation... ". 
Entrapment theory (e. g. Wilson and Zhang, 1995b) and escalation theory (e. g. Staw and Ross, 
1987; Brockner, 1992) would suggest that economic utilities often play an important role in 
facilitating escalating commitment in the growth stage of the investment life cycle. It seemed 
true that, from the costs already incurred in SK, further investment was required for its further 
growth, the probability of attaining the goal of 
forming a global competitive giant, the 
probability of the investment's quickly going 
bust, the perceived future probability of both the 
ongoing and opportunity 
investments, and the `stickiness' of the project such as the salvage 
value of both the amount of 
funds already spent and the remaining resources, all played an 
important role in escalating SG's, KG's, SH's, KH's and SK's commitment to the investment. 
As was revealed by the secretary of the board meeting, many of the board members believed 
that "... [SK] is an investment which bears significant meaning for both [SG and KG]... ", and 
had mentioned that, given enough support from both parties SK 
is unlikely to die young, that it 
was a "waste of resources 
for both parties", that the future of "further cooperation is still 
promising and encouraging... 
", and that SH was willing to invest for the domestic market. SA3 
revealed later that 
"we have the funds available on our side, ... we are willing to help SK to 
squeeze into the 
domestic market,... we know we have further investment opportunities, ... we 
also know that 
if we don't use the funds left [a substantial amount of allocated by the parent 
company (i. e. SG) to 
foster exciting investments] it is gone and we won't have it next year... ". 
However, economic utilities are not alone in facilitating escalating commitment in the growth 
stage of the investment 
life cycle, and SK's reality suggested that cultural or ideological norms 
can play an important, 
if not bigger, role in facilitating escalating commitment. As SA1 joked 
when he was asked why 
SG tolerated SK's support for KG's home struggle, "... China once 
helped Northern Korea to fight against Southern Korea, why couldn't we help the southern 
Korean friends to fight against their southern Korean competitors... ". Perhaps one of the 
mysteries of modern 
China is that the Chinese are willing to show their hospitalities on their 
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doorstep. "Let's tighten our belt by cutting costs, and focus, if we are asked for help, on what we 
can help rather than what we can't help... ". Said a SG-appointed high-rank commissioner to SK, 
"[because SH] is our son... [and SK] is our grandson, when our grandson's problem appears to 
be our problem, let's face it and try to solve it together". SK's practice vividly suggests that the 
role of social norms (e. g. cultural and ideological) in triggering escalatory behaviour cannot be 
ignored in that they can magnify the possibility of gains, shrink the probability of losses, 
consequently distort economic calculations and hence result in escalating commitment. 
Research results did not record any significant effects of certain psychological gains and losses 
(e. g. reinforcement traps, self-justification, self-inference, and information processing) or of 
certain constitutional contingencies about gains and losses (e. g. economic and technical side- 
bets, political support, administrative inertia and institutionalization) or of certain social gains 
and losses (other than cultural or ideological) had any significant role in causing escalation at 
this stage of SK's life cycle. However, the existence has been found in SK's road to rapid 
growth of such psychological factors as 
information processing, such social factors as 
competition between SH-appointed staff and KH-appointed staff and such constitutional 
contingencies as economic side-bets; but they can only 
be treated as non-insignificant. In fact, 
both SH and KH were processing the same information provided by SK, although SH had only 
had limited sources of information in that the control of marketing activities was at KH's 
disposal. Both SH-and KH-appointed staff at SK started to compete for success, power, social 
recognition and political status; 
but this did appear to affect the investment, decision-making 
process. 
In brief, it seems to this researcher that SK's ventures in the growth phase of its life cycle more 
or less indicate that the utilities of experimenting can outrank 
those of others such as 
continuance, withdrawal and 
time-biding, and that escalatory behaviour happens when the 
utilities of experimenting appear 
to be superior to others especially from the economical 
perspectives along the consideration of some social factors such as the cultural and ideological. 
The third crucial event in 1993: The third general manager of SK, KA63, resigned in the 
winter of 1993. He was of 
Chinese nationality and was appointed by KG due to KG's one-sided 
re-location two years ago of 
their previously appointed general manager KA62. The reasons that 
he used to justify his resignation 
included: "... I couldn't stand any further pressure from the 
bank which kept demanding the 
firm [SK] to pay back part of the loan as outlined in the 
contract,... [KG] was on 
the brink of bankruptcy in Korea,... [KH] was no longer effective in 
acquiring overseas orders,.. . overheads were 
too high,... losses were amounting higher and 
higher,... I had too many bosses [KH, SH, sometimes, KG and SG] competed for 
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power,... quality standards were falling since many batches of work had to be redone,... and it 
was totally out of my capacity to bring the firm back to a healthy track". Commenting upon his 
behaviour, the only female vice-general manager, SA121 said, "[KA62] was like a mad 
bull.. . wasn't going 
to do this, wasn't going to do that... slamming the office phone down and 
never switched his mobile phone on.. . passing every task and responsibility to the deputy 
general manager as if he were on holiday in Qing Emperor Island". As a result, a new round of 
urgent board meeting was called by SK's top management. This round of board meetings had a 
new board member, Mr. SA32, the new general manager of SH. This board meeting appeared to 
be the biggest board meeting so far held for discussing and deciding on SK matters in that 
invited to attend the meeting were the whole top management team of SK, SH, and several top 
guns in KH and KG. The board accepted KA63's resignation, claimed that no general manager 
was going to be nominated but the deputy general manager took full charge, and decided that 
SK should continue to survive but should shift its focus from export-orientation to domestic 
market-orientation. Thus, the young deputy general manager who was nominated one year later 
by SG as SK's fourth general manager, SA6i, had an opportunity to reform the joint venture at a 
full swing including recruiting a young SG accountant as the deputy general manager SA72 and 
another young female vice-general manager 
(i. e. SA122) to replace the previous one (i. e. SA121) 
who took two years' maternity 
leave after enormous success at SK. 
Analysis of the third crucial event:; It is obvious that SK was at the time in the maturity stage 
of its life cycle. The removal of the 
first general manager did not do any good, neither did the re- 
location of the second general manager. The third general manger proved to be very competent 
but lost his confidence. SK's top management looked as if it was playing a time-biding game, 
waiting to see something good 
to happen. So did the two holding companies SH and KH. SK 
had not saved KG and both were 
in trouble. Two worse situations couldn't make a good one. 
Perhaps, for many SK people, the only fortunate thing which occurred to SK was that it had 
established its own marketing 
taskforces in the past four years, being directly helped by both SH 
and KH. SH had 
invested heavily in SK in terms of personnel, material, and capital. As the then 
general manager of 
SH, who became the deputy general manager of SG in 1993, said, "the 
parent company 
has not lost confidence in the joint venture... and the time will come for people 
in the joint venture to see prosperity and enjoy their 
fulfilment". 
A brief look at the flow of SK's 
business activities reveals that SK was literally still focused in 
the textile industry (Figure 9-9). 
SK had squeezed into the Chinese clothing market- and the 
Chinese work-wear market and had a 'good position in both markets. While exports declined, 
domestic sales increased. However, what upset SK's top management was the fact that SK was 
still unable to make a profit. 
The sales increased but so did the overheads. The losses mounted 
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higher and higher. In addition to that, SK was obliged to pay back part of the loan borrowed 
from CB every three months., Given that exports had sharply declined, every SK employee was 
expecting that magic could happen in the Chinese domestic market. 
Escalating commitment theory suggests that both economic and psychological utilities of the 
investment play a significant role in facilitating escalating commitment in the maturity stage of 
the investment life cycle. The research evidence seems to indicate that, for SK, the joint force of 
economic utilities played an important role in triggering further escalating commitment, but they 
tend to have lost their momentum. Said one of the board members, "let bygones be bygones and 
let's decide for tomorrow". SA4 recalled that "it was accepted that the probability of being a 
global competitor had been smashed by KG's declining,... 
[while] the probability of going bust 
did not loom large.... " Other board meeting attendees added, "some of us did value the 
opportunity investments higher than the current one" and 
"the salvage value of the plant would 
be nil for nobody would take it at its book value and we are not allowed to sell 
it below the book 
value". 
Figure 9-9: The flow of business operation in SK from 1989 to 1993 
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For SK, psychological utilities tended to 
dominate in triggering further escalating commitment 
in this maturity stage of its 
life cycle but they did not play a major role. Fresh faces tended to 
attack the old 
faces, while the old faces tended to explain how the decision situation had been. 
As one of fresh 
faces challenged, "further resources should not have been put into their [SK's 
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top management] hands, for they could do nothing but borrow from the bank.. . People in my 
cycle have been fed up with them ... I think we need to sack all of them and sell the plant to the 
bank". One of the old faces replied, "[last time] the board had many experts' advice to support 
the project but it did not come through,... [this time] you guys want this project shut .... how can 
you know you are better than them? " The Chairman SAL calmed everybody when he said, "I 
hold the overall leadership responsibility for those misfortunes... [and] I trusted that no one, 
including me, in the past, at present and in future, would intend to erect a building and 
immediately destroy it because it's built on good purpose... ". Research revealed that the 
Koreans acted very passively, perhaps due to the language problem, and insisted that SK's 
future needed to be carefully examined and cautiously determined. The Chinese, however, had 
mixed views. However, one thing that did matter a lot was SK's workers' concerns about their 
jobs. SA1 took out a batch of letters and read one of the named to the board stating "We have 
listened hard, we have worked hard, we have never hidden our energy, the factory is our home, 
we need our home... ". Most board member felt pressures for uniformity when some board 
members declared support for SK's continuance and 
further investment. Thus the decision was 
made to let it have a go, and to see what would 
happen next. One of the board meeting attendees 
commented, "I was moved, I voted 
for it because I shared the feelings of the workers. They need 
a home, I need a home, We all need a 
home". Nonetheless, other board attendees confessed that 
"home and business are two different concepts .... [but] a 
few of us cannot make a majority". 
In brief, it seems to this researcher that SK's ventures in the maturity phase of its life cycle more 
or less indicate that the utilities of time-biding can outrank 
those of others, such as continuance, 
withdrawal and experimenting, and 
that escalatory behaviour happens when the utilities of time- 
biding appear to be superior to others especially from the social perspectives along the 
consideration of some psychological and economical 
factors. 
The fourth crucial event in 1996: In the summer of 1996, CB, for the first time for nearly 10 
years, CB called 
for an urgent board meeting to discuss the management practices at SK. It was 
alleged that SA61 violated 
the initial agreement between SK (under SH and KH's approval) and 
CB. CB had stopped lending loans to SK. SK delayed again and again in paying back the loan 
and the interest. 
In fact SK did not show any sign of paying them in the near future. Even worse, 
it was known that SK 
had opened a new business account in another bank, CB2, the strongest 
competitor of 
CB. There were also rumours that neither KG nor KH was satisfied with the top 
management of 
SK in that they seized every bit of power and had acted very arrogantly towards 
the holding company. Besides, 
SK's competitive marketing force started to provide services to 
SK's competitors to help them to export certain categories of products which SK was no longer 
producing. 
Although the machines were still running, the loan and the interest relating to the 
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loan had severely hampered SK people's ambition. During the board meeting, the top 
management team was ordered to be replaced by some outsourced high flyer, and, although no 
substantial financial resources were further allocated to the project, SK was encouraged to 
continue its course under new leadership. Workers did not like the decision. But CB liked it this 
way, so did KH and SH. A new top management team was recruited which included SK's fifth 
general manager (i. e. SA62) who had a good track record. Moreover, more people flooded in to 
replace the previous administrative staff. One special movement was that KH had withdrawn all 
its appointed or nominated staff under the excuse that they were required to return home because 
KG had suffered huge losses at home. It was claimed that KH's world-wide office could still be 
used by SK but the fact was there were few offices which were still open at the time. After the 
arrival of the new general manager, SA62, SK started another long march. 
Analysis of the fourth crucial event: ' Obviously SK was in the saturation stage of its life cycle. 
Through building up its core people management team, SK's performance was actually 
hampered by its expanding overhead. It was a joke among the SH people that SK people looked 
as if they no longer need their parent's advice. 
Others commented that SK people under AS6I's 
leadership had in fact produced a lot of products, they also earned a lot of revenue, and they had 
saved a lot of the funds they 
borrowed (from the bank), but they also spent a lot of funds on 
people's training, public relations, cars, office equipment, and travelling, etc.. 
Escalation theory (e. g. Wilson and Zhang, 1995c; Staw and Ross, 1987) suggests that both 
psychological and social utilities of 
investment play an important role in facilitating escalatory 
behaviour in the saturation stage of the investment life cycle. Research evidence tends to support 
the theory. It was observed that 
SK people actually predicted that there was no relationship 
between their actions and SK's consequences and, as Gross (1991) predicted, after several 
failures in acquiring quality orders via KH, SA61 and his team had the feeling of learned 
helplessness, they did not contact KH once throughout the whole year of 1995. They tended to 
just not believe in KH and 
SH. For people at SH, SH, and CB, psychological reactance 
(Wortmau and Brehm, 1975) easily drove them to re-seize control which they previously 
expected to have and pushed 
themselves further down towards the escalatory black hole. 
Social factors also seemed to be active 
in this stage of SK's life cycle. SA61 was said to have 
joked with his core team mates that they were a rolling stone that gathered no moss. Job 
insecurity started to become a shadow 
for the administrative staff at SK after the new year of 
1996 when there was a rumour that there would 
be a lot of personnel movement from 1996 
onwards. The biggest shock could be that KG was expected to go bust soon in Korea. Thus the 
Korean nominated or appointed staff started to make a lot of phone calls, even at lunch time. 
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Nobody was really helpful when the research was in progress because "everyone had another 
fish to fry". Senior people tended to save face by muddling through from time to time, 
exhibiting self-presentational motives, while the young were more daring to head for immediate 
success. 
Figure 9-10: The flow of business operations in SK from 1993 to 1996 
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However, political factors were also found to facilitate escalatory 
behaviour at this stage. SK, 
SH, and KH were acting as a triad, all 
bidding for power and influence. SK under SA61's 
leadership had undergone a lot of changes. It was quite usual 
for SK to refuse to attend any 
meeting conveyed 
by SH. SK's staff sometime went beyond SH to contact the SG boss for 
advice. KH's influence and marketing power 
were cut to zero. SK people often maintained that 
KH needed to help themselves 
first, and thus, it was quite usual for SK to reject orders acquired 
by KH if they were economically 
inferior. People at SH and KH complained that SK's top 
management had not 
learned how to cooperate at all. Workers at SK mentioned that SA61's 
leadership was probably so far the 
best even though no net profit had ever been made yet. 
Moreover, although SG had shown signs of retreat 
by withdrawing its staff, it defended at the 
board meeting furiously that they were not retreating. 
As written in the memo of board meeting, 
KA2 pleaded that SK should not 
be abandoned, and "we need to be side by side, we need to 
believe in ourselves, and ... 
[KG] will be back". 
In brief, it seems that SK's ventures 
in the saturation phase of its life cycle more or less indicate 
that the utilities of 
both time-biding and withdrawal outranked those of continuance and 
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experimenting, and escalatory behaviour can happen when the utilities of time-binding appear to 
be superior to others especially from the psychological or social perspectives along with the 
consideration of some political factors. 
The fifth crucial event in 1998: In the spring of 1998, KG was declared bankrupt in Korea, and 
KH was dismantled. CB started to use legal weapons. This time an extended board meeting with 
the absence of KG and KH staff was held. SAl had left his post as SG's general manager and 
went for a higher rank post as the deputy general manager of a nation-wide operation. SA31 
became SG's general manager and also succeeded as SA12. The decision was made that SK 
was not to declare bankrupt and that the plant should run as usual, despite its continuous 
fmancial nightmares. 
Analysis of the fifth crucial events SK was at the time in the decline stage of its life cycle. 
The market share was falling. It really looked like a deserted home. Even at daytime, there were 
"no noises, no cars, no calls, ... and no people". Revenues generated in the textile sector kept 
falling sharply, partly due to market competition, partly due to organizational inertia, partly due 
to learned helplessness, and partly due to social pressures. People who could afford to abandon 
the job had all left. Revenues generated at other sectors can only be good enough for the 
salaries of those remaining workers who 
did not have any place'to go. Job security was still a 
big issue there. 
Escalation theory (Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) suggests economic, psychological, social and 
structural factors all play an 
important role in facilitating escalating commitment in the decline 
stage of the investment 
life cycle. Evidence found in SK seems to support this. However, SK's 
practice suggested that economic 
factors play an unforgettable role in facilitating escalating 
commitment but their 
importance can fade away dramatically as compared to the previous 
stages. The investment 
incurred can be treated as "a pity,... [but] it is your boy". SK's salvage 
value was regarded as too 
low. Proposals were raised that SA should write-off SK because 
focuses needed to be on alternative investment opportunities. Psychological factors still seemed 
to be very active. When asked, many 
decision-makers still convince themselves that the problem 
was temporary. Said the new chairman, 
for example, "It is always dark before dawn... " and 
"Remember the days when the company [i. e. SG] was established, nothing was possible but the 
pioneers had made everything possible". 
Social factors seemed to play a rising role in that "[SG] 
is to lose its whole face.... [and 
SH and SG] need to get it back" and that pressures for job 
security had 
become intensively high. Structural factors seemed to play a supreme role in 
facilitating further persistence, 
because that new businesses under SK (see Figure 9-11) had 
been created and some operations 
(e. g. importing) had already started to show some excitement, 
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that "political influence needs to be carefully considered before a big decision", that pressures 
from the workers' union were high, that "the bank [i. e. CB] will take away everything 
immediately", and that, given the impression that SK's problem was also considered as SH's 
problem and SG's problem, the symbolic meaning was so high that something must be done on 
it. 
Figure 9-11: The flow of business operations in SK from 1996 to 1998 
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On the surface, SK saw the utilities of withdrawing surmounting those of persisting, time-biding, 
and experimenting 
due to changes in its environment. However, time-biding` seemed to be a 
better choice for SK. For one thing, "the official contract of the strategic alliance will last until 
2001". For another, "we still have a chance to re-run it [i. e. SK] if the bank can write-off the 
loan and interests", and "if the machinery 
is be put on auction, a lot of us would like to discuss 
the possibility". All this showed that 
legitimate withdrawing can sometimes give way to 
unreasoned time-biding 
in that utilities of time-biding can be magnified by a small probability of 
recouping the 
initial investment depending on the reference point of the decision-maker. Besides, 
there were generic utilities of time-biding which 
include certain gain due to, neither persisting 
nor withdrawing and possible gain 
due to neither persisting nor withdrawing. And this was 
perhaps why SK was still rolling 
forwards when its debt from the bank had exceeded ¥5m . 
The sixth crucial (ending) event 
in 1998: In late 1998 SK was officially closed and the 
splendid office was taken over by one of its main stakeholders, CB. The bosses of SK, SH and 
SG gathered again, unofficially though, to 
discuss SK matters. It was revealed that the final 
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liquidation, according to one source of information, wouldn't start until the beginning of 2002. 
Analysis of the sixth crucial event: 6 It looks like that SK's search for success has been going 
towards a non-ending disastrous trap (Figure 9-11), although an inductive reasoning based 
generalization can be unsound (Hume, 1951). 
Figure 9-12: A summary of SK's life route (from 1987 to 1998 and onwards) 
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? hoped! 
Can't help now 
SH 
Going bust at an No but Can't help early stage of its = had 
Can't help SK 
life cycle ? chances! 
Loan + interest 
Expected No, but f Sony ! _ one-sided nearly Sony ! 
sale ? there ! 
-"---- K11 (Gone bust) 
Sorry ! Sony ! 
Non-ending L Yes, It's KG (Gone bust) disastrous ---*E 
almost 
Trap ?! there ! 
At this final stage of its life cycle, SK metaphors a typical Chinese saying that "an insect of one 
hundred legs can be still alive even if it is frozen". Reasons for not declaring bankruptcy could 
include many. Among those conceivable were that, "nobody deserts a dying child", that 
situations might turn around, 
that keeping an option can be better than exercising an option, that 
"the Koreans might show up one day", that "it can be as easily revived as it is closed by the 
bank ... 
", that "we [SG] want a footprint, not a shadow... ", and that "it is not finished until it is 
finished". 
The summarizing analysis of the crucial events since 1987: After 12 year's operation SK's 
appearance had 
been surfed by all sorts of factors, strategic, organizational, operational, 
psychological, environmental, 
ideological, cultural, social, political, legal, and constitutional, etc. 
Above all, it tends to be a self-deception trap, and the spontaneous, emerging interweaving of 
utilities of withdrawing, experimenting, 
persisting and time-biding had ", entrapped decision- 
makers to "put off the evil 
day" by sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally 
taking the upward-, downward-, 
leftward-, rightward- shift of their reference points (Figure 9- 
13), ' the consequences of which were 
that the process was dynamic, that the decision situation 
was worsening, and 
that the effect of escalation was like a black hole. 
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Figure 9-13: A hypothetical reference map of utility 
(Source: Adapted from Wilson and Zhang, 1995c) 
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9.5 Discussions 
This longitudinal study of an entrapped strategic alliance is definitely an example of escalation, 
and clearly an example of entrapment, or 
"putting off the evil day". Each crucial event triggered 
by change, things, people, or events themselves, presented the investment decision-makers with 
an opportunity to persist, withdraw, wait, or experiment. 
All of these options had appeared 
although the magnitude and scope of each option and 
the time and space of the exercise differed. 
However, the investment rolled forward and forward until it was nearly absorbed by the black 
hole. 
In review, SK's escalation 
in committed resources is not limited to funds alone. Escalatory 
attempts have covered other resources such as 
time, human resources, technology, and strategy. 
In fact, SK not only increased its loans from the bank, but also added more people, more 
equipment , more 
time, more structure, more strategies to the investment aiming at its objective 
to become a global competitor. 
As can be seen in the analysis, the research was focused upon 
crucial changes caused 
by unexpected changes in things, people, events and changes themselves, 
and so the research was contextually 
justified by focusing only on the unanticipated increase of 
resources (be they time, 
funds, effort, etc. ) against realistically needed resources in investment 
decision-making. 
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In this study, escalation has been referred to SK's continuing strategy to carrying on the 
investment which contextually contains both "carpe diem" (make the most of the present) and 
"putting off the evil day". However, the research was limited to several crucial events which this 
researcher thought had exerted significant influence on the investment. It would be wrong to 
suggest that SK was a case of strict entrapment which exclusively accords with "putting off the 
evil day". There were events or changes in people, things, and changes which could not be held 
to be escalatory at all. For example, personnel change due to the maternity leave of a vice- 
general manager and the layout re-arrangement of production lines had been downsized. 
While economists were discussing financial traps ahead of SK, sociologists might conclude that 
the economic rationalities per se which articulate the economists' traps are traps themselves. 
Thus, this research was not conducted purely based upon economists' perspectives. As can be 
seen in the text, little attention was paid to financial analyses. The research was conducted to 
cover the full organizational context, which include, inter alia, economic, psychological, social, 
strategic, political, institutional perspectives. SK's escalation in commitment reflects a 
compromise among the perceived utilities of withdrawing, persisting, time-biding and 
experimenting. When further funds were demanded by the market-oriented rationalities, for 
example, SK's boss could choose to stop, wait, or experiment; but SK bosses decided to persist, 
a situation in which escalation occurs particularly when the utility of persisting eventually 
outranks that of experimenting, or time-biding. At various stages of its life cycle, SK-decision- 
makers' chaotic and interweaving shifts of reference points on their varying reference maps 
jointly lead to their down-and-left-ward shift of reference points on their economic-perspective 
reference map and consequently contributed to escalation of economists' prototype. 
The present study examined the interplay between conflicting perceived utilities of persisting, 
withdrawing, time-biding and experimenting along the approximated investment life cycle of a 
Sino-Korean strategic alliance. It achieved its objective to forward the research by extending 
escalation study into new territories 
(i. e. Asian dimensions and the strategic dimensions) and 
new research themes 
(i. e. the match between outputs and processes). 
Although they cannot be used to convincingly test theories, the research results implied that it 
can be vague to 
describe escalatory behaviour without a full organizational context. Persisting 
resulted in escalation, 
but so did time-biding and experimenting. In fact all of the four elements 
can appear in the escalating processes. 
It is the perceived utilities of each factor which is fully 
filled with spontaneously emerging conflicts (e. g. certain gains, certain losses, possible gains 
and possible losses) that actually matter. 
Eventually it is the decision-makers' shift of reference 
points on their varying reference maps 
(i. e. perspectives such as strategic, operational, economic, 
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environmental, social, -, ideological, structural, and psychological) that distort their reference 
points on their economic maps and drag the investment into the black hole. 
However, the interpretation of the research can be problematic. Further, effort directed at a sub- 
theme of the research (i. e. hidden agenda) was not very productive. ' Little effort had been made 
to examine the opportunity costs of the strategic alliance despite the fact that there exists vivid 
evidence in that line. Since more emphases were place on insights any sorts of generalization 
can only be treated as tentative or suggestive. However, given that the research can be said to be 
thoroughly undertaken in a constructive way, some further research propositions derived from 
the research can be used to partially justify the conclusion: (a) escalating commitment is more 
likely to occur in investments involving more than one" investors; (b) some corporate cultures 
(such as the Chinese and the Korean) can be in favour of escalating commitment; (c) decision- 
makers' task-oriented leadership styles can be more vulnerable to escalation than the 
relationship-oriented; (d) the less decision-making power the top management team has on an 
investment the more likely the team is to escalate commitment to its course of action; (e) 
escalation is more likely to appear as an interweaving process constantly interacted by varying 
contingent factors covering the full organizational context; and (f) compromise among the 
perceived utilities of withdrawing, persisting, time-biding and experimenting tends to lead to 
escalation of commitment in the 
investment decision-making process. 
9.6 Conclusion and recommendation 
Commitment escalation in the investment decision-making context should mean unanticipated 
increases in the commitment of resources (be they time, funds, effort, etc. ) against realistically- 
needed commitment 
in resources. Escalation refers to a continuing strategy to carrying on a 
course of action which contextually contains 
both "carpe diem" (make the most of the present) 
and "putting off the evil 
day" while entrapment exclusively accords with "putting off the evil 
day". Escalating commitment reflects a compromise among the perceived utilities of 
withdrawing, persisting, time-biding and experimenting, with escalation occurring particularly 
when the utility of persisting, experimenting, or time-bidding eventually outranks that of others. 
The decision-makers' down-and-left-ward shift of reference points on their varying reference 
maps jointly distorts their reference points on 
their economic maps and consequently contributes 
to escalation. Future practice 
in this line should aim at integrating different perceived utilities 
rather than simply pursuing a compromise among 
them, and future research in this line should 
include further longitudinal case studies which reflect the dynamics of the escalatory processes 
as well as further theorizing on escalation of commitment. 
9-30 
Chapter 9 Escalation: A Longitudinal Study Of An Entrapped Strategic Alliance 
Moreover, it seems that investment projects once on their way tend to be escalatory, and 
therefore, escalating commitment in the investment decision-making process can be a general 
phenomenon, although the findings of the meta-analytical synthesis did not provide a very 
strong statistical support (please see Type F test or Q8-1). Thus, escalating commitment in 
investment decision-making, as a phenomenon, demands that researchers go beyond the 
phenomenon to explore what lies behind the veil of escalation. This suggests that advancing the 
theory of investment decision-making also seems promising and profitable. That is, specifically, 
investment decision-making needs to be considered as both a science and an art and as a vehicle 
for humankind to make progress towards their desirable ends, goals or objectives. Another 
profitable theme of future research under the mega-theme of investment decision-making can be, 
in the light of Q1-1, Q1-3 and Q1-6, the study of organizational memory about investment 
decisions made in that it seems that decisions made tend to be naturally forgotten by 
organizational decision-makers over time. (All this is going to be dealt with in Chapter 12 
entitled "On Investment and Investment Decision-making". ) 
' Words in quotation marks are extracted from Zhang et al (1989), while words in square brackets are this 
researcher's insertion. Other sources of evidence 
include corporate memos of board meetings, corporate documents 
and materials filed at the great parent company. 
2 Words in quotation marks are extracted from Zhang et al (1989), while words in square brackets are this 
researcher's insertion. Other sources of evidence include corporate memos of board meetings, corporate documents 
and materials filed at the great parent company. 
3 Words in quotation marks are extracted from Zhang et at (1993), while words in square brackets are this 
researcher's insertion. 
Other sources of evidence include corporate memo, corporate propaganda, memos of 
managerial meetings. 
4 Words in quotation marks are extracted from Zhang et al (1996), while words in square brackets are this 
researcher's insertion. 
Other sources of evidence include corporate memos of board meetings, corporate documents 
and materials filed at 
the great parent company. 
s Words in quotation marks are extracted from Zhang et al (1998), while words in square brackets are this 
researcher's insertion. Other sources of evidence 
include corporate memos of board meetings, corporate documents 
and materials filed at the great parent company. 
6 Words in quotation marks are extracted from Chou (1998), while words in square brackets are this researcher's 
insertion. Other sources of evidence include corporate memos of board meetings, corporate documents and 
materials filed at the great parent company. 
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10. De-escalation: An Experimental Study of Managerial Cadres' Perseverance 
10.1 Introduction 
It seems that there is a glaring omission in the corpus of escalation and de-escalation literature: 
it lacks direct research (Mintzberg, 1979; Zhang, 1993). Little is revealed about how decision- 
makers actually experience mounting evidence of failure in a venture which is important to them; 
little is understood about, how it feels to be confronted with a dilemma; little is reported about 
how decision-makers actually behave in those circumstances and, most important, what informs 
their actions; and little is known about the conditions under which decision-makers opt for de- 
escalation. 
Partially based upon this, therefore, this study of the researcher aims to forward the research on 
de-escalation of commitment by examining the'combined effects of sunk costs and negative 
feedback on decisions to` de-escalate commitment to a diversifying programme with a string of 
investments. Structure-wise, this part of the thesis first explores the theme of sunk costs and 
negative feedback, then provides a brief review of the de-escalation literature, and finally 
summarizes the two field experiments undertaken in a large Chinese enterprise with regard to 
the settings, methods, results and analyses. 
10.2 Escalation and de-escalation: behind the veil of sunk costs and negative 
feedback 
Investment decisions made in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity can fail to turn out as 
expected. When decision-making situations 
deteriorate, investment decision-makers can be 
faced with a dilemma over whether to risk continuing or whether to withdraw and face the 
consequences (Zhang, 
1993). Research into such predicaments (i. e. escalation) has mainly 
sought to identify the reasons 
for irrational persistence known as escalation (e. g. Brockner, 
1992), and has been predominantly experimental presenting decision-makers with forced 
choices such as whether to commit 
further funds to an ongoing course of action or not. In such 
circumstances, investment 
decision-makers are believed to compound the problem by persisting 
irrationally, and reasons for such irrational persistence have been broadly categorized into four 
groups: project, psychological, social and structural 
(Staw and Ross, 1987). 
Basically, there are three areas of research suggesting that sunk cost effects and negative 
feedback affect decisions to escalate or de-escalate organizational commitment to an on-going 
course of action. 
First, a series of research papers by Staw (e. g. 1976,1981) on escalation of 
commitment suggests' 
that investment decision-makers ollen allocate additional resources (e. g. 
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time, money, knowledge, effort) to an on-going investment project despite information 
suggesting that the investment is not likely to achieve its intended outcomes; this line of 
research is primarily based on a model of decision-making in which negative feedback 
following the choice of some action stimulates concern for the justification of that choice and 
encourages escalation of commitment in the hope that future positive outcomes might vindicate 
the original choice. Second, a related area of research on entrapment (Rubin and Brockner, '1975; 
Brockner et al 1979; Wilson and Zhang, 1997) suggests that the allocation of resources to obtain 
some goal may be followed by increased allocations when the goal is not achieved; the 
explanation proposed for entrapment involves approach-avoidance conflicts in which, as time 
passes by, the desire to obtain a goal surpasses the desire to minimize cost-benefit ratios. Third, 
a distinctive string of research promoted by Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggests that investment 
of any resource in an activity directed at obtaining some outcome may result in `irrational' sunk 
cost effects, whereby the tendency to commit additional resources is positively influenced by the 
magnitude of prior investments. 
10.3 De-escalation literature 
Staw and Ross (1987) have suggested non-empirically that the relationship 'between de- 
escalation and escalation is fundamentally one of opposites. Losing predicaments, they suggest, 
present decision-makers with conflicting pressures for persistence and withdrawal respectively. 
Seemingly, withdrawal can be the more probable outcome where alternative investment 
opportunities exist, and psychological and social pressures are either weak or outweighed by 
fears of consequences. High accountability, for example, is thought to reduce cognitive bias, 
thus producing de-escalating effect (Tetlock, 1991); but it is also thought to enhance cognitive 
bias, thus fostering escalation (Simonson and Staw, 1992). The pattern of project variables such 
as high salvage value 
is also regarded as critical in de-escalation decisions (Staw and Ross, 
1987). De-escalation can be facilitated where a venture has not yet become organizationally 
embedded or where the 
decision-maker believes that the goal is distant, or where there exist 
conditions which are opposite 
to those favouring persistence (such as low commitment and low 
information equivocality). The few empirical studies of de-escalation of commitment have been 
primarily concerned with comparing 
the worth of various de-escalation strategies. 
Summing up, plausible de-escalating strategies proposed by previous research include: 
1, backing off (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
2. being aware of the likelihood of entrapment (Nathanson et al, 1992), 
3, boosting experimentation (Staw and Ross, 1987). 
4. creating decision alternatives (McCain, 1986), 
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5. evaluating decision-makers on the basis of their decision process rather than outcome 
(Simonson and Staw, 1992), 
6. forcing decision makers to review their options (Bracken et al, 1979), 
7. improving the information system (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
8. maintaining a balance between risk and opportunity (Drummond, 1994), 
9. making negative outcomes less threatening (Simonson and Staw, 1992), 
10. preparing a progress report on the project (Ghosh, 1997), 
11. providing information about future benefits of additional expenditure (Ghosh, 1997), 
12. providing unambiguous feedback regarding previous expenditure (Ghosh, 1997), 
13. recognizing over-commitment (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
14. reducing the risk of failure (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
15. seeing escalation for what it is (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
16. separating decision-makers (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
17. setting minimum target levels (Teger, 1980; Simonson and Staw, 1992), 
18. turn over administrators (Staw and Ross, 1987), 
10.4 Forwarding the research on de-escalation: the relevance of sunk cost and 
negative feedback in diversifying investments 
What the three strings of research on escalation and de-escalation have ignored are any specific 
relationships that might exist in a particular investment situation among sunk cost, negative 
feedback, the subjective probability of future returns, and the felt responsibility for the previous 
decisions, although these relations can vary widely across different investment decision-making 
contexts and types of decision-making tasks. 
It has been held (Wilson and Zhang, 1997) that prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
remains one of the most viable mechanisms which provide sound explanations for the escalation 
and de-escalation of organizational commitment phenomenon. According to prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1984), investment decision outcomes are normally evaluated as 
gains and losses from some reference point. Investment decision-makers are posited to be 
influenced by a `certainty effect', in which probable outcomes are under-weighted in 
comparison with certain outcomes. Because 
de-escalation of commitment may lead to any sunk 
costs being viewed as a certain 
loss, people ought to become more reluctant to de-escalate their 
commitment as sunk costs increase. 
Sunk cost effects, as predicted from prospect theory, may indeed occur in games of pure chance. 
Whilst prior loss and future return are unrelated, sunk costs mount with each loss. Furthermore, 
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the common `gambler's fallacy' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) which is based upon the 
erroneous belief that a series of losses makes a win more likely serves to strengthen sunk cost 
effects in gambling situations. This shows that sunk cost effects can actually deter de-escalation 
of commitment. For instance, in some investment projects, such as R&D, long delays between 
investments and returns coupled with the fact that increased expenditures usually bring 
investment decision-makers closer to the project completion, can result in a great reluctance to 
de-escalate the commitment as investments increase; indeed, studies using R&D decision 
scenarios have often found strong sunk cost effects (Arkers & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990). 
Taking negative feedback, which indicates failure to achieve a desired outcome after action, it 
can be reasoned that things such as no return following some investment can cause ° lower 
expectations about future returns after similar actions. Indeed, Staw and Ross (1987) argue that 
when negative feedback suggests that future investment is not likely to result in positive returns, 
as it might when negative returns are experienced repeatedly (Staw and Fox, 1977), or when the 
cause of a negative return is perceived to be endogenous to the course of action itself (Staw ad 
Ross, 1978), de-escalation of commitment may be the most likely response taken by investment 
decision-makers. 
10.4.1 The settings of the present study 
In the present study, this researcher focuses on decision-making in the context of diversifying 
investment projects in China's state-owned enterprises. The current status of diversifying 
investments in China's state-owned enterprises can be defined as a series of investment 
decisions, with each decision producing a progressively clearer determination of risk versus 
reward and serving for the experimentation of exploring new business horizons, which might 
contribute to an organization's continuous prospering, although the organization may not 
necessarily enjoy distinctive advantages compared to competitors in the marketplace. 
In one type of diversifying situation currently occurring in China's state-owned enterprises, "Xia 
Gang Feng Liu" (i. e. diversification and divergence), the term sunk cost takes on a literal 
meaning. Typically, one company has received encouragement from both the central 
government and its holding company to create new businesses so as to provide more job 
opportunities. On the basis of hierarchical intent 
in terms of downsizing goals, a decision is 
made to initiate an investment which can desirably break even. If the investment turns out to be 
an `iron hen' (i. e. no financial rewards so that the firm can hardly break even), a significant sunk 
cost (i. e. the cost of implementation of the investment such as equipment, technology, capital, 
knowledge) has been incurred. At the same time, the infertile investment provides feedback 
10-4 
Chapter 10 De-escalation: An Experimental Study Of Managerial Cadres' Perseverance 
which may influence the decision-makers' expectations of finding another profitable investment 
in the light of the hierarchical intent. 
After having implemented an investment and witnessed its fruitlessness, the decision-makers 
have to decide whether to continue (by means of new management, new resources, etc. ) or 
discontinue staying in the same business (by means, say, of embarking on new ventures). The 
interesting question here is how, if at all, this second decision will be influenced by the negative 
outcome from the earlier investment. On the one hand, prospect theory might predict that the 
cost of the first venture, in the absence of any return, will place the decision-maker on the loss 
side of the value function, thereby increasing the likelihood of his or her commitment to the 
previously chosen investment. On the other hand, if the infertile investment project decreases 
the perceived likelihood of subsequent success, the decision-maker may be less willing to 
escalate but more willing to de-escalate commitment towards the previous chosen investment. 
Assuming that the decision-makers do not run out of funds, which has been the case in so many 
Chinese. state-owned enterprises in the past decade, the research question can be extended to 
how a second, third, fourth, and nth infertile investment will influence the decision to undertake 
the next investment, given that, with each infertile investment, both sunk costs and negative 
feedback have increased. 
Nonetheless, it is not this researcher's purpose in this thesis to generate a definitive test of 
different theoretical models such as self-justification, China mentality, prospect theory, sunk 
cost effects, and organizational inertia, because it remains doubtful that at the present stage of 
theoretical development any empirical study of decision-making in a moderately complex 
situation could provide such a test. Instead, the researcher seeks to examine the generalizability 
of sunk cost effects on the escalation and de-escalation of commitment to ongoing elusive 
projects among expert decision-makers 
in a familiar context in which sunk costs are inextricably 
tied to clear negative feedback. 
10.4.2 Field Experiments I and II 
Subjects in these two experiments are educated managerial cadres of a development company, 
which is a subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise seeking ways of downsizing. A mail-based 
survey design (please see Appendix B) 
is used to conduct two different experiments 
simultaneously. Each respondent is presented with one of the 
five developmental investment 
scenarios, which have been randomized before the mailing. The scenarios are developed by this 
researcher and have been reviewed by two experienced researchers and three professionals in 
the industry. 
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Four scenarios form a between-subjects experiment (i. e. experiment I) with sunk costs 
manipulated by depicting a situation in which one to four infertile investments have already 
been implemented, at a fixed cost per investment and with an investment budget that allows for 
five investments. After reading a scenario, each managerial cadre is asked to indicate both the 
likelihood of authorizing the funds to conduct the next investment and the perceived likelihood 
that the next investment would be productive. 
The fifth scenario is a within-subjects experiment (i. e. experiment II) designed to better 
represent the dynamic nature of Chinese state-owned enterprises' sideline investment decisions. 
The managerial cadres are first asked to indicate the likelihood that, after one infertile 
investment, they would authorize the capital resources to initiate the next investment, they then 
continue to respond to an evolving scenario of questions about the likelihood of authorizing 
resources for a third, fourth, and fifth (i. e. the last) investment, under the assumption that all 
preceding investments have been infertile. 
10.5 Method 
The sample: independent managerial cadres (N=500) were randomly selected from the 
computerized database of a large state-owned enterprise in northern China. The reason why 
independent managerial cadres are chosen as subject lies in the fact that they are believed to 
have the widest range of investment decision-making experiences among 3802 employees. The 
experiment was conducted in the autumn of 1998. A total of 235 completed forms are returned 
(with a response rate of 47%). The , 
final sample size in experiment I is 197, and that in 
experiment II is 38. 
The procedures: a personal covering letter from the researcher (please see Appendix A) and an 
internal return envelope were sent along, with an experimental scenario to each individual 
targeted. The covering letter states that the researcher has received the cooperation of the 
managers' committee in conducting research on investment decision-making in support of the 
firm's continuous prospering. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses 
and thanked in advance for their cooperation. The fact that the experiment asks for no 
organizational information serves to both reinforce the researcher's promise of confidentiality 
and reduces the amount of time necessary for responding. 
Experiment I: In this between-subject design with four levels of sunk costs, all subjects are 
provided with a two-page protocol (please see Appendix B). A cover page (identical in all 
conditions) is used to help assume that the subjects are experiencing the situation depicted on 
the second page of the protocol and to respond as if they really have to make a decision. 
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Furthermore, the importance of actually placing oneself in the situation described is then 
reiterated. 
The decision scenario is designed to portray, albeit in a simplified form, a realistic investment 
project situation. All information presented is easily understandable to the managerial cadres. To 
examine the impact of infertile investments on the decision to realize additional investments, all 
other things being equal, the researcher deliberately excludes from the scenarios the typically 
generically rich or poor investments. The actual scenario employed in the first investment 
condition is as follows: 
Your company has recently realized an investment in the petroleum-chemical industry, 
similar attempts in other part of the land have been proven very successful. The acreage 
position is such that a minimum of five more similar investments can be planned and 
implemented. The holding company provides V 10 million RMB budget for up to five 
investments with each investment sharing a maximum of V2 million RMB allocation (Y1 
million RMB for implementation cost, another V1 million RMB for operation cost). You 
have been given the final authority to authorize all expenditures on varying investments in 
five years. The research result previously carried out has proven both your original 
implementation plan and associated financial forecast. However, the realization of such an 
investment is a Vi million RMB infertile project and your total cost for this non-producing 
investment is, thus, Vi million RMB. 
Subjects in the two, three, four infertile investment conditions read the same scenario, except 
that it is specified that the realized investments and the next one, two, or three investments have 
all been infertile. In addition, it is specified that the total cost for these two, three or four infertile 
investments is '2 million RMB, Y3 million RMB, or Y4 million RMB, respectively. By 
emphasizing the total cost of infertile investments in each condition, the researcher hopes to 
make sunk cost salient to all subjects. 
A number of points should be made about how managerial cadres in a large Chinese state- 
owned enterprise would interpret the facts presented to them in these scenarios. First, the 
positive information provided about the investment supported by the managerial success in 
another part of China clearly implies that there is potential profit which can be made in this part 
China. Second, it would be assumed that the management has made the specific choice as to the 
best available location, capital and personnel to implement all investments in this part of the 
land. Third, the relatively low cost of the land, compared with the cost of implementation, is 
typical in the petroleum-chemical industry. Fourthly, it remains typical to authorize both the cost 
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of implementation and operation for each investment, even though the actual risk involved is 
only the implementation cost of the infertile investment, which in the present case is '1 million 
RMB. 
Immediately following the scenario were two questions. First, subjects were asked to indicate 
"on a scale from 0 to 100 (%) how likely it is that if faced with this situation, you would 
authorize another V2 million RMB to realize the next (or third, fourth, last, depending on the 
subject's condition) investment in the programme"; subjects respond by circling a point along a 
100 point scale marked definitely would not authorize (0) and definitely would authorize (100) at 
the endpoints with the midpoint of the scale (50) marked even chance. Second, subjects are 
asked "Regardless of how you answered the previous question, what remains your perception of 
the likelihood that the next investment to be implemented on this prospect would break-even as 
in the case of some other company in another part of the country? "; subjects are reminded that a 
break-even business is a reasonable and desirable endeavour for the holding company which 
seeks to create job opportunities so as to downsize the mainstream businesses; again subjects 
respond along a 100-point scale marked definitely would not break even (0) and definitely would 
break even (100) at the endpoints and even chance (50) at the midpoint. 
Experiment H. The protocol for the within-subject experiment includes a cover page and four 
further pages. The cover page is identical to that in the between-subjects experiment. After 
reading the investment decision scenario, subjects are asked to respond to the same question 
about the likelihood of their authorizing another '2 million RMB to realize the next of the four 
remaining investments in the programme. To avoid confusion in this more complicated research 
design, the researcher did not ask subjects to indicate their perceptions of the likelihood that the 
next investment would break even. 
On the third page, subjects read the following: 
Assume that you have decided to implement the second investment which turns out to be 
another infertile project. Your total expenditure for the two infertile investment has been V2 
million RMB. On a scale from 1-100 how likely would you be to authorize another V2 
million RMB to implement the next of the 3 remaining investments in the programme? 
On the fourth and fifth pages, subjects are asked to assume they have decided to implement the 
third and fourth investments, respectively. In each case, subjects are reminded of their total 
expenditure (i. e. V3 million RMB and V4 million RMB, respectively) and asked to indicate the 
likelihood of their authorizing another '2 million RMB to implement the next investment in the 
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programme. Repeated references to the total expenditures associated with implementing the 
infertile investment projects should make sunk costs particularly salient to respondents in this 
within-subjects experiment. 
10.6 Interpretations of the results 
10.6.1 Results 
Table 10-1 records responses to the dependent measures in each of the infertile investment 
conditions for both experiment I and II. Seemingly, Table 10-1 tells that within columns means 
with different subscripts are significantly different from one another, p< . 05, given the fact that 
subjects in experiment II are not asked to estimate the likelihood of next investment's breaking 
even. 
Table 10-1: Responses to dependent measures across four infertile investment conditions 
Experiment Experiment I Experiment II 
Items Likelihood of authorizing 
funds 
Likelihood of breaking 
even 
Likelihood of 
authorizing funds 
Parameter M SD M SD M SD 
1 One infertile investment 65.3 35.5 51.0 24.0 66.6 28.0 
2 Two infertile investments 30.8 31.8 31.8 18.4 31.8 37.4 
3 Three infertile investments 27.4 29.7 28.9 22.9 8.9 15.2 
4 Four infertile investments 13.9 19.2 18.7 16.8 1.7 8.2 
10.6.2 Further analysis 
Experiment I: First, a multivariate analysis of variance on responses to both dependent 
measures across the four conditions öf Experiment I shows that a highly significant effect (i. e. 
Fwilks (6,384) = 13.13, p< . 0001) of the number of infertile investments that have been 
implemented. Second, separate univariate tests on each dependent measure reveals a significant 
effect of number of infertile investments on both the reported likelihood of authorizing the funds 
to realize the next investment (i. e. F(3,193) = 26.67, p<0.0001, o)2=0.28) and the perceived 
likelihood that the next investment would break even (i. e. F(3,193) = 20.82, p<0.0001, w2=0.23). 
Third, polynomial analyses reveal that a highly significant linear trend on each measure, 
F(1,193) = 70.79, p<0.0001,0.25, for the likelihood of authorizing, and, F(1,193) = 57.17, 
p<0.0001, w2=0.22, for the likelihood of breaking even. Fourth, the effect' of a number of 
infertile investments on each dependent measure is clearly negative as can be seen from the 
above Table 10-1: the greater the number of infertile investments, the less likely subjects are to 
authorize funds to realize the next investment and the less likely they are to believe that the next 
venture will break even. Fifth, consider the difference between a subject's reported likelihood of 
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authorizing funds for the next investment and his or her perception of the likelihood that this 
investment will break even, there is a positive difference (i. e. higher probability of investing 
than the perceived probability of breaking even), which might be interpreted to reflect a 
particular type of risk seeking and a negative difference (lower probability of investing than the 
perceived probability of breaking even) which might be interpreted to reflect a particular type of 
risk aversion; ' and, a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with number of infertile 
investment treated as a between-subjects factor and type of dependent measure treated as a 
within-subjects factor reveals a'significant between-subjects main effect of the number of 
infertile investments implemented (i. e. F(3,193)' = 28.70, p<0.0001,0.30), no significant 
within-subjects effect for type of dependent measure (i. e. F(1,193) = 1.46), and a significant 
interaction effect of these two factors on subjects' responses (i. e. F(3,193) = 7.2l, p<0.0001, 
cot 0.09). Sixth, further tests show that, despite the significant interaction suggesting differences 
between a subject's reported likelihood of authorizing investment and the perceived likelihood 
of the pursued investment's breaking even, only in the one-infertile investment condition is the 
difference between responses to the two dependent measures statistically significant (i. e. 
F(1,193) = 19.8, p<0.0001) . 
Experiment II: First, as can be seen in Table 10-1, as the number of infertile investments 
increase, subjects are markedly less willing to authorize the next investment in the programme, 
and a repeated-measures ANOVA (multivariate approach) reveals a significant effect on number 
of infertile investments (i. e. F(3,35) = 81.47, p<0.0001, o)2=0.77). Second, further examination 
of Table 10-1 shows that the willingness to authorize funds to implement the next investment 
after one or two infertile ones is virtually identical across both the between-and within-subjects 
experiments, but in Experiment II, de-escalation of commitment to the diversifying programme 
after the third and fourth infertile investments is far greater than in Experiment I. Third, in order 
to ascertain how a subject's willingness to commit resources to the infertile investments is 
influenced by his or her previous decisions and by consistent negative feedback, it seems 
appropriate to make statistical comparisons across experiments at any level of infertile 
investment variables since subjects in Experiment II are actually a random subgroup of the 
sample used in Experiment I; and the results of these comparisons are highly significant for 
three and four infertile investments (i. e. t (85) = 3.71, p<0.0001, and t (89) =4.05, p<0.0001). 
Fourth, attempts (by dividing the managerial cadres into two groups on the basis of the median 
reported likelihood of authorizing investment funds to implement next investment after one 
infertile investment has been implemented, median = 70) to compare patterns of de-escalation of 
commitment after negative feedback among managerial cadres who are more or less willing to 
authorize investment fund following the first infertile investment in the diversifying programme 
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reveal that the managerial cadres can be rated as either enthusiastic (above the median) or 
unenthusiastic (below the median) as can be graphically viewed in Figure 10-1, which clearly 
shows that the two groups converge over time with repeated negative feedback and there exists a 
significant interaction effect (i. e. Fwilks (3,34) = 19.63, p< . 0001, W2. =0.09) by means of a2 
(enthusiastic vs unenthusiastic) X4 (number of infertile investments) mixed-model ANOVA. 
10.6.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment I and Experiment II suggest that, in their decisions to de-escalate or 
escalate their commitment to an on-going investment, these managerial cadres are not subject to 
the kind of sunk cost effects which have been observed in previous research studies (e. g. Arkers 
& Blumer, 1985). Earlier work (e. g. Wilson and Zhang, 1997), including the earlier study of this 
research (e. g. Table 7-5 in Chapter 7 and Q8-5 in Chapter 8), would suggest that higher sunk 
costs are associated with decisions to escalate involvement in on-going investments while in this 
study it is found to have a strong and opposite effect. That is, as sunk costs increase, investment 
decision-makers are, more willing to-de-escalate their involvement in on-going investments in 
the diversifying programme and less willing to escalate their commitment in on-going 
investment activities. This study also provides partial support for one of the research findings 
generated from an earlier study of this researcher (i. e. Q8-7 in Chapter 8) that different de- 
escalation strategies tend to have a very small effect on de-escalation (please see type J test in 
Chapter 8). 
The results of Experiment II (within-subjects) both support and extend the results of Experiment 
I (between-subjects). Moreover, when investment decision-makers in Experiment II make 
repeated decisions, they exhibit an even stronger tendency than do the investment decision- 
makers in Experiment Ito de-escalate commitment to the diversifying programme as the number 
of infertile investments increases. The fact that subjects in Experiment II make their decisions in 
rapid succession could certainly have accounted for the apparent rationality of these decisions. 
However, the rapid evolving scenario employed in this within-subjects experiment repeatedly 
emphasizes the overall expenditure for all infertile investments in the programme, which 
increases with each trial. Given this, it would have been surely reasonable, at least according to 
prospect theory, for the managerial cadres to have become more risk-seeking over trials, as they 
increasingly frame their decisions as a choice between losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Moreover, the fact that de-escalation of commitment is as strong (actually stronger) for those 
who are initially enthusiastic about realizing investment as it is for those who are less committed 
to begin with, suggests that self-justification (Staw, 1978) is not a major factor in the results of 
this fieldwork, and this echoes Q8-2 that escalating commitment literature is inconsistent and 
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Q8-3 that self-justification does not tend to possess a large effect on escalation and de-escalation 
at all. 
Figure 10-1: The relation of infertile investments to the likelihood of authorizing funds 
for next investment in the programme among enthusiastic and unenthusiastic decision-makers 
4" Stands for enthusiastic decision-makers 
Ä3+ Stands for unenthusiastic decision-makers 
pp2 
0 
0% 
Likelihood of authorizing next investment (%) 
To compare this fieldwork with previously conducted research in this vein, one can find that one 
obvious difference between this work and earlier work in this area is that subjects in this work 
are all Chinese and all experts who are presented with a decision problem which is common in 
their line of routine work. As noted by Wilson and Zhang (1997) and Conlon and Parks (1987), 
most experimental studies of escalation have employed university students who lack experience 
in the decision-making contexts with which the researcher presents them. 
Looking back, one can find that there exist at least two factors, either alone or in combination, 
which may account for the discrepancy between the findings of this work and those of earlier 
research on sunk cost effects on decision-making: first, subjects in this research are all formerly 
trained in rational decision-making in their field of experience, whereas the subjects of most 
experimental research on sunk cost effects and escalating phenomenon have been relatively 
inexperienced university students, and this gives rise to the inevitable difficulty of generalizing 
from students to expert populations; second, in this research a decision scenario is deliberately 
developed in which sunk costs are directly related to unambiguous negative feedback, whereas 
in earlier studies decision scenarios are often related to negative feedback which is either 
ambiguous or less diagnostic. 
10.7 Conclusion and recommendation 
The results of the experiments imply that the effects of negative information on decisions to 
escalate or de-escalate commitment towards an on-going investment can be influenced by the 
degree to which that information is diagnostic of future returns. Although this study can not be 
regarded as, not even by design, providing a test of varying theoretical models of escalation and 
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de-escalation of commitment, research results do suggest that one needs to be careful in 
attempting to use one decision model to understand the impact of single variables (e. g. sunk 
costs, negative feedback, etc. ) on behaviour across situations in which all things are far from 
equal., 
What can be learned from the results of this study is that, despite any tendencies respondents 
may have had to engage in self-justification (Staw, 1978), and despite a decision-making 
problem in which de-escalation of commitment is very likely to be framed as a loss (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), the structure of the problem is such that respondents cannot ignore the 
diagnostic value of repeated failures which mount in direct proportion to sunk costs. That is to 
say, had this researcher chosen to structure the problem differently, the research result might 
have looked quite different. For instance, it is possible that the greater the funds expended to 
implement an investment to a higher business level (e. g. going beyond pure manufacturing of 
products to include the establishment of the distribution channel), the greater the propensity to 
implement and improve the investment when the investment fails to break even. 
In their review of behaviour in escalation and de-escalation situations, Staw and Ross (1987) 
contrast a protocol situation for de-escalation of commitment with one for escalation of 
commitment. It is asserted (Staw and Ross, 1987) that two major factors in the prototype of de- 
escalation of commitment are that the "objective situation increasingly worsens over time, 
making it economically clear that persistence is more costly than withdrawal" and the existence 
of "social norms for experimentation and the acceptance of failure". The first factor is certainly 
present in the infertile investment scenario which this researcher presented to managerial cadres 
of a Chinese state-owned enterprise which is undertaking a downsizing programme; the second 
factor seems endemic to the petroleum-chemical industry under the influence of horizontal 
diversification. Thus, in this study, this researcher seems to have identified at least one 
combination of an applied decision context and a problem in which increasing sunk costs are 
associated with increasing tendencies to de-escalate rather than escalating commitment to 
ongoing investments. 
In a number of ways, the method utilized in this study seems to represent a step forward from 
earlier studies of sunk-cost and escalation effects. This is because, in those earlier studies, more 
often than not university students were asked to respond to hypothetical scenarios outside the 
realm of their experience. However, no matter how expert the respondent and how relevant the 
scenario, experiments cannot substitute for the study of actual decision-making in field settings. 
Although it is likely that one can manipulate sunk costs or feedback or both in most business 
settings, researchers should not abandon more descriptive field studies of actual decision 
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behaviour. The fact that the decision scenarios presented to the Chinese managerial cadres 
exclude the type of detailed data and social pressures usually present in job-orientated 
diversifying programme may have contributed to the overall level of rationality observed. For 
instance, the absence of these complicating factors in this researcher's study on de-escalation of 
commitment may have heightened the salience of negative feedback and reduced concerns about 
self-justification. It thus remains possible that, had the Chinese managerial cadres been involved 
in a real investment project, their decisions would have been less rational and more susceptible 
to escalation effects. Moreover, the major difference between this study and previous ones 
perhaps lies in the fact that, while others, use a theory as the theory to explain things, this 
researcher in this study uses a theory as a proposition (i. e. Q4-20,22,23&24) to probe new 
theories or add new dimensions to the theory. 
To gain more insight into how less expert individuals might respond to the procedure of this 
research, future researchers can repeat, given time and access, the between-subjects experiment 
with a sample of university business students, or alternatively, involve themselves in more 
rigorous research such as a longitudinal case study. Although the escalation and de-escalation 
literature is filled with anecdotal examples of what look like sunk-cost effects, more descriptive 
field research and controlled experimental studies are needed to document the conditions under 
which `irrational' effects are most or least likely to occur. There is also a definite need to 
combine the manipulation of theoretically important variables with richer methods of collecting 
respondent data. Therefore, future researchers can continue to investigate practical techniques 
that have the potential to contribute to effective decision-making by minimizing irrational sunk- 
cost effects and maximizing concern for future costs and benefits. 
To go further beyond the theory-using paradigm of escalation of commitment, future researchers 
can direct their research effort at organizational commitment itself by examining the bond or 
contract (be it psychological, economic, ideological, political, social or environmental) by which 
investment decision-makers are attached to organizations and/or investments. Research in this 
line can prove useful in re-establishing the criteria for the identification of escalating 
commitment (e. g. improvement for QC6-1,2,3,4,5,6&7) and in re-discovering the importance of 
proper amount of commitment in organizations, the ways in which organizational commitment 
manifests itself, and the ways by which investment decision-makers can effectively manage 
their double-edged commitment towards investments. (All this is to be dealt with in Chapter 13 
entitled "On Organizational Commitment". ) 
1 For example, in the one-infertile-investment condition, the difference is positive (risk seeking); in the two- and 
three- infertile-investment condition, there are no differences; and in the four- infertile-investment condition, the 
difference is negative (risk aversive). 
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11. Strategic Control: A Survey Study Of Chinese General Managers' Perceptions 
11.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, people in the world of investments tend to accept the notion (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985) that strategy is no longer the prerogative of top management but emerges from the 
outcome of organizational struggle. Moreover, "self-organization" (Dermer, 1988) becomes 
more rampant than ever before in that it is much easier nowadays for people to form groups 
which produce patterns of behaviour despite the absence of formal hierarchies within the groups 
or authorities imposed from outside them. Concepts of emergent strategies and self organization 
directly encourages people to reconsider the notion of strategic control (Coad, 1995). 
Investment decisions made in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity can fail to turn out as 
expected and thus strategic control as an integral part of the overall process of strategic 
management emerges to play an essential role in ensuring that the strategy is being implemented 
as planned and that the results produced by the strategy are those intended (Schendel and Hofer, 
1979). For example, despite the belief that strategic control is little understood and seldom 
found operating effectively in practice (Goold and Quinn, 1990), it has been reported that 
effective strategic controls at firms as diverse as Chevron, Honda, Bank of America, Anheuser- 
Busch, and DPA have led them to substantially improved economic performance. (Harrison, 
1991). 
Partly for this reason and partly because of the aggregate demand from QR8-1, Q6-3, Q1- 
3,4,5&6, Figure 2-8, Table 2-2, Figures 3-2&4, Q4-10, Q4-21, Q4-31, Q5-1,3,4,5,6,7,13,14&18, 
QB6-1,2,3,4,5,6,7&8, Q6-4,5,6,7&8, and Q8-5&7, this study sets out to explore to what extent 
the Chinese general managers understand and exploit the concept of strategic control. That is, is 
strategic control at the top of the indigenous Chinese state-owned enterprises merely a scarcity 
as it is in the UK and the USA (Goold and Quinn, 1990) or does it play a more active role in 
formulating, selecting, implementing and improving organizational strategies (Zahra, 1990)? 
This part of the thesis aims to identify and validate those strategic control factors which directly 
contribute to the success of investment decisions made, implemented, evaluated and improved 
across China by the use of face-to-face interview based survey. In terms of structure, the 
researcher first provides a review of strategic control literature, then conceptualizes an 
empirically backed-up strategic control process model, and then describes the method as well as 
the subjects of the study before he finally discusses the research results of the study. 
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11.2 Strategic control literature 
11.2.1 The definition of strategic control 
Definitions of strategic control range from overly simplistic to needlessly complex. Strategic 
control is most usually portrayed as something to do with ensuring conformity with the central 
organization-wide intent of top management (Schendel and Hofer, 1979). Schreyogg and 
Steinmann (1987) claim that strategic control means "the critical evaluation of plans, activities, 
and results, thereby providing information for future action". Glueck and Jauch (1988) declare 
that strategic control is intended to see that implemented strategic choices result in the 
attainment of the objectives which gave rise to the process of choice. Neale and Holmes (1990) 
perceive strategic control as an advanced form of post-auditing of actual performance against 
intended performance with a particular emphasis on achieving long-range objectives within 
established time and cost constraints. Kellinghusen and Wubbenhorst (1990) advance a triadic 
model of strategic control made up of awareness, audit and action. Roush and Ball (1987) 
conceive strategic control as a reporting system designed to provide the CEO with timely 
information related to the successful implementation of strategic decisions. 
However, organizations are increasingly viewed by leading management theorists (e. g. Hamel, 
1997) as non-goal-oriented, non-instrumental social systems which are susceptible to change in 
infinite ways. Thus, the concept of strategic control needs to explicitly recognize that forces 
other than senior management can and do shape strategic evolution and that organizational 
effectiveness is no longer goal-related but can be evaluated only in terms of adaptability and, 
ultimately, survival. One of the most recent descriptions of strategic control goes to Coad (1995) 
who sees it as "concerned with the decisions and actions undertaken by organizational actors in 
response to perceived environmental patterns in organizational action, past or yet to come". 
Harrison (1991) sees strategic control as being `a discernible sub-process within the overall 
process of strategic management... [which] focuses on the fit between the formulation of 
strategy and its implementation ensuring that the strategy is both on schedule and on target'. 
Harvey (1987) notes that strategic control is the managerial function that ensures that actual 
organizational actions correspond to planned actions". Stacey (1991) sees strategic control as 
"... the process by means of which the managers of an organization discover strategic issues, 
make strategic choices and act to realize those choices". 
For the purpose of this study, strategic control, is conceived as a cyclical progress-oriented 
process featuring identification, definition, searching, choosing, authorization, implementation, 
monitoring, and improvement of an investment strategy for the total organization, and it can be 
both a subset of a large development-oriented process that includes the conceptualization, 
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operationalization, actualization and idealization of the investment at the macro level and a 
mega-set of a small performance-oriented process that includes the goal, plan, execution and 
measure of the investment at the micro level. 
11.2.2 The need for strategic control 
The need for strategic control lies in the intrinsic nature of the overall strategic management 
process in that strategic control is intended to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of selected 
managerial strategy with a particular emphasis on the attainment of the established managerial 
objectives. For example, strategic control provides management with information regarding the 
progress being made in the operating areas of the organization so as to facilitate the successful 
implementation of the selected managerial strategy and, further, to ensure that actual outcomes 
are in conformity with the outcomes integral to the strategic choice. 
The need for strategic control is also centred in the inevitability of change in the organization's 
external environment which is fully filled with forces (such as political, economic, 
technological and social) which bring forth change. For example, it can be difficult for 
investment decision-makers to implement a given strategy with complete confidence that its 
outcome will result in the attainment of the pre-aimed objectives. Thus, it seems both plausible 
and necessary for managers at all levels (especially the decision-makers) to review, via strategic 
control mechanisms, the results of the implemented managerial strategy and to make 
adjustments in the system as appropriate. 
The need for strategic control also results from the potential of increasing efficiency in the 
operating areas of the organization. If a given implemented managerial strategy generates 
continuing evidence of a departure from its intended objectives, strategic control mechanisms 
can be employed to signify a need to make preventive adjustments or corrective surgery. For 
example, a different mixture of inputs, a different application of technology, a different use of 
key personnel, or a different layout of process, can result in an outcome which is more (via 
strategic control) or less (via laissez) in keeping with management's strategic choice. Thus, 
continuous improvements in the internal efficiency of the organization, along with the 
requirement to remain constantly responsive to environmental forces such as the PETS (i. e. 
political, economic, technological and social), poses a continuing need for strategic control. 
11.2.3 The position of strategic control 
Anthony (1965) emphasized the triadic hierarchy of control with his conceptualization of 
strategic planning, management control and operational control, Lorange (1984) propounds 
strategic control as the top-level totality of all control systems in an organization. Higgins (1985) 
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develops a hierarchy of strategic control, management control and operational control. Thus, 
there is no surprise, given the responsibilities of the top management for overall monitoring and 
surveillance of the total organization, when Harrison (1991) anchors strategic control at the apex 
of a triadic systems of controls that starts with top management and extends downwards through 
middle management into the bottom lines of the organization: 
To distinguish strategic control from management control and operational control, one can 
easily find that strategic control normally starts with the strategic plans at the level of general 
management and extends downward through middle management into the operating areas of the 
organization, with information feedback beginning with operations and being transmitted 
upward from the operating control system through the management control system into the 
strategic control system at the level of general managers. Seemingly, at each level of 
management, the operating performance is measured and appraised against the organizational 
objectives which underlie the strategic plan of the organization; at each level, corrective or 
preventive actions may be initiated depending on the nature of the actual divergence (i. e. the 
difference between pre-established objectives and the performance measured). 
It has been argued (Harrison, 1991; Asch, 1992) that strategic control is accomplished by the 
establishment and use of strategic checkpoints which act as benchmarks employed by top 
management to measure and evaluate organizational progress toward the accomplishment of a 
given strategy. Roughly speaking, it can be held that strategic control is objective-oriented in the 
same way that management control is responsibility-oriented and operating control is task- 
oriented. To put it another way, while strategic control remains addressed to the accomplishment 
of organizational objectives, management control remain addressed to the allocation and 
utilization of resources in the accomplishment of such objectives, and operating control remains 
concerned with the execution of the tasks made possible by the aforementioned allocations. 
11.2.4 The approaches to strategic control 
Wilson (1995) has identified five approaches to strategic control which can be regarded as very 
helpful for investment decision-makers to understand strategic control in the jungle of control - 
Lorange et al's (1986) strategic momentum and strategic leap; Schreyogg and Steinmann's 
(1987) premise control, implementation control and strategic surveillance, which is further aided 
by Preble's (1992) special alert control; Johnson and Scholes's (1988) information and control 
systems, regulatory systems, cultural systems, and political systems; Simon's (1987,1990) 
prospector, defender, and analyzer; and Stacey's (1991) closed change, contained change and 
open-ended change. 
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Taking Preble's (1992) modified 4-step model of strategic control for example, Preble (1992) 
extends and modifies Schreyogg and Steinmann's (1987) 3-step (i. e. premise control, 
implementation control and strategic surveillance) model and forms a so-called comprehensive 
system of strategic control (Figure 11-1). As reflected in Figure 11-1, strategy formulation (i. e. 
determining an organization's strategic direction) begins at time To. The strategic surveillance 
Figure 11-1: Strategic control components in the strategic management process 
(Source: Adapted from Preble (1992)) 
Strategic surveillance 
(environmental scanning) 
Special alert control 
(crisis audits / crisis management) 
Premise control 
(environmental monitoring) 
Implementation control 
(implementation process) 
Strategy 10- Strategy Strategy evaluation 
formulation implementation -feedback control 
II 
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(with environmental scanning as its key mechanism) of emerging events parallels the strategic 
management process and runs continuously from time To to T3. Special alert controls (with crisis 
audits or crisis management as its key mechanism) are really a subset of strategic surveillance 
controls and therefore conducted over the entire planning cycle. Premise controls (with 
environmental monitoring as its key mechanism) run continuously from the point of initial 
premise/assumption setting (i. e. T, ). Implementation control (with implementation process as its 
key mechanism) begins when strategy implementation starts (i. e. T2) and runs to the end of the 
planning cycle (i. e. T3). 
To further illustrate, the common purpose of all the strategic control components is to examine 
and determine on a continuous basis whether strategies should be modified in accordance with 
changing circumstances. Premise controls involve qualified individuals and divisions in the 
systematic and continuous checking of environmental conditions to see if planning premises 
(such as forecasts of expected inflation and the nature of competition) are still valid which are 
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previously established earlier on in the strategic planning process and are later employed to act 
as a basis for formulating organizational strategies. Strategic implementation controls provide 
additional sources of information and help compensate for selectivity in planning by 
continuously questioning the basic direction of the organizational strategy by means of first 
establishing milestones, intermediate goals, and strategic thresholds and then applying them to 
evaluate the suitability of continuing or terminating new strategic investments or reassessing 
existing investments based upon results achieved up to particular points in time. Strategic 
surveillance, compared to premise control and - implementation control, is designed to be a 
relatively open, unfocused, and broad search activity, and aims at early detection and advance 
warning of events or issues which may threaten ongoing strategic investments. 
11.2.5 Some problems with strategic control 
There are several limitations of strategic control, some of which are believed to be generic. First, 
the body of literature relating to strategic control is still extremely small (Shrivastava, 1987; 
Preble, 1992). Second, the practice of strategic control by organizations can be characterized as 
still being in its infancy (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Third, most strategic control approaches such 
as Schreyogg and Steinmann's (1987) 3-step model hold a limited objective of providing a 
conceptual foundation for strategic control. Fourth, many approaches to strategic control have 
been accused of being incomprehensive and inaccurate due to their requirement for massive 
investment in analysis, planning and bureaucracy (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Fifth, formalistic, 
cut and dried, and simplistic control systems carry the danger of bureaucratization when 
attempting to operationalize strategic control in that the logical rationality underlying these 
strategic control models may conflict with a skillful decision-maker's powers of intuition and 
judgment (Lorange et al, 1986). Sixth, many of the above-mentioned approaches to strategic 
control suggest that analysis and intuition be combined in such a way as to help assure a creative 
strategic control process which retains its vitality over time, but all fail to prescribe how to 
achieve this ambitious (if not nearly unachievable) goal. 
One of the most significant problems in strategic control relates to measuring performance in 
that it seems that poor objective and poor performance appraisal trigger most of the control 
problems (Asch, 1992). It has been frequently noted that establishing objective measurable 
targets or goals is essential for successful strategic control (e. g. Asch, 1992; Harrison, 1991; 
Ansoff, 1987). For example, financial measures of performance for strategic control often 
prevail. Financial methods are often more objective, but they tend to emphasize the 
measurement of outputs via inputs (rather than the process), although they deal with inputs 
better than with outputs. Consider return on investment (ROI) which is commonly employed to 
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measure divisional performance relating to an investment, given that the lower the asset base the 
higher the ROI, it may be in the interests of business unit managers not to replace equipment 
and technology as this increases the asset base, so to either use normal accounting rules or to 
apply replacement value or to employ market value becomes a tough decision for the investment 
decision-makers. Besides, most profit measurements are problematic in that unless the business 
unit operates only in an open market the resulting revenues and costs can be subject to distortion 
due to imperfect or fixed internal markets, and this can easily lead managers to influence results 
in the short term by postponing or canceling altogether discretionary costs such as R&D and 
maintenance. 
11.2.6 Barriers to strategic control 
It has been argued (e. g. Lorange and Murphy, 1984, Goold and Quinn, 1990) that there are 
three broad categories of barriers to strategic control. First, there are systemic barriers which are 
most likely to stem from deficiencies in the design of the control system itself, or from an 
inability to manage the system. For example, investment decision-makers may experience 
difficulty in defining adequate performance measures for strategic control. There can be 
excessive complexity in the control system. The cognitive capacity of investment decision- 
makers to reconcile meaningfully a diversity of variables, especially when multidimensional 
interpretation of performance is required, can also contribute to system design problems. Second, 
there are behavioural barriers which might stem from an inability to dispense with the habit of 
thinking that an investment decision-maker's background, education, training and corporate 
culture have created over many years or stem from cognitive limits to the decision-maker's 
basic intellectual capacity. For example, vested interest and sunk costs can lead to entrapment 
which can further but adversely affect the utility of strategic control. Fear of losing face or being 
proved wrong, or the difficulty 
involved in abandoning familiar thought patterns and acquired 
behaviour can also enhance behavioural barriers. Third, there are political barriers which might 
stem from decision-makers' inability to create a sufficiently broad sense of agreement regarding 
basic direction, or stem from their inability to manage the resources needed to get to where they 
want, or stem from the lower level managers' unwillingness to report unfavorable results to top 
management. Clearly, a strategy has to be `politically' accessible for the various power groups 
which exist in most organizations. For example, if the strategic control process calls for changes 
in the basic strategic agenda, it can affect internal power groups and thus it can be viewed as 
potentially disruptive to the relative power of coalitions, thus leading to resistance. 
11.2.7 Prescription for effective strategic control systems 
It seems inappropriate to attempt to formulate any common prescription of a normative view of 
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strategic control. However, some ideas developed by previous researchers can prove worthy of 
consideration in developing strategic control systems. For example, Lorange and Murphy (1984) 
highlight that investment decision-makers need to keep the strategic control process as simple as 
the external environment permits, to create a broader and more explicit awareness of strategic 
control issues such as making the process explicit, and to promote interorganizational trust 
which can be crucial to the development of a viable control atmosphere and which may result in 
a shared perception safeguarding the long-term viability of the organization and also of their 
employees. 
Preble (1992) proposes that investment decision-makers can employ environmental monitoring 
and scanning techniques as efficient mechanisms for implementing premise control and strategic 
surveillance respectively, and use crisis audits and crisis management teams as effective 
mechanisms for conducting special control so as to refine the strategic control process. Preble 
(1992) further prescribes that, to achieve effective strategic control, investment decision-makers, 
can follow Ansoff's (1980) procedures to guide strategic issues groups (e. g. by means of staff 
groups or ad hoc groups) to help with the coordination of the strategic control system, or 
organize their strategic control activities in accordance with the considerations descriptively 
summarized in Table 11-1. 
Table 11-1: Constructive how-to-organize considerations for strategic control 
(Source: Adapted from Preble (1992)) 
Components of strategic control 
Dimension Premise control Implementatio Strategic surveillance Special alert control 
s n control 
Purposes Keep premises current Monitor the Advance warning (via Strategic readiness in 
and strategies valid effects of early detection) of times of crisis 
actions as they environmental changes 
impact on or shifts that could 
strategy affect strategic direction 
Mechanis Environmental Implementatio Environmental Crisis audit / crisis 
ms monitoring n process scanning management 
Procedure List premises (i. e. GNP Establish Determine and partition Determine vulnerable 
s growth rate, industry standards the environment into areas (human, production, 
growth rate, societal (milestones) manageable sectors organizational, 
resistance to certain (e. g. economic, technological, social, 
products, competitor industry, social, market, political, macro-economic 
actions, length of new governmental) and systems, internal or 
product life cycle) break into a cluster of external), call for 
variables (e. g. immediate and intense 
economic-interest rate, strategic review and a 
inflation rates, business `wartime' response 
cycle, income trends, 
employment trends, 
money supply) 
Key points on-going validity On-going Data acquisition Unwelcome surprises or 
responsibility discontinuous leap of 
change 
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Major Tracking events, trends Tracking Tracking publications Writing worst-case 
activities and constituent plans, (e. g. Fortune), scenarios, conducting 
demands measures, reports (think tank, environment impact 
standards, and trade journals), assessment, rehearsing for 
goals. conversations (with crisis, simulating 
supplier, competitor, emergencies 
peers, consultants), on- 
line computer data base 
Pitfalls Information over-load Ambiguity in Beating the wrong bush Stagnant communication 
accountability with the public 
Degree of High High Moderate High 
focus (i. e. key success Wide-angle lens within 
premises) a structured picture of 
the environment 
Informatio Multiple sources Classical Multiple sources and Scanning systems 
n sources accounting and methods Managers at crisis 
financial Personal/impersonal Media informs company 
reporting data Inside / outside 
Key Internal scanning staff Operational Scanning unit personnel Planning staff and business 
personnel and specialists (e. g. control Technical specialists level managers conduct 
political scientists, personnel Environmental crisis audits 
competitive analysts provide reports monitors . Crisis management team 
economists, industry on strategic Issues management Communication 
analysts, demographers) progress to top team consultants, 
Consultants managers Top management team Scientists, medical 
Top managers personnel, neutral experts. 
In summary, strategic control demands critically checking (via observations), scrutinizing (via 
measurements), and acknowledging (via actions) assumptions, strategies, processes, and results 
continuously in the light of evolving internal and external conditions; and the strategic control 
process begins when planning starts and is performed. continuously and simultaneously with it. 
Strategic control is forward looking in nature and has its own rationale. It can be held that 
effective strategic control can not only facilitate the timely updating of strategies but also 
improve the overall success rate of strategic management. 
11.3 Strategic control of investments: Chinese general managers' perceptions 
11.3.1 The conceptualization of strategic control 
Figure 11-2 reflects a conceptual process model of strategic control developed from leading 
edge theories and real world applications expressly for use in the study of some Chinese general 
managers' perceptions 
underlying the strategic control practices in the Chinese state-owned 
enterprise sectors. It features four phases: the conceptualization phase which runs from Ti,,, to 
Ti+2, the operationalization phase which runs from T; +,, to T; +4, the actualization phase which 
runs from Ti+5, to Ti+6, and the idealization phase T; +,, to T; +8. 
Given that strategic control demands continuous checking, scrutinizing, and acting on the 
assumptions, strategies, processes, and results of an investment, the timeliness and effectiveness 
of strategic control progress-oriented actions become crucial if the organization wants to 
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become constantly fit for the evolving internal and external conditions and consequently survive. 
There are eight components together with sixteen checkpoints of strategic control which are 
central to this study of the Chinese general managers' perceptions on strategic control. 
Figure 11-2: The knowledge-oriented strategic control process 
T' 
r""'r rý- ° Intensive a Progress- i=i+1, i=0,1,2,3... n 1 analysis (strengthh, 
/" orientation for _. weakness, opportunities & threats) .,.. 
preventive 
refinement ý`" Pertinent articulation of strategic I ý`" j Identifying the potential intentions (normal or revolutionary) 
Timeliness for 
corrective surgery / 
Ti+i Resource availability (funds, 
T people, technology, demand) 
Change-d etetion ? 
I+2 
'" 
-orientation for 
Improving for tomorrow Defining the workable Clear criteria for 
continuous 
I 
performance 
surveillance Ti+s 
' 
"" 1, 
'tT, + Individuai 
Wide-a- - ngle --? creativity at idea 
auditing (post . 
'". 
_ 
Monitoring the on-going Searching for the possible 
' 
generation 
completion, crisis) 
1itT; +, 
Collectivity in the 
Focus on the 
ý1I development of options Ti+4 
balance between t [Implementing the approved Choosing the optimum 
efficiency and 
Cleärly priontized 
effectiveness rationalities 
(e. g. 
"/ economic or i` 
____n_. __ 
\ ", / 
Ti+6 / 1. operational) Tj+J /* I Performance orri entation with 
J` 
:..................... ... ....... emphasis on goal, plan, vj ......... ... _ ......... . 
execution and measure 
V. Authoring the chosen 
Careful consideration of 
practicality (intuition, sense, 
experience 
Anchored contractual , ý'` "-"". /` , 
and judgment) 
assignments (behavioural, ` .. i__. F Proper stretch for budgetary 
economic, environmental, ethical,. 'i 
societal and technological) 
allocations 
I+i1plciý}rntit+cm control /[ Prcmisc 
cöntrol" "I III' ý".. ý- i: ý Strategic surveillance 
" (via implementation process) 
(via environmental (via crisis audit and I (via environmental 'I 
L" monitoring) 
I crisis management) 
ý 
scanning) 
-------------------- 
j ....... J-"-"-. -. -. I----J 
Identification of the potential. Identification of the potential strategy is the triggering phase of 
strategy formulation. By means of a intensive SWOT analysis, strategy-makers can actually 
recognize investment problems and understand 
investment opportunities. However, strategy- 
makers cannot always rely on normal investment opportunities, sometimes they need to create 
revolutionary investment opportunities. Thus, pertinent articulation of strategic intentions 
becomes as important as a SWOT analysis. Usually, it seems nearly impossible to obtain the 
information required for every investment potentials and thus the identification phase itself 
needs to be both contextually undisciplined and purposefully disciplined. 
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Definition of the workable. Definition of the workable strategy is the matching of what is 
available -i. e. availability of resource such as competent personnel, ý finance, advanced 
technology, and beneficial governmental macro-political and economical policy - and what is 
wanted - criteria for performance such as measurements for results and tolerance for errors. 
This is to ensure that strategic intentions can be turned, by' the use of standardized 
documentation, procedures and the like, into operational formulations of spending requirements, 
implementation practicalities and measurements for the outputs as well as the processes of the 
forthcoming organizational activities. 
The search for the possible. The search for the possible strategy aims at the development of 
alternatives from which decision-makers can choose and further exploit. It has been noted that 
the generation of investment alternatives can be more `emergent' than `deliberate' (Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985) or vice versa (Ansoff, 1991). A strategy would not be said to be successfully 
fulfilled if it did not have alternatives from the outset. Forms of developing alternatives can 
include planning screening activities, market survey, telephone - calls and collective 
brainstorming; but the key to alternative producing is competent, imaginative, and cooperative 
people. Thus, it remains essential for organizations to promote both individual creativity in the 
generation of ideas and collectivity in the development of options. Seemingly, the combination 
of individual creativity and collective effort are needed to search for alternatives. 
Choosing the optimal. Choosing the optimal strategy is actually a well thought compromise 
between rationality and reality. Stakeholders of the organization can sometimes provide the 
management with sharply differing rationalities, and the management needs to process them and 
produce a set of clearly prioritized rationalities (e. g. economic or operational) which can be 
used to overwhelm the rest of them. To evaluate an investment one needs appraisal techniques 
such as payback, average accounting rate of return, net present value and computer simulation. 
However, these examples of economic or financial rationality can, due to the validity of the very 
assumption underlying such techniques, fail to reflect the real investment decision-making 
situations. That is to say, experienced decision-makers' intuition or judgment can outpace 
economic or financial rationalities. Therefore, careful consideration of practicality can become 
relevant in choosing a strategy, and people's experience, intuition, sense, and judgment can play 
as useful a role in decision-making as can formalized rationalities. 
Authorizing the chosen. Authorizing the chosen strategy relates to allocations of funds, 
responsibility and authority. Seemingly, the primary vehicle through which allocations of 
resources are made is the budget, which itself is derived from strategic intention related resource. 
Needless to say, performance positively relates to budget, and performance within budget results 
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in the attainment of strategic objectives. So when facing the `scenario of many investment 
bidding for scarce resources, investment decision-makers need to encourage proper stretch for 
budgetary allocation so that strategic intentions receive strategic attention in terms of formal 
statements of policies, goals, and plans However, budgets are not only reflected by the amount 
of `resources allocated but also bear 'on them varying standards on the basis of which 
performance can be measured and evaluated. This refers to anchored contractual assignments 
which can be, ý inter alia, behavioural, economic, ethical, environmental, societal and 
technological. Authorizing the chosen strategy not only leads to the' allocation of funds, 
authority and responsibility to varying hierarchical levels and especially to the business level, 
but also implies the accountability of the allocator to the allocated. That is to say, the allocators 
of, resources should remain accountable for the results of the allocatees and the general 
managers whose authority spans the whole enterprise should hold the final accountability for the 
performance of the investment being authorized. 
Implementing the approved. Implementing the approved strategy relies on competent personnel 
who are not merely `prospectors' nor just `defenders' but also `analyzers' (Simons, 1990). It is 
the implementers of a strategy who physically actualize the conceptualization and 
operationalization of an investment and directly contribute to the further idealization of the 
investment. Therefore it remains crucial that the implementation of an investment involves a 
sharp focus on the balance between efficiency and effectiveness in that the implementers have 
been allocated direct responsibilities for better utilizing the input and producing quality output 
as well as the accountability for the interactive process of inputs leading to desired outputs. This 
also suggests that the implementation of an investment needs to involve a performance-oriented 
execution, that is, relevant activities need to be rigidly controlled with an emphasis on goal, plan, 
execution and measure. For the implementation of an investment to be successful, . 
investment 
decision-makers need to follow a logical sequence which includes setting goals and standards, 
planning resources, preparing for and carrying out the execution, measuring and evaluating the 
results. Further, this logical sequence not only applies to implementing the, approved, it also 
applies to the rest of the strategic control components; and this justifies why the implementation 
control loop covers not just implementation but the whole process although the former shares a 
much higher rate of importance than the latter. 
Monitoring the on-going. Monitoring the on-going strategy suggests that a strategy is nothing 
without control. To achieve effective strategic control, investment decision-makers need to 
ensure that all elements of the decision-making process are designed, including control 
mechanisms such as feedback or feedforward methods, to function in a coordinated way. Since, 
in the age of knowledge, one thing which has not been changed is change, it appears sensible for 
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an enterprise to adopts a change-detection -orientation for continuous surveillance so that the 
enterprise can monitor, via environmental scanning, the emerging events affecting the 
investment which are likely to threaten the course of strategic action. The ever-increasing 
complexity of business activities due: to the advent of information technology and diversified 
man-made knowledge, it also appears necessary for an enterprise to adopt wide-angle, auditing 
( e. g. before, during and post completion, auditing, and peace and crisis auditing, internal and 
external auditing) so that the enterprise can be provided with a comprehensive advance warning 
of impending threats or evolving weaknesses which, from the perspectives of response time and 
flexibility, enables the management to take timely and effective actions. 
Improving for tomorrow. The improving for tomorrow strategy epitomize the notion that today 
is the image of yesterday but the shadow for tomorrow (Zhang, 1988). It seems that at the apex 
of the improving for tomorrow strategy are' progress-orientation for preventive refinement and 
timeliness for 'corrective surgery. This requires that the total accountability holders' of an' 
investment promote continuous improvement if past decisions are proved effective, urge the 
provision of corrective actions if past decision are seen to be ineffective, and facilitate further 
analyses (i. e. let i=i+1 in Figure 11-2) if the current review of the process (i. e. the eight strategic 
control components) has not shown a clear picture of the enterprise's strategic intents. That is, to, 
combine them, the total accountability holders of an investment need to encourage 
organizational learning in terms of knowledge creation, knowledge utilization, knowledge 
abandonment, and knowledge accumulation. .. 
To sum up, it seems clear that the proposed knowledge-oriented strategic control process 
consists of eight strategic components (i. e. identifying the potential, defining the workable, 
searching for the possible, choosing the optimum, authorizing the chosen, 
implementing the 
approved, monitoring the on-going, improving for tomorrow), which further feature sixteen 
strategic control factors (i. e. intensive SWOT analysis, pertinent articulation of strategic 
intentions, availability of resource, criteria for performance, individual creativity in the 
generation of ideas, collectivity in the development of options, clearly prioritized rationalities, 
careful consideration of practicality, proper stretch 
for budgetary allocation, anchored 
contractual assignments, the balance between efficiency and effectiveness, performance- 
oriented execution, change-detection-orientation for continuous surveillance, wide-angle 
auditing, progress-orientation for preventive refinement and timeliness for corrective surgery). 
11.3.2 Real-world applications of the model 
The conceptual process model of strategic control depicted in Figure 11-2 is partially derived 
from the actual experiences of organizations such as DPA, CNPC, and WPS which have 
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followed the process to a successful outcome. A brief mention of three of these successes is 
expected to help clarify the scope of applicability across various organizations. 
DPA has been the most admired state-owned enterprise in China for nearly 30 years. It the early 
1980s it acquired the major petroleum operations in North and West China ranging from Jilin 
province, Heilongjiang Province, Inner Mongolia, to Xingjiang Province. In implementing, 
DPA dispatched a work force to Xingjiang, Inner Mongolia and Jilin, thus expanded work and 
increased output without rigid downsizing. DPA's primary standard by which to retain strategic 
control of its expansion and growth objective was always not to operate in any field in which 
DPA did not have over 50% of the total market. Through progress-oriented preventive 
refinement and timely correction, the company successfully implemented the strategic choice to 
dominate in Jilin, Inner Mogolia, Xingjiang, Heilongjiang, and today DPA is not only the most 
competitive and knowledgeable organization but also the only profitable petroleum company in 
China. DPA used the factors of strategic control depicted in Figure 11-2 with consummate 
effectiveness. 
In 1993, WPS established a joint venture, JHL, in Beijing, with its strategic intention being to 
strengthen its market leader position in China and, more specifically, to deepen its penetration of 
the rapid growing market for petroleum down hole services throughout China and Asia. The 
joint venture among 14 indigenous companies throughout the country created the nation's fourth 
largest petroleum development company in central China. By observing the factors of strategic 
control conceptualized in Figure 11-2, JHL aggressively attacked the Asian market and the 
Chinese market and today JHL, with WPS as its holding company, is hailed as a tremendous 
success with its assets increased 100 times. It looks like that JHL met its strategic intentions 
through a strategic decision process featuring careful consideration of practicality, the balance 
between efficiency and effectiveness, and change-detection-orientation for continuous 
surveillance and auditing. 
By size, CNPC is arguably one of the top 10 largest companies in the world. Since 1997 it has 
attempted to acquire chemical companies in China. This strategy involved a decision to 
downsize the corporation and refocus its operations in the northern part of China. To meet the 
need of the newly appointed general manager, Mr Fucai Ma, controls were strengthened at all 
levels. Contractual assignments are anchored; accountability was strengthened; and budgetary 
allocations were stretched. With an emphasis on improving resource availability, CNPC 
conducted intensive SWOT analysis, highlighted competence among its managers and 
integrative cooperation of resources, promoted individual creativity in the generation of ideas as 
well as collectivity in the development of options. The clearly prioritized economic and 
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marketing rationalities, among other factors, fostered CNPC to successfully achieve its strategic 
intentions in the middle of 1998. Today, in CNPC, severe bureaucracy is gone, redundancy is 
eliminated, peripheral business is trimmed, the then sleeping giant is now with its feet on the 
ground and its eyes on the future. The process model of strategic control depicted in Figure 11-2 
seems further validated by the reality of this success. 
In short, the brief mention of three successful Chinese organizations' strategic successes only 
provides limited evidence for strategic control factors set forth in Figure 11-2. However, the 
point seems well made that the process model of strategic control depicted in Figure 11-2 is 
representative of the way in which many Chinese organizations have strategically and 
successfully managed investments. One thing for sure is that it is worth testing the process 
model of strategic control set forth in Figure 11-2 in a wider investment decision-making 
context, preferably in an empirical setting. 
11.3.3 Method of the study 
Studies of strategic control centred directly on Chinese general managers are rare in the 
literature. This researcher's study reports the perceptions of incumbent, general managers 
regarding the factors of strategic control which they feel contribute significantly to the 
successful implementation of investment decisions. The study was conducted in early 1997. 
Semi-structured interview was used to obtain information from the Chinese general managers. 
The interview involved Likert-scaled questions, the interviewees were asked to rate (from one to 
five points representing very low, low, neutral, high, and very high, respectively) factors related 
to successful strategic control of investment decisions. The interview was designed to last for 
about one hour. However, other sources of information about the specific organization such as 
documents, video programmes, and informal contacts were tried by this researcher prior to the 
interview so that the researcher was background-wise well prepared. Some interviews were 
disrupted due to genuine causes but resumed later on. Most interviews were conducted during 
the Chinese two hour lunch time breaks. Some were conducted at night. at the interviewees' 
homes when the interviewees insisted on exhibiting traditional hospitalities. 
The organizations included in the study were randomly selected from "Dang Dai Zhu Ming Qi 
Ye Ji Jin" (A Collection of 500 Modem Excellent Chinese Enterprises), an propaganda type 
material updated every four or five years by a provincial authority. It had made clear that only 
general managers were the target. 110 organizations were contacted by telephone and 87 of 
them offered access. Of the 87 organizations, a total of 101 attempts were made, and 64 general 
managers participated in the interview. One Chinese statistician who used to be this researcher's 
assistant at WPS was invited to help document and analyze the results. 
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The answers received from the 64 Chinese general managers were analyzed using Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), including x2 analysis, analysis of variance, and Pearson 
correlation coefficient analysis. This researcher focused on measures of central tendency for 
selected factors of strategic control which were subsequently correlated to ascertain significant, 
meaningful statistical relations. Two tables were employed to summarize the findings. 
11.3.4 The profiles of the interviewees 
The Chinese general managers: the interviewees of this study had an average service of 
between 18 to 30 years in their respective companies. Of the 64 general managers 34 had 
bachelor degrees in engineering or applied sciences, 15 had masters degrees, none possessed 
doctoral degrees, and 15 elder general managers had college or university certificates 
(equivalent to BA). None did not have any higher education. 
Organizations: every Chinese organization is a society and the only difference is that some are 
big and others are small, or some are profitable and others are not. The 64 organizations headed 
by the interviewed general managers comprised a broad cross-section of state-owned 
enterprises. There were 20 traditional manufacturing organizations, 18 . service companies,, 
15 
high-technology manufacturing companies, and 11 others such as university, hospital, retail 
chain, and local government. Among the 64 organization, there were 6 joint ventures. When the 
interviews were conducted, a typical Chinese organization such as WPS had an extremely wide 
horizon of businesses ranging from hospitals, kindergartens, schools, , sports clubs, a 
broadcasting station, a sports stadium, own TV channels, cloth-manufacturing plants, farms, 
chemical plants, soft-drink plants, beer breweries, wine plants, fruit farms, domestic supply 
plants and industrial supply plants. Thus, the typical organization in this study was a service or 
manufacturing company employing about 5000 people and generating annual sales of Y1 billion 
RMB with total operating assets of double the magnitude. Given the fact that Chinese 
organizations in this study were extremely diversified at the time when the study was conducted, 
it appeared that to test a generic set of strategic control factors across such a broad range of 
organizations with such a diversified business horizon can be extremely difficult. Bearing this in 
mind, this researcher tried to sharpen the focus by categorizing the organizations headed by the 
interviewees, by employment (big for more than 100000 employees, medium for between 5000 
and 10000, and small for less than 5000), by ownership (single or multi-partnership), by strategy 
(visionary or operational), by purpose (profit or non-profit), by intensity (capital or labour), and 
by position (mainline or peripheral). None of these categorizations exhibited any statistically 
significant variances among the enterprise types in this study for any one of the strategic control 
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factors depicted in Figure 11-2 or enumerated in Table 11-2. This suggests that the diversity of 
the organizations in this study tends to support the broad applicability of the results. 
11.4 Analysis and interpretation of the research results 
The factors of strategic control presented and the relationships inferred from this research are 
derived from the directly written verbal descriptions regarding the perceptions of the 64 Chinese 
general managers from a cross-section of large and small Chinese state-owned service and 
manufacturing enterprises. However, they were selected from a geographically limited area and 
were the so-called excellent companies. Hence this researcher realizes that attempts to 
generalize these findings to other Chinese enterprises such as those in the private sector or 
collective sector have to be approached with caution and that even for the state-owned 
enterprises the application of the findings of this research can only be tentative. 
Strategic control factors: Table 11-2 summarizes an array of strategic control factors which 
corresponds to the process model of strategic control depicted in Figure 11-2. First, the Chinese 
general managers being interviewed ascribed a much higher level of importance to the factors 
constituting the idealization phase (i. e. factors 14 to 16) of the strategic control process. Second, 
the ratings of the Chinese general managers for the conceptualization phase (i. e. factors 1 to 4) 
tend to be relatively low and suggest a definite need for a greater appreciation of the importance 
of identifying potential opportunities and articulating the workable strategies. Third, the ratings 
for the operationalization phase (i. e. factors 5 to 8) implies that Chinese general managers 
appear to look up to the prioritized rationalities, perhaps thanks to their scientific logic acquired 
at higher educational institutions or the pressures, from both internal and external environment, 
but tend to look down on practicality, collectivity and individualism. Fourth, the ratings for the 
actualization phase (i. e. factors 9 to 12) depict a mixed picture: on the one hand, the Chinese 
general managers being interviewed highlighted the importance of authorization from the 
perspective of anchored contractual assignments including responsibility, and accountability and 
that of implementation from the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness; on the other hand, 
they tended to ignore the role of authorization as a stretch and neglect that implementation 
should be performance-oriented rather than being treated as joy-riding as one of the Chinese 
general manager being interviewed seriously proposed during the interview. 
Put together, it seems reasonable to infer from Table 11-2 that the Chinese general managers 
being interviewed find it much easier to set the stage for strategic control of investments (i. e. 
A&B in Table 11-2) than to actually achieve the strategic intention (i. e. C&D in Table 11-2) 
through continuous follow-up (i. e. from a to h in Table 11-2). In general, it can be tentatively 
held that the Chinese general managers tended to place a high rating (i. e. with an average point 
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of from 3.53 to 4.249 out of 5) for all the 16 strategic control factors as depicted in Table 11-2, 
thus suggesting a promising role of strategic control in investment management. 
Table 11-2: Strategic control factors perceived by Chinese general managers 
No. No o. Strategic control factors Rank Mean Median 
Standard Skew- Standard Range Error ness Deviation. 
1 Intensive SWOT analysis 10 3.854 3.829 0.102 0.033 0.687 3 
a 
2 Pertinent articulation of strategic intentions 11 3.779 3.690 0.109 0.049 0.872 4 
A b 3 Availability of resource$ 
8 3.865 3.823 0.087 0.029 0.785 3 
4 Criteria for performance` 9 3.860 3.799 0.065 0.011 0.802 3 
c 
5 Individual creativity at the generation of ideas 14 3.598 3.613 0.089 0.044 0.759 4 
6 Collectivity in the development of options 12 3.665 3.571 0.099 0.043 0.755 3 
B 7 ed rationalities# i iti Cl l 3 4.093 4.000 0.090 0.035 0.712 3 d y pr or z ear 
8 Careful consideration of practicality 13 3.643 3.601 0.098 0.037 0.659 3 
e 
9 Stretch or budgetary allocation 16 3.530 3.546 0.084 0.055 0.784 4 
10 Anchored contractual assignments 6 3.893 3.843 0.058 0.034 0.599 3 
C 11 The balance between efficiency and effectiveness 7 3.878 3.767' 0.085 0.045 0.803 4 f 
12 Performance oriented execution 15 3.546 3.453 0.082 0.022 0.892 3 
13 Change-detection-orientation for surveillance 5 3.902 3.891 0.094 0.028 0.781 3 
g 
14 Wide-angle auditing 4 3.974 3.903 0.096 0.056 0.790 4 
D 15 Progress-orientation for preventive refinement 2 4.128 4.089 0.091 0.038 0.659 3 It 
16 Timeliness for corrective surgery 1 4.249 4.181 0.069 0.032 0.719 3 
Note 
N=64, Mode for the 16 factors = 2.000.1= very low, 2= low, 3= neither high nor low, 4= high, 5= very high. 
A, B, C and D represents the conceptualization, operationalization, actualization, and idealization phase of strategic control, 
respectively; while a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h represent the stage of identifying the potential, defining the workable, 
searching for the possible, choosing the optimum, authorising the chosen, implementing the approved, monitoring the 
on-going, and improving for tomorrow, respectively. 
$ The majority of Chinese general managers being interviewed viewed competent people, advanced technology, abundant 
funds and good governmental policy as the key resources. 
* The majority of the Chinese general managers being interviewed quoted that objectives, measurement and standards often 
failed to be explicit. 
# Many Chinese general managers being interviewed indicated profit and job opportunity should be the dual rationalities 
being prioritized. 
However, there are apparent weaknesses in the practice of strategic control in organizations as 
revealed by the perceptions of the Chinese general managers being interviewed. First, it begins 
with a lack of sufficient emphasis on conceptualization of strategic control featuring identifying 
the potential and defining the workable through such mechanisms as SWOT analysis, strategic 
intention-setting, and a match between what is available and what is wanted, and criteria setting 
for performance. Second, it continues with a dilatory approach towards the operationalization of 
strategic control featuring searching for the possible and choosing the optimum via careful 
considerations of a string of things such as individual imagination, collective thinking, operating 
practicality and integrative rationality, although the last of which provides a totally different 
picture with the Chinese general managers being interviewed giving a high rating for economic 
and societal rationalities but neglecting all other rationalities surrounding investment decision- 
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making such as operational, psychological, and environmental. - Third, it culminates in a marked 
tendency, toward procrastination in stretching for budgetary allocation for and undertaking 
performance-oriented execution of the investment, thus providing a sophisticated picture for the 
actualization of strategic control featuring--the authorization and implementation of the 
investment. 
Strategic control correlates: It seems logical that for any strategic control process to be 
effective, all of the components of strategic control (e. g. from a to h in Table 11-2) should be 
accorded roughly equal emphasis so that the organization can accomplish the synergistic 
benefits of the total process. From the study of this researcher, it becomes apparent that, as can 
been seen in Table 11-2, the Chinese general managers being interviewed have established a 
solid foundation of strategic control only to fall short in the use of the system (please see the 
Range, Standard Error, Standard Deviation, Skewness as well as the Ranking of Mean in Table 
11-2), and clearly this situation is a correctable situation in which, from the perspective of the 
strategic control process conceptualized in Figure 11-2, an improving for tomorrow strategy 
needs to be adopted by means of progress-oriented preventive refinement and/or timely 
corrective surgery so as to encourage organizational learning in terms of knowledge creation, 
knowledge utilization and abandonment, and knowledge accumulation. 
Table 11-3 presents a correlation matrix of the 16 strategic control factors (please see Table 11-2) 
which can be used to help formulate the improving for tomorrow strategy. Of the 120 statistical 
possibilities in Table 11-3, there exist 95 statistically significant positive relations. That is, 79% 
or nearly four out of every five relationships in Table 11-3 tend to confirm the process model of 
strategic control conceptualized in Figure 11-2. Apparently, the preponderance of statistically 
significant positive correlations in Table 11-3 has offered a high level of credibility to the 
process flow depicted in Figure 11-2, given that, although correlations per se do not necessarily 
validate the precise relationships roughly depicted in Figure 11-2, correlations can be used both 
to confirm the existence of positive linkages among the strategic control factors and to justify, 
partially though, the conceptualization of the resultant process of strategic control. 
Moreover, further analysis in the similar vein, which bridges the links between the articulated 
phases of the strategic control process (i. e. A to D in Table 11-2) and the links among the 
identified components of the strategic control process (i. e. a to h in Table 11-2), further 
strengthens the tentative confirmation of the strategic process depicted in Figure 11-2, especially 
when most of those links are statistically validated by the perceptions of the 64 general 
managers. For example, as can been seen from the correlation matrix of strategic control phases 
(Table 11-4) and the correlation matrix of strategic control components (Table 11-5) 
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respectively, of the 26 statistical possibilities there are 22 (nearly 86%) statistically significant 
positive relations which tend to support the conceptualized components of strategic control (i. e. 
a to h) and, of six statistical possibilities there are five (nearly 83%) statistically significant 
position relations which tend to support the conceptualized phases of strategic control (i. e. A to 
D). 
Table 11-3: Correlation matrix of strategic control factors at the general manager level 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Pm. ool 
2 P4. OJ1 tti0.001 
3 P=ns. Pm. 009 Pm. 001 
4 Pe0.04 P=ns Pß. 003 Pm. 001 
5 Pm. 009 Pm. 03 P . 005 
Pe0.01 Pm. 001 
6 Pm. 01 Pm. 003 P=ns Pm. 03 Pm. 006 Pm. 001 
7 P=ns Pm. 005 Pm. 001 Pm. 006 P=ns. Pm. 005 Pm. 001 
8 moo' Pm. 001 M-005 P 0.001 P 0003 M. 006 P , *. 03 P1.001 
9 Pm. 003 P=n. s. Pm. 008 P=ns Pm. 007 P=n. s. P=ns PQ1.004 Pm. 001 
10 P=ns. M. 006 Pm. 04 P 0.0I P=ns. M. 004 Pm. 001 Pa0.004 Pm. 009 Pm. 001 
11 Pm. 007 Pß. 001 Pß. 006 P<0.0041 P=n. s. Pm. 003 P<0.005 Pm. 03 Pm. 004 Pm. 03 Pm. 001 
12 Pm. 04 Pm. 03 P=ns. Pm. 001 P=ns Pm. 03 P=n. s M. 008 P=ns M. 004 Pm. 03 Pm. 001 
13 P0.008 P'0.01 P11001 M. 001 P0.03 P=r Pm. 004 Pm. 04 M. 004 P<0.01 M. 004 P 0.004 P0.001 
14 P'. 03 P'0.006 P=ns Pm. 001 Pm. 01 Pm. 006 M. 009 P<0.007 P=ns Pß. 006 P <D-003 Pm. 006 Pm. 01 Pß. 001 
15 P=ns M. 0071 P0.003 P4). 04 P=ns P4)003 P10.006 P= ms. P4.006 P4.007 P4). 004 P4.04 P4). 006 P4.009 P4). 001 
16 P7.03 P4.01 P4.03 P4.006 Pm-01 Pm. 01 Pm. 006 Pm. 01 P-ns. Pm. 008 P=ns. P4.001 Pm. 003 P=n. & Pm. 03 P, ýoool 
Note: n=64 Chinese general managers, n. s. = not statistically significant, or not below P<0.05 where the probability of error is 
not greater than 5 chances in 100. 
Table 11-4: Correlation matrix of strategic control components at the general manager level 
Strategic control components a b c d e f g h 
a P<o. 00l 
b P-n. s. P<0.001 
C P<0.009 P<0.003 P<0.001 
d P<o. ol P<o. 005 P<o. ol P<o. 00l 
e P<0.005 P<0.003 P=n. s. P<0.04 P<0.00I 
F P<0.003 P<0.003 P<0.007 P<0.003 P=n. s. P<0.001 
g P<0.005 P<0.001 P=n. s. P<0.001 P<0.003 P<0.005 P<0.001 
h P<0.01 P<0.03 P<0.003 P<0.001 P<0.005 P<0.01 P<0.003 P<0'00 1 
Note: n=64 Chinese general managers, n. s. = not statistically significant, or not below P<0.05, where the probability 
of error is not greater than 5 chances in 100. 
Table 11-5: Correlation matrix of strategic control phases at the general mana ger level 
Strategic control phases A B C D 
A P<0.001 P<0.03 P<0.01 P<0.003 
B P<0.03 P<0.001 P<0.02 P<0.00I 
C P<0.01 P<0.02 P<0.00I P=n. s. 
D P<0.003 P<0.001 P=n. s. P<0.001 
Note: n=64 Chinese general managers, n. s. = not statistically significant, or not below p<0.05 where the probability of 
error is not greater than 5 chances in 100. 
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A final note: To go beyond the current research theme, further analysis and interpretation of the 
research results aimed to achieve the reappearance incarnate of different strategic control 
mechanisms vis-ä-vis the practical management of investments, reveal, that conventional 
strategic control mechanisms remain necessary but not sufficient for organizations to excel in 
the competitive marketplace. The majority of the informants had called for "spiritual control", a 
higher level of strategic control which can serve as the ultimate mechanism, complementary to 
"material control" which are most likely to be conceivable-results-oriented, on which 
organizations can principally rely so as to effectively manage their yesterday's, today's or 
tomorrow's investments. In addition, discrete results also reveal that several tactical approaches 
had been employed by the Chinese general managers to exercise the strategic control of 
investments, and they include, inter alia, publicizing investment evaluation, periodic progress 
assessment, empowering shop floor management, setting explicit responsibility and power for 
top managers, encouraging criticism and self-criticism among managers, and reviving audit for 
business assumptions, strategies, and operations. 
11.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
This study of 87 Chinese organizations in which 64 Chinese general managers were involved in 
a semi-structured interview to rate the role of strategic control upon investment management 
provides a statistical confirmation of the relationship among the 16 factors and of the relevance 
of the four phases and eight components of the process model of strategic control depicted in 
Figure 11-2. It reveals that the Chinese general managers being interviewed ascribed a higher 
level of importance to the idealization phase of strategic control and exposed some discernible 
weaknesses in the process of strategic control (e. g. lack of emphasis on the conceptualization 
phase, neglecting the operationalization phase, and messing about the actualization phase). It 
also reveals that, in order to achieve optimal results, it is not enough to just have a strategic 
control process in place, as each of the organizations headed by the general managers 
interviewed has experienced, all of the strategic control factors in the process need to be given 
appropriate emphasis at different times. The proposed strategic control process, backed up by 
three real world applications of the strategic control factors, provides a useful paradigm of 
strategic control which deserves both wider practical attention and further empirical research. 
Thus strategic control, if practiced effectively as in the three most successful Chinese state- 
owned enterprises, can lead to a cyclical generation of success including the identification of 
potential investments, definition of the workable investments, search for options, selection of the 
optimal investments, authorization of the chosen strategy coupled with accountability, 
responsibility and authority, implementation of the financed investment, monitoring of the on- 
going investment, and improvement of the investment. 
Chapter 11 Strategic Control: A Survey Study Of Chinese General Managers' Perceptions 
To recommend, it seems plausible to undertake more empirical " work such as longitudinal 
studies relating to effective strategic control practices. Besides, as Q6-3 and Q1-2 dictate, more 
theoretical work on the theme of strategic control is needed so that both academics' and 
practitioners' understanding of strategic control of investments can be enhanced. For example, it 
can be profitable to employ, inter alia, new methods and new procedures to conduct further tests 
to examine the same factors of strategic control practices (please see Q4-24); and it can also be 
profitable to construct a covering model or meta-principle, of strategic control which is based 
upon first principles to bridge observations and theories (please see Q4-25). (Research in the 
theory-advancing line is to be dealt, with in Chapter 14 entitled "On Strategic Control Of 
Investments". ) 
-I 
a 
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12. On Investment And Investment Decision-Making 
12.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis aims to incorporate various mechanisms explaining and/or guiding 
investment decision-making in an organizational context and to conceptualise methods which 
can be used to help practitioners to better understand and play the real trick of investment 
decision-making. In terms of structure, this part of the thesis first looks at various theories of 
investment and discusses the nature of organizational decision-making, and then specialises in 
investment decision-making in organizations, and finally presents an integrated model of 
investment decision-making in the full organizational context and a control mechanism for 
practitioners to memorise valuable information as well as offering some 15 recommendations 
for future practice-or research-oriented investigations. 
12.2 The world of investment decision-making 
Investment remains a major component of spending and plays two roles in any economy. First, 
sharp changes in investment which are large and volatile can result in a major impact on 
aggregate demand which in turn affects employment and output in the short' run. Second, that 
capital accumulation resulted from the creation of real capital adds to the stock of productive 
assets such as workshops and equipment; it can increase an organization's potential output and 
consequently promote its economic growth in the long run. 
Investment, by definition, is the time rate of change in a stock of durable assets (Carsberg, 1974). 
Issues on investment are normally complex and involve many magnitudes, each with a variety 
of dimensions. From an economist's point of view investment means the production of durable 
capital goods (Carr, 1969), and therefore investment refers to the sacrifice of current 
consumption to increase future consumption (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995). This is in 
contrast to the common usage of investment referring to buying security, purchasing a piece of 
land in central England or northern China, or opening a savings account at Barclays Bank, in all 
of which, loosely speaking, only financial transactions or portfolio changes take place. 
Major types of investment: economists (e. g. Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995) tend to break 
investment down into three general categories: (A) additions to inventory, (B) purchases of 
residential structures, and (C) investment in business fixed plant and equipment. Evidence 
shows that only a small amount of total investments belong to changes in inventories, that about 
a quarter of all investments belong to residential housing, and that the majority (as high as three 
quarters in recent years) of total investments pertain to those in business plant and equipment. ' 
In the line of investment in business plant and equipment, however, investment theorists and 
practitioners tend to break it further down into four types (e. g. Derkinderen and Crum, 1981)2, 
namely, (a) the replacement of existing assets with like assets, (b) the substitution of cost- 
reducing assets for existing assets, (c), the expansion of productive capacity, and (d) strategic 
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investments. To explain further, the expansion investments include additional real assets for 
current production lines or extensions to existing production lines as well as working capital 
projects which may facilitate the promotion of sales; strategic investments include those which 
take an organization in new directions or yield (typically financial) benefits external to the 
investments themselves to the organization undertaking them. 
It seems quite obvious, to compare and contrast the four types of investment, that investment 
opportunities for categories (a), (b) and (c) are likely to be first perceived from the lower levels 
of the organization and can be comfortably dealt with by adequate techniques with which most 
financial managers are familiar (Carr, 1969; Parkinson, 1997), and that possibilities for strategic 
investments - i. e. category (d) - such as investment in new technology or overseas ventures are 
most likely to emerge from non-routine or strategic thinking at the most senior levels and can 
be difficult to evaluate in conventional ways (Pike and Neal, 1996). 
The determinants of investment: managerial economists (e. g. Gough and Hill, 1979; Baumol, 
1972) often state that the reason why businesses invest lies in that businesses purchase capital 
assets when they expect that their course of action will earn them a wealth of cash flow, viz., 
the revenues to be generated will be greater than the costs of the investment. This highlights 
three determining elements essential to any investments: revenues, costs and expectations. 
An investment will generate additional revenue for an organization if it helps the organization to 
produce more and sell more. In general, investment depends on the revenues which will be 
generated by the state of overall economic activity (Begg, 1991), and fluctuations in the 
overall 
level of output dominate the movement of investment over the business cycle (Baker, 1978). 
The costs of investing are also important, especially when an investment involves borrowing 
capital, say, through mortgage, in the bond market, from banks, or even from governments. 
When purchased assets last many years it becomes necessary to calculate the cost of capital in 
terms of the interest rate on borrowings (Emery and Finnerty, 1997). The cost of investment can 
also include taxes imposed by governments 
in that governments do sometimes use fiscal 
policies to affect investment 
in specific industries. The tax treatment in varying industries or 
even in different countries also 
has a profound effect upon the investment behaviour of profit- 
seeking organisations (Carsberg, 1974). 
Investment remains above all a gamble on the future (Parkinson, 1997) that the revenue to be 
generated from an investment will exceed the costs to be 
incurred, and thus, investment is often 
hung by a thread on expectations (and forecasts) about future events (Lucas and Thomas, 1981). 
It becomes quite common now that organisations spend a lot of time and energy analyzing 
investments and trying to narrow the uncertainties about their investments despite the fact that 
predicting can be very fuzzy, 
difficult or even hazardous. 
Seemingly, investment remains very volatile and consequently very risky in that its 
determinants can be highly unpredictable, and major sources of risk can be political, economic, 
technological, and even behavioural. For example, it is not surprising for investment decision- 
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makers to discover that investment can behave very unpredictably depending upon such 
uncertain factors as the success or failure of new and untried products, changes in tax rates or 
interest rates, political attitudes or approaches to stabilising the economy, and similar 
changeable events of macro- and micro-economic importance. 
12.2.1 Modern theories of investment 
The literature on investment reports a number of different theoretical approaches to investment, 
many of which remain complementary but not a few contradictory, depending upon different 
interpretations of entrepreneurial motives and different emphases given to alternative constraints. 
However, all theories of investment address the same question: how should decision makers 
decide whether to invest in a project new or old in the face of uncertainty over market conditions? 
At the firm or enterprise level of investment and regardless of the complications arising from 
macro-economic relations such as constructed cycle theories, there are at least eight categories 
of investment theory, namely, (A) the marginal or profit maximization theories, (B) the 
technically-oriented acceleration hypotheses, (C) institutional and empirical generalizations, (D) 
residual funds theory, (E) the diversification theory, (F) the options theory, (G) the agency 
theory, plus (H) the cross boundary dimensions. 
The marginal theories: marginal theories hold that investment decision-makers are singularly 
single-purposed individuals who seek nothing but maximum possible profits or utility from the 
conduct of business affairs (e. g. Baumol, 1972; Weber, 1976). The neo-classical profit- 
maximizationism dating back to the 19`h century posits that the volume of investment is 
determined by the cost of capital equipment and the market rate of interest (Weber, 1976; 
Gough and Hill, 1979). 
Partial recognition of institutional changes has given rise to a shift of the theory of the firm and 
consequently of investment 
from a profit orientation to that of utility maximization, with the 
latter seeking to explain a much wider range of behavioural responses such as investment 
decision-makers' desire for flexibility. The utility maximizationism places a premium on 
investment decision-makers' being able to adapt to the changing circumstances resulting from 
the uncertainty about future events (Lutz and Lutz, 1951). In essence, however, both profits and 
utility maximization theories contain some theory of expectations 
but in terms of the parameters 
of a probability distribution 
(Weckstein, 1953). ' 
Another description of investment decision-makers' response in the face of uncertainty lies in 
the minimax solution derived from the theory of Games (von Neumann and Morganstern, 1947). 
The minimax solution posits (Friedman, 1990) that maximum pleasure is realized when 
investment decision-makers pursue a course of action which minimizes his maximum possible 
loss. 
Although it has become tautological that, especially in a free enterprise society, the prospect of 
increased profit remains an important ingredient of investment decisions, most marginal theories 
remain too general to be practically useful 
because unfortunately ignored are numerous features 
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of the investors' milieu which are likely to be important to the investment decision-makers. " 
The accelerator hypotheses: there are actually three theories of investment emerging from the 
accelerator analyses, and they are (a) the original theory based upon change in sales, (b) a 
capacity oriented theory involving the ratio of absolute sales or output to capital stock, and (c) a 
profit model. In essence, accelerator hypotheses concentrate on the dynamic aspects of 
investment and emphasize the importance of growth as a determinant of investment. 
The original acceleration principle (Clark, 1917) asserts that the change in the capital stock per 
unit of time is a linear function of the rate of change in output. This implies that investment can 
be high when output is growing or low when output is falling, and that the typical investment 
decision-maker behaves somewhat like a magnified thermostat, noting when capacity is 
technically overtaxed and then initiating steps to remedy this deficiency. This approach remains 
simple and direct but has little or no motivational content. 
One of the most critical assumptions of the acceleration principle is that there must be no excess 
capacity prior to an increase in output (Clark, 1917), but this becomes troublesome in that 
excess capacity has been frequently observed in actuality. To solve this problem, investment 
theorists (e. g. Goodwin, 1951) tend to view excess capacity mainly as a cyclical phenomenon. 
This leads to the suggestion that secular excess capacity is often needed for profit maximization 
for businesses with increasing returns to scale and growing output (Chenery, 1952). This means 
that the level of output and the firms' capital stock, rather than the change in output alone, 
become the relevant variables when there exists secular overcapacity. 
Another assumption which is not always convincing of the simple acceleration principle is that 
investment decision-makers or the investing organization can obtain funds with little or no 
difficulty. In actuality, however, unlimited financial availability does not always exist, or at least 
not for all firms. In fact, 
it has become quite common nowadays (Parkinson, 1997) that 
investment decision-makers are frequently financially constricted. This echoes the practitioners' 
assertion that profits are generally and truly the major source of investment and facilitates the 
incorporation of profits into the acceleration theory. Indeed, it has been accepted (e. g. Tsiang, 
1951; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995) that, although the basic accelerator notion that more 
productive capacity is normally 
desired when demanded, this motivation can be obscured or 
even modified by other factors such as 
financial availability and constraints. 
The institutional and empirical generalizations: numerous empirical studies (e. g. Meyer and 
Kuh, 1959; Butler et al, 1977) have been undertaken to examine investment with little or even 
without reference to a specific theoretical model. 
The most outstanding finding lies in that 
internal liquidity considerations and a strong preference for internal financing remain principal 
factors in determining the volume of investment (Hoover, 1954). Another important finding is 
that practitioners can be very sensitive to their organization's `trade position' (Mack, 1941) or 
oligopolistic rivalry from economists' viewpoints. The notion of trade position asserts that 
investment decision-makers are driven by the desire to keep pace with rivals and investment is 
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undertaken when and if needed to keep the organization's strategic standing in the industrial 
hierarchy (Fellner, 1949). 6 Briefly speaking, however, ' the institutional or empirical 
generalizations are seriously lacking in theoretical framework for explaining the investment 
process. Prior to more precise qualification, neither can trade position nor can liquidity restraints 
serve as a satisfactory theory of investment. 
The residual funds theory: the residual funds theory results from empirical studies which 
emphasize the process of investment, and is actually compounded from many sources. ' The 
residual funds theory (Meyer and Kuh, 1959) posits that, in the light of the modern economy 
characterized by oligopolistic markets, large corporations distinctly separated in ownership and 
management, and largely imperfect equity and monetary markets, the investment outlay on fixed 
and working capital appears, in the short run, to be most suitably regarded as a residual, which 
remains the difference between the total net flow of funds captured from current operations less 
the established or conventional dividend payments. 
Although the residual funds theory has not received as much attention as have the others 
(notably, the marginal theories or the accelerator principle), it does provide a theoretical 
framework (set up in the framework of conventional price theory) which serves to explain the 
varying impacts on investment arising from varying sources such as technological advance, the 
market structure, the size of the demand shift, and capital intensity! Another distinction of the 
residual funds theory is that it places a great emphasis on the investment process (embodying 
costs, price policy, market structure, dividend, inventory, debt and equity). 
" 
The diversification theory: the diversification theory (Markowitz, 1959) forms a strategic 
device for investment decision makers to deal with risk and derives from the principles of 
diversification that diversification is beneficial, a financial principle which has long been used 
for security investment (Markowitz, 1952). Putting it in common sense terms, the diversification 
theory highlights the relationships between investments and well reflects an old proverb about 
not keeping all one's eggs (i. e. 
investments) in one basket. It posits (Markowitz, 1991) that risk 
can be reduced through 
diversification'. This implies that investing organisations, being 
discouraged by the risk that investment in a single operation or industry might fail, deliberately 
spread their capital over a wide set 
(i. e. a portfolio) of investments (Emery and Finnerty, 1997). 
Seemingly, portfolio risk can easily be reduced by pursuing less risky investments, although the 
portfolio expected return will also 
be reduced, but the beauty of portfolio diversification lies in 
the fact that portfolio risk is reduced without a consequent reduction in expected return. The 
practical implications of the 
diversification theory include that organisations will invest in a set 
of projects, selecting the portfolio which produces the 
highest total reward (e. g. NPV) addition 
to wealth. In practice, however, not many investment decision makers are incorporating 
portfolio concepts into their analytical procedures and not many 
investments are admittedly 
undertaken to reduce portfolio risk 
(Petty and Scott, 1981; Carter, 1981). 
The options theory: the options theory which factors real world uncertainties into investment 
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decisions derives from financial options the principle of which is that options (i. e. the rights but 
not obligations to take some action in the future) are valuable (Emery and Finnerty, 1997; Cox 
and Rubinstein, 1985; Hull, 1989). The options theory of investing (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995) 
posits that firms invest in order to keep their. options - open by intelligently creating and 
preserving options. The options theory essentially relates to irreversibility, uncertainty, and the 
choice of timing by challenging the conventional business premise that investment decisions can 
be either reversed or now-or-never propositions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). It has been claimed 
that, on the one hand, to invest is to exercise the call option and the lost option value is an 
opportunity cost (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995); and, on the other hand, organisations can be enticed 
by the uncertainty over future market conditions to invest if the investments undertaken create 
additional options which in turn give the organisations the ability (although not the obligation) 
to do additional future investing, viz., investment may create options and options may create 
flexibility (Stoll and Whaley, 1993). " 
Although the options theory of investing is just recently developed, its application to real world 
investments is ever increasing, and its implications for modem organisations are imperative 
(Paddock, 1988). It simply requires that investment decision makers should look beyond 
conventional investment evaluation techniques such as Net Present Value to assess and account 
for risk due to the volatile and unpredictable nature of investments (Hayes and Garvin, 1982). 12 
The agency theory: the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) analyzes conflicts of 
interest and behaviour in a principal-agent relationship, a relationship in which the ownership 
and the management are separate. It posits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) that decision makers as 
agents can make decisions which can affect the principals (i. e. shareholders). That is, 
investments can be made in favour of investment decision makers' self-interest especially when 
the decision makers have information that the principal does not have (Myers and Nicholas, 
1984). The agency theory remains a direct application of the principle of self-interested 
behaviour (Emery and Finnerty, 1997) which dictates that, since people act in their own self- 
interest, competing desirable actions can be taken which are most advantageous to themselves. 
This self-interest problem can give rise to what is called managerialism which can include 
investing in low-risk or `satisfying' projects. In fact, investment decision makers have been 
observed to possess as many self-interests 
(such as physical well-being, social acceptance, or 
prominence, and ideological satisfaction) as any other groups 
do (e. g. Wright, 1964; Crutchley 
and Hansen, 1989). 
The cross boundary dimensions: 
" in the past 30 years, an immense body of literature has 
emerged explaining the rapid growth of multinational 
businesses, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) remains the most prominent. 
14 Among the most influential theories explaining FDI are: (a) 
the business administrative approach, (b) industrial organization approach, (c) product cycle 
theory, (d) the MacDougall-Kemp model, (e) a specific factor model, (f) Kojima hypothesis, (g) 
internalization theory, and (h) the eclectic paradigm. 
The business administrative approach (Penrose, 1959) views the activities of FDI as a natural 
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consequence of the growth of a firm. It claims that the decision-making of the firm changes 
from the traditional domestic market to a world market orientation, and its organization goes 
through changes, first with the strengthening of its export section, then to the independence of 
the international business section, next to the establishment of a foreign subsidiary, and finally 
to the central control of subsidiaries all over the world. 
The industrial organization approach (Caves, 1971, Hymer, 1972) proposes that FDI is typical 
of an oligopolistic firm, which has some sort of superiority, searching for control in an imperfect 
market so as to maximise profits. 15 This theory suggests that firms venture into FDI because of 
their oligopolistic characters and that their investment and operation abroad enable them to 
survive by strengthening and expanding oligopolistic systems (Hymer, 1972). 
The product cycle approach (Vernon, 1966,1979) suggests that FDI is a natural stage in the life 
cycle of a new product from its inception to its maturity and eventual decline. 16 It has been 
advocated (Buckley and Casson, 1985) that the names of the stages tell the story of the 
competitive devices used to construct and maintain oligopoly (i. e. innovation -based oligopoly, 
mature oligopoly such as price competition and scale economies, and senescent oligopoly such 
as cartels, product differentiation and the essential breakdown of entry barriers). 
The MacDougall-Kemp approach (MacDougall and Kemp, 1964) remains a macro-economic 
analysis of effects of foreign investment in the 1960s. " It is claimed (MacDougall and Kemp, 
1964) that direct foreign investment firstly increases total world output, secondly helps the 
spread of new technologies and brings the benefits of labour training, scale economy and 
external economies to the host country, and thirdly enables the investing country to enjoy a 
greater national income than before the foreign investment. " 
A specific factor model (Caves and Jones, 1971) suggests that, in each industry FDI is induced 
from the low-profit-rate country to the high-profit rate country, and that international movement 
of the managerial resources (i. e. a specific factor1') or their construction, continues until the 
rates of profit are equalised in the same industry of both country. 20 
The Kojima hypothesis (Kojima, 1978,1982) posits that much Japanese FDI has been 'trade- 
oriented' and much US FDI 'anti-trade oriented', and prescribes that a home country should 
invest abroad in sectors which require intermediate (but internationally mobile) products which 
it is comparatively well suited to supply; but which need to be combined with non-transferable 
inputs in which the host country is relatively well endowed. " 
The internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) attempts to synthesize and extend those 
theories of FDI which are based on market imperfections. It is argued (Buckley and Casson, 
1976) that firms will find it beneficial to internalize factors other than the direct manufacturing 
process to gain the benefits from them. 
22 That is, firms resort to backward and forward 
integration to overcome market imperfections, and the internalization of markets across national 
boundaries results in FDI. It is argued (Buckley, 1985) that the concept of internalization 
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embodies two aspects: the internalization of an externality where a market is created where none 
existed before and the internalization of a market where an arm's length contractual relationship 
is replaced by unified ownership. 
The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1985) explains FDI in terms of ownership, location, and 
internalization effects. " Effort has been made (e. g. Dunning, 1972,1988) to bring together both 
aspects of trade theory and the theory of multinational companies within an integrated 
framework incorporating all forms of international business involvement. "' In essence, what the 
eclectic paradigm is proposing is the use of different theories to explain different forms of 
international business involvement. 
In summary, investment decisions remain not only subject to a multiplicity of influences, but 
also confined to different behaviour under varying milieus and in varying time frames. Not one 
of the existing theories of investment can be considered as completely adequate or inadequate: 
they each claim a certain amount of empirical truth but none can claim unique superiority above 
others. 25 
12.2.2 The nature of decision maldng 
Decision remains a basic factor in human knowledge (Drucker, 1992). Decision, by definition, 
has been viewed as, a product which comes of choice, a certain kind of choice, the process of 
choice itself, the processes leading up to the actual choice process, and more (Lundberg, 1962). 
To winnow all this, decision is referring to the judgmental process along a course of action to 
serve a purpose. It has long been considered as the art of human actions (Suntzi, 1992) in that 
decision deals over time with people who want things (Lundberg, 1962). However, decision- 
making has also been proposed (e. g. Kaufmann, 1968) as a science, although it still needs more 
advanced processes of analysis and more means of calculation. By nature, decision-making 
relates to the possibility of making a rational choice 
in given circumstances which may demand 
sense making in the face of uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, and rules (March, 1994). 
Decision-making elements: there are six common but essential decision elements which vividly 
depict choice situations, namely, (a) the state of nature, (b) the decision maker(s), viz., an 
individual or a group, (c) the goals or ends to be served, (d) the relevant alternatives as well as 
the set of actions from which a choice is to be made, (e) a relation which yields an ordering of 
alternatives in some arrangement, and 
(f) the choice itself, viz., the selection of one or some 
combination of alternatives (Gore and 
Dyson, 1964). Furthermore, these six elements have been 
extended (Ackoff and Emery, 
1972) into four components (namely, the individual, the choice 
environment, the available courses of actions, and the possible outcomes) and four parameters 
measured by probabilities (namely, the probability of choice of action, the efficiency of an 
action for an outcome, the relative value of outcomes, and the probability of outcomes). 
Fundamental frameworks for decision-making: there are two fundamental frameworks for 
the making of decisions, namely, the `closed' and `open' decision-making framework (Arrow, 
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1957; Simon, 1957a; Wilson and Alexis, 1962). Seemingly, the `closed' framework dominates 
the managerial (and especially the investment) circle, but is becoming increasingly disenchanted 
because practical decision-making becomes less likely to be recurring and more constrained by 
the bounds of some preferred solutions (Arrow, 1957). The `open' framework remains more 
flexible and dynamic and becomes highly promising especially when the decision-maker(s), 
along with his (their) aspirations on the making of decisions as well as what constitutes 
acceptable decision-making, are all `growing' (Simon, 1957a). 
Apparently, from the perspective of `closed' decision-making, decision-makers are viewed as 
logical and methodical (i. e. rational) maximizers (Miller and Starr, 1960), 26 and hence, the 
`closed' framework is designed to enhance the planning, problem-solving and decision-making 
abilities of decision-maker(s) in pursuit of common goals (Gore and Dyson, 1964). As 
exemplified by linear programming problems and games of strategy (game theory), it is 
crystallised by the concept of rationality rooted in the consciousness of the decision-makers' 
individual choice behaviour, largely due to the scarcity of resources which serve as ultimate 
restraints in actual decision-making as well as such determining factors as action-outcome 
relations, preference ordering, and decision (sub)optimisation27 (Wilson and Alexis, 1962). 
The 'open' decision-making framework, in contrast to the `closed', views decision makers as a 
complex mixture of many elements such as culture, personality, and aspiration (Gore and Dyson, 
1964). The `open' framework acknowledges decision makers' inability, to recognize all goals 
and feasible alternatives due to the limitations of human cognition and the complexity of the 
milieus of interest. It enjoys a solid behavioural foundations in that decision-makers are believed 
to act on the basis of what Boulding (1956) calls the images (which include more than the 
objective facets of the decision situation) such as perceptions of people, roles, and organisations, 
plus individual values and emotions. 
28 Apparently, the `open' decision-making framework 
brings to bear the totality of forces (i. e. both internal and external) to the making of decisions in 
practice, and offers a richer view about the dynamics of decision-making processes in real 
settings. 
Decision-making in actuality: decision-making in actuality has been looked at from various 
perspectives (e. g. Jannis, 1977), and one effective way of doing this is to examine decision- 
making from the vantage points of varying decision elements (Wilson and Alexis, 1962): it can 
be programmed or non-programmed (Simon, 65), short term or long term (Kaufmann, 1968), 
strategic or operational (Mintzberg, 1976), to name just a few. From the decision maker's 
perspective, however, there are three kinds of decision-making in organizations: (a) individual 
decision-making29, (b) group decision-making30, and (c) organizational decision-making. 
Speaking from the angle of applicability, individual decision-making can be effectively applied 
to decision problems which have several tightly coupled parts (Huber, 1980; March and Simon, 
1958), group decision-making is suited to ill-defined decision situations consisting of loosely 
coupled parts (Vroom and 
Jago, 1988), and organizational decision-making is suited to decision 
problems involving complex sub-systems or a mixture of many disciplines each of which covers 
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a lot of dimensions (Simon, 1958). Moreover, ' organizational decision-making has been 
considered (e. g. Shapira, 1997; Drucker, 1992; Thompson, 1967; Cyert and March, 1963; March, 
1994) as dramatically different from individual or group decision-making, although the three 
overlap greatly in that many decisions in organisations are made by individual managers (Simon, 
1958; Thompson, 1967; March, 1994). 
12.23 Organizational decision-malting 
The characteristics of, organizational decision-making: it is argued that organizational 
decision-making boasts some characteristics which differentiate itself from others. Among those 
distinctive are: (a) ambiguity is more pervasive in organisations in terms not only of information 
but also of preferences as well as the interpretation of the history of decisions (Shapira, 1997), 
(b) organizational decision-making involves a longitudinal context with decision makers as a 
part of the ongoing process (Simon, 1958), (c) organizational decision-making can be too 
iterative that self-built rules of thumb can take over scientific methods (Taylor, 1967), (d) 
organizational decision-making highlights the role of incentives because incentives, penalties 
and their ramifications are real and can produce long-lasting effects (Herzberg, 1966), (e) 
organizational decision-making values individuals' commitment towards the ongoing decision 
processes more than their judgmental accuracy with respect to the" role they, are playing 
(Salancik, 1977), (f) organizational decision-making highlights the role of sense making in that 
most decisions have to be made in non-artificial and complex settings (Weick, 1994), (g) 
conflict can be so pervasive in organizational decision-making that decisions can be 
considerably influenced or biased by power considerations rather than economic calculations 
(Follett, 1973), and (h), organizational decision-making can be so hierarchical that decision- 
making can be seriously affected by the nature of authority relations (Weber, 1964). 
International aspects of organizational decision-making: decision-making can vary 
depending upon the culture in which the decision process happens, and sometimes it can become 
frustrating for decision makers from different cultures to interact to reach decisions if difficulty 
exists in understanding such 
behavioural things as perceptions in relation to the problem 
identification, ways to develop alternatives from which to choose, and orientations to the 
evaluation and choice of alternatives 
(Champoux, 1996). 
Decision-making in some cultures such as the American tends to be problem-solving oriented, 
while that in other cultures, such as the 
Malaysian, the Thai, and the Indonesian, it is likely to 
favour adjustment to the problem (Adler, 1986); decision-making in some cultures such as the 
North American can rely on new ideas from which alternatives are generated, while that in other 
cultures such as the British may 
largely turn to the past to find solutions to present problems 
(Hofstede, 1984); the making of decision in some cultures such as the Chinese may happen only 
when all alternatives have 
been considered; while that in other cultures such as the German can 
happen progressively by rejecting alternatives along the way to a final choice (Adler, 1986; 
Hofstede, 1984). 
12-10 
Chapter 12 On Investment And Investment Decision-making 
12.2.4 The processes of organizational decision-making 
The organizational decision-making process refers to the phenomenon of organizational 
decisioning, a series of activities which include all those behaviours applicable to choices 
effecting organizational participants in organizational goal achievement (Lundberg, 1962). 
Literature on the organizational decision-making process suggests (e. g. Butler et al, 1993; 
Champoux, 1996; Simon, 1960) that there are seven approaches (Figure 12-1) to appreciating 
organizational decision-making processes, namely, (a) the rational process, (b) the hounded 
rational process, (c) the unstructured process, (d) the political process, (f) the garbage-can 
process, (g) the humble process, and (h) the contingency process. 
The rational process portrays organizational decision-makers who optimise utilities or profits. it 
finds its roots in the classical economic theory of the firm and statistical decision-making 
(Champoux, 1996). It echoes the `hill climbing' technique of practical problem solving (Newell 
and Simon, 1972) in that it does not possess dynamic properties such as revising the goal or 
extending the search for new alternatives (March and Simon, 1958). It features a number of 
distinct stages of decision-making normally featuring (a) a goal to maximise, (b) complete 
knowledge about all alternatives and their result, (c) some known function to give a preference 
ordering to the alternatives, and (d) the application of the preference ordering function to 
generate the utility maximising choice (Simon, 1957b). 
Figure 12-1: Approaches to appreciating organizational decision-making process 
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'I'hc hounded rational process exhibits sympathies to organizational decision-makers who 
manage under pressure or with 
incomplete information. It posits that decision makers select an 
alternative which 
is good enough to reach the goal as opposed to considering all possible 
alternatives and to choose the alternative which maximizes a goal (Lindblom, 1959), and 
assumes that decision makers 
have limitations which constrain rationality in the decision- 
making process (March and 
Simon, 1958). Those constraints (or limits) include a problemistic 
search rather than complete alertness 
(Hickson et al, 1986), cognitive Inuits in comprehension 
(Lindblom, 1959), time pressures against incomplete inlormation (Butler et al, 1993), 
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discontinuity between initial and sequential decisions (Kaufmann, 1968), intuitive rather than 
computational judgement (Simon, 1987), and satisfying rather than optimal solutions (Simon, 
1957). 
The political process describes decision-makers who potentially compete for resources and 
attention (Butler et al, 1977) or submerge individual differences to form coalition or alliances 
(Cyert and March, 1963). It assumes that organizational decision makers pursue their self- 
interests and try to reach decisions which serve their interests (Pfeffer, 1982). It posits that 
power (i. e. the ability or capacity of an individual or group to overcome opponents) is the axis of 
the organizational decision-making process (Chamboux, 1996). It is believed (e. g. Chanmboux, 
1996) that political forces are most likely to affect investment decisions (say, resource 
allocations), taking the form of bargaining (Butler et al, 1977), guile (Pettigrew, 1973), coalition 
building (Cyert and March, 1963), and /or biasing (Pfeffer, 1981). 
The garbage-can process (Marsh and Olsen, 1986) well depicts decision situations filled with 
ambiguity. It characterises decision makers who encounter rapid change or `organized anarchy' 
featuring problematic preferences, ambiguous technology, and fluid participation (Cohen et al, 
1972). Typically, in ambiguous decision situations, decision makers may not know all the 
alternatives and the results of each alternative, nor do they have a clear set of rules to guide 
choices from alternatives (Champoux, 1996). Thus, organisations are seen as a time-sensitive 
garbage-can through which independent streams of activities (i. e. problems, solutions, 
participants and choice) flow with possible connecting (Butler, 1991)" and with certain 
circumstances. 32 In this sense, the garbage-can model views organizational decision-making as 
chaotic with solutions looking for problems to solve (Marsh and Olsen, 1986). 
The humble process describes complex decision situations in which decision makers have 
extensive information available to them and the decision-making itself features many or discrete 
aspects. It assumes that decision makers cannot possibly absorb and process the information the 
quantity and the complexity of which have both exceeded the decision makers' ability to use it 
effectively (Etzioni, 1989). It further posits that, once recognising they cannot have all 
information needed for an optimal decision, decision makers make trial and error decisions and 
check the results along the way (Etzioni, 1989). Seemingly, humble decision makers revise a 
decision whenever new information dictates so, but the possible delays due to waiting for new 
information are perceived as part of the process rather than a negative development. In short, 
this adaptive and dynamic trial and error nature (Newell and Simon, 1972) sets the humble 
decision-making apart from other processes, but, unfortunately, it does not remain a rigid 
approach to appreciating organizational decision-making. , 
The unstructured process describes decision situations in which there is not a structure which 
permits orderly progression 
from identifying decision problems to winnowing decision 
alternatives (Newell and Simon, 1972). The process is characterized by complexity, novelty, and 
openendedness (Mintzberg et al, 1976), and essentially pertains to satisfying rather than 
optimizing (March and Simon, 1958). It assumes that decision makers in organisations usually 
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start with little understanding of the decision situation, including the route to the solution, or 
perhaps with a vague idea of what constitutes the solution and how it can be evaluated and, 
normally, end with a final choice by groping through a recursive, discontinuous process which 
involves many difficult steps as well as many dynamic factors over a considerable period of 
time (Mintzberg et al, 1976). The unstructured process largely accents the decomposition and 
localization strategy (Simon, 1969; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993) in that the unstructured, 
unprecedented, complex and ambiguous decision has to be broken into manageable sub- 
decisions which do not defy programme-like decision processes. Typical activities to incur in 
the unstructured decision-making process can involve (a) simultaneous assessment of many 
alternatives using a series of cycles for finding and assessing them, (b) identification of 
implicitly preferred alternatives during (instead of at the end of) the decision process, and (c) 
the inclusion of both new and old acceptable alternatives and the rejection of the unacceptable 
along the ongoing process (Soelberg, 1967). It has been noticed that unstructured decision- 
making can be disturbed by political forces, misled by inadequate information, or driven onto a 
dead lane if the `satisfying' alternative fails to solve the problem (Mintzberg et al, 1976). 
The contingency process provides decision-makers with varying decision-making processes 
with regard to particular situations in the light of the uncertainties relating to decision-making 
(i. e. the uncertainty about ends resultant from the politicality of the decision topic, and the 
uncertainty about means resultant from incompleteness of knowledge, dynamic object, and the 
unpredictability of the behaviour of, say, rivals, customers, suppliers or regulators). The 
contingency process (Tompson and, Tuden, 1976) posits that a different decision strategy (i. e. 
computational, judgmental, bargaining, and inspirational) is needed to cope with different 
decision conditions. That is, the computational strategy is best suited to decisions involving 
certain ends and certain means, the judgmental strategy to those involving certain ends and 
uncertain means, the bargaining strategy to uncertain ends and certain means, and the 
inspirational strategy uncertain ends and uncertain means. Comparatively speaking, the 
`computational strategy' (Thompson and Tuden, 1976) proceeds with assumptions similar to the 
rational model, such as the `sample budgeting system' (Neale and Holmes, 1991) but essentially 
corresponds to the `hill climbing' method (e. g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Mayer 1993); the 
`judgmental strategy' (Thompson and Tuden, 1976) is essentially in parallel to the processes of 
the bounded rational model of decision-making, such as the `successive limited comparisons' 
(e. g. Lindblom, 1959); the `bargaining strategy' (Thompson and Tuden, 1976) captures the 
political model of decision-making, such as `bargaining' (e. g. Butler, 1977); the `inspirational 
strategy' (Thompson and Tuden, 1976) corresponds to the `random trial and error' method (e. g. 
Newell and Simon, 1972; Mayer, 1993) or the `garbage-can' or the `humble' model (e. g. Cohen 
et al, 1972). 
In short, it seems clear that each decision-making process applies to different decision 
conditions in that each process offers a different perspective on decision-making in 
organisations. The rational and 
bounded rational processes are suited to well-structured decision 
situations. The unstructured or the garbage-can processes help describe ill-structured decision 
12-13 
Chapter 12 On Investment And Investment Decision-making 
situations more accurately than the rationality processes. The political process accents the role 
of power and self-interests in organizational decision-making. The humble process emphasizes 
the sense of humility about how much information decision makers can process and advocates 
trial and error moves. The contingency process highlights the dynamics of decision-making in 
organisations and advocates that particular techniques or strategies should be employed which 
arc best suited to the particular decision conditions feathered by uncertainty. 
To decide which decision-making process best suits an investment decision, one needs to 
borrow the `open' decision framework and link the decision-making process to the decision 
situation, viz., all decision-making elements (Gore and Dyson, 1964) or components (Ackoff 
and Emery, 1972) need to be consulted. Figure 12-2 provides a tentative summary, from the 
open system theory vantage point, of decision-making processes using a nmeans-end schema to 
crystallize the four decision components into a functional matrix featuring the interaction of 
likely outcomes of possible courses of action, decision makers, choice environment, and 
decision-making processes. Seemingly, the selection of decision-making processes depends 
upon how related the system will he to the decision situation in terms of (a) the degree of 
freedom the system can have on decision processes as well as (b) the magnitude of the influence 
decision outcomes can have on the system. " By this logic decision makers will have a perceived 
choice base from which they can choose a decision-making process which best reflects the 
organizational reality. 
Figure 12-2: The likely applicability of varying decision-making processes 
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123 Invcstment decision-making in or ; anizations 
One important step to begin one's discourse is, as normally practised by Socrates, to clarify the 
definitions of the subject of interest or, as usually followed by Aristotle, to list or discuss all 
possible alternatives which are 
feasible at hand. This can he particularly beneficial when one is 
exploring things 
like investment which are complex, subjective, and heavily dependent upon so 
many variables derived 
from varying disciplines over time. 
12 3.1 Investment decision-making in organisations: the context 
Obviously, it rcnnains Iiiip ossihlc tu summarize (especially when one ºuay not know) all the 
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circumstances which surround every investment decision in practice. However, it can be very 
fruitful to set down some headings for the organizational context of investment, the common 
threads of the investment which in each case have a significant influence on investment 
decisions. 
The organizational context of investment decision-making refers to the circumstances in which 
organisations realise the making of investment decisions. The organizational context of 
investment decision-making can be conceived as embodying at least four dimensions (i. e. 
phenomenological, psychological, physical, and operational)34, and this borrowed framework is 
assumed to correspond with Mayer's (1992) tried practical contexts of problem-solving (i. e. 
psychological, historical, empirical, practical, and social). 
First, an investment decision can be strongly dependent on both the actual and the expected 
external environment over which the firm has little or no control. This phenomenological sub- 
context can involve, inter alia, changes in market growth rates, changes due to competitor's 
actions and reactions, changes in technical progress, and changes in terms of relationships with 
suppliers and customers. 
Second, an investment decision can be greatly influenced by the attitudes of the firm's 
stakeholders or the psychology of its decision-makers (at any moment in its history) which may 
ultimately determine the firm's policy on investment. This psychological sub-context can 
involve, inter alia, perceptions on the sort of business in which the firm will take part, the extent 
to which the firm will diversify or concentrate its activities, the rate at which the firm should 
seek to grow, the standard of performance which the management seek to achieve, and the 
criteria upon which the measurement of performance is based. 
Third, an investment decision draws on the resources of the firm, and the optimal combination ' 
of the resources determines the success of investment. This physical sub-context can involve, 
inter alia, capital assets, human resources, time, technical skills, financial expertise, economic 
expertise, management expertise, experience in certain trades or industry, know-how in 
particular types of investment, reputation with suppliers and customers. 
Fourth, an investment decision bears some relationship to the firm's existing operations which 
can exert influence upon new ventures. This operational sub-context can involve, inter alia, the 
siphoning of existing operations 
into the new venture and this can cover staff, strategy, assets, 
cultures, pricing tactics, products, promotion channel, procedures, and nearly obsolete 
technology. 
Realistically speaking, an investment project normally remains ongoing over a period of time, 
and the importance of varying sub-context can be very changeable and situation dependent, 
dependent upon the firm's opportunities, threats, strengths, and weaknesses (Porter, 1980), or, to 
put it broadly, the nature of the 
investment. 35 Further, these dynamics of investment can also 
promote some emergent sub-contexts which may, under certain circumstances, appear to be 
more significant than some of the above mentioned. It seems that these emergent sub-contexts 
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can involve, inter alia, the hybridisation of two or more sub-contexts (e. g. phenomenological 
plus psychological), practical considerations which may be perceived or framed differently from 
established disciplines, and specific considerations which may or may not become universal but 
remain important or at least nontrivial to certain investments. 
123.2 Investment decision-mating in organizations: the international dimension 
With respect to the globalisation of modern corporate operations, investment decision-making 
can be catalogued into three subgroups in the light of the state of the nature of decisions: 
domestic, foreign direct investment, and strategic alliances (i. e. joint ventures), and one of the 
effective ways to address it is through the perspective of cultural differences. It seems, in this 
sense, that organizational investment decision-making can vary in structures, contexts, and 
processes from culture to culture (Trice and Beyer, 1993; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Martin, 
1992; Buckley, 1983). For example, overseas investment decision-making can face tremendous 
challenges originating from cultural differences (Dunning, 1972; Buckley and Casson, 1985). 
However, research evidence has shown (Neale and Buckley, 1992; Wilson, 1990; Robbins and 
Stobaugh, 1973) that decision-making in certain overseas investments such as foreign direct 
investment by multinational corporations may not produce a huge difference between the home 
and the host country, although the differing political structures, economic policies and value 
systems can result in certain analytical problems (Pike and Neale, 1996). For instance, it has 
been found (Wilson, 1990) that most multinational corporations employ essentially similar 
methods of evaluating and control of capital investment projects for both foreign and domestic 
operations (with the application of different discount rates; though). 
1233 Investment decision-mating in organizations: the process 
Basically there are two generally preferable types of 'decision-making process in literatures 
concerning investments in practice: 
(a) the `rational selection' process which corresponds to the 
`normal' or `closed' decision-making model (e. g. Simon, 1954), and (b) the `incremental' (or 
`adaptive') process which corresponds to an `open' decision-making model (e. g. Arrow, 1958). 
The `rational' process prevails in most investment decision-making activities such as resource 
allocation (e. g. Lumby, 1991; Carsberg, 
1974; Pike and Neale, 1996; Masse, 1962), despite the 
belief (including this researcher's) that the investment decision-making process in practice (e. g. 
resource allocation) can remain 
inseparable, fuzzy, less rational, or, even organisationally 
irrational. The `incremental' process has gained much acceptance most recently, partly due to 
the fact that practical investment decision-making involves many people up or down the 
organization hierarchy over an extended period of time 
in an ever-changing environment (e. g. 
Wright, 1964; Simon, 1965; Butler, 1993; Mintzberg, 1976), and partly due to the awareness 
that many investment decision-makers use time in order to gain knowledge and commitment 
through a prolonged but loosely structured process of exploration and learning (Lindbolm, 1959; 
Quinn, 1980; Hickson et al, 1986; Johnson, 1988). 
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In fact there have been numerous attempts (e. g. Bower, 1971; Butler, 1993; King, 1975; 
Lindblom, 1959; Mintzberg et al, 1976; Neale and Holmes, 1991; Northcott, 1995; Pike and 
Neale, 1996; Pinches, 1982; Quinn, 1980; Wright, 1964) at describing investment decision- 
making process along these two lines, although the usefulness of each decision-making process 
can depend upon the dynamics of the decision situations as well as users' methodological 
preferences. 
For example, Pinches (1982) describes a four phase capital investment decision-making process 
(i. e. identification, development, selection, and control), " which is essentially based upon 
Mintzberg et al's (1976) three phase model of decision process (i. e. identification, development, 
and selection). " Lindblom (1959) proposes that the investment decision path takes the form of 
rational comprehension as can be exercised through the `root' approach, or the form of 
successive limited comparisons as can be exercised by `branch' approach (Figure 12-3), both of 
which accent the lengthiness rather than the stages of the making of investment decision. " 
Neale and Holmes (1991) suggests a sample capital budgeting system (Figure 12-4) which 
involves 5 phases (i. e. determination of the budget, search, evaluation, monitoring, and post- 
auditing)". Quinn (1980) suggests that the investment decision takes the form of a series of 
actions which explore and develop the solution while building a greater commitment of 
resources and a consensus to support the development, and that the decision process is primarily 
concerned with solution development, which is achieved through the phased implementation 
and testing of the solutions. 
4 
In summary, it seems that the 
`rational process' offers more analytical convenience and the 
`incremental' process provides a richer context, with the operational distinction between them 
being whether evaluation and choice are explicit or implicit in the `(Icvelopment oI- tile 
solutions' (Mintzberg et al, 
1976) in the full organizational context. However, other 
organizational 
decision-making processes have also to be employed to depict the investment 
decision-making process in practice. Depending on the structure, context, cultu re, and time 
frame within which an investment decision is made, approaches such as the political process, the 
garbage -can process, 
the humble process, and the unstructured process can he equally as good as 
the rational or bounded rational process in appreciating organizational investment decision- 
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12A Investment decision-malting in the full organizational context: an integrated model 
Research onto the decision-making process within the organizational context has mushroomed 
since Follet's (1987) study on organizational control, Sheldon's (1936) study on organizational 
principles, Barnard's (1938) study on organizational functions, and Simon's (1947) study on 
theories of organizational decision-making. The dynamics of existing wisdom on organizational 
decision-making suggest that one effective way of solving a complex problem is to view it as a 
process with a number of distinct and separable steps (Barnard, 1938; Newell and Simon, 1972, 
Kahney, 1993), although it has been noticed that functional separation of problem-solving can 
be operationally difficult and methodologically hazardous (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). 
Seemingly, it has become axiomatic to approximate investment decision-making to a `normal' 
one the process of which can be seen as similar to the Hempelian inquiry system (see Hempel, 
1965). One good example of this goes to Bransford and Stein's (1984) IDEAL model (please 
see Figure 0-2-5) which remains, in essence, a typical `normal' decision-making process for 
finding a solution for any class of problems. However, effort has also been made to approximate 
investment decision-making to a `revolutionary' one, the process of which can be seen as 
parallel with Kuhn's (1970) or Feyerabend's (1975) `revolutionary' 
inquiry system (e. g. Cohen 
et al, 1972; Mayer, 1993; Thompson and Tuden, 1976). 
Figure 12-4. A sample capital budgeting system (Source: Neale and Holmes (1991)) 
1. Determination of the budget 
How much is available to spend? 
2. Search 
W hat project ideas have emerged? 
W hat costs and benefits w ill they generate? 
3. Evaluation 
W hat is the value of the projected costs and benefits? 
What is the target rate of return? 
Does the project's IRR exceed this, or does it have a positive NPV? 
How risky is the project? 
4. M onitoring 
During implementation: --- Is the project on schedule? 
--- W ill costs exceed the budget'! 
ongoing: --- Is the project performing to budget? 
--- If not, why not? 
5. Post-Auditing 
Is the project performing to initial expectations? 
How justified were those expectations? 
W hat lessons can we draw to assist future appraisal? 
All models of investment decision-making (be they the `rational', the `bounded rational', the 
`political', the `garbage-can', the `humble', the `unstructured', or the `contingency') reflect a 
sense of perspective but, 
inevitably, they share some similar characteristics. Thus, it can seem 
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plausible to provide a balance by adding a pinch of people, contextual rationality, structural 
`reality' and operational `objectivity' to the abstract world of investment analysis theory. 
Thus, in the light of the Chinese boxes game" as well as the findings of empirical research42 
reflecting the dynamics of investment decision-making in modern organizations, an integrated 
model of investment decision-making process is constructed as depicted in Figure 12-5,4' and 
the elements of this model will later form a basis for considering the economic, operational, 
behavioural tools which have been developed since the 19''' century to assist investment 
decision-making in real world settings. 
Figure 12-5: Investing as an unbounded knowledge accumulation process in the full organizational context 
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To a great extent, the integrated approach differs from other models in that well recognised are 
not only the image (teleological rather than simply mechanistic as what the word process 
connotes) of investment 
decision-making in organisations, but also the dynamics of investment 
decision-making activities which are framed from the control perspective, as well as the kinetics 
of human actions with respect to 
investment decisions. Seemingly, the integrated model accents 
other models such as the 'rational' and the 
`bounded rational' but only uses them as analytical 
tools rather than as constructive frameworks; it turns the structural simplicity of other models 
such as the 'humble' and the 
`unstructured' into less-fuzzy and more workable functions; it 
acknowledges the 
beauty of other models such as the 'political' but extends into other 
contextual considerations; 
it corresponds to other models such as the 'garbage-can' In the l tce 
of ambiguity but overcomes the 
latler's lack of structure; it agrees with other models such as the 
, contingency' on operational objectivity 
but also emphasizes the importance of good structure as 
a guideline but not an obligation; 
it looks 'normal' for it incorporates positivists' rationality hilt 
it also looks 'revolutionary' 
in that it ignores established rules of procedures its well its 
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encouraging creative responses; it looks `micro' for it is concerned with specific investment 
decision-making processes in practice but it also looks `intermediate' in that it looks beyond 
specific investments and focuses on it being part of the organizational knowledge accumulation 
process, as well as looking `macro' in that it goes beyond the milieu in which organisations exist 
and reflects the ultimate desires of human beings who create organisations and investment. In 
essence, it remains an unbounded rationality approach (please see Figure 12-2) reflective of an 
experimentalist worldview which, in this context, incorporates a nonrelativistic synthesis of 
modern rationalism and logical positivism as 
This integrated model reckons that investments can be carried out in order to achieve hierarchies 
of ends by means of planning and participation. Among the most distinguishable ends are 
(Figure 12-6): (a) ideals, (b) objectives, and (c) goals. Ideals are referred to the long term or 
ultimate ends the desirability as well as the closeness of which magnetizes organizations to 
invest. Objectives are referred to the immediate term ends the attainment of which leads to the 
success of the organizations which undertake the investment. Goals are referred to the short term 
ends the attainment of which prepares for the success of the investments. 
Hence, this integrated model can also be represented by three cyclical processes (Figure 12-7, 
please also see Figure 12-5): the 'macro' process 
featuring progress in terms of ideal pursuit, the 
'intermediate' process featuring development in terms of attainment of objectives (i. e. 
knowledge accumulation), and the micro process featuring performance in terms of goal 
achievement. Obviously, the macro process pinpoints the ultimate 
desires of organisations 
mastered by humans who desire their ability to achieve their 
desires; the intermediate process 
emphasizes the long term 
developmental benefits of the organization and of its people; the 
micro process has a sharp 
focus on the short term achievements of the organization and of its 
people. 
Figure 12-7: Investment decision-making as a process of performance, development, and progress 
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Specifically speaking, the three processes supplement one another: the high level process relies 
on the competence of the lower level process, while the lower level process benefits from the 
nurturance dedicated by the high level process; the lower level processes vectorially constitute 
the highest level process (please see Figure 12-7); and each level per se involves a compromise 
between ideal and reality, viz., humans' quest for knowledge as being formulated as a pursuit of 
an ideal named truth, with an ideal being an outcome or end-state which can never be attained 
but can be approached without limit, and reality stands for an ideal or ideals to be pursued. 
12.4.1 The macro process of investment decision-making: a progress orientation 
The macro process is represented by four identifiable elements which jointly lead to the human 
pursuit of ideals (Figure 12-8): (A) conceptualization, (B) operationalization, (C) actualization, 
and (D) idealization. It refers to the organizational progress, which can be defined, in the light of 
an experimentalist worldview, as an infinite sequence of sets of facts (e. g. resources and market 
information) and laws (e. g. knowledge), with each set more closely approximating the truth or 
ideal (which is functionally a limit which can be indefinitely approached by responses but not 
obtained), and with facts and laws in each set being revised during the progress to the ideal. 
Such a progress remains virtually a process of `learning more and more' (Singer, 1959) or an 
inquiry the original questions of which become `more and more complicated, not simpler and 
simpler' (Churchman, 1981). 
To illustrate the manner in which such a progress takes place (Figure 12-8), investment decision 
makers firstly, conceptualize the decision by formulating an image of nature according to some 
facts and laws (e. g. information, knowledge, and understanding); secondly, operationalize the 
decision by defining the image via the use of formal scientific principles (e. g. logic, economic, 
and methodological); thirdly, actualise the decision by taking both mental and physical actions 
through communicable structure and coordinating procedures while bearing in mind the image 
of nature; and fourthly, idealise the decision cooperatively after a set of actions either by 
adjusting the adjustable actions to the 
image of nature until adjustment is no longer possible, or 
by revising the image of nature in the face of nonadjustable actions and hence repeating the 
process..., and this process repeats 
indefinitely, moving towards the truth to be pursued, an ideal 
which is ultimately unattainable but always approachable. 
"' 
(A) Conceptualization refers to which ideals to pursue and how to pursue them. That is, in 
order to make progress, investment 
decision makers need to (a) determine what ideals there are 
to pursue, (b) construct or reconstruct a system which most suits the pursuit of the ideals, and (c) 
have a source from which strength can be built so as to facilitate the selection of ideals and the 
construction of an appropriate system. 
At this stage, an image of nature has to be assumed by 
processing some facts and some 
laws, and thus, information concerning desires, resources, 
opportunities and threats, remains the 
key to the success of conceptualization. It is through the 
emergency and disappearance of conflicts among varying rationalities with respect to ends and 
means that conceptualization can 
be achieved. 
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Figure 12-8: The macro process of investment decision-making: a progress orientation 
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It has been argued (e. g. Ackoff and Emery, 1972) that there are basically four sub-ideals after 
which individuals, groups, or organizations can chase: (a) the politicoeconomic state of PLENTY 
(Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Emery, 1981) or HOMONOMY (Emery, 198 1)16, (b) the scientific state of 
TRUTH (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) or NURTURANCE (Emery, 1981)", 
(c) the ethicomoral state of 
GOOD (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) or HUMANITY 
(Emery, 1981)48, and (d) the aesthetic state of 
BEAUTY (Ackoff and Emery, 1972; 
Emery, 1981). To relate this to investment decisions in 
organizations big and small, 
for example, investment decision makers can be motivated to invest 
to reconstruct the environment in order that more efficient means are available and that the 
mode of production can be 
improved (viz., the ideal state of PLENTY). They can also be motivated 
to invest to reconstruct themselves so that the right persons will select the right (i. e. the most 
efficient) means available 
(viz., the ideal state of TRUTH). They may be motivated to increasingly 
intensify their interest in an end which is desired by all stakeholders (viz., the ideal state of 
GOOD). They may also 
feel obligated to integrate their interest in the ethical end in order that the 
interest is to be continuously, if not perpetually, pursued under changing conditions (viz., the 
ideal state of BEAUTY). Although investment decision makers can be encompassed by conflicts in 
an infinite sequence, the pursuit of these 
ideals can necessarily, as well as sufficiently, facilitate 
organizations' progress toward the 
ideal state of omnicompetence. 
From the systems point of view, organizations can have varying systems set up for varying ends 
(Ackoff, 1971). The simple system can be the passive functional system in which objects simply 
act in only one way in all environments and thus pertain to an extrinsic functional class. A 
slightly complex one goes to the reactive functional system which acts in only one way in any 
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given environment and acts in different ways in different environments. A complex system is 
the goal-seeking system which enjoys one intrinsic function (i. e. goal) and can act in different 
ways in any one environment and in varying environments, with the selection of the different 
ways of acting being coproduced by the environment and the system. The more complex system 
remains the multi-goal-seeking system which enjoys more intrinsic functions (i. e. two or more 
goals) and can act in different ways in any one environment and in varying environments, with 
the selection of goals (but one goal in any one environment) being produced by the environment. 
The most complex system is a purposeful system which seeks two or more goals in any one 
environment and in different environments, with the selection of goals caused by itself. 
In terms of to whom could investment decision makers turn in order to gain strength to pursue 
ideals as well as to modify or set up anew a workable system, it has been argued (Singer, 1948) 
that the source of strength comes from humans themselves rather than an ultimate authority such 
as God (in the West) or Heaven (in the Far East). For example, investment decision makers can 
acquire strength (a) from within themselves, (b) from contemporaries, (c) from past generations, 
and (d) from future generations. In fact investment decision makers gain more and more 
knowledge via learning or experience, and the knowledge accumulation itself paves the way for 
them to pursue the ideal state of truth or nurturance. It also seems possible that investment 
decision makers can be fostered by their contemporaries such as subordinates, superiors, or even 
rivals by means of selection of those objectives the attainment of which will help each other 
achieve individual objectives and this relates to the ideal state of plenty or homonomy. Besides 
the fact that past decision makers can pass down emotional experiences which can generate a 
heroic mood of satisfaction with the progress made so far, investment decision makers can be 
aided by the wisdom and lessons generated by past decision makers to overcome adversities as 
well as to prevent vacillation of ends along their pursuit toward the ideal state of beauty. 
Furthermore, investment decision makers can be assisted by future decision makers in the 
pursuit toward the ideal ethical state of good 
by exhibiting, through actions, the fundamental 
good in human nature and 
by encouraging, through modelling, future decision makers to 
remember as well as to emulate. 
(B) Operationalization refers to the measurable processing of the image of nature by 
employing formal sciences (such as 
logic, mathematics, philosophy, and economics) and the 
related disciplines (such as IT, 
finance, accounting, and methodology). The reason why this 
processing has to be aided 
by sciences lie in the procedural sophistication caused by conflicts 
existing or emerging among varying rationalities concerning means and ends. 
However, given 
that all facts depend on theories and all theories depend on facts, sciences are not used in any 
order of hierarchical preference, 
but are incorporated to cross check on each other. This suggests 
that, methodologically, operationalization can only be regarded as having been achieved when 
all of its aspects have been explicitly 
designed as well as being open to revision if the design 
fails to meet the criteria of acceptability. 
Efficient operationalization demands teleological measurement. To operationalize the image of 
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nature is to specify the ideals (or sub-ideals) so that measurement can be taken. Investment 
decisions can be very complex as far as decision situation (e. g. volatile outcomes, and 
changeable processes) is concerned, thus, measurements, which are pieces of information 
having application in varying places and times, have to cover a wide variety of contexts (e. g. 
physical such as economic, phenomenological, psychological, and operational such as technical 
or strategic). This requires the use of both scientific framework (e. g. the `lattice' and the 
`preference graph') and non-scientific framework (e. g. the `holistic') so that any part of the 
conceptualized image can be viewed and possibly understood from as many different viewpoints 
as possible. Standards, which are another feature of teleological measurement, are also required 
so that costs of measurement can be reduced and later adjustments can be made accordingly. 
Predictions can also be teleologically used to predict investment decision makers' future 
behaviour by measuring their values (e. g. ethics). 
Teleological measurement demands an optimal methodology. Teleological measurement 
dictates the use of an optimal problem solving technique (e. g. means-ends schema, hill- 
climbing, or random trial and error) depending on the balance between conflicting rationalities, 
although it may vary in practice. For instance, means-ends analysis can be employed as the 
optimal (i. e. most economical or efficient) technique to investigate psychological phenomena 
such as escalating commitment. 
Optimal methodology demands interactive planning. Optimal methodology requires an optimal 
design covering all stages of the decision-making process, and this can be achieved by the 
interactive planning (Ackoff, 1981) - in the light of the optimal methodology - under which 
each phase of the decision-making process remain a continuous activity and 
interacts with other 
phases, insofar as the planning process 
facilitates effective judgement (in order to measure the 
participative decision makers' value, the planning 
incorporates all stakeholders' points of view, 
the planning involves all hierarchical levels of the organization, planning aims at encourage 
organizational learning 
(Ackoff, 1981). 
(C) Actualization refers to the implementation of the operationalized image of nature. 
Resources are coordinated within the organization so that performance criteria are met. It 
demands good interpersonal, inter-group, and inter-organizational communicational skills, 
competent technology, optimal strategy, responsive 
information processing systems, and an 
adaptive structure. Consider 
implementing strategy, for example, one can stick to one normal 
techniques (e. g. breaking the actualization into parts, working backward, or using a specific 
case); one could also employ non-scientific strategies 
(e. g. artistic, moral or political). 
In terms of organizational structure, for another example, an adaptive organizational structure is 
required to ensure the actualization of 
the interactive planning. This adaptive structure needs to 
be flexible so that accountabilities can be assigned, integrated and coordinated; it needs to be 
circular so that hierarchical command can 
be effectively utilised to facilitate the integration of 
different views, participative planning and decision-making; it also needs to be responsive so 
that the implementation of decisions can be effectively controlled and the information can be 
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widely distributed (Ackoff, 1981). 
(D) Idealization refers to the adjustment of the decision situation after actualization to the 
image of nature. If the actualization is successful as to the standards, then improvement is aimed 
at, providing that it is adjustable, by achieving better results through re-actualization; if the 
actualization is unsuccessful as to the standards, improvement is aimed at, providing that it is 
adjustable, by, improving the results through re-actualization; if the actualization is 
nonadjustable or nearly nonadjustable, improvement is aimed at through re-conceptualization, 
providing that the actualization is successful, by setting higher standards; if the actualization is 
nonadjustable or nearly nonadjustable, improvement is aimed at through re-conceptualization, 
providing that the actualization is unsuccessful, by modifying the assumptions underlying the 
standards. This stage requires an efficient intelligence system, an adaptive structure, an optimal 
strategy, the most practical tactics, improved understanding and knowledge, and, above all, the 
cooperation spiritual and material through out the organization and its environment. 
It can be argued, in the light of an experimentalist view that progress towards the ideal brings 
forth satisfaction (Ackoff, 1981), that investment decisions can remain a means. by which 
organizations pursue ideals so that they can keep being progressive. 
49 It is in part because that 
ideal-pursuing remains one of the very few common characteristics possessed by humans who 
may make investment decisions to serve human purposes. Besides, humans are desiring beings 
who must desire, above all, the ability to achieve their desires. Hence, all people or 
organizations of all times must desire this unlimited ability to achieve their desires. 
" 
On the one hand, the difference in organizational progress framed by idealization (i. e. pursuit of 
ideals) and by actualization (i. e. pursuit of purposefulness of lower level) can be huge. For 
organizations filled with decision makers who are 
ideal seeking, investment decision-making 
involves formulating and selecting organizational (or even individual) ends, goals, or objectives 
by determinedly plotting the ideal as a long term target to be approached as well as willingly 
sacrificing short-and medium-term gains 
if the sacrifice is believed to facilitate progress toward 
the ideal at some later time even if this later time may come after the life span of a specific 
investment or beyond the service of the current management. For organizations filled with 
decision makers who prefer not to seek ideals, investment decision-making involves a selection 
of ends, goals, or objectives which serve the short-and medium-term satisfactions which are 
hoped to be gained at a relatively less dearly cost. 
On the other hand, as being historically considered and debated (e. g. Pigors, 1935), the ability to 
achieve desires refers to either omnipotence which means power over (viz., the ability of one 
person or a small group, 
but not other people, to achieve his or her desires) or omnicompetence 
which means power to 
(viz., the ability of all people to achieve their desires). Since `power 
over' cannot be an ideal 
for every person or every organization (Follet, 1973) and `power to' 
enables every individual or every organization to pursue 
ideals (Pigors, 1935), the major hurdle 
for an ideal-seeking organization, thus, is to overcome the will to compete to overpower others 
but to cooperate instead to co-prosper in the long run (Singer, 1948). 
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Practically speaking, organizations' progress toward ideals remains a dialectical process full of 
conflicts which occur in an infinite sequence (please see Figure 12-6). For example, it can be 
argued that it is the involvement of choice inherent in decisions that provokes conflicts among 
varying rationalities (i. e. economical, operational, technological, psychological, and strategic, to 
name just a few), that it is conflicting rationalities between means and ends which calls for 
changes of behaviours in organizations, and that, while one conflict disappears, another arises, 
and so forth. In this sense, investment decision-making can be regarded as being driven by 
`divergence' (Suntzi, 1992; Churchman, 1961) along the course of organizational progress: 
investment decision makers `rationalize' in order to `irrationalize'; investment decision-making 
can also be regarded as being driven by `convergence' (Suntzi, 1992; Ackoff, 1967) along the 
course of organizational progress: investment decision makers work through conflicting 
rationalities concerning ends and means in order to achieve what this researcher calls meta- 
rationality. Thus, the progress per se is a never-ending series of conflicting interactions between 
`rationality' and `irrationality' from any given vantage-points at any time, begetting that no 
specific rationality (i. e. phenomenological, psychological, operational, physical, and the like) 
will (and should) always matter more than others or be employed more frequently than others 
because the ideal can only be approximated but never reached, given the fact that desire is an 
essential characteristic of being human and that a being without desire is not human. 
Seemingly, this macro process featuring organizational progress in terms of ideal pursuit has 
some significant aspects worthy of notice. First, since there is no fundamental truth from which 
investment decision makers could develop further truths, no science (not economics, not 
psychology, not even mathematics, and not even logic) remains more fundamental or more 
important than another, and these sciences are simply required (or assumed) in order to learn 
along the progress toward the truth. Second, since the notion of ideal drags attention away from 
what investment decision makers actually do relative to what they ought to do, this progress has 
to be judged from an ethical point of view rather than being judged relative to specific decision 
makers or the organizations. Thirdly, since all knowledge of fact implies knowledge of law, any 
phenomena which take place along the route of progress have to be measured by considering 
sets of varying natural mechanical 
images and by assuming a teleological view of the world (see 
Table 1-2-2) since investment decision makers constitute a system involving intrinsic functions, 
be it a goal-seeking, multi-goal-seeking or a purposeful system. Finally, it seems that 
actualization and idealization are the core elements along the progress toward ideals, and that 
other elements (i. e. conceptualization, and operationalization) are merely functionally 
supplements; besides, since conflict 
is an essential feature of the pursuit of ideals, the 
investment decision-making process itself can be framed as continuous sets of conflicts between 
idealization and actualization: investment decision makers actualize in order to idealize and 
idealize in order to actualize, while organizational progress as a whole is a non-stopping series 
of actualization and 
idealization. 
In short, investment decision-making can serve for organizations' ideal-seeking, and investment 
decision-making can become a cyclical process of actualization and idealization along an 
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organization's progress toward ideals, a process which is essentially characterized by conflicts 
in terms of varying rationalities concerning ends and means. 
12.4.2 The intermediate process of investment decision-making: a development orientation 
There are eight identifiable elements which jointly lead to the intermediate process of 
knowledge accumulation: (A) identification, (B) definition, (C) search, (D) choice, (E) 
authorisation, (F) implementation, (G) monitoring, and (H) improvement. As can be seen in 
Figure 12-4, the process of investment decision-making is much more than choosing one from 
alternative courses of action and implementing it, it involves several identifiable interrelated 
phases only two of which are choice and implementation. 
Seemingly, investment decision-making can include a great range of possible mental and 
physical activities during the period of identification, definition, 'search, choice, authorization, 
implementation, monitoring, and improvement; and these activities can be directed towards the 
satisfaction of a wide variety of objectives. Among the most important objectives for which 
investment decision-making may serve are (Drucker, 1954; Dean, 1951; Wright, '1964)51: (a) 
profitability, (b) innovation, (c) productivity, (d) physical and financial resources, (e) market 
standing, (fl public responsibility, (g) desire for security, (h) avoidance of conflicts with 
associates. 
Apparently, all of these possibilities are subject to the milieu in which specific investments take 
place and the evolution to which they lead. Some of the objectives are interdependent, not in a 
consistent way, though; the relationship between varying objectives can be complementary, 
competitive, or even exclusive (viz., one objective may act as a restraint preventing the excess 
fulfilment of another). In the intermediate run it all inevitably comes back to one abiding 
necessity which is of developmental nature: improved knowledge for the investment specific 
business unit, the organization, and, possibly, the geographical economy52. To survive and to 
prosper, organisations heavily rely on their ability to create and improve knowledge rather than 
on their exercises of individual investment activities of rather short duration: " knowledge 
accumulation remains the end and investment activities are merely the means for achieving the 
end. 
The intermediate process of investment decision-making (Figure 12-9) can be so dynamic that, 
it can unfold linearly or be restarted at any earlier phase, it can completely repeat or restart itself 
due to its cyclical nature, it can even stop at one phase for an extended time and restart later on, 
and it can move backwards through knowledge accumulation although the latter of which 
normally follows a logical sequence as shown in Figure 12-9 (which can be viewed as, to a great 
extent, an unfolding version of Figure 12-5 or Figure 3-1). 
(A) Identification of potential investments: identification of potential investments refers to the 
recognition of problems or the creation of investment opportunities which firms can possibly 
define and further explore. It remains a `triggering' phase of investment decisions in that in 
most cases `normal' investment opportunities exist and simply need to be identified and 
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exploited (King, 1975); it also remains an `innovating' phase of investment decisions in that 
many `revolutionary' investment opportunities need to be created. The identification of 
investment opportunities remains crucial in that it is the starting point to secure successful 
outcomes (Pike and Dobbins, 1986)54 
Figure 12-9: The intermediate process of investment decision-making: a development orientation 
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lt is often held that most investment ideas cone from people who work in technical positions 
(e. g. Northcott, 1995), that lower organizational levels collectively account for more investment 
ideas than do higher levels (e. g. Petty et al 1975), that ideas for new product lines arc more 
likely to come from higher levels, and that ideas for strategic investments are more likely to 
conic from executive levels (e. g. Pike and Neal, 1996). It is also held (Northcott, 1995) that an 
important rule for generating more investment ideas is to create an environment in which 
individuals or groups feel free to present or develop ideas, and that an important mechanism to 
facilitate this is perhaps to finance both premature and mature investment ideas. 
in addition, there may not be a continuous flow of investment ideas, in contrast to economists' 
beliefs that investment remains the interaction of the supply of capital and the flow of 
investment opportunities (Begg, 1991). This means that ideas for investment may have to be 
rigorously generated 
in a structured way, say, by cultivating a corporate culture which 
encourages people to search 
for, identify, and sponsor investment ideas (Butler et al, 1993). This 
cultivation may have to 
be clearly purpose-oriented, planned, executed, and measured if it is 
going to be continuously successful. 
For instance, ideas can be planned by means of collective 
thinking through, say, quality circles, or by means 01' putting varying emphases on the 
organizational levels; 
it can also be periodically evaluated and both materially and spiritually 
awarded. A firm can easily 
bypass existing investment opportunities il it clots not set explicit 
objectives, plan for idea-seeking activities, conduct the search effectively, and measure the ideas 
generated as well as the effort 
involved. 
In practice, however, research evidence shows that there is no clear indication of the nature or 
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extent of deliberate investment idea generation (Northcott; 1995). It has been observed that 
firms are increasingly active in searching for investment ideas (Pike, 1983; Klammer, 1972) but 
it is in strong contrast to the findings of others including Istvan (1961), and McIntyre & 
Coulthurst (1987). There has been little agreement on the organizational levels from which 
investment ideas arise (Northcott, 1995, Petty et al, 1975; Mao, 1970; McIntyre and Coulthurst, 
1987). However, there is evidence suggesting that firms control ideas via the capital expenditure 
budget to ensure the ideas which emerge are in line with group objectives (Scapen and Sale, 
1981). In short, limited research evidence provides a fuzzy picture of the identification of 
potential investments although it appears that the stimulus for active searches can include a short 
supply of profitable investment opportunities, that most `normal' investment ideas emanate from 
lower hierarchical levels in large firms, and that ideal generation on higher hierarchical levels 
incurs more frequently in smaller firms or with `revolutionary' investments. 
(B) Definition of workable investments: the definition of workable investments refers to 
turning ideas into operational formulations of spending requirements, implementation 
practicalities, and criteria for performance measurements, by both of which firms can develop 
investment alternatives and optimize their use of resources. It involves the detailed specification 
of a proposal, together with its technical and economic characteristics (Butler et al, 1993). It is 
important in that these formulations or criteria are directly tied to the last phase which in turn 
dictates the success of the investment. The more explicit and the more measurable the 
formulations or criteria, the more easily investment decision makers can determine the success 
or failure of the decision. 
It is commonly believed (Pike, 1983; Northcott, 1995) that it remains nearly impossible or 
normally costly to obtain the information required for a full investment definition. For instance, 
the definition may need varying expertise of technical staff as well as marketing information 
before an investment can eventually take a workable shape and form. In this sense, the definition 
phase itself needs to be purposefully 
disciplined, to be corporately' planned, to be perhaps 
executed by a small host of people playing the role of 
investment initiators, and to be 
continuously measured by assessments against certain established criteria. This cyclical process 
embodying goal, plan, ` execution, and measure 
leads to further investigation and further 
definition so that the feasibility of investment can be convinced to colleagues before further 
resources are committed. The goal, plan, execution, and measure may 
have to be re-addressed or 
re-start anew in the process of 
definition in that some options may have been consciously or 
unconsciously but prematurely exercised simply 
due to the established goal and plan. In short, 
the more commitment an investment achieves at this phase, the more likely it is to be eventually 
realized; the more explicit and quantifiable the 
definition is, the more likely it is to be ultimately 
approved. " 
Industrial evidence suggests that investment initiators remain an economic vehicle for defining 
investment prior to the search for alternatives. Limited research evidence shows that, in practice, 
investing organisations have employed standardized documentation and procedures (e. g. Pike, 
12-29 
Chapter 12 On Investment And Investment Decision-making 
1983) and central management committees as the formal organizational structure (Gitman and 
Forrester, 1977), although the delegation of much of authority, such as spending limits, has been 
assigned to different hierarchical levels (Scapens and Sale, 1981). 
(C) Search for possible investments: the search for possible investments refers to the 
development of alternatives from which firms can choose and further exploit. This involves the 
search for both the alternatives and the information about the alternatives, although it remains 
neither feasible nor desirable to conduct a full-scale evaluation of each investment ideas. The 
search can be formal by taking the form of market surveys, or informal by taking the form of 
telephone calls for advice, addressing fundamental questions about investment viability. 
However, the search needs to fall in line with the definition of workable investments. Thus, 
commitment towards the search for alternatives needs to be purposefully focused and this can be 
done by roughly sticking to the goal (i. e. the definition of workable investments), planning 
screening activities, effectively conducting the investigations, and measuring them against the 
previously set criteria (i. e. the definition). Although the generation of investment alternatives 
can be more `emergent' than `deliberate' (Mintzberg and Waters, 1995), preparedness can lead 
to the proliferation of `normal' (if not `revolutionary') investment alternatives. 
(D) Choice for promising investment(s): the choice for progressive investment refers to the 
most rigorous assessment of investment alternatives in the feasible set from which the choice 
investment can be hierarchically authorised to enable further and massive corporate commitment. 
This phase involves evaluation of alternatives, analysis of risks on outcomes (e. g. acceptance, 
rejection, and request for further information), and the selection among available alternatives 
(e. g. one, two, or more preferences). 
Seemingly, the making of choice requires more cyclical commitment involving goal, plan, 
execution, and measure. For instance, besides information (e. g. in terms of cash flow), firms 
need quantifiable goals such as the criteria for investment so that more meaningful evaluation 
can be conducted. Firms also need to determine, via planning, which evaluation models 
(sophisticated or simpler) to use. A number of preferences need to be selected accordingly. The 
risks involved in each outcome need to be appropriately measured. 
In addition, the cyclical process of making a choice from a number of alternatives becomes even 
more vital in that the investment appraisers can face a series of dilemmas which include: (a) 
there are two or more equally good investment alternatives, (b) no prompt investment alternative 
looks truly promising, (c) no investment alternative has offered enough positive results (societal) 
to offset expected negative effects (e. g. environmental), (d) many investment alternatives are 
perceived as being acceptable according to the pre-set criteria, (e) there is a better investment 
alternative but it is based upon a set of performance criteria which seems to be obsolete and 
requires refinement, and (f) there 
is not a convincingly good investment alternative but the 
assumptions on which the conclusion is drawn also seems shaky. These dilemmas can easily 
lead to a waste of resources or missed opportunities if there is not an effective control 
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mechanism covering goal, plan, execution, and measure to guide, co-ordinate, and monitor the 
practice. For instance, the investment appraiser can intentionally or unintentionally choose a 
personally favourable alternative when encountering many acceptable alternatives, and this 
gives rise to the need to measure (or evaluate) the evaluation. 
To evaluate investment alternatives demands the use of particular investment appraisal methods 
which include financial appraisal techniques (e. g. payback, average accounting rate of return, 
internal rate of return, and net present value, options theory), risk analysis techniques (e. g. 
sensitivity analysis, analysis under different assumptions, reduced payback periods, increased 
hurdle, rates, probability analysis, beta analysis) and management science techniques (e. g. 
mathematical programming, computer simulation, decision theory, and critical path analysis). 
Recent research evidence has ° shown that practitioners prefer to employ a combination of 
sophisticated or naive appraisal methods (e. g. Pike, 1988), although some naive methods such as 
payback remain the most popular for smaller firms (e. g. Scott et al, 1972), while the discounted 
cash flow (DCF) techniques consisting of the internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value 
(NPV) have become standard techniques for the large firms (e. g. McIntyre and Coulthurst, 
1986). 56 There is also evidence (Pike, 1988) showing that, although the techniques being used 
vary considerably from investment to investment, assessing the risks involved in making 
investment decisions, becomes increasingly popular, with the testing of the sensitivity of critical 
investment outcomes and underlying business assumptions being the most popular. 
(E) Authorization of the chosen investment(s): the authorization of the chosen investment(s) 
refers to the approval of the chosen investment(s) so that massive commitment in coordination 
with organizational objectives can be geared up to the implementation of the chosen 
investment(s). Industrial evidence shows that in many cases the final decision on an investment 
(especially if it is organizationally significant) is made at much higher hierarchical levels in the 
organization, 
" and the process of approval is usually politically economic. In fact, there are 
relatively very few 
investments in modern organisations which receive rejection at the final 
approval stage, partly because the rejection may 
imply a lack of confidence in junior managers' 
decision-making judgement (King, 1975), and partly because more and more top management 
are seen involved in the earlier 
if not the whole stages of the investment decision-making 
process (Marsh et al, 1988). 
Seemingly, it becomes necessary for an organization to have a control mechanism to guide and 
monitor the exercise of investment approval at 
higher hierarchical levels. For instance, it can be 
plausible if the organization 
has a set of explicit criteria as well as planned quantifiable methods 
for evaluating investment decisions made at the final stage, by, say, publicizing the process of 
the final approval or evaluating decision-making in reference to the specific context based upon 
which the decision is approved. 
(F) Implementation of the decided investment(s): the implementation of the decided 
investment(s) refers to carrying out the investment decision so that the investment(s) can be 
monitored towards success. 
Since carrying out the investment decision can be as complicated as 
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making the decision, organisations in pursuit of successful implementation of an investment 
need to look beyond the quality of the investment decision. That is, managerial behaviour starts 
to play a significant role in the investment decision-making at this phase, prior to which the 
investment decision-making process has been mainly based upon information and ideas. In fact, 
only through implementation, with the organization deploying and developing both capital , 
physical and human assets, does the investment decision become a part of the organization's 
operations. 
Seemingly, successful implementation demands an appropriate control mechanism. This also 
accents the conservatism literature on capital budgeting which frequently assumes that control 
occurs after an investment is eventually selected (e. g. Wright,; 1964). It is argued that investing 
organisations need to design certain control mechanisms, which correspond to what Scapen et al 
(1982) call pre-decision controls, to influence managerial behaviour. This involves setting goals 
for the investment-related staff, planning authorization levels and procedures to be followed 
during the implementation, conducting specific tasks such as obtaining quotations for 
equipment or construction requirements to achieve the goals, and measuring both the financial 
and physical activities undertaken to ensure task performance (e. g. how much has been spent). 
In addition, the information generated via this control mechanism by means of checking actual 
spending against budgets or benchmark performance against pre-set criteria, can actually help 
signal the need for reviewing the investment or identify problems emerging during the 
implementation phase while there is still time to make improvement. 
(G) Monitoring the ongoing investment(s): monitoring the ongoing investment(s) refers to 
post completion audit58 in order that improvements on the on-going investment(s) can be made 
to ensure the success of the investments and of the organization. By nature, post completion 
audit pertains to what Scapens et al (1982) call `post-decision' controls. To monitor an 
investment is to assess the effects of the decision against the performance criteria as well as 
looking for problems which need immediate or remote solutions. This is often done by 
measuring the progress of the investment after, say, a year's operation, and comparing them 
with the performance criteria, say, the 
forecast made at the time of authorization. 
In essence, monitoring remains an otherwise impossible means for either correcting ineffective 
decisions or promoting effective decisions, by continually comparing the performance which is 
being achieved with the pre-set performance. It has been argued (Horngren and Foster, 1987) 
that monitoring (especially post audit) enjoys a number of potential desirabilities which include: 
(a) a clearer picture about realized spending and specifications vis-ä-vis the plan as approved, 
(b) increased likelihood that capital-spending requests are sharply conceived and fairly 
estimated, and (c) improved 
budgetary estimation on future investments. 
Seemingly, to conduct an effective post audit; organisations need to have explicit goals (e. g. 
performance criteria), workable plans 
(e. g. resources and methods), efficient executions (e. g. 
collecting information) and effective measurement (e. g. continuous comparison between 
achieved and predicted performance). A typical post completion audit review should address 
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those influential aspects of an investment which are particularly sensitive or critical to the 
success of the investment and of the organization as a whole (Klammer, 1972). For example, 
research evidence (e. g. Pike, 1983) suggests that major justifications for the use of post 
completion audit include managers' desire both to learn from the investment experience in the 
hope of improving the quality of future decisions and to ensure accountability in an attempt to 
deter over-optimistic forecasts. 
In practice, however, due to its time-consuming and costly nature, post completion audit is not 
widespread in all countries, nor does it prevail in all organisations within a country in which it 
remains comparatively most popular, nor is' it being employed for all investments in an 
organization which does favour it. In fact, research evidence suggests that post audited are those 
investments which require the greatest expenditure or remain most risky or strategically 
important (e. g. Pike, 1983; Northcott, 1995; Scapens, and Sale, 1981), although the use of post 
completion audits does not seem related to firm size (Pike, 1983). 59 Furthermore, since 
monitoring occurs after the investment has run a significant part of its life, many firms have 
been reported as refusing to use post-decision control methods such as post audit due to their 
operational difficulties (Scapens and Sales, 1981: Pike and Neale, 1992). 
60 
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(II) Improvement on investments and investment decision-making: improvement on 
investments and investment decision-making refers to the betterment of an organisations' 
investment decision-making, and this betterment can have four meanings: (a) the pursuit of 
continuous improvement if past decisions are proved to be effective, (b) a provision of 
corrective actions if past decisions are proved ineffective, (c) conducting further analyses if the 
current review has not shown a clear picture, and (d) encouraging organizational learning in 
terms of knowledge creation and accumulation. This shows that the investment decision-making 
process will probably repeat 
its later phases by assessing and improving past decisions, or 
simply restart again from the very 
beginning by identifying new opportunities and new threats 
and analysing new strengths and weaknesses. 
However, this has to be assisted with modified or 
new control mechanisms which are purposely goal oriented, methodically scheduled, skilfully 
executed, and accordingly measured. 
In actuality, however, the phases of the intermediate investment decision-making process (i. e. 
identification, definition, search, choice, authorization, implementation, monitoring, and 
improvement), can be performed by different people throughout the organization. They may 
overlap and iteration between phases can occur 
frequently. Nonetheless, the intermediate 
decision-making process should aim to enhance the effectiveness of investment decision-making, 
viz., the effectiveness of the present 
investments as well as the effectiveness of future 
investments. 
12.4.3 The micro process of investment decision-making: a performance orientation 
There are four identifiable elements which jointly form a cyclical as well as interdependent 
micro process which itself functions as a control mechanism (Figure 12-10): (A) goal, (B) plan, 
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(C) execution, and (D) measure. This micro process is relatively short-term focused in that it, 
by means of means-ends schema, sharply focuses on investment decision makers' performance 
and responsibility". It is normally concerned with operational issues and is usually dominated 
by some explicit rationality (e. g. economical, methodological, operational, or strategic). All in 
all, it is a process with the concept of control as the main thread linking the four interdependent 
elements to a control mechanism. 
However, this micro process can be very dynamic, although its time frame can be relatively 
much shorter than other processes and its space frame can be relatively much smaller than other 
processes: for example, all four sub-elements can be executed almost simultaneously and 
possibly, by an individual or a small interest group. The process can unfold linearly or to be 
restarted at any earlier phase; it can completely repeat or restart itself due to its cyclical nature; it 
can even stop at one phase for an extended time and restart later on; it can, broadly speaking, 
move backwards through the control mechanisms (such as management information systems), 
or, otherwise, it normally follows a logical sequence as shown in Figure 12-10: 
Figure 12-10: The micro process of investment decision-making: a performance orientation 
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Goal refers to an explicit and overwhelming set of specific tasks for' the investment decision 
makers to achieve, the attainment of which will satisfy the major motives of the activities 
associated with the specific task. 
Such goals like quality, quantity and time, stand for the 
acceptable and measurable performance, normally associated with responsibilities, the zone of 
which can be represented 
by a finite space bounded by a series of conflicting rationalities or by a 
series of intersecting contextual planes. 
Therefore, goals in this context are an input to the 
control mechanism as well as an output of the planning process 
in that they represent the 
standards of performance 
for comparison with actual results. It has to be measurable, realistic, 
and explicit, or otherwise, the comparison of 
desired and actual performance can be problematic, 
improbable, or ambiguous. 
Plan refers to the planning of the decision: its elements, its sub-process, its output, and the 
control mechanisms which warrants 
its success. In practice, it may unnecessarily be separable 
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from the control mechanism (Anthony and Dearden (1980). It is normally based upon an 
assessment of the present, expectations of the future, and reflections of the past. It remains a 
necessary extension of the goals and a useful guideline for the execution of the task. In essence, 
it reflects an explicit, compromised balance between conflicting rationalities concerning the 
ends and the means of the specific task. This plan, as its short term nature dictates, remains a 
participative activity which requires investment decision makers' direct involvement. Since it 
consequently leads to its execution and the measurement of the execution, it inevitably requires 
that such a plan must be designed to facilitate effective judgement by the investment decision- 
makers. 
Execution refers to the carrying out of the established plan. It demands both psychological and 
political commitment. It requires a powerful structure and efficient problem solving techniques 
as well as being contextually rational and focused. It also needs a large degree of flexibility so 
that investment decision makers can effectively cope with change. For example, investment 
decision makers may need to establish a power plus responsibility centre so as to sharpen a large 
number of relevant variables into a very limited number as well as imposing rational 
assumptions on the operating procedures during the execution. To carry out the task some 
contextual rationality (e. g. profitability or market standing) may overpower the operation 
temporarily. The sharp focus on the task may require the means-ends (or, sometimes, the hill- 
climbing, but, certainly not the random trial and error) technique to enable the investment 
decision makers to discipline themselves in order to ultimately achieve the goal. 
Measure refers to assessing the task performance against its pre-set criteria vis-ä-vis both the 
outcomes and the processes of the 
investment decision so that actions can be accordingly taken 
either to correct the deviation where the actual deviates from the standard or to repeat the 
process indefinitely. First, it 
involves why this task in terms of decision choices in association 
with their possible decision outcomes 
(e. g. Cl, C2, EI, E2, see Figure 1-1-2); industrial 
experience tells that most 
investment decisions are `programmed' in a way that performance is 
measured as it is and that the 
link between performance and responsibility is often 'tunnelled"'. 
Second, it involves what to measure in terms of decision-making responsibility such as profit 
and growth, the quantification 
(e. g. in terms of probability) of which may seem preferable. 
Third, it involves by which to measure in terms of standards of performance which are pre- 
established in previous stages. 
Fourth, it involves how, when, and by whom to measure in terms 
of what evaluation mechanisms 
(e. g. post completion audit, self-assessment, self-criticism, or 
periodic review) are to 
be used. Fifth, it involves what to do next in terms of post-measure 
actions so that the continuation of 
investment decision-making activities can be ensured toward 
the achievement of the decision goals. 
The control mechanism refer to designs which put all elements of the decision-making process 
together in order to monitor functional performance in a co-ordinate way as well as to 
effectively achieve what 
is desired. Such a mechanism assumes that investment related activities 
are controllable: goals can 
be identified and pre-set as well as incorporated into plans which are 
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then implemented and measured; the comparison between the actual and the desired results 
helps facilitate (a) further planning by means of feedforward which leads to the amendment of 
plans in the light of experience, (b) further participation by means of feedback which leads to 
reaction, or (c) both further planning and further participation by means of what this researcher 
calls feedinward which leads to learning in terms of memory, which refers to the total 
accumulation of prior learning experiences, and consists of two interrelated components: (a) 
short-term or working memory and (b) long-term memory. 
Feedinward refers to the flow of information which is made memorable by storing it in a 
retrievable memory `chip' so that organizational learning is fostered whenever the memory is 
needed. Seemly, feedinword accents organizations' long term memory featured by an unlimited, 
permanent storage which stores numerous types of information such as processes, decision rules, 
concepts, affective states, participants, decision alternatives, and so forth. The use of the long 
term memory can be much plausible for investment decision makers to improve the 
effectiveness of their decisions. For instance, schematic memory, which is the stored 
representations of the organizations' generalized knowledge about what the business individuals 
or groups are doing can help organizations avoid mistakes similar to those they had made before, 
perhaps, under previous leadership, structure, and norms; episodic memory, which depicts an 
action sequence, can help facilitate investment decision makers to make more efficient decisions. 
It is not surprising that in practice many organizations do not have this kind of mechanism to 
memorize their valuable information. What they normally do 
is to acquire the information 
acquired at a specific stage of the decision-making process and then make short term use of 
it 
via feedback or feedforward but keep no 
long term memory of it. Feedforward and feedback 
remain, in essence, a form of what this researcher calls 
feedoutward in that the flow of 
information becomes chronically diffused and remains only temporarily usable but permanently 
irretrievable. Feedoutward accents short term memory which is currently exploitable but needs 
to be processed by means of maintenance rehearsal or elaborative activities so that it can be 
transferred to long term memory. It seems evidential that most organizations make less effort to 
facilitate continual repetition of a piece of information in order to hold it for current use in 
decision-making or transfer it to long-term memory63, nor do they employ previously stored 
investment - decision - specific experiences, values, attitudes, 
beliefs, feelings and the like to 
interpret and evaluate information in working memory as well as to redefine or add new 
elements to memory. 
Apparently, memory is necessary for organizational learning in that without memory learning 
can be either impossible or meaningless, although memory per se 
is not sufficient for 
organizational learning 
in that memory remains merely a stock of data, and cannot facilitate 
learning without, inter alia, the processing of the data, a framework to be used to process the 
data, and an operator / user. Therefore, it appears very beneficial for organizations to have some 
mechanisms which enable them to strengthen the memorization of their valuable information. 
Table 12-1 provides such a control mechanism in the form of a decision file which is designed 
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to facilitates both feedoutward and feedinward control. It aims to incorporate both the decision 
outcomes (the chosen course as compared to its alternatives) and the decision process so as to 
foster organizational learning by making retrievable the memory of useful information 
concerning all decision components and their parameters. The retrievable decision file should 
contain at least the following information '(words in italic are sample answers provided by this 
researcher). ` 
Table 12-1: A sample retrievable investment decision file 
0 Decision situation Descriptions 
0.1 Decision name FDI in China. 
0.2 Decision type Strategic investment, overseas operations, expectations as major determinant, originally driven by internalization 
and invested or options. 
0.3 Decision date 1 January 1997. 
0.4 Decision background medium sized, industrial products specialized in telecommunication, strategic standing huge market potential, 
growing indigenous competition, governmental protection. Similar investment into Thailand seems potentially 
profitable. The existing project in China has been operated for a few years. It suffered losses due to local 
economic recession. Research reveals that economy is booming and an expansion is proposed to increase 
productivity. 
0.5 Decision situation involving choice To decide whether to withdraw, allocate more resources, or to play a waiting game, given that the pioneering 
operation has been suffering losses in the last five years. 
I Goal Descriptions 
1.1 Current situation Choices Continuation Withdrawal Waiting game 
1.1.1 Discussion Argument for Now-never competition, Negative NPV, to invest in Environment might 
options Thailand change 
1 . 
1.2 Argument against Bigger loss Publicity Lost initiative 
1.1.3 A regiment Voted to continue 50% (byA, BCDE) 20% (by F, G 30% (by H, I, J 
1.2 Goal no. I Market share - 20% by the year o f2000, (Break even at 2005, a net profit o f210m by 20/0 
1.2.1 (Associated ideals) Plenty 
1.2.2 Associated objectives) Innovation, market standin in Asia, understanding business in China 
1.2.3 Possible outcomes Unsuccessful continuation Successful continuation Cl Error of omission El Successful 
E2 (Thai project) withdrawal C2 
1.2.4 Expected consequences - 20% x f10m 40% xf 220m - 20%x f150m 20% x 80% xf 150- 
20% x f20m 
1.2.5 Available information 90% 90% 60% 70% 
1.2.6 Information still needed Local bankruptcy policies Indigenous product Thailands new taxation Other competitors' 
distribution channels policy performance in PRC 
2 Plan Descriptions 
2,1 Critical assumptions for expected 1, China is to double its demand for telecommunication equipment; 2, China enjoys lower labour costs: 3, 
conse uences indigenous arms are technically incapable of roducin high-end roducts in the next 7 years. 
2.2 Critical assumptions for dumping 1. Thailand's economy is less stable than the Chinese: 2, Indigenous competition is intensive in Thailand; 3, The 
Thai inject Thailand project won't lead to a prominent market standing in Asia as big as will the Chinese one. 
2,3 Who votes or anti-votes the Mr G and Mr Fsupport the Thailand project; 
Ms D, Ms B, Mr C DrA, and Dr H anti-vote the Thailand project; 
Thailand ro'ect? Miss J and Dr I want the committee to hold the option until next year. 
2,4 By when 2.2 and 2.2.4 can be 2002 
2000/2005/2010 2005 2010 
expected? 
2,5 
, Investment criteria Total loss > f7m by 2000 Market share >- 20% by Market share >- 40% A net profit off 12Sm 
2000, 
3 Execution Descriptions 
3.1 When to finish the implementation? By the end of/ 998. 
3,2 Who is responsible for the DrA and Ms D 
implementation" 
_ 
3,3 Who are taking part in the project? International business division, Marketing division, Operation division, plus a special working committee chaired 
by Mr K. 
.4 
Who is responsible for major Ms is going to be in full charge when it is implemented, and is responsible for the market share and profitability 
decisions? 
4 Measure Descriptions 
4,1 What to monitor? Job satisfaction, goal attainment, implementation, cost incurred as compared to standards, and business 
assumptions. 
4,2 Who takes part in monitoring A group o outsider consultants led by rou chie accountant. Auditing results report to Ms D 
4.3 When to monitor? Auditing quarterly 
before implementation and annually after implementation 
4,4 Whom to notify in case of deviation 
Small deviation is reported to Ms D; large deviation is reported to Dr A. and significant deviation is reported to 
' HQ decision committee. 
7.5 After monitoring adjustments or In April, Mr L suggested In July, Miss M and Mr N In the beginning of the second year, a post 
corrective actions being proposed, that construction materials proposed that strategic completion audit conducted by Mr R revealed that 
accepted, or implemented 
by be substituted by local alliances with raw the total expenditure has far exceeded the 
whom? materials 
in order to cut material suppliers in anticipated figure and suggested that inventory be 
costs Northern China be kept at the lowest level. It was reported to Ms D 
The proposal was denied by established. It was and Dr A. Ms D disagreed and tried to fasten the 
Ms D in the fear of delaying approved by Dr A and production in order to produce more and sell more. 
implementation. implemented by Miss M. The l1Q approved Ms D's plan. 
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In summary, the three processes of investment decision-making are simultaneously supporting 
one another. The phases of identification, definition, and search in the intermediate process 
functionally mirror the CONCEPTUALIZATION stage in the macro process; the phases of search, 
choice, and authorisation in the intermediate process functionally mirror the OPERATIONALIZATION 
stage in the macro process; the phases of authorization, implementation and monitoring in the 
intermediate process functionally mirror the ACTUALIZATION stage in the macro process; the phases 
of monitoring, improvement, and identification in the intermediate process functionally mirror 
the IDEALIZATION stage in the macro process. Each stage in the intermediate process contains one 
micro process which features goal, plan, execution, and measure. The micro process reflects 
the essence of the macro process in decomposing the task into identifiable parts. However, the 
three processes enjoy differing focuses. The macro process emphasizes ideal pursuit, it admits 
variances, it favours borderless cooperation, it advocates organizational progress, and it holds no 
discrimination against any sciences. The immediate process emphasizes objective attainment, it 
tolerates mistakes, it encourages divisional development, it supports organizational coordination, 
and it aims at maximum knowledge accumulation. The micro process emphasizes short term 
goal achievement, it encourages corrective actions, it favours tight control mechanisms 
throughout all managerial functions, it highlights business unit performance, and it aims at 
desirable outcomes. 
12.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
Explorations of investment and investment decision-making lead to the conclusion that practices 
of, or research into, investment decision-making needs not only to address questions in relation 
to not only the inputs, the outputs, and the process of an investment decision (Figure 12-1), but 
also to explore the relationships between the inputs, outputs, and the process of the decision 
(Figure 12-2). It is compelling that practice- or research- related investigation into the 
investment decision-making process should reflect what investment decision makers are actually 
doing, but it remains more plausible to compare what they are actually doing with what they 
ought to do so as to provide a more meaningful measurement and more constructive findings. 
To realize this, an integrated investment decision model (Figure 12-5) is developed involving 
three purposive decision-making processes (Figure 12-6; Figure 12-7) - i. e. progress orientation 
in terms of ideal pursuit (Figure 12-8), development orientation in terms of knowledge 
accumulation (Figure 12-9), and performance orientation 
in terms of goal attainment (Figure 12- 
10). A sample decision file (Table 12-1) is also developed to facilitate organizational learning in 
practice or shed lights on research 
into the control perspective of investment decisions. 
In addition, the above explorations have also discussed in detail some of the most important 
aspects regarding investment 
decision-making, and among the most plausible, operation- or 
research-directional considerations are: 
Q12-t. Does the investment decision to be studied fall into any of the following categories 
concerning both the determinants of investment and the type of investment? 
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Table 12-2: The nature of investment 
Expansion Replacement Substitution Strategic considerations 
Revenues 
Costs 
Expectations 
Q12-2. What are the major motives underlying the investment decision to be studied, and do 
they pertain to any of the existing investment theories as depicted as follows? If not, 
what else emerges as the most prominent? 
Table 12-3: The motives of investment 
Marginal Acceleratio Institutional and Residual Diversifi Options Agency Cross-boundary 
theory n theory empirical generations funds cation theory theory dimensions 
Q12-3. Which decision-making elements remain most critical in practice? How do investment 
decision makers perceive decision-making elements (or decision components and their 
parameters)? How are these decision-making elements actually judged and measured? 
Table 12-4: Investment decision-making elements 
Decision component individuals Choice environment The available courses of action Possible outcomes 
Decision parameters I The efficiency of an 
action 
Probability of choice 
of action 
The relative value of outcomes The probability of 
outcomes 
Q12-4. What remains the most critical characteristics which distinguish organizational decision- 
making from individual or group decision-making? Which characteristics are more 
related to the research or the operations? 
Table 12-5: Characteristics of organizational decision-making 
More Longitudinal Heuristic Focus on Request for More sense More Hierarchica 
ambiguity context methods incentives commitment making conflicts I relations 
Q12-5. Which decision-making process' best matches what was actually followed in the 
investment decision-making process to be studied? Are there any cultural differences in 
selecting investment decision-making processes? 
Q12-6. Which sub-contexts can be more indicative relating to the study of investment decision- 
making in the full organizational context? Which sub-contexts have emerged as the most 
critical sub-contexts in the investment decision-making process to be studied? 
Table 12-7: The organizational decision-making contexts 
Major sub- Contents Emergent 
context (sonne examples) sub-context 
Phenomeno Market Uncertai Politics Market Relationship Relationship Technical Political? 
logical growth rates my competition with with progress 
customers suppliers 
Physical Market Time HRM Economics Finance Technology Expertise Economic? 
structure 
Psychologi Standard of Values Cultures Perceptions Self-urterests Criteria for Relationship Perceptional? 
cal performance performance with associates 
operational Marketing Staff Choice Strategy Procedures Obsolete Assets Strategic? 
tactics technology 
Q12-7. Do organizations have hierarchical levels of ends associated with investment decision- 
making? What kinds of sub-ideals, objectives, and goals were/ are they pursuing? 
Table 12-8: Hierarchical levels of ends associated with investment decision-making 
Contents (some examples) 
Ideals PLENTY/ HOMONOMY GOOD / IIUMANITY BEAUTY TRUTH NURTURANCL 
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Objectives Profitability Responsibility Productivity Resources 
Goals Time Task performance Quality Quantity 
Q12-8. How useful is the integrated decision-making process in making investment decisions? 
What are its strengths and weaknesses from the practical point of view? 
Q12-9. Are idealization, knowledge accumulation and goal attainment all perceived as 
important in the organizational context? If so, how are decision-makers actually dealing 
with them? If not, what is the deviation, and why? 
Q12-1o. Have investment decision makers felt that they were/are encountering continuous 
conflicts between actualization and idealization when making investment decisions? 
How do they deal with them? And what should they do? Do they go through a process 
composed of a series of identifiable steps? 
Q12-lt t. Does investment decision-making contribute to knowledge accumulation? How do 
investment decision makers actually deal with it? And what should they do? Do they 
follow a process which is essentially similar to the 8 step procedure in their pursuit of 
organizational development? 
Q12-12. Do organizational investment decision makers have a performance orientation? How do 
they actually deal with it? And what do they feel that they ought to do? Do they follow 
any specific control mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of investment decisions? 
Q12-13. How do practitioners perceive control mechanisms in the investment decision-making 
process? Do investing organizations have feedinward control mechanism to facilitate 
organizational learning? 
Q12-I4. Do organizations have long term memory of their investment decisions? If yes, how do 
they actually deal with it, and how effective it is? If no, what do they think they ought to 
do? 
Q12-15. Do they have any investment decision files, or the like, which can be retrieved when 
they are needed? If so, do the files cover all important aspects of an investment decision? 
1 Source: The Economist, October 14th, 1995. 
2 Strictly speaking, these four types of investment can also be applied to the other categories of investments (i. e. residential housing and changes 
in inventory)- 
3 However, Shackle (1949) denies the possibility of assigning probabilities in that the uniqueness of the typical entrepreneurial decisions and 
hence the inapplicability of probability theory. Instead, Shackle (1949) views utility as a function of 'potential surprise' which in turn is a 
function of various outcomes, an unfavourable and a favourable outcome evoking the greatest surprise. 
4 For example, the profit-maximization theories involve a few assumed conditions about the investment milieu which can immediately 
determine the usefulness of the theories. Among them are (Meyer and Kuh, 1959): (a) all future product or factor prices as well as outputs are 
known so that future revenues accruing to a particular investment are known, (b) current costs are known once investment takes place all at once, 
or future costs are known when outlays are incurred over a period of 
time, (c) technology is consistent, and (d) the supply of funds remains 
either unlimited at the going rate of 
interest or at least reflected in a certain known way by the interest rate structure. 
5 This can be justified by, say, the disadvantages arising 
from extending a firm's external debt position, the difficulties in obtaining outside 
finance due to institutional adjustments or historical events, the hierarchical obstacles from the corporate management due to the risk inherent 
with outside financing. For example, the 
increased professionalization of corporate management as well as the greater divorce of ownership and 
control increases the tendency 
for investment decision-makers to eschew debt financing of risky or even remotely risky ventures (Gordon, 1945). 
6 Consider relative market shares as a form of oligopoly behaviour, one can prove that individual firm profit maximization does not accord with 
the group-oriented behaviour of 
joint prof it maximization or maintenance of relative market shares when a stable market situation is upset by 
some mavericks or in an 
industry which is young, dynamic, and/or without a stable market pattern. 
7 For example, the residual funds theory echoes that technological relationship, which 
is central to the acceleration principle, articulates the 
long-term objectives of investment policy. It admits that considerations of financial conservatism, which is central to the motivational patterns 
emerging in an economy the control and ownership 
of which are separated, to a great extent determine the timing as well as the short-run 
patterns by which the long run objectives are attained. 
It also agrees with the institutional and empirical generalizations that prof it motive, which 
is tightly linked to the long run retention of market share and 
trade position in a world of oligopolistic markets, maintains the principal 
wellspring of investment 
decisions. 
8 Large technical alternations such as innovation the effect of which is to only reduce cost can call for outside funds, but the outsourcing can be 
largely influenced by the size of the 
demand shift plus the rate at which the shift continues (viz., the larger the size, the higher the marginal 
efficiency of capital, the more 
likely a firm is to seek outside funds to finance the most profitable investment), by the market structure (viz., the 
more competitive the market, 
the greater the freedom of entry, the higher the speed a firm needs to work at in order to make long-run 
adjustments), and by the capital 
intensity (viz., current asset requirements can also influence outside capital fund requirement as can be seen in 
most high technology manufacturing 
firms as opposed to most traditional textile firms). 
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9 For instance, consider the cost and price relationship for investment, economists will agree that, an increase in demand can push firms beyond 
the minimum cost capacity point and induce them to expand so as to operate again in the minimum average variable cost range and consequently 
encourage those with a long term view to act roughly in conformance with accelerator postulated behaviour, viz., that the maintenance of a 
reasonably stable capital output ration becomes the most profitable long term behaviour, particularly in oligopolistic markets. Managerial 
economists will agree that the converse of the above also hold true in that the short run superiority of profits (rather than accelerator variables) is 
necessitated by the relative flexibility of cash requirements for other major demands for funds, inventories and dividends. Corporate financial 
controllers will comprehend well the importance of long term external funds especially when they have experienced the lagged reaction in 
supply of funds from capital markets and the tight corporate demand for funds, because access to the capital markets is frequently sought on 
occasion, at irregular intervals and during prosperous periods; however the access can be largely affected by, Inter alia, the extent of lucrative 
opportunities foregone by not borrowing, the strength of the internal equity position which a firm has achieved through the retention of earnings, 
administrative procedures, the significance of the action, the regulation on the period of time required to float a security issue, and the 
availability of credit sources. 
10 Technically speaking, the risk of the portfolio which is measured by its standard deviation of returns remains less than the weighted average 
risk of the individual constituent investments, although the expected return of the investment portfolio is simply a weighted average of the 
expected returns on the individual investments which go to make up the portfolio (Lumby, 1991). 
11 For example, investment in R&D can lead to patents or yield information and thereby stake out competitive positions or reduce uncertainty. 
12 According to Dixit and Pindyck (1995), for example, investment decisions which enhance a firm's flexibility by creating and preserving 
options such as R&D and test marketing should be valued more than a naive calculation of NPV; and choices which reduce flexibility by 
exercising options and committing resources to irreversible uses such as the construction of specific plants need to be valued less than their 
conventional NPV. 
13 Subject to the length requirement, only theories explaining foreign direct investment are included here. However, there are also others forms 
of investment such as joint ventures which are both theoretically and practically important. 
14 The essence of FDI, which can involve three distinctive types (Grimwade, 1989), namely, horizontal FDI, vertical FDI, and conglomerate 
FDI, is that it is a package of capital, technology and managerial skills (Francks 1982). FDI has been defined as the class of capital movements 
which aims mainly at the control over management and profits of the enterprise abroad (Kojima 1978). 
15 For example, Caves (1971) argues that newest products tend to be oligopolistic in their nature of product differentiation, and the development, 
refinement and sale of underground resources such as oil are suited to vertical integrating, which strengthens the oligopoly. 
16 To demonstrate, new products created in UK first enjoy a monopolistic position; exports increase when mass production is introduced and 
the cost reduced; but threats to this export position, including tariffs & import quotas, arise and export decrease; thus direct foreign investment 
made before the mature stage is a monopolistic defense of the market. 
17 In this theory (MacDougall-Kemp, 1964), the law of diminishing marginal productivity is assumed for capital, also assumed are a world 
composed of an investing country and a host country, and that within each country perfect competition prevails and the price of capital is 
determined equal to the marginal productivity of capital. 
18 However, for the host country direct foreign investment works as a double-edged knife: it may destroy domestic capital by superior 
technology and managerial skills on the one hand, or it may exert spillover effects on the other. It will be received, therefore, with Ambivalence. 
19 Caves (1971,1982) defines a specific factor as 'the factor of production which does not move to other industries', and maintains that 
managerial resources (a bundle of capital, technology and managenal skills, etc. 
) are a factor specific to the individual industries and cannot 
move between industries but can move not only 
domestically but also internationally within the same industry, in sharp contrast to labour which 
is considered as a general factor that can move freely between industries within the country 
but cannot move abroad. 
20 But between different industries there still remain differences in the rates of profits. 
21 In this case, FDI acts both as a catalyst to trade, and as an arbitrageur for improving the international allocation of economic activity. 
22 According to the theory of internalization, the key ingredients for maintaining a firm-specific competitive advantage are possession of 
proprietary information and control of the 
human capital that can generate new information through expertise in research, management, 
marketing, and technology (Eiteman et al 
1992: 436). 
23 Dunning (1985) argues that explanations of both trade and production can be linked together into a general paradigm which has its basis in 
the disposition of factor endowments and the extent and characteristics of market 
failure'. 
24 The main elements of the Dunning (1972,1988) approach include: 1) there is the need to appreciate that international business involvement 
can take a wide variety of different 
forms; 2) there is the need to appreciate that all these different kinds of transactions take place in different 
kinds of markets; and 3) it follows that any theory of 
international business needs to be able to explain all these different forms of transaction. 
25 For example, Each existing theory on FDI explains typically why FDI exists in a specific firm or industry or country. None of them can fully 
explain all FDIs, although the eclectic paradigm stands out as the most useful and robust general 
framework for explaining and analyzing the 
economic rationale of FDI and many organizational and 
impact issues relating to FDI. 
26 Many of the well established decision models in the domain of management assume a kind of administrative rationality similar to that 
prescribed for the ideal man, who makes choices on 
the basis of (a) a known set of relevant alternatives with corresponding outcomes, (b) an 
established rule or relation which yields an ordering of 
the alternatives, and (c) maximising something such as rewards, income, physical goods 
or some form of utility (Miller and 
Starr, 1960). 
27 For example, evidence suggests that the 'closed' framework in organizational decision-making can be well influenced by decision sub- 
optimization under which 
decision-makers act on the basis of the decision framework and information available to their particular business unit 
in the hierarchy and make decisions which are optimal 
locally and less optimal for the organization as a whole. 
28 Consider role behaviour, for instance, to the extent that it is able to plant a dominating operation, the investing organization is able to control 
and unify the behaviour of participants 
through the role systems provided by the organization's structures in that individual behaviour is 
normally structured by premises reflective of experience and expectations associated with roles 
(Simon, 1957b). 
29 Over the years behavioural decision theory (Kahneman, 1991), the roots of which include Edwards's (1954) studies on probability revision, 
Meehl's (1954) analysis of clinical judgement, Luce and Raiffa's (1957) description of game theory, has produced a remarkable set of findings 
on individual decision-making, albeit 
by neglecting the effects of social and emotional factors (Kahneman, 1991). 
30 Group decision-making has received much attention (e. g. Earley, 1993; Gersick, 1988) since Shaw's (1976) and Janis's (1973) classic studies 
on groups. In general, group 
decision-making 
acceptance 
sof 
the decision, 
such assets with gy the 
jor 
decisions like 
ob satisfaction, 
and 
extensive information and knowledge, (b) (c) ) enhanced understanding, () uPgrad 
personal development, as well as 
having such liabilities like (a) pressure for conformity, (b) dominance of individuals, (c) favoured alternatives, 
(d) winning the argument and 
(e) more time to reach decision (Vroom and Jago, 1988; Champoux, 1996; Maier, 1967; Kelley and Thibaut, 
1969). 
As argued by Butler et al (1993), the garbage-can model accents an 
important notion that organizational decision-making process may not 
follow a sequence of steps beginning with a problem and ending with a solution 
in that problem-identification and problem-solution stages may 
not be connected to each other. 
This disconnection supports that decisions can be resulted from varying independent streams of events within the 
organization (Butler, 1991). 
32 By means of computer simulation, 
Cohen et al (1972) suggest that garbage-can model has demonstrated that solutions can be proposed in 
absence of problems, choices can 
be made without solving problems, problems can persist without being solved, and some problems connecting 
with choices can be solved. 
33 The system, in this sense, can be 
investment decision makers, interest groups, or, preferably, the whole organization. I lowever, in terms of the 
purposive system. For example, while all organizations can possess intrinsic 
functions, different decision-making processes can represent 
different systems: the garbage-can model 
functions like a passive functional, the contingency model mirrors the reactive functional systems, 
rational model can be seen 
in single mechanistic system, and unbounded rational, political or unstructured model can appear more appropriate in 
goal-seeking systems. 
34 The justification of this is similar to that of 
Figure 0-3-1. 
12-41 
Chapter 12 On Investment And Investment Decision-making 
3S For instance, the nature of the investment can be addressed in the light of (a) the specific type of the investment, (b) the dominant 
determinants of investment, and (c) the underlying principle of the investment. 
36 However, pinches includes post audits in the final phase (i. e. control of projects). 
37 Mintzberg et al's (1976) model is derived from a study of 25 strategic decision processes and actually embodies (a) recognition, (b) diagnosis, 
(c) search, (d) design, (e) screen, (f) evaluation/choice, and (g) authorization. It seemly echoes the CSA method (see Table 1-2-2) and remains in 
essence the simplest replication of the Hempelian inquiry system (see Hempel, 1965). 
3$ The 'root' approach approximates the normative model of decision-making, except that decision makers are assumed (Lindblom, 1959) to 
have an extensive knowledge of a range of (instead of all) alternative solutions which are relevant to decision situation. The 'branch' approach 
assumes that decision makers have limited ability to identify and evaluate a wide range of alternatives. 
39 it seemly that Neal and Holmes' 5 phase capital budgeting system largely echoes Bransford and Stein's (1984) IDEAL model (Please see 
Figure 0-2-5) and remains in essence a typical replication of the Hempelian inquiry system (see Hempel, 1965). 
40 Decision makers are believed (Quinn, 1980) to use time to refine his understanding of the proposed development and to gain acceptance for 
the solution due to the lack of information with respect to the precise form and viability of the development and the need to establish political 
acceptance. 
41 Especially Figure 1-I and Figure 1-3 in Chapter 1 and COAL framework in Chapter 6. 
`z For example, findings generated from Chapter 9, Chapter 10, and especially the four-stage-and-eight-component process model of strategic 
control in Chapter 11. 
43 The justification of this can be similar to that of Figure 3-1. 
44 In essence, the experimentalism distinguishes itself from others (i. e. criticism, rationalism and empiricism) by opposing what others claim 
that there are simple truths from which one could develop further truths. It absorbs others' essence to further claim that all knowledge of law 
implies knowledge of fact and vice versa. Thus, it indicates that facts and laws are inextricably intertwined and that truth is not the starting point 
of inquiry but is the end point. 
41To a great extent, ideal-seeking is like an ever-lasting car racing among championship-bidders or an endless economic rivalry among 
competing countries with all contenders seeking for one ultimate goal (i. e. the superior championship title or economic power). From time to 
time, contenders come to a roundabout (Please see Figure 12-6), which is virtually aT -junction for they can never actually go straight forward 
except that they can see the ideals more clearly each time, emulating themselves by turning right or repairing themselves by turning left, each 
with the hope of either being the only one left in the circle, taking the far-reaching lead within the circle, or enjoying the time being. However, 
the focus for the ideal-seekers lies in driving the car or the economy via dominantly looking ahead through the front windscreen while 
cooperatively avoiding tail-clashes, and that for those who become the lower-level-purposefulness-seekers can be driving via looking through 
windscreen but, perhaps even more intentionally, frequently looking at rear mirrors. 
46 Emery (1981) employs homonomy in stead of plenty to accent that improvement of choice depends more on the relating among fellow 
contemporaries (e. g. suppliers, customers, and competitors) than it does on material plenty (e. g. resources). 
47 Emery (1981) argues that the turbulent environments of today have entangled the pursuit of truth in that it remains nearly impossible for 
organizations or individuals to know what the most effective means are, and have much encouraged the maintenance and improvement of the 
global resource pool by means of cultivation so that future generations can make better or ample use of it. 
4s GOOD has been defined as the reduction of conflicts within individuals themselves or within groups (Ackoff and Emery, 1972). Emery 
reformulated the ethicomoral state of the good by suggesting the ideal of humanity in that the ultimate frame of reference must be each 
individual human being. 
1' It has been argued (Ackoff, 1981) that both people and social systems can seek ideals. For example, Ackoff (1981) speaks highly of the 
stakeholder viewpoint of social systems. Furthermore, evidence shows that the ideals of organizations have been expressed in mission statement 
which defines how organizations will relate to their stakeholders and embrace their stakeholders' ideals. However, evidence also shows that the 
pursuit of ideals in organizations can lead to the deification of the organizations and consequently give rise to the exploitation of the deification 
by one or a handful of stakeholders to the detriment of the rest. 
50 However, not all organizations pursue ideals given that it is the most rational way for humanized organizations to live. In fact, to invest is to 
sacrifice consumption and it can 
be great in cost. Since the current society is structured on the basis of zero-sum (i. e. win-lose) competition 
(Mumford, 1971; Kohn, 1986; Walton, 1992), the image of Nietzschian 'Man of Might' still looms large (Singer, 1948), and the same type of 
'will to power' can be sensed anywhere in the world so that any person in any organization whose ambition is such has to stand in direct or 
'indirect' competition with people having the same ambition. This suggests that investment decision makers need to have all the qualities of a 
hero in order to be progressive, and this partly justifies why few organizations attempt to seek ideals and tend to operate at a lower level of 
purposefulness in that to or not to seek 
ideals is largely an individual choice. 
Si These objectives may not necessarily follow any hierarchical order of priority. For example, investment decision-making can be generally 
regarded as profit-maximization orientated, 
but investment decisions can also be directed, as suggested by Dean (1951), at a limited amount of 
profit so as to, inter a/ia, discourage potential competition, restrain the zeal of anti-trusters, and maintain customer good will. 
52 This becomes more visible when capitals, technology, information , labours and the like enjoy free movement. 
53 Most investments and investment activities in modem society won't last for long. Typically, it can be a matter of a few months, a few years, 
to at most a few decades. 
54 For example, Pike and Dobbins (1986) argue that 'the prosperity of a business depends more on its ability to create profitable investment 
opportunities than on its ability to appraise them'. 
55 I lowever, there is also a possibility that over-explicitness and over-quantification can lead to the defying of investment opportunities which 
do not satisfy the established criteria 
but can create more options for future investments or become profitable if market conditions change. 
56 however, there are controversies about the use of non-DCF or DCF techniques. For example, low use of DCF is found in New Zealand 
(Bailes and McNally, 1984); there is a widespread primary use of non-DCF methods in US -based multinational corporations (Bavishi, 1981). 
57 However, there are also cases in which investment decisions have to be consulted with or even approved by higher levels of authorities 
beyond the organization. 
58 In literature, however, post audit and monitoring have been interchangeably discussed (e. g. Scappens and Sale, 1981; Klammer, 1972; Pike, 
1983). 
59 However, it has also been empirically argued (e. g. McIntyre and Coulthurst, 1987) that more medium-sized firms consider post audit 
important than do larger firms. 
60 For example, Pike and Neal (1992) identify several operational difficulties which may explain organizations' initial reluctance to use post 
audit: (a) biased selection, the 
disentanglement problem (due to, say, shared overhead or facilities), (c) prohibitive cost (due to, say, possible 
interference with present management information systems), (d) investments' uniqueness, (e) lack of cooperation, (f) environmental changes, 
and (g) risk aversion among analysts. 
61 Decision-making performance refers to the actions in terms of achievement in relation to how successful they are, possibly being compared 
with past results. Decision-making responsibility refers 
to the requirements from the specific decision situation to which organizations should 
stick when making investment 
decisions. It inevitably relates to organizations' criteria for the investments and shareholders' desires in relation to 
the investments. 
62 For example, in a number of firms this author 
has worked for, investment performance was assessed purely within a frame obsessed by the 
chosen course of action, with 
little attention paid horizontally to other decision alternative which had been rejected. 
63 Although extensive rehearsal does not remain essential for a strong long term memory, it generally strengthens retention in long term memory. 
64 1 lowever, answers can be much longer. Thick description will be acceptable although probability can be much preferred. The contents can be 
bigger and smaller depending on the decision situation. 
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13. On Organizational Commitment 
13.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis aims to extract insights from sense-data to form a paradigmatic 
framework of organizational commitment in investment decision-making in order to provide 
both academics and practitioners in the domain of investments with both awareness and methods 
of commitment management. In terms of structure, this part of the thesis first looks at the nature 
of commitment, then discusses the foundations, conceptualization, development, impact and 
management of organizational commitment, and consequently explores the definition, 
manifestation and dynamics of organizational commitment in the investment decision-making 
context before it finally offers some 20 recommendations for future practice- or research- related 
investigations. 
13.2 The nature of commitment 
Commitment, by definition, generally refers to the state of being willing to give a lot of time, 
work, energy, and the like to something (Homby, 1995). Research into the theme of 
commitment has mushroomed since Whyte's (1956) major treatise on the dangers of over- 
commitment entitled The Organization Man, in which individuals are described as the 
organization men who not only work for the organization, but also belong to it. It has been 
commonly noted that consensus over the definition of commitment does not exist, and, as 
Morrow (1983) points out, there are over 25 commitment-related concepts and measures 
prevalent among commitment related researchers (e. g. Mead, 
1970; Buchanan, 1974; Porter et al, 
1974; Staw, 1976; Gould 1979; Mowday et al, 1982;, Wiener, 1982; Randall, 1987; Ghemawat, 
1991, Meyer and Allen, 1997). ' 
Analytically speaking, the term commitment has been widely used to refer to antecedents (e. g. 
Becker, 1960) and consequences (e. g. Sheldon, 1971) as well as the process (e. g. Staw and Ross, 
1978) of becoming attached and the state of attachment itself (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986), 
although the central theme, underlying numerous 
differences in the approach to commitment 
research in the domain of work organizations, 
lies in individuals' psychological attachment - 
the psychological bond which links individuals and the organizations in which they are staying 
(Salancik, 1977). 
Commitment, by its nature, involves beliefs which may turn out to be true or false (Salancik, 
1977), and the beliefs have a truth which is not only relative to the organization, but also, 
according to the `open' systems theory, external to the organization of 
interest. Individuals could 
not be committed to an organization 
because of their beliefs in something which is only true 
relative to the organization; the only alternative, 
in fact, is to admit that commitment to an 
organization must be regarded as 
`ultimate' in some sense, which, although remaining in 
principle unjustifiable, has become attractive to many 
including the experimentalists. 
Conceivably, commitment enjoys two common distinctive elements: it presupposes certain 
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beliefs and involves a personal dedication to the actions implied by the beliefs (Salancik, 1977). 
Believably, each element can occur without the presence of the other; but it remains necessary 
that, if individuals are truly committed, both elements must be jointly present. For example, 
purely intellectual assent to Marx's doctrine does not make individuals committed Marxists. 
Commitment cannot be `free-floating' like a leaf of duckweed and there must be a propositional 
element lurking behind every commitment. This indicates that individuals can never become just 
`committed', and they must always be committed to some conception of what they are 
committed to - something or somebody. For example, nobody can be a truly committed Marxist 
if he or she believes that Marx was basically mistaken. The fact that somebody commits himself 
or herself to some cause implies that he or she sincerely believes that the cause is good, worth 
supporting or important, viz., there is an `evaluative' element in commitment (Wittgenstein, 
1958). 
Commitment logically entails certain beliefs and preclude certain others (Trig, 1973). This 
implies that individuals must believe in the truth of what they are committed to. Advocates of 
capitalism, for example, if they are committed capitalists, must believe that capitalism is 
desirable and that it remains important and beneficial to have a system to put their view forward. 
Individuals who live in or give support to such a system without really believing that capitalism 
is desirable can hardly be committed capitalists. 
Commitment changes as soon as individuals' beliefs change (Becker, 1960). This indicates that 
individuals' beliefs may play a more important role than reality does in shaping commitment 
and that the nature of commitment functionally relies on. what individuals are committed to. 
People who do not believe in socialism may sincerely repudiate the socialist principles by 
strongly supporting welfare programmes, but they cannot be solidly called committed socialists 
even if, at least for a time, their actions remained indistinguishable from those of genuine 
socialists. 
Commitment could also be declared by what manner individuals have actually behaved in 
because what people do is a more reliable guide than what they say to determine what 
propositions they actually accept (Bartley, 1964). This echoes what economists call "revealed 
performance" and indicates that actions speak louder than words. In this sense, individuals who 
behave in the same way consistently over a period of time can be regarded as showing the same 
commitment even if they each claim differing beliefs and consequently differing commitment. 
13.3 Organizational commitment: its foundations, conceptualization, development, 
impact and management 
Organizational commitment can be briefly referred to as the unforced psychological or 
sociological attachment which bond individuals in an organization to some perceived or real 
conception in the full organizational context. In this sense, organizational commitment becomes 
perceptively richer in its nature and contextually broader in its focus than do other forms of 
commitment. However, organizational commitment, per se, has never grown out of the first 
13-2 
Chapter 13 On Organizational Commitment 
principles or foundations of commitment. 
13.3.1 Organizational commitment: the foundations 
Beliefs and organizational commitment: it seems clear that the propositional element is of 
importance in any organizational commitment because, if not, reasoned argument , becomes 
impossible (Wittgenstein, 1958). That is, if an organizational commitment cannot be 
distinguished from beliefs of the individuals who commit, any questioning of their beliefs turns 
out to be a direct onslaught on their commitment to the organization, although questioning their 
beliefs and even doubting their truth need not necessarily weaken their commitment. In fact, 
organizational commitment can logically precede the entertainment of varying stories or pictures 
(e. g. religious or ethical) of any specific organization, which can be true or false. Thus, 
individuals may have different kinds of organizational commitment not all of which can be right 
or wrong, or, at least, many of which can conflict with each other. 
Meanings and organizational commitment: it appears evident that there is little consensus on 
what the term organizational commitment means and that the meaning of organizational 
commitment varies as much or more in everyday use of the term (Mowday et al, 1982). 
Purportedly, organizational commitment can take varying forms (e. g. Angle and Perry, 1981; 
Meyer and Allen, 1991; O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Mayer and Schoorman, 1992): for 
example, organizational commitment can take place because the individuals (a) want to commit, 
(b) have to commit, or (c) ought to commit! Organizational commitment can also have different 
foci (Reichers, 1986): for example, organizational commitment can relate to specific 
constituencies such as investment projects, business units, and stakeholders such as top 
management, work teams, team leaders, suppliers and customers. It also seems evident that 
organizational commitment can be difficult to track down in that the meaning of (and especially 
the magnitude of) each organizational commitment can be depreciated or even inflated over time. 
It may become true that one cannot wholly appreciate what the then organizational commitment 
really involved or exactly meant. What meant a lot decades ago can become senseless or even 
meaningless to the modem generation. For example, it is possible for modem golfers to 
understand a full description of a game of tennis and still see no point in playing the game. This 
can give rise to the possible rejection of the 
idea, shared by many philosophers including the 
teleologists, that an organizational commitment is right or wrong, justified or unjustified, in that 
the conventional criteria of logic remain only intelligible in the context of modes of social life 
but inadequate to be applied to modes of social life (e. g. Wittgenstein, 1966). 
Reasons and organizational commitment: the view that many a commitment remains 
unjustifiable and that a justification presupposes a previous commitment becomes influential in 
many areas of inquiry. This view 
implies that there must be some reasons prior to any 
organizational commitment and that such reasons become relative to a particular commitment 
(e. g. Wittgenstein, 1966). However, what counts as a strong or good reason in one 
organizational commitment can 
be regarded as a poor or bad one in the second, or even no 
reason at all in the third. This dictates that individuals can differ from each other not only in the 
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reasons they each hold for their beliefs and actions but also what they each are willing to count 
as a reason, viz., individuals may themselves decide what counts as an explanation for an 
organization commitment and what does not count as an explanation. It has been put forward 
that individuals' attitude (Hare, 1955) determines what will count as reasons for organizational 
commitment, because organizational commitment is `not the kind of thing which could itself be 
rationally justified' (Kuhn, 1970) and thus the reasons for it become a matter of psychology, 
concerned with, say, personality, education, experience, as well as such values as accuracy, 
simplicity, and scope. 
Concepts and organizational commitment: it has also been proposed (Wittgenstein, 1966) that 
the conceptual system determines what will count as reasons for commitment. This implies that 
questions about organizational commitment in any organization are closely linked to questions 
concerning such concepts as employee-group cohesion, management-group cohesion, 
motivation, empowerment, involvement and behavioural intention (e. g. Huselid and Day, 1991; 
O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986). To investigate organizational commitment-related phenomena, 
therefore, one needs not only to consider what concepts he or she has, but also to understand 
whether the concepts available properly reflect organizational reality. It can be possible, for 
example, that the concepts being employed remain adequate in one society or organization but 
inadequate in another because of, say, ideological or even linguistic differences. ' 
Freedom and organizational commitment: for individuals in an organization to determine 
what count as reasons for organizational commitment requires that they must be in possession of 
very considerable freedom the choice of which is not restricted by the demands of rationality. 
That is, there is always a subjective element in any organizational commitment, and individuals' 
decisions about what they are going to commit themselves to do belong to the individuals. " In 
this sense, decision-making involves nothing more than a stress on the fact that decision makers 
cannot shelve their responsibility for deciding which principles to adopt. Even if decision 
makers adopt a principle unthinkingly so that an irrational choice is made, it is still a choice 
through which decision makers exercise their freedom; even if there are in principle some 
reasons for or against an organizational commitment, 
decision makers' freedom in deciding 
whether to make that commitment 
is still not restricted in that no reason can have any influence 
until it is regarded as a reason, let along that decision makers can still be free to assess such 
reasons as they wish and to 
ignore what is in fact a perfectly or nearly perfectly good reason for 
commitment. 
Rationality and organizational commitment: to justify any commitment apparently comes 
down in the end to the question whether commitment to rationality itself can be justified because 
rationalists can be as irrational as can 
irrationalists (Ayer, 1950). 5 However, it seems logically 
impossible to justify being rational, because of an inherent circularity that any justification 
which does more than arguing what 
is to be deemed rational must provide reasons for rationality 
which are themselves confined to rational scrutiny. It has been suggested (Bartley, 1964) that 
such a circularity problem can 
be arguably solved by an openness of mind involving the 
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justifiers' readiness to expose everything, including their rationality, to criticism and continued 
test, although whether there is an objective standard of criticism itself is subject to criticism. 
This suggests that any specific rationality can be limited so that dogmatic and irrational actions 
will inevitably occur in the course of any organizational commitment. With limited rationality, 
hence, it seems wrong to think that an organizational commitment made outside its scope is 
irrational for just because it is non-rational does not mean that it is positively irrational. 
To commit themselves individuals need a firm basis which serves as a first step towards 
deciding what to commit themselves to. This calls for an arbitrary, or caused, if not an all- 
embracing, rationality. " If reasons cannot be given to justify individuals committing themselves 
to one course of action rather than another, it is a fairly obvious step to say that one needs to 
look for causes why organizational commitment is as it is. The notion of an ultimate arbitrary 
rationality from which everything springs can be popular although it is in many ways an 
unsatisfactory one; for instance, it has been noted that progress in many disciplines can in the 
final analysis be psychological or sociological (Kuhn, 1970). ' It has been argued (e. g. 
Wittgenstein, 1966; Toulmin, 1972) that one of the most plausible arbitrary rationalities has to 
be the sincerity of the organizational commitment: if organizational commitment per se 
determines what individuals regard as true, all that matters is whether the organizational 
commitment is sincere, for sincerity, at least in many people's eyes (including this researcher's), 
remains the only virtue and hypocrisy the only vice. 
Perspectives and organizational commitment: it has been argued (e. g. Meyer and Allen, 1997; 
Mowday et al, 1982; Salancik, 1977; Reichers, 1985) that the psychological bond (Salancik, 
1977) which links individuals with organizations can be explored in two distinct perspectives, 
namely, the prospective and the retrospective. This dimensional difference has hence given rise 
to two distinct forms of commitment (Mowday et al, 1982; Staw, 1977; Scholl, 1981), namely 
attitudinal commitment which focuses on the process whereby people in an organization come to 
think about their relationship with something, somebody or some organization (Mowday et al, 
1982), and behavioural commitment which relates to the process whereby people in an 
organization become locked into some body or the organization as a whole, and into something 
including the way by which they deal with this problem (Mowday et al, 1982). 
The prospective development of this psychological state involves the measurement of an attitude 
or mind-set, along with other variables presumed to be the antecedents to, or consequences of, 
commitment (e. g. Buchanan, 1974); 
it has been aimed to demonstrate that strong organizational 
commitment is associated with 
desirable organizational outcomes (e. g. productivity) and to 
determine what personal characteristics and situational conditions contribute to the development 
of high levels of organizational commitment. Meanwhile, the retrospective development of this 
psychological state (such as 
justification for an ongoing course of action) is concerned with 
people's becoming committed to a particular course of action rather than to an entity (Kiesler, 
1971); it has been aimed to unveil the conditions under which individuals become committed to 
a course of action (Salancik, 1977). 
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13.3.2 Organizational commitment: the conceptualization 
Research into commitment continues to grow, and much of the theoretical work on 
organizational commitment, within the organizational behaviour literature, has focused on 
commitment to the organization, although organizational commitment as a construct can be 
potentially redundant with other organizational commitment construct such as job involvement 
(Kanungo, 1982), work ethic (Buchholz, 1976), and career commitment (Blau, 1985), partly 
because the variables identified as potential antecedents and consequences of organizational 
commitment do not differ from the antecedents and consequences of these other organizational 
commitment variables (Morrow, 1983) and partly because organizational commitment can be 
best understood as a collection of multiple commitment (Reichers, 1985). 
Organizational commitment has been defined (Porter et al, 1974), in an earlier conceptualization, 
as individuals' (a) strong desire to maintain organizational membership, (b) belief in and 
acceptance of organizational goals and values, and (c) willingness to exert effort toward 
organizational goal accomplishment. This tripartite conceptualization has been restricted (e. g. 
Becker, 1992; O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986) to the attachment based upon employees' 
compliance (i. e. conformity driven by rewards and punishments), identification (i. e. a desire for 
affiliation), and internalization (i. e. the congruence between individuals' values and the 
organization's goals and values). 
A later conceptualization of organizational commitment, based upon the multiple commitment 
view (Reichers, 1985,1986; Randall, 1990; Cohen, 1993), conceives commitment in 
organizations not as just a monolithic, undifferentiated entity which elicits an identification and 
attachment on the part of individuals, but as a coalition of various constituencies (Reichers, 
1985) and, therefore, commitment in organization is portrayed to have a general (i. e. global) as 
well as a specific (i. e. commitment to one or more constituencies) construct (Reichers, 1986). 
The more recent conceptualization of organizational commitment reveals (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994) that the general (i. e. global) commitment enjoys the role of a key mediator, best 
representing the relationships between constituency-specific commitment, global commitment 
and important organizational outcomes. 
The most recent conceptualization of organizational commitment reports that, according to the 
general consensus, organizational commitment remains a multi-dimensional construct (Meyer 
and Allen, 1997) possessing three components (Meyer and Allen, 1991): (a) affective 
commitment which refers to 
individuals' emotional attachment to, identification with, and 
involvement in an organization, (b) continuance commitment which refers to an awareness of 
the costs associated with leaving the organization, and (c) normative commitment which reflects 
a feeling of obligation or moral responsibility to continue to remain with an organization. It has 
been clearly observed (Meyer and Allen, 1997) that organizational commitment may take 
different forms and can be directed at varying constituencies within an organization, despite that 
there is an imbalance existing in the attention given to the different forms or foci of 
commitment. 
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Seemingly, none of the above conceptulization can be regarded as complete in that commitment 
remains multidimensional in, at least, both its form and focus, if its meaning is to be fully 
comprehended. Further, a comprehensive conceptualization of organizational commitment, 
risking the danger of being virtually impossible to test or use in its entirety, could serve no better 
than those simple conceptualizations except in raising the awareness of the complex nature of 
commitment in the workplace. Thus, for researchers and practitioners alike, the most important 
issue relating to organizational commitment, perhaps, lies in, the understanding of how 
commitment develops as well as whether its development can be utilized to directly facilitate 
desirable behaviour at work, rather than the establishment of the so-called comprehensive 
conceptualization which may eventually lead to futility. 
13.3.3 Organizational commitment: the development 
It becomes clear that organizational commitment can be best thought of as a psychological state 
which links individuals to whatever they are attached to (be it an organization, an investment 
project, a team leader, or top management). Apparently, most of the previous empirical research 
has focused on commitment to organizations (e. g. Mead, 1970; Buchanan, 1974; Porter et al, 
1974; Gould 1979; Mowday et al, 1982; Wiener, 1982; Randall, 1987; Becker, 1992; Meyer and 
Allen, 1997). However, it seems likely that the development of as well as the process of 
commitment specific to organizations can apply to other domains (such as investments) to which 
individuals become committed (Meyer and Allen, 1997). 
Thus, Meyer and Allen's (1997) conceptualization is used hereafter to examine the development 
of organizational commitment, in order to `make use of the experience of a certain unit to 
promote work of the whole area'; although it can be envisaged that the exploration based upon a 
not-totally-relevant framework can at best serve as a somewhat simplified description of the 
complex nature of relationship between the two end parts linked by organizational commitment. 
The antecedents of organizational commitment: it has been widely acknowledged (e. g. 
Mowday et al, 1982; Meyer and Allen, 1997) that there exists a wide range of variables which 
have been hypothesized to be the antecedents of commitment, and these hypothesized 
antecedents have been put into three categories, each under the line of a sub-commitment in the 
light of Meyer and Allen's (1997) conceptualization of commitment (namely, affective, 
continuance, and normative). 
Affective commitment refers to the `want to commit' scenario. Among the proposed antecedents 
of affective commitment, normally under the research themes of either supportiveness / fairness 
or personal importance 
/ competence, are: (a) organizational characteristics (e. g. Bateman and 
Strasser, 1984; Kim and Mauborgne, 1993) which include (i) size, (ii) structure, and (iii) climate; 
(b) person characteristics (e. g. Pierce and Dunham, 1987; Buchanan, 1974) which include (i) 
demographics, (ii) values, and (iii) expectations; and (c) work experience (e. g. Steers, 1977; 
Bycio et al, 1995) which include (i) job scope, (ii) relationships, (iii) participation, (iv) support 
and (v) justice. 
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Continuance commitment refers to the `have to commit' scenario. Among the proposed 
antecedents of continuance commitment are: (a) investments (e. g. Whitener and Waltz, 1993; 
Allen and Meyer, 1990) which include (i) side bets, (ii) job security, and (iii) role status (i. e. 
overload, conflict, and ambiguity, etc. ); (b) alternatives - coupled with environmental conditions 
such as unemployment rate, family responsibility, and union status (e. g. Allen and Meyer, 1990; 
Whitener and Waltz, 1993) - which include (i) attractiveness of alternatives, and (ii) perceptions 
of opportunities. 
Normative commitment refers to the `ought to commit' scenario, and among the acknowledged 
antecedents of normative commitment are (a) socialization experiences (e. g. Wiener, 1982) 
which include (i) cultural, (ii) familial, and (iii) organizational; (b) management practices (e. g. 
Scholl, 1981) which include (i) selection, (ii) training, and (iii) compensation; and (c) 
psychological contracts (e. g. Argris, 1960) which include (i) economic exchange and (ii) social 
exchange. 
It seems that the antecedents of organizational commitment can be decomposed into separable 
components as demonstrated in most previous research. In practice, however, the antecedents of 
organizational commitment can hardly be isolated from each other, and commitment normally 
occurs in the face of complex driving forces which could cover differing contexts (say, 
operational, phenomenological, psychological, and physical) and/or differing scenarios (say, a 
combination of `want to commit', `have to commit' and `ought to commit'), with some 
commitment taking place very quietly and quickly, the process of which can be so subtle that it 
simply does not raise enough awareness for the concerned organizations or even the committer 
themselves. 
The processes of organizational commitment: from the `open' 'systems perspective, the 
process of organizational commitment has to bear the totality of forces (i. e. both internal and 
external) to the occurrence of organizational commitment. That is, the investigation of how a 
certain organizational commitment occurs and develops must satisfy a complex array of 
constraints (which are changing over time) covering psychological, operational, physical, and 
phenomenological (see Figure 0-3-1), although some of them can be very entity specific while 
others can be roughly generalized by use of any established conceptualizations of organizational 
commitment (say, Meyer and Allen's affective, continuance, and normative commitment model, 
purely for the sake of compatibility). 
The process through which affective commitment develops include: (a) retrospective 
rationalization or self-justification, which suggests (Kiesler, 1971; Salancik, 1977) that, subject 
to conditions such as irrevocability of the initial act, its publicness, or the volition associated 
with it, individuals are becoming 
`bound' to commit by retrospectively justifying their actions 
and consequently developing emotional attachment to a conception relating to the organization; 
and (b) personal fulfilment 
(enriched by the role of conscious awareness, of causal attribution, 
and of the universality of the needs 
involved), which suggests (Gleitman, 1981), that, individuals 
are considering as rewarding the 
development of affective commitment insofar as their 
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commitment satisfies their needs, meets their expectations, and allows them to achieve their 
goals. 
The process through which continuance commitment develops lies in individuals' recognition or 
awareness that investments or the lack of alternatives have made it costly not to commit 
themselves to a conception relating to the organization. This process can be of an accumulative 
nature like an electrical relay being triggered by some time-based variables (e. g. age and tenure) 
or being triggered by some attention-catching cost-related variables such as family relocation 
(Meyer and Allen, 1991). 
The process through which normative commitment develops include (a) pre-entry socialization, 
which suggests individuals develop their normative commitment to a conception relating to the 
organization on the ground of a cluster of pressures (from their families, friends, or cultures) 
which individuals feel about the concerned or any other entity (Wiener, 1982), and (b) post- 
entry socialization, which suggests that individuals can develop their normative commitment to 
a conception relating to the organization especially when the organization makes particular (if 
not totally irreciprocal) kinds of investment such as organization sponsored career development 
programmes (Scholl, 1981), or, somehow, engenders psychological contracts (between the 
individuals and the organization) consisting of the beliefs of the parties involved in a subjective 
exchange relationship regarding their reciprocal obligations (Argyris, 1960). The pre-and-post- 
entry socialization process in essence belongs to a process of internalization, by which 
individuals yield a belief about the appropriateness of being loyal to an entity. 
It appears plausible to separately describe the processes of organizational commitment, but it 
will be unwise to presume that the processes of organizational commitment occur separately or 
become mutually exclusive (although conflicts can remain commonplace among them). 
Organizational experience demonstrates that many a process of organizational commitment 
occur largely in concert, and, in fact, the processes involved in the development of 
organizational commitment can be so complex that they can cover the full organizational 
context ranging from psychological, cultural, institutional, societal, environmental, 
situational, ..., to operational 
factors. 
The consequences of organizational commitment: it can be expected that the consequences of 
varying forms of organizational commitment will differ because of the very differences in the 
psychological or sociological nature of each of the three forms of organizational commitment. 
Briefly speaking, on the evidence of theoretical and empirical research (e. g., Meyer and Allen, 
1991; Angle and Perry, 1981; Cascio, 1982; Ashforth and Saks, 1996), it seems that individuals 
with strong affective commitment tend to 
be motivated to perform better in the organization 
than those with weak affective commitment, thus contributing more to the organization, that 
individuals with continuance commitment as a primary link to an organization can remain 
apathetic about performance or contribution unless job retention becomes clearly contingent on 
performance, and that individuals with strong normative commitment can be motivated to 
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behave appropriately to do what is right for the organization and thus perform well in the 
organization. It also seems convincing (e. g. Morrison, 1994; Randall, 1987) that the variance in 
consequences between different forms of organizational commitment can also extend to other 
areas such as citizenship behaviour and individual well-being. 
To sum up, organizational commitment occurs, and, consequently, inflates or deflates, in an 
affective way if what is going on around the concerned organization is perceived as supportive, 
fair, or competent, in a continuance way if it is perceived as much cost-related, and in a 
normative way if it is perceived as obligatory. The development of organizational commitment 
brings forth changes in individuals' perceptions and behaviour, and undoubtedly exerts a 
tremendous impact on the organization's competitiveness in the marketplace as well as on 
individuals' competence and well-being in society. 
13.3.4 Organizational commitment: the impact 
The amount of empirical research conducted to examine the impact of organizational 
commitment on both the contributor and the receiver of the commitment is very limited though 
remaining progressive. Most earlier explorations of organizational commitment (e. g. Lawrence, 
1958; Thompson, 1965; Katz and Kahn, 1966) have been based upon the assumption that high 
levels of commitment have a healthy impact. For example, it has been claimed (Lawrence, 1958) 
that `ideally, we would want one sentiment to be dominant in all employees from top to bottom, 
namely a complete loyalty to the organizational purpose. ' 
Not until recently have references to the possible dangers of high levels of organizational 
commitment surfaced (e. g. Salancik, 1977; Whyte, 1986; Brockner, 1979,1985,1986,1992; 
Staw, 1976,1977,1978,1987; Randall, 1987), and research about the dangers of high levels of 
commitment still remains sparse, sporadic and scattered throughout various disciplines (Randall, 
1987). Findings from discrete literatures indicate that high commitment may be linked to a lack 
of creativity and resistance to change (Marsh et al, 1958; Thompson, 1965), excess stress and 
tension in nonwork relationships (Mowday et al, 1982), over-zealous conformity (Hoffer, 1963), 
a willingness to engage in corporate crime for the benefit of the organization (Clinard and 
Yeager, 1980), and an ineffective use of resources (Rowan, 1981; Staw, 1976). 
Apparently, it can be summarised that organizational commitment has two facets of impact (e. g. 
Statman, 1987; Randall, 1987; Whyte, 1956). The first is a motivating face which helps generate 
the force i needed to surmount obstacles which seem at least temporally insurmountable and 
accomplish goals which seem 
impossibly remote. The second face of organizational 
commitment is wasteful 
in that commitment can easily turn into entrapment where good money 
is thrown after bad in the pursuit of impossible goals. 
Table 13-3 provides a summary of potential positive and (especially the overlooked) negative 
impact of varying (i. e. high, moderate, and low) levels of organizational commitment. It appears, 
at least in the literature as 
depicted in Table 13-3, that low levels of commitment remain largely 
dysfunctional for organizations, although there exists a `purging' function which may rid the 
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organizations of misfits, that the advantages of moderate commitment generally outweigh the 
disadvantages in that the relationship between individuals' needs and organizational needs can 
be balanced, and that, at high levels of commitment, the costs of commitment normally 
outweigh the advantages, in that organizations may lose flexibility and find themselves 
vulnerable to a variety of unethical and illegal behaviour, although the organizations' production 
demands can be met with greater ease. 
Table 13-1: Potential impact of organizational commitment (Source: Adapted from Randall, 1987) 
Item 
Positive impact for Negative impact for Positive impact for the Negative impact for the organization individuals individuals organization 
A source of individual Slow career advancement and Limited damages done Higher turnover (Steers, 1977), higher 
creativity, innovation and promotion (Kanter, 1977; by disruptive or poor absenteeism (Steers, 1977), greater 
originality (Thompson, Hacker, 1978); performers (Mowday tardiness (Angle and Perry, 1981), a lack of 
1965); Heavy personal costs et al, 1982); intention to stay with the organization 
An effective use of human including loss of income, job Improved morale of (Steers, 1977), low quantity of work 
resources (Angle and security, harassment, non-disruptive or (Steers, 1977), disloyalty to the 
Perry, 1981); isolation, and defamation of good performers; organization (Schein, 1968), illegal 
Low An improvement on firm- character as a result of (Mowday et at, 1982); activities against the organization (Clinard 
level quitters' mental whistle-blowing (Miceli and Additional skills and Yeager, 1980), limited extra-role 
of healthiness (Mowday et Near, 1984); brought in by behaviour to advance organizational 
organizational at, 1982). Possible expulsion, exit, or replacement (Mowday interests (Mowday et at, 1982); 
commitment effort to defeat organizational et at, 1982); Damaging role modelling (Walters, 1975) 
goals (Schein, 1968). Whistle-blowing and possible threats to the organization's 
effects including the authority structure (Weistein, 1979) as a 
avoidance of public result of whistle-blowing; 
outcry, expensive Limited organizational control (Gouldner, 
lawsuits and 1958) and damaged attitudes and 
regulatory reform performance of the whole organization 
(Ewing, 1983). (Mowday et al, 1982) 
Greater feeling of loyalty Slow and uncertain career Longer tenure Limited extra-role work for the organization 
and duty to the advancement and promotion (Mowday et al, 1982); (Scholl, 1981); 
organization (Wiener and (Mowday et al, 1982); Limited intention to Limited citizen behaviour including 
Vardi, 1980); Possible uneasy compromises quit (Steers, 1977); cooperation, helpfulness, suggestions, 
Greater feeling of security, in many segmental Limited subsequent gestures of goodwill, and altruism (Smith 
Moderate belongingness and commitment (Katz and Kahn, turnover (Stumpf and et at, 1983); 
level efficacy (Mowday et al, 1966). Hartman, 1984); A tendency to balance the organization's 
of 1982); Greater job satisfaction demands with those outside the workforce; 
organizational Creative individualism (Porter et al, 1974). A greater likelihood of pro-social 
commitment (Schein, 1968); behaviours such as risking harm to the 
Maintenance of identity organization in order to avoid harming 
distinct from the others (Randall, 1987); 
organization (Katz and Possible decrease in organizational 
Kahn, 1966). effectiveness (Randall, 1987). 
Enhanced probability of Hampered individual growth A more secure and Ineffective use of human resources 
career advancement and and limited opportunities for stable work force including wastes of talent and energy as a 
promotion (Whyte, 1956); mobility (Mowday et at, (Steers, 1977); result of too much loyalty of the wrong 
Increasing grants of power 1982); stifled creativity and Increased goal- kind (Rowan, 1981); 
due to obedience (Biggart innovation (Thompson, attainability (Hoffer, Lack of organizational flexibility, 
and Hamilton, 1984); 1965); 1963); innovation and adaptability in that over- 
Ardent dedication to the Bureaupathic resistance to Higher levels of commitment reduces the organization's 
organization and change (March and Simon, performance and task ability to carry out alternative lines of 
passionate pursuit of 1958); insufficient completion (Mowday action (Coser, 1974); 
goals (I [offer, 1963) individuation leading to et al, 1974); Inviolate trust in past policies and High altruistic suicide (Durkheim, Increased willingness procedures and an entrenchment of 
level 1951); of employees to traditional practices (Salancik, 1977); 
of Stress and tension in social accept the Problematic burdens to the organization 
organizational and family relationships; organization's such as irritation and antagonism from 
commitment decreasing sense of self and demands for greater overzealous employees over people outside 
ability to relate to others production (Etzioni, the organization (Mowday et at, 1982); 
(Korman and Korman, 1980); 1975) Illegal / unethical acts committed on behalf 
Lack of opportunities to learn of the organization (Clinard and Yeager, 
patterns of peer solidarity 1980) which may lead to a tarnished 
(Whyte, 1956); corporate image, loss of present and future 
Limited time and energy for customers, stockholders, and suppliers, 
nonwork and other criminal liability for the acts of stringent 
organizations (Larson and employees, and the like (Clinard and 
Fukami, 1984). Yeager, 1980). 
This complex diversity (full of complements and conflicts) of the impact of organizational 
13-11 
Chapter 13 On Organizational Commitment 
commitment on individuals and organizations inevitably calls for the management of 
organizational commitment if a healthy development of commitment is what is desired for both 
individuals and organizations. 
13.3.5 Organizational commitment: the management 
It seems clear that it is the perceptions which individuals have upon the conception relating to 
the organization as well as the organization's corporate practices that play an important role in 
the development of organizational commitment and trigger an immediate or shadow impact on 
the workforce. Thus, for organizations vying for competitiveness, to manage the impact of 
organizational commitment inevitably leads to influencing individuals' perceptions and minding 
their corporate practices. 
Among major themes which have been tentatively believed (e. g. Cameron, 1994; Meyer and 
Allen, 1997) to have significant impacts on organizational commitment are: (a) Human 
Resource Management which involves an organization's day to day management of people in an 
organization, and (b) the management of change which involves an organization's 
reorganization (and elimination) of jobs which affects its competitiveness. 
The management of HRM practices: it has been strongly argued (e. g. Ogilvie, 1986; Gaertner 
and Nollen, 1989; Meyer and Allen, 1997) that individuals' perceptions of the organization's 
IHM practices, such as recruitment and selection, socialization and training, assessment and 
promotion, and compensation and benefits, significantly influence organizational commitment. 
For example, genuine recruiting strategies such as realistic job previews describing both positive 
and negative aspects of the post can generate healthier commitment than the traditional hard-sell 
approaches (Wanous, 1992). Organizations can actually `select' for organizational commitment 
based upon individuals' propensity (e. g. Pierce and Dunham, 1987), measured prior to entry into 
the organization, which can be determined by a set of variables including personal 
characteristics (e. g. self-efficacy), pre-entry expectations, and organizational choice (e. g. 
irrevocability). 
The reinforcement of individuals' sense of self-worth and the provision of a supportive 
environment can be a more effective socialization strategy for instilling a strong sense of 
commitment than breaking down or reshaping individuals' self-image (van Maanen and Schein, 
1979). Individuals' perceptions gained through training fulfilment, satisfaction with the training 
experience and performance, can also correlatively influence the post-training organizational 
commitment (Tannenbum et al, 1991). 
Organizations can adopt a to-be-regarded-as-adequate mid-career assessment strategy or remain 
careful about the feedback of early-career assessment so as to achieve a desired level of 
organization commitment (Robertson et al, 1991). Organizations can also facilitate promotion 
(especially promotion from within) so as to exercise positive impact on organizational 
commitment (Schwarzwald et al, 1992). 
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Organizational commitment can be considerably influenced by some compensation-relevant 
practices such as an employee share ownership plan (Klein, 1987). 9 Organizations' emphasis on 
individuals' benefits by, say, making a plan financially meaningful, enhancing individuals' 
opportunities to participate in decision-making, or providing `family-responsive benefits' such 
as flexible hours, can increase organizational commitment if that is the organization's objective 
(Pierce and Furo, 1990). 10 
Empirical evidence has exhibited much support for individual HRM practice in possessing the 
potential to influence organizational commitment (Ogilvie, 1986; Gaertner and Nollen, 1989; 
Meyer and Allen, 1997; Wanous, 1992; Pierce and Furo, 1990; Klein, 1987; Schwarzwald et al, 
1992; Tannenbum et al, 1991; van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Pierce and Dunham, 1987; Grover 
and Crooker, 1995). However, while these specific HRM practices each have advantages, they 
do not operate in isolation. Thus, organizations need to develop complex HRM systems (perhaps 
in the line of the `open' systems framework) made up of component parts which, hopefully, 
operate in unison and are compatible with the overall organizational strategy for dealing with 
the ever-changing competition in the marketplace. 
The management of change: it has also been strongly, perhaps over-optimistically, argued (e. g. 
Brockner et al, 1987,1990; Cameron, 1994; Mone, 1994) that organizational commitment can 
be monitored by means of management of changes such as downsizing, mergers and 
acquisitions nowadays taking place in organizations. 
It has been argued (e. g. Cascio, 1993) that organizations can potentially influence organizational 
commitment by means of downsizing, the 
benefits of which can include economic (e. g. 
increased productivity, reduced expenses, higher profits, -increased return on investments, and 
increased stock prices) and organizational (e. g. lower overhead, smoother communication, and 
greater entrepreneurship). Organizations can 
hope to increase organizational commitment (e. g. 
Cascio, 1993) by propagating job enrichment (e. g. enhanced responsibility for decisions and 
increased participation in decision-making) or hinting at the potential costs (should the 
individuals fall as victims in the , 
next round of cuts); organizations can also expect (e. g. 
Brockner et al, 1987) that downsizing may exert negative impacts on organizational 
commitment especially when survivors 
feel there has been a lack of fairness in layoff decisions 
or job insecurity. To healthily 
influence individuals' perceptions of fairness of layoff decisions 
so as to shape the success of the 
initiative, downsizing organizations can themselves exercise an 
impact on the perceptions through their effective communications with individuals prior to, 
during, and after the downsizing efforts (e. g. Mellor, 1992). 
It has been anticipated (e. g. Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Newman and Krzystofiak, 1993) that 
merger or acquisition tends to 
bring forth a decline in organizational commitment. To minimize 
the negative impact of mergers on organizational commitment, organizations can actually try to, 
say, minimize the misinformation 
(normally negative) propagandised in the absence of clear 
communication on the part of management about 
how the merger will affect individuals 
(Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991). To minimize the negative impact of acquisitions on 
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organizational commitment, organizations, can - try to ° promote, inter alia, effective 
communication so as to build commitment to the newly regrouped organization while smoothly 
eliminating individuals' dissatisfaction with the change in jobs and supervision (Newman and 
Krzystofiak, 1993). 
Research findings have yielded strong support for the importance of accurate communication in 
the face of change (e. g. Cascio, 1993; Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Newman and Krzystofiak, 
1993), although the nature of the change can preannounce certain limitations to how much 
information can or should be provided. If organizations are truly determined to strive for after- 
change success, they need to recognize the needs which individuals will inevitably have and the 
perceptions which individuals can have, and to solve the problems creatively by either 
promoting effective communication or trying other (if not more viable) optional strategies so as 
to achieve a desired level of organizational commitment. 
In short, the management of organizational commitment calls for an complex but effective HRM 
systems plus viable business strategies dealing with change, and to manage organizational 
commitment is to manage individuals' perceptions through effective competence-building 
corporate practices. Moreover, prolific HRM systems and successful management of change per 
se do not necessarily guarantee the development or maintenance of a desired level of 
organizational commitment. There exist other concerns or themes, general or specific, which 
might remain sufficient if not totally necessary in forging healthier organizational commitment, 
complementary to or conflicting with the role played by HRM systems and strategies designed 
for change. 
13.4 Organizational commitment in the investment decision-making process 
It appears clear that most if not all of the commitment-related research has lain in the line of 
human resource management and have focused on commitment specific to the organization 
under the research theme of attitudinal commitment (e. g. Buchanan, 1974; Steers, 1977; 
Mowday et al, 1982; Meyer and Allen, 1991,1997). As an aside, however, commitment 
research in the behavioural commitment tradition with differing forms or foci can have 
important implications for other aspects of organizational commitment. 
13.4.1 Organizational commitment in the investment decision-making context 
There is one subset (which is also one of the latest as well as, perhaps, the most interesting) of 
the two-faced commitment along the behavioural commitment tradition which seems very 
worthy of exploration but remains relatively much overlooked, viz., the work of entrapment / 
escalating commitment toward a 
failing course of action, viz., decision makers' persisting in a 
course of action in a given context - e. g. the 
investment decision context which broadly refers to 
`situations in which resources are allocated to one decisional alternative over others, and in 
which the level of resources can 
be increased or decreased at the discretion of decision makers' 
(Staw, 1976) - despite objective evidence suggesting that it is not prudent to do so (Staw and 
Ross, 1987; Brockner, 1992; Zhang, 1993; Wilson and Zhang, 1997). 
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13.4.2 Organizational commitment as organizational strategy persisting over time 
It has been held (Commons, 1934) that it remains common that organizations often make 
strategic decisions without really looking at the difficulty of reversing them or at the constraints 
they impose on future options, and so, given that it remains impossible for organizations to base 
their overall strategy on all relevant strategic success factors at all times, it appears pleasant for 
decision-makers to focus on only one every time (Barnard, 1938). This tendency of 
organizations to impose past choices on present ones triggers organizations to persist with their 
strategy over time, and this persistency has been referred to as organizational commitment 
(Ghemawat, 1991). Research around persistence as a form of organizational commitment has 
been sparkling with excitement (e. g. Ghemawat, 1991; de Kare-Silver, 1997; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Zhang, 1993; Wilson and Zhang, 1997). " 
13.4.3 The manifestation of organizational commitment in the investment decision-making 
context 
In the light of the decision-making quadrants (please sec Figure 1-1-2), it can be argued that 
there are at least four kinds of manifestations of organizational commitment which illustrate 
organizations' persistence in a particular strategy: the 
lock-in, lock-out, the time lag, and the 
mentality lag (Figure 13-1). 
Professedly, the lock-in effect manifests a presumption in favour of persisting in a particular 
strategy even if it has not yet proved valuable, 
because, otherwise, the pre-conunitment in terms 
of resources in the past, as can 
be reflected by Boeing's pursuit of the 747 wide-bodied airframe 
which at some point the net 
investment of the company considerably exceeded its net worth, 
will become valueless at the present or 
in the future. As the mirror image of the lock-in, the 
lock-out effect simply manifests the persistence of particular strategy in that committing the 
organization to the particular strategy remains 
the most plausible way for the organization to 
avoid the possible misfortune 
due to the difficulty of future re-commitment in terms of 
reactivating, reacquiring or re-deploying specialized resources so as to exploit the 
lapsed 
opportunities to which the organization was once committed, as 
in the case of Euro Disney in 
the 20"' century. 
Figure 13-1: The manifestation of organizational commitment as persisting strategy over time 
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The time lag effects manifests that lime matters in deciding whether the expectation of a 
commitment towards a particular strategy can be fruitful, because the realization of the 
commitment can take up to a decade or even half a century as in the case of Euro-Channel 
project in which the pre-commitment started in the 19"' century, commitment started in the 20°' 
century and the re-commitment or de-commitment won't manifest itself until, perhaps, the 21s` 
century, because it might take a decade or two to develop suitable technology, even longer to 
accomplish major economic and/or environmental restructuring. The m entality lag manifests 
that mentality or culture or history matters in deciding on whether to commit to a particular 
strategy because the complex of political, psychological and sociological driving forces which 
might suggest re-conmmitnient so as to preserve the strategic status quo might surpass economic 
or environmental constraints which might suggest de-commitment in that preservation can well 
lead to failing to maximize economic or environmental profits, as can be seen in the case of 
China's Three Gauge Dain project in which the pre-commitment started in the 19' century, 
commitment started in the 20"' century and the re-commitment or de-conmnitment won't 
manifest itself until, perhaps, the 21 " century, because it might take a decade or two to build the 
Dam, even longer to accomplish major economic and/or environmental restructuring. 
13.4.4 The dynamics of organizational commitment in the investment decision-making 
process 
it can be intuitively held that organizational decision makers are expected to change their 
commitment when their previous commitment 
(be it resources, funds, time, or effort) to a course 
of action (be it a strategy vis-ä-vis expansion, replacement, substitution or strategic investment) 
has resulted in negative consequences. Yet, like prevailing in any competitive sports matches 
during which even world class players can remain stubborn enough to refuse to dump the 
initially tried strategy which has been proved ineffective until the match is literately over even if 
they had been well prepared with a list of calculated optional strategies beforehand, evidence 
shows that, in the investment 
decision-nmaking context, the organizational commitment (say, of 
resources) can be enlarged regardless of consequences resulting 
from previous commitment (not 
even the negative consequences). 
This high level of commitment towards a certain strategy or a certain course of action, may turn 
into a cyclical process in which a high 
level of commitment begets higher levels of commitment 
and negative consequences 
beget even more negative consequence (see Figure 13-2). Figure 13- 
2 has been depicted, in the light of Figures 1-2 & 5-1, to serve as a generalized but simplified 
description of the possible development of organizational commitment in the investment 
decision-making context. It is worth noting that the process of organizational commitment is 
depicted by the general now of' strategy over time (featuring pre-commitment, conirfritmeut, re- 
co, nn1itment, and (le-commilinci t), and 
thus it does not fully reflect the specific evolution of 
specific organizational commitment over 
time, which should cover most areas mentioned under 
each of the 
four (or more if it is cyclical as can be reflected in Figure 13-2) stages of the 
devclop»1ei1t of organizational commitment in the investment decision-making context. 
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Figure 13-2: The hypothesized development of organizational commitment in investment decision-nmaking 
context: antecedents, process, and consequences 
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Obviously, many factors can influence Investment decision-making in the commitment of 
resources to a course of action. Both established analyses of the development of organizational 
commitment and recipes for the effective management of organizational commitment can apply 
to the analysis as well as management of the organizational commitment work in the investment 
decision-making context. There has been some research undertaken on this theme since Staw's 
(1976) pioneering work assessing self-justification in investment decisions. however, most of 
the past studies have been based upon laboratory simulations of investment decisions and have 
focused mainly theoretically on specific constituencies of commitment such as psychological 
attachment; little work has been empirically undertaken to investigate investment decision- 
making related organizational commitment 
in a full organizational context; nor is there much 
effort directed to examining 
how organizational commitment develops in the investment 
decision-making processes. 
13.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
In brief, organizational commitment remains a double-edged weapon, and its benefits can 
outweigh its costs, or vice versa. 
Organizational commitment, by nature, must presuppose 
certain beliefs as well as 
involving organizational dedication to the actions implied by the 
beliefs. Further investigation into this scenario, thus, needs to place emphases on, infer alia, the 
propositional element 
in, the meanings of, the reasons prior to, the concepts realistically 
reflective of, the subjective element 
in, and the arbitrary (or cause(l) rationality of, the 
organizational commitment of 
interest. That is, research or operation related investigation into 
organizational coil] 'III tment 
in the investment decision-making process needs to embrace 
relevant considerations of, iter ulia, the theoretical conceptualization, the antecedents, 
consequences, the processes, the 
impact, and the management of' the specific commitment of 
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interest, although it seems that the most interesting work on organizational commitment in the 
investment decision-making context still lies far ahead of academics and practitioners, and the 
systematic study of the flow or process of organizational commitment still remains in its early 
infancy. 
Specific practical operation- or research-directional considerations on the management of 
organizational commitment can include the following: 
Q13-1. Should and can the organizational commitment to be investigated be re-defined to better 
reflect its theme? Is it threaded through the following categories concerning investment 
decision makers' psychological attachment to the organization? 
Table 13-2: The concerns of the organizational commitment 
Organizational The core Psychological attachment 
commitment Distinctive 
concerns 
The state of 
attachment 
Process of 
being attached 
Antecedents of 
being attached 
Consequences of being 
attached 
Q13-2. Could the organizational commitment to be studied be regarded as `ultimate', not only 
relative to but also external to the specific organization of interest? Does this general 
commitment play the role of a key mediator, or is it just one of many? How can the 
relationships be best represented between constituency-specific commitment, general 
commitment, and important organizational outcomes? 
Q13-3. What counts for the `evaluative' element lurking behind the organizational commitment 
to be studied? To what or to whom can the organizational commitment to be studied be 
referred to? What other beliefs do the commitment to be studied logically presuppose or 
preclude? 
Q13-4. How to identify the organizational commitment to be studied? What is the logic (or the 
underlined first principles) behind the proposed identification? Is it both orally and 
wholeheartedly accepted among the involved investment decision makers, within or 
outside of the organization, or has it to be claimed by an analysis of what investment 
decision makers have actually done if it remains orally disputable? 
Q13-5. What are the criteria for 
identifying organizational commitment in the investment 
decision-making context? What is the rationality for evaluating its development? What 
is the logic lurking behind the articulated criteria for the identification? 
Q13-6. Can organizational commitment 
be studied through varying perspectives such as 
retrospectively and prospectively? What remains the distinction between them? Which 
perspective remains more relevant if it can be so claimed? 
Q13-7. What are the reasons 
being considered prior to the commitment made? What were 
regarded as good reasons at the time? What were regarded as bad reasons at the time? 
What had been the criteria for deciding what accounts as reasons? 
Q13-8. Do the concepts 
(relating to organizational commitment) employed to analyze the 
problems adequately reflect the specific organizational reality? Can they be extended 
into other cultures or societies? Are cross-cultural studies of organizational commitment 
comparable? Do they differ in terms of the meaning, concept, rationality and perspective 
of the organizational commitment? 
Q13-9. What are the 
beliefs which investment decision makers are presupposing before 
organizational commitment takes place? What are the actions which are implied by the 
presupposed beliefs among the decision makers? To what extent have the investment 
decision makers dedicated themselves to the implied actions? 
Q13-1o. Does the commitment 
to be studied logically precede the entertainment of any aspects of 
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organizational culture, say; in terms of stories, ideologies, slogans, or pictures? What did 
the commitment exactly mean to the investment decision makers and to the organization 
at the time when it was made? Is Meyer and Allen's (1997) or others' conceptualization 
relevant to the concern to be studied? 
Table 13-3: The meaning of commitment 
Foci of commitment Relevant forms of commitment 
Wanted to commit Ought to commit Had to commit Mixture 
Organization 
Investment project 
Top management 
Management team 
Business unit 
Q13-H. How much freedom had the investment decision makers had in deciding whether to 
make a commitment on the organization's behalf? Can individuals' freedom to commit 
be influenced by some variables? To what extent do individuals concerned feel and use 
that freedom? 
Q13-12. What makes organizational commitment in the investment decision-making process 
distinguishable from other forms of organizational commitment? How does 
organizational commitment develop or evolve? Is there a general framework which can 
be used to describe the development of organizational framework in the investment 
decision-making context? 
Q13-13. What was the organizationally agreed basic rationality? What was the first step towards 
investment decision makers' deciding to what they are going to commit, for the 
commitment before it actually took place? Was there any arbitrary or caused rationality 
from which actions spring? 
Q13-14. Which factors are likely to influence organizational commitment in the investment 
decision-making process? What appears to be the true cause of organizational 
commitment in the investment decision-making context? What investment decision- 
making process fosters or hinders the development of organizational commitment? Why? 
What appears to be the managerial solution to the management of organizational 
commitment? 
Q13-15. Are investment decision makers aware of the double-edgedness of commitment in 
organizations? What is the nature of the process through which organizational 
commitment develop resultant from high level of commitment under negative 
consequences? Is this kind of organizational commitment wrong or unhealthy? 
Q13-16. What mechanisms appear to better describe the development of organizational 
commitment in the investment decision-making context? What are the major or most 
potential antecedents which trigger organizational commitment? What are major 
processes through which organizational commitment develops? Is it possible to identify 
or verify the consequences of organizational commitment? 
Q13-17. How does commitment manifest itself within the investment decision-making context? 
Can organizational commitment be referred to the persistence of organizational strategy 
over time? What remains the major causes which effect organizational commitment in 
the investment decision-making context? 
commitment as form of persisting strategy over time 
Q13-18. Does the impact of organizational commitment in the invest-decision-making context 
upon organizational competence differ a lot cross-culturally? What are the useful lessons, 
if there are any, which can be drawn from cross-boundary management practices? 
Q13-19. Do the previously proposed themes regarding the management of commitment such as 
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HRM and management of change still play an important role in managing organizational 
commitment in the investment decision-making context? What accounts for a good 
HRM systems for the management of commitment in the investment decision-making 
context? How does management of change significantly contribute to management of 
organizational commitment in the investment decision-making context? 
Q13-20. Which themes apart from HRM and change can be entailed in or can contribute to the 
management of organizational commitment? What role do corporate strategy, projectal 
factors, and other software and hardware factors such as IT and technology play in the 
development of organizational commitment? What else can be regarded as the best or 
most promising practices which can be employed to help manage organizational 
commitment and to contribute to organizations' sustainable success? How do 
organizations manage for commitment. 
' For example, Porter et al (1974) define commitment as 'the strength of an 
individuals' identification with and involvement in a 
particular organization'; 
Buchanan (1974) sees commitment as 'a partisan, affective attachment to the goals and values of an 
organization, to one's role 
in relation to the goals and values, and to the organization for its own sake'; a more explicit definition 
goes to Ghemawat's (1991) claim that commitment remains 
'the tendency of strategies to persist over time. ' 
2 Although individuals can never just happen to become 'committed' in that they must be committed to some conception which 
can be either wordily expressible or 
inexpressible, it logically seems reasonable that the cause lurking behind organizational 
commitment could well 
be a combination of (a), (b), and (c). 
3 For example, one may have something the concept of which may 
be distinct from it; one may also have the concept of 
something which does not exist; one may even 
have the concept of nothing, the thinking of which becomes totally different from 
thinking of nothing. 
4 For example, no one can commit others to 
Communism, Socialism, or Capitalism. 
5 Ayer (1950) says that scientific method 'could be irrational only if there were a standard of rationality which it failed to meet: 
whereas in fact it goes to set the standard; arguments are 
judged to be rational or irrational by reference to it. ' 
6 The all-embracing rationality must be completely abandoned simply 
because the diversity of nature dictates that what is true 
for some can be not true for others. 
7 However, the explanations derived from sociological and psychological domain may only be valid within sociology or 
psychology given the 
fact that sociologist or psychologists may disagree among themselves about what count as an adequate 
explanation in their 
disciplines. 
8 For example, a number of questionnaires 
including Mowday's (1979) Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) have 
been developed to measure the various aspects or theories of commitment, 
but most measures have tended to concentrate on 
affective commitment 
(Arnold et al, 1993). 
9 This is because (Klein, 1987), according to the 
intrinsic satisfaction model, commitment can derive directly from ownership 
and it should be proportional 
to the amount of stock individuals hold; commitment, according to the extrinsic satisfaction model, 
should also be proportional 
to the degree of financial gain an individual realizes or has the potential to realize as a function of 
holding stock in the company; commitment, according to the 
instrumental satisfaction model, is doomed to increase with the 
advent of individual ownership 
in that partial ownership increases the actual or perceived influence that an individual has in 
decision-making within the organization. 
10 This is because individuals expect to benefit either financially or in terms of their ability to influence decisions or both. 
" In essence, research into persistence as a 
form of commitment coalesces around the idea that history matters, that an 
organization is conditioned and 
constrained by its past. Industrial economists, academics in business policy and strategy experts 
may use different terminologies - resources, competence, capabilities, and administrative 
heritage, etc., but they all suggest 
organizational commitment of one 
kind or another, some thing which is deep-seated and hard to change (i. e. history-dependent). 
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14. On Strategic Control Of Investment, - 
14.1 Introduction 
Two notions, strategy and cybernetics, have dominated management studies for the last three 
decades (Dermer, 1988; Berry et al, 1995), with strategy being normally described as 
management's definition of what organizations should be doing, and control as being effected 
cybernetically, by means of goal-related feedback and feedforward. However, the emergence of 
new inquiring systems has brought forth alternative portraits for both strategy and control. 
Take the teleological woridview, for example, organizations are believed to be made up of a 
variety of stakeholders each striving to satisfy their wants amidst a host of conflicts of varying 
levels (e. g. Ackoff, 1967,1981; Emery, 1981; Churchman, 1961; The Economist, 1996). Thus, 
from this point of view, strategy derives from organizational struggles between `divergence' and 
`convergence' (e. g. Churchman, 1961; Ackoff, 1961) rather than being the prerogative of top 
management (Storey, 1983), and control results from the collectivity of interactions of differing 
organizational actors rather than the creation of an overall designer (e. g. Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985; Dermer, 1988; Johnson, 1987). 
Thus the relationship between strategy and control should not only be described, as conventional 
wisdom dictates, with a focus on administrative planning and control systems (Ansoff, 1979) in 
order to realise strategic change, but also be considered, in the light of experimentalist 
viewpoints, within a frame which embraces many important dimensions (e. g. operational, 
psychological, phenomenological, and physical) of organizational reality such as collective 
perceptions and cognitive biases of decision makers - as well as social, technological, 
environmental, economic and political factors (e. g. Schwenk, 1984; Pettigrew, 1973; Pffeffer, 
1982) in that, these factors, according to the open systems theory, can equally affect the 
relationship between strategy and control (please see Figure 12-5). 
Furthermore, the change that takes place nowadays in both the internal and external 
circumstances of investments has become so complex and turbulent that it appears very 
necessary to reconsider what 
is coined as strategic control, which has been conventionally 
portrayed as something to do with ensuring conformity with the central organization-wide intent 
of top management. 
To manage investments effectively, organizations or individuals have to explicitly recognize 
that driving forces and/or constraints other than top management can shape strategic evolution 
or revolution, and that the effectiveness of 
investing becomes no longer goal-related but can and 
should be evaluated in terms of performance, development, and progress, all of which integrally 
contribute to the ultimate survival of organizations. 
To reflect the eight perspectives outlined in Chapter one (i. e. Q1-1 to Q1-8), to combine the 
macro-themes of the study of this researcher (i. e. Q6-1, Q6-2 and Q6-3) in Chapter 6, and to 
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make use of the issues raised earlier in the thesis (e. g. Q4-1 to Q4-33, Table 5-6, Figure 2-1 to 
Figure 2-4, Figures 3-1&2, Figure 5-1, Table 5-4, Q6-4 to Q6-8, QB6-1 to QB6-8, Q8-1 to Q8-8, 
and QR8-1 to QR8-3), this part of the thesis aims to explore the nature of strategy-making and 
of control in relation to investments and to articulate criteria for successful strategic control of 
investment. In terms of structure, this part of the thesis starts from the theoretical exploration of 
strategy-making in practice; it then turns to useful conceptual frameworks of control, discusses 
effective strategic control of investments in terms of factors leading to successful controllership, 
and proposes a meta-principle of strategic control that unifies various forms of organizational 
commitment; and finally closes by offering 36 recommendations for future practice or research. 
14.2 The aspects of strategy 
Historically, the organizational strategy field within the decision-making frame has been broken 
into two discrete sub-fields (Collis and Montgomery, , 
1997): namely, business level strategy 
which focuses on competitive advantage within an industry (e. g. Porter, 1980), and corporate 
strategy which focuses on the overall plan for managing a diversified enterprise (e. g. Porter, 
1987). In this thesis, however, the term organizational strategy is used to cover both but it 
essentially focuses on business level strategies. 
14.2.1 Organizational strategy: the connotations 
The term strategy, per se, being one of the most ill-defined in the management vocabulary, has a 
wide range of connotations (e. g. 
Chandler, 1962; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980,1985, 
1987; Newman and Logan, 1971; Quinn, 1980; Ackoff, 1974; Hamel, 1996; Ansoff, 1979, 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Ghemawat, 1991), and generally refers to a plan designed for a 
particular purpose, or the process of planning something 
in a skilful way, or the process of 
carrying out some action 
in a skilful way (Hornby, 1995). 
To complicate matters, strategy has been particularly referred to a plan, the end product of 
strategy formulation 
(e. g. Newman and Logan, 1971), to the attainment of organizational 
objectives (e. g. Ackoff, 
1974),, to the means such as the allocation of resources for an 
organization to achieve certain ends 
(e. g. Hofer and Schendel, 1978), to a formal logic which 
threads the business activities (e. g. Ansoff, 1979), to organizational purposes (e. g. Quinn, 1980), 
to competitive positioning 
(e. g. Porter, 1985), to incremental evolution (e. g. Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985), to a game which people play (Stacey, 1993), to a label which applies to patterns 
in action (Coad, 1995), and to revolution whereby an organization 
breaks the rules which dictate 
the current market competition 
(e. g. Hamel, 1996). 
Nonetheless, there have been several attempts (e. g. Hax and Majluf, 1991; Whittington, 1997; 
Collis and Mongomery, 1997) aiming to unify the varying dimensions. For instance, Hax and 
Majluf (1991) propose a comprehensive definition that, (a) organizational strategy is a coherent, 
unifying and integrative pattern of 
decisions, (b) organizational strategy determines and reveals 
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the organizational purpose in terms of long-term objectives, action programmes and resource 
allocation priorities, (c) organizational strategy selects the business the organization is in or is to 
be in, (d) organizational strategy attempts to achieve a long-term sustainable advantage in each 
of its businesses, by responding properly to the opportunities and threats in the firm's 
environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations, (e) organizational strategy 
engages all the hierarchical levels (be it corporate, business and functional) of the firm, and (f) 
organizational strategy defines the nature of the economic and non-economic contributions it 
intends to make to its stakeholders. 
14.2.2 Organizational strategy: the theories 
It has been argued (e. g. Mills and Snow, 1978) that theories of strategy, as actual short-cuts to 
organizational action, save the management from going back to first principles at each decision 
stage. Although they can be dangerous if the management have left the underlying assumptions 
hidden (Argyris, 1977), theories of strategy remain generally very important in that they can 
indicate what to look out for, what the first steps the management should take, and what to 
expect as a result of organizational actions (Andrews, 1971). 
Generically speaking, there are four basic theories of strategy as can been seen depicted in 
Figure 14-1, along two contextually sufficient but fundamentally different dimensions - i. e. 
outcomes of strategy and the processes 
by which it is made (please see Figure 2-1); namely, they 
are: (a) classic, (b) evolutionary, 
(c) processual and (d) systematic (Whittington, , 1997), with 
each category enjoying some unique characteristics which 
have been summed up in. Table 14-1. 
Figure 14-1: Theories of strategy: an overview (Source: Adapted from Whittington, 1997) 
Deliberate 
Systematic Classic 
Granovetter (1985) Ansoff (1965,1991) 
Marris (1964) Chandler (1962) 
Knights & Morgan (1991) Porter (1980,1985) N 
omes 
co 
Outcomes > co Processual N Evolutionary 
Mintzberg (1978,1987) 
°J 
Hannan & Freeman (1988) 
o 
Hamel & Prahalad (1989) ß+ Peters (1992) 
Cyert & March (1963) Williamson (1991) 
Emergent 
Table 14-1: Characteristics of organizational strategies (Source: Adapted from Whittington, 1997) 
Theories Classic 
Evolutionary Processual Systematic 
Key approach 
Formal Efficient Crafted Embedded 
Key rationale Profit-maximisation 
Survival Vague Local 
Key focus Internal (plans) 
External (markets) Internal (politics/ cognition) External (social) 
Ky processes Analytical 
Darwinian Bargaining / learning Social 
Key influences Economics 
/ military Economics / biology Psychology Sociology 
Kev period 
19Gds 1980s 1970s 1990s 
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The classic theorists (e. g. Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Sloan, 1963; Porter, 1980,1985) 
propose that profitability remains the supreme goal of organizations and rational planning the 
means to achieve it. Classic theories of strategy place great confidence in the readiness and 
capacity of decision-makers (Chandler, 1962), who are equipped with an abundant technology 
of matrices, formulae and flowcharts (Ansoff, 1965), to adopt the profit-maximization dogma 
through rational long term planning (Sloan, 1963). 
The evolutionary theorists (e. g. Hannan and Freeman, 1988; Friedman, 1953; Pelikan, 1989; 
Peters, 1992; Williamson, 1991), by paralleling economic competition and the nature of the laws 
of the jungle, posit that it will be only the best performers that survive no matter what methods 
decision-makers adopt (Hannan and Freeman, 1988), thus not necessarily prescribing rational 
planning methods but expecting markets to be sought - such as product market, managerial 
labour market, capital market and the market for corporate control - to secure profit 
maximization (Pelikan, 1989). Evolutionary theories of strategy place less confidence in top 
management's ability to plan and act rationally (Friedman, 1953), ' but, instead, rely on markets 
to choose the prevailing strategies within a particular environment (Williamson, 1991). 
The processual theorists (e. g. Mintzberg, 1978,1987; Pettigrew, 1973; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; Hamel, 1996), while generally sharing the evolutionary scepticism 
about rational strategy-making, remain less confident about markets ensuring profit-maximising 
outcomes, and claim that it is to the very imperfections of organizational and market processes 
that decision-makers owe their strategies and competitive advantages. Processual theories of 
strategy propose that the best processual advice on effective strategy is' not to strive after the 
unattainable ideal of rational 
fluid action (Cyert and March, 1963) but to accept and work with 
the world as it is (Cyert and March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973). Processual theories of strategy also 
posit that what matters 
in strategy is the long term construction and consolidation of distinctive 
internal competences rather than the fluid externally oriented pursuit of opportunities (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1989; Hamel, 
1996). 
The systematic theorists (e. g. Marris, 1964; 
Granovetter, 1985; Knights and Morgan, 1991), 
while still retaining 
faith in the capacity of organizations to plan forward and to act effectively 
within organization-specific environments, challenge 
the universality of any theory of strategy. 
Systematic theories of strategy propose that decision-makers are not simply detached calculating 
individuals interacting in purely economic transactions, but people who are rooted deeply in 
densely interwoven social systems (Granovetter, 1985), and thus, the objectives of strategy plus 
the mode of strategy depend on the strategists' social characteristics and the social context 
within which they operate 
(Marris, 1964; Knights and Morgan, 1991). 
The implications of the theories of strategy can be seen as follows (Whittington, 1997): classic 
theories of strategy indicate that strategy 
is best made through rational analysis undertaken at 
one remove from the 
hurly-burly of the business battlefield itself; evolutionary theories of 
strategy posit that strategists, as Darwinists, need to keep their options open rather than 
investing heavily in any single strategic plan which can court disaster; the processual theories of 
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strategy posit that effective strategy emerges through bargaining or learning, directly from 
intimate involvement in daily operations; and the systemic theories of strategy suggest that 
successful strategies have to be sociologically efficient and maintain appropriate to particular 
social contexts. 
14.2.3 Organizational strategy: the major themes 
It seems evident (e. g. Coad, 1995) that, although the word strategy has been used in different 
ways and in different contexts, the diverse descriptions of strategy can be roughly catalogued 
into three major themes: namely, (a) position, (b) process, and (c) the match between position 
and process. The theme of position (e. g. Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1985) involves the 
identification of where organizations or individuals locate themselves in their ever-changing 
environment and concerns such conceptions as market niche, product-market domain, and 
competitive position. The theme of process (e. g. Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1979) concentrates on 
the way strategy is formed and implemented and links to conceptions such as rationality and 
behaviour. The theme of the match between position and process (e. g. Stacey, 1993) explores 
the overlap between the themes of position and process in the strategy literature as can be 
especially reflected in strategy related questions such as `why strategy arises'. and `who is 
involved in strategy' (Coad, 1995). 
The idea that strategy remains a version of positional analysis is concerned with the status of an 
organization relative to competition and other aspects of the environment in which the 
organization operates. Strategy can be described as a match (e. g. Hofer and Schendel, 1978) 
between varying organizational contexts (e. g. internal and external): strategy becomes an 
environmental niche in an ecological sense, a place where `rent' 
is generated in an economic 
sense, a product-market domain where resources are concentrated 
in a managerial sense (Coad, 
1995). Thus, in this line, strategy is universal in that all organizations can be said to have a 
strategy which helps 
identify where they locate themselves in their operating environment, 
although the match itself 
(say, between their resources and their operating environment) may (or 
may not) be explicit or well 
developed (Hofer and Schendel, 1978). 
The idea that strategy remains a version of process analysis is preoccupied with the way 
organizational strategy 
is formed and implemented, leaving what is being decided (such as the 
business unit, the organization and its population) as the province of positional analysis 
(Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1979; Andrews, 1971). Strategy, in this line, is thus largely concerned 
with individuals or groups 
in the organizations, by means of logical or behavioural rationales 
(Coad, 1995). 
The idea that strategy remains a version of analysis of the match between position and process 
does not surface until the distinction 
between the two major themes of position and process has 
been at least theoretically weakened. Nowadays 
it becomes accepted among most scholars that, 
the content of any strategy tends to 
be affected by the processes whereby the strategy is 
developed and implemented, and that each process per se can be equally likely to be affected by 
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the content and outcomes of previous strategic decisions. Thus, it seems less surprising that 
some positioning strategies such as Miles and Snow's (1978) analysis (characterised by 
prospectors, analysers, defenders, and reactors) have implied a search for organizational 
processes, while some prescriptions for the processes of strategy such as Andrews'(1971) 
identifying exploitable opportunities in a given environment have inferred a search for 
competitive positions such as environmental niches. 
14.2.4 Organizational strategy: a simple model 
The three major themes of strategy (i. e. position, process, and match between position and 
process) - perhaps, especially the overlap (i. e. the match between two traditional competing 
themes of strategy (i. e. position and process)) - has been well exploited by Stacey's (1993) 
simple model of the strategy concept (Figure 14-2) whereby strategy is considered as a game 
which organizations play consisting of patterns in actions past or yet to come. One of the 
beauties of Stacey's (1993) model lies in the fact that strategy is personalised, as opposed to the 
conventional wisdom of strategy which traditionally infers an objective reality in which 
organizations move in response to changes in the environment (Glaister and Thwaites, 1993), by 
referring organizations and their environments to groupings of individuals interacting with one 
another so that the dynamics which dictate the ultimate success or failure of organizations (i. e. 
the moves, countermoves as well as further responses by, inter- and intra-organizational players, 
which may not be physically touched or felt), are to be surely taken into consideration. 
Figure 14-2: The strategy concept: a simple model (Source: Adapted from Stacey, 1993) 
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To illustrate (Figure 14-2), one can see the gaming process of strategy in such a fashion whereby 
people both within and outside an organization operating 
in a given environment interact 
through a series of feedback loops (which bring forth the discovery of opportunities, the 
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decisions on how to respond, and the actions to ensure arrival) that all organizations get 
controlled and developed: it starts at the time slice T,; at the time slice T, +;, decision makers in 
organization X start to engage in some course of action (e. g. an investment) which they discover 
to be potentially beneficial in the environment in which organization X operates, people in 
organization X choose how to respond to the opportunity and then act on that choice; at the time 
slice Ti+2, other people who also work or live in the environment in which organization X 
operates (e. g. notably, competitors and stakeholders), will undergo the consequences of 
organization X's actions and then correspond to those consequences according to their 
perceptions of the actions of people in organization X, by choosing how to respond and acting 
upon their choices; and the game goes on and on. In this sense, organizational strategy remains a 
continuous synthesis followed by a series of action and reaction with knowledge and experience 
themselves accumulating from time to time. 
14.2.5 Organizational strategy: the strategy-making processes 
From Figure 14-2 and Table 14-1, it is not difficult to see that the strategy-making process is a 
gaming process. That is, the whole process of strategy-making remains a process of a game of 
either analytical, bargaining, learning, Darwinian or social nature (see Table 14-1 in particular). 
In practice, however, the picture of the game can differ significantly dependent upon the 
constituent components and/or parameters of the game, itself (Table 14-2), including (a) who are 
playing (i. e. the players), (b) how the game can be played (i. e. the available courses of action), 
(c) what conditions surround the game situation (i. e. the choice environment), (d) what purposes 
the game has been aimed to achieve (i. e. the possible outcomes), plus (e) why the game should 
be played (i. e. the probability of choice of action), (f) how well the game can be played (e. g. the 
efficiency of an action for an outcome), (g) why the game should be played in a particular way 
(e. g. the relative value of outcomes), and (h) to what degree the aims of the game can be 
achieved (e. g. the probability of outcomes). 
Table 14-2: Elements of gaming: a tentative approach 
No Components / Parameters Summarising questions Some leading dimensions 
1. The individual or game player Who are playing? Central actors, Champions, Influential 
sources, Influential authority 
2. The choice environment What conditions surround the game Environment, Organizations 
situation? 
3. The available courses of actions How the game can be played? Basic process, Strategy content, 
Vocabulary 
4. The possible outcomes What purposes the game has been Generic outcomes, Intended message, 
aimed to achieve? Realized message 
5 The efficiency of an action for an outcome How well the game can be played? Leadership 
6. The probability of choice of action Why the game should be played? (Most likely) Period, Change 
7. The relative value of outcomes Why the game should be played in a (Best fit) Situation 
particular way? 
8. The probability of outcomes To what degree the aims of the (Potential) Status, (Implicitly 
game can be achieved? favoured) Structure, 
To draw a clearer or more comprehensive picture, Table 14-3 is employed, in the light of the 
experimentalists' view of 
the strategy-making process as illustrated above (Table 14-2), to 
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portray this gaming process; and the strategy-making process is considered in Table 14-3 as 
consisting of eighteen dimensions corresponding to the eight questions which in turn are in 
parallel to the eight elements of strategy-making processes as described in Table 14-2. The 
eighteen dimensions are central actors, champions, influential authorities, influential sources, 
organizations, strategy content, change, environment, basic process, vocabulary, intended 
message, realized message, generic outcomes, leadership, (most likely) period, (best fit) 
situation, (implicitly favoured) structure, and (potential) status (Table 14-3). 
Table 14-3: Organizational strategy as clarified by strategy-ma{dng processes (Soutee: Adapted from Mintberg, 1990) 
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Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
14.2.5.1 Strategy-making as a conceptual process 
The conceptual processists of the design school (e. g. Andrews, 1971; ' Selznick, 1957; 
Christensen et al, 1982; Newman, 1951; Ohmae, 1982) consider organizational strategy as a 
process of capturing a successful match between qualifications and opportunity that positions an 
organization in its environment. 
The fully evident or implicitly recognized basic premises underlying the conceptual process 
include that, (a) strategy formation remains a controlled, conscious process of thought, (b) the 
responsibility for the control and consciousness rests with the CEO and the CEO is the sole 
strategist, (c) the model of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal in that 
elaboration will kill it, (d) strategies remain unique and the best ones result from a process of 
creative design, (e) strategies emerge from this process full-blown, (f) these strategies should be 
made explicit and possibly articulated (i. e. to be kept simple), and (g) only after the unique, full- 
blown, explicit and simple strategies are fully formulated can they then be implemented 
(Christensen et al, 1982). 
The critique of the conceptual processists has included a number of grounds: (a) the use of other 
theories including the findings on the incremental aspects of strategy-making process is virtually 
dismissed, (b) the relevance of the model could go out of context, and (c) ý having to make 
strategy explicit actually promotes inflexibility (Quinn, 1980; Mintzberg, 1990). 
It has been well argued (Mintzberg, 1990) that the conceptual process of strategy-making 
maintains a set of concepts - such as distinctive competence and fit - which infuse strategic 
management and can be best used in the reconception periods during which organizations come 
out of a time of contextual change into one of new stability. 
14.2.5.2 Strategy-making as a formal process 
The formal processists of the plan school (e. g. Ansoff, 1965,1979,1987; Malmlow, 1972; 
Jelinek, 1979) consider organizational strategy as a process of generating synthesis by analysis, 
treating planning not just an approach to strategy formation but also a virtual religion to be 
promulgated with the fervour of missionaries. 
The basic premises underlying the formal process include that, (a) strategy formation should be 
of controlled, conscious and formal process, decomposed into distinct steps, each delineated by 
checklists and supported by techniques, (b) responsibilities for the overall process rests with the 
CEO in principle and the responsibility for its execution rests with the staff planners in practice, 
and (c) strategies emerge 
from the process full blown, to be explicated so that they can then be 
implemented through detailed attention to objectives, budgets, and operating schedules of 
various kinds (Ansoff, 1965; Mintzberg, 1990). 
The critique of the formal processists covers a number of grounds: (a) plans are sometimes 
useless in that the planning process is always indispensable, (b) the pitfalls of planning exist that 
planning has lacked the proper managerial support or a climate congenial to its practice, (c) 
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planning can, under certain circumstance, impede the commitment necessary for effective 
strategic management, (d) while being aimed to deal with change and especially with turbulent 
environments, planning is in fact used in organizations to set direction but not to encourage 
change, and (e) planning promotes the pitfall of politicized climates, i. e. the grand fallacy that 
analysis provides synthesis, which itself consists of the fallacies of predetermination, 
detachment and formalization (Quinn, 1980; Newman, 1951; Steiner, 1979; 1983; Mintzberg, 
1990). 
It has been held (e. g. Mintzberg, 1979; Jelinek, 1979) that, with formal processists being both 
analysts or catalysts, the formal process of strategy-making can be effectively used to program 
organizational strategies by first codifying them, then elaborating and translating them into ad 
hoc programmes and routine plans or budgets, and finally using them for the purpose of 
communication and control, and that, when change seems dramatic or organizations function 
with varying forms of -structure (e. g. that of entrepreneurs and/or intrapreneurs), the formal 
process can be best relied on in conjunction with other forms of strategy-making processes (e. g. 
the looser forms first, the left-handed planners second, and the right-handed planners last). ' 
14.2.5.3 Strategy-making as an analytical process 
The analytical processists of the positioning school (e. g. Suntzi, 1992; von Clausewitz, 1962a, 
1962b; Schoeffler et al, 1974; Porter, 1980,1985,1987) consider organizational strategy as a 
process of delineating categories of strategy and matching them to the contexts which seem 
most suitable, by emphasizing on strategies themselves more than the process by which they are 
to be formulated and by focusing on the content of strategies' 
The recognized premises underlie the analytical process include: (a) strategies are generic, 
specifically common, tangible positions 
in the marketplace, (b) the marketplace is economic and 
competitive, (c) the strategy 
formation process is thus one of analytical selection based upon 
calculation, (d) strategies as positions 
lead to other types of strategies (e. g. functional), 
sometimes within clusters which 
define generic type `strategic group' of organizations within 
industries, (e) analysts play a significant role in this process, feeding the results of their 
calculations to managers who officially control 
the choices, and (f) strategies therefore emerge 
from this process full blown and are then calculated and implemented, and therefore market 
structure dictates positional strategies which 
dictate other strategies which dictate organizational 
structures which determine performance 
(Porter, 1980; Mintzderg, 1990). 
The critiques of the analytical processists 
include: (a) the separation of thinking from action 
places undue emphasis on strategy-making as a 
deliberate process and thereby slights the 
importance of strategic learning, (b) the strategy-making process can be undermined by the 
fallacies of predetermination, detachment, and formalization, (c) the focus of the strategy- 
making process is narrow 
in that it is biasedly oriented to the economic and quantifiable as 
opposed to the social, political or even non-quantifiable, 
(d) the context of the analytical process 
has been biased towards traditional, big established organizations, (e) a conceptual schism exists 
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that organizations can be advised to conduct formal analyses under conditions of relative 
stability but also to focus attention on the dynamic aspect of strategic positioning, (f) that the 
narrowness of the analytical process in favour of calculation can impede not only learning and 
creativity but also commitment required, and (g) the analytical process tends to have a narrow 
focus, with strategy being seen as generic position, not unique perspective (e. g. Channon, 1977; 
Mintzberg, 1990). 
It has been suggested that the analytical process can be"effectively oriented toward mass 
products and services in more mature segments, especially during the period of recalculation 
when changes of position can take place within given perspectives (Mintzberg, 1990). 
14.2.5.4 Strategy-making as a visionary process 
The visionary processists of the entrepreneurial school (e. g. Schumpeter, 1934; Meindl et al, 
1985; Cole, 1959). seeing personalized leadership based on strategic vision as the key to 
organizational success and the initiative of the visionary leader as the means to overall growth, 
consider organizational strategy as a process of maximizing profit in visionary response to the 
dictates of a competitive market, by not only focusing the strategy-making process exclusively 
on entrepreneurial leaders but also stressing the most innate of mental state and processes - 
notably, intuition, judgment, wisdom, experience, and insight. 
The fundamental premises underlying the visionary process embrace: (a) strategy exists in the 
mind of the single leader as perspective, specifically, as a sense of long-term direction, a vision 
of the organization's future, (b) the strategy-making process is semiconscious at best, rooted in 
the experience and intuition of the leader, (c) the entrepreneurial leader maintains close control 
of the implementation as well as the formulation of the vision, binding the two together tightly 
through personalized feedback on actions, (d) the strategic vision is therefore malleable as is the 
leaders' organization, a simple structure responsive to their directives, and (e) the 
entrepreneurial strategy tends to take the form of niche, one or more pockets of market positions 
protected from the forces of outright competition (e. g. Cole, 1959; Mintzberg, 1990). 
The main critique of the visionary processists include:, (a) visionary processists wrap up 
strategy-making in the vision of a single individual but can hardly really tell much about what 
the process is, and (b) visionary processists seldom come to grips with the fact that the 
behaviours - which are glorious and energizing to some - can become pathological and even 
deadening to others (e. g. Mintzberg, 1990). 
It has been proposed (e. g. Cole, 1959; Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982) that the visionary process can be better exploited in start-up or turnaround 
situations in which 
forceful leadership and rich vision are needed (especially in the sustained 
small sized organizations). 
4 
14.2.5.5 Strategy-making as a mental process 
The mental processists of the cognitive school (e. g. Simon, 1957a, 1957b, 1987; Nystrom, 1979; 
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Tverskey and Kahneman, 1974; March and Simon, 1957; Bruner et al, 1956; Pondy and Huff, 
1985; Wissema et al, 1980), viewing strategy-making as a set of collective activities initiated by 
individual brains, consider strategy as a process of getting at what strategy-making actually 
means in the sphere of human cognition, by examining at least four aspects of cognitive 
psychology including perception - how the strategists get informed (Simon, 1957a, 1957b; 
Tverskey and Kahneman, 1974; March and Simon, 1957), concept attainment - how the strategy 
itself forms (e. g. Bruner et al, 1956), reconception - how the strategy changes (e. g. Pondy and 
Huff, 1985), and strategic style - how strategists differ in terms of cognitive orientations (e. g. 
Wissema et al, 1980). 
The premises underlying the mental processes embrace: (a) strategy-making remains a cognitive 
process which takes place in the mind of the strategists, (b) strategies are perspectives or 
concepts which form in the mind of the strategists, (c) the strategists' environment is complex 
and their cognitive capabilities are limited by comparison so that the receipt of information 
becomes restricted and biased and the strategy-making process can be distorted, (d) strategies 
can remain dynamic in that, specifically, they can be difficult to attain in the first place, 
considerably less than non-optimal when attained and subsequently difficult to change when no 
longer viable, and (e) strategists can vary significantly in styles depending on individual 
cognitive makeups (Mintzberg, 1990). 
The major critiques of the mental processists include: (a) given that strategy-making remains a 
cognitive process particularly 
in the attainment of concepts, cognitive psychology has yet to 
adequately address the questions of prime 
interest to strategy-making such as how concepts 
actually form in the mind of a strategist, and 
(b) though it remains interesting and informative to 
learn about distortions in the strategy-making process, strategists' understanding itself can risk 
becoming distorted when phenomena such as experimental wisdom, creative insight, and 
intuitive synthesis are ignored (Sperry, 1974; Mintzberg, 1990). ' 
It has been concluded that viewing strategy-making as a mental process reminds strategists that 
strategies can vary 
in their cognitive orientations with significant consequences for the strategies 
pursued (Simon, 1993), and 
it has also been suggested (Mintzberg, 1978; 1990) that, as soon as 
the mental process is concerned, attention needs to 
be drawn to particular stages in the strategy- 
making process, notably the periods of original conception and reconception, and especially the 
period of clinging to existing strategies 
due to cognitive fixation (Mintzberg, 1978). 
14.2.5.6 Strategy-making as an emergent process 
The emergent processists of the 
learning school (e. g. Lindblom, 1959; Quin, 1980; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Bower, 1971; Weick, 1979) consider strategy as a process of learning over time, 
viewing strategy-making as a set of sometimes 
individual but more often collective activities 
with unintended order emerging 
from strategists' knowing a context and the' organization's 
capability of dealing with 
it to the organization's converging on patterns of behaviour which 
work in practice. 
In essence treating strategy-making as emerging is regarding organizations as 
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learning systems (e. g. Argyris, 1976; Normann, 1977) by which organizations learn. Learning 
can take place by means of disjointed incrementalism under the umbrella of which strategy- 
making becomes a never-ending process of successful steps in which continual nibbling of many 
actors maintains a substitute for a good bite (Lindblom, 1968). Learning can also take place 
though logical incrementalism by which strategy-making becomes the constant integration (of 
the central actors who aim to promote politically a strategic vision which itself is undergoing 
change and improvement) of the simultaneous incremental processes of strategy formulation and 
implementation (Quinn, 1980). Learning can take place through emergencism in terms of, say, 
strategic initiatives under which strategy-making becomes an emergent process of learning 
involving multiple strategic actors functioning in varying levels of the hierarchy (Bower, 1970). 6 
Learning can also be obtained by emergencism though retrospection under which strategy- 
making remains a process of learning involving the interface of thought and action as actors 
reflect on what they have done (Weick, 1979). ' 
The emerging premises which underlie the emergent processes include: (a) the complex and 
dynamic organizational environment coupled with the diffusion in the organization of its 
knowledge base for strategy-making precludes deliberate control, and thus, strategy-making 
must above all take the form of a process of learning over time, in which, at the limit, the 
formulation and the implementation of strategy become nearly indistinguishable, (b) there can 
be many potential strategists in most organizations because more commonly it is the collective 
system which learns although the leader must learn too and some times can be the sole learner, 
(c) the strategy-making process can proceed in emergent fashion through behaviours which 
stimulate thinking retrospectively in that strategies can take root in all kinds of strange ways and 
places often in response to external pressures and events, (d) the role of leadership lies in 
organizations' ability to manage the process of strategic learning rather than to preconceive 
deliberate strategies, (e) organizational strategies appear first as patterns out of the past and only 
later perhaps as deliberate plans for the future, ultimately perhaps as broader perspectives 
(Mintzberg, 1990). 
The main critiques of the emergent processists include: (a) emergent processes can run the risks 
of not being able to converge on a clear organizational strategy, (b) collective style of learn ing 
can prove cumbersome 
in dealing with certain types of strategic change, especially when 
considerable commitments are required, 
(c) incrementalism can lure organizations into positions 
they never intended via escalating commitment in that negative consequences of previous 
incremental action can encourage further commitment to recoup deployed resources, (d) 
organizations in crisis may not 
have the time to learn in a decentralized, incremental way, and 
they may be better off with strategic visions which are novel and tightly integrated (Mintzberg, 
1978; 1990). 
It can be concluded that the emergent processists have provided organizational strategists with 
greater understanding. 
For the emergent processists, slotting organizations into supposedly 
optimal strategy such as profit-maximization may prove ineffective because setting out to be in 
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total control may in fact forfeit control; while within what appears to be passive, reactive 
responses to external forces, organizations can actually learn and create and come up with novel 
and interesting strategies (Pascale, 1984). It has been suggested (e. g. Mintzberg, 1979; Grinyer 
and Spender, 1979) that the emergent processes might appear most commonly in organizations 
obsessed with adhocracies and professional bureaucracies, during periods of dramatic or 
unprecedented change in the environment, or on occasions when evolving strategic change is 
required due to the need for political manoeuvring. 
14.2.5.7 Strategy-making as a power process 
The power processists of the political school (e. g. Allison, 1971; Perrow, 1970; Pfeffer and 
Salanick, 1978), viewing strategy-making as internal politicalization, regard strategy as a 
process of exploiting power in other than purely economic ways (e. g. legitimate or illegitimate) 
by individuals or a group of individuals in an organization with regard to the internal 
environments or by organizations themselves with regard to their external environments. ' This 
means that, within an organization, different actors or a coalition of them with power are able to 
use political means which is outside the ordinarily acceptable ones of authority, expertise and 
ideology to vie with each other over outcomes by engaging in continual processes of bargaining 
or negotiating to produce series of outcomes which emerge as strategies (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Mintzberg, 1983), and that, within the operating environment, some organizations can function 
as political vehicles acting out of organization-specific self 
interest, in conflict or cooperation 
with other organizations in order to pursue clear, 
deliberate strategies of political nature by 
means of, say, integration, merger, cooperation, and even 
bankruptcy (Freeman, 1984; Astley, 
1984; Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978; Rheman, 1973; Mintzberg, 1983). 
The basic premises which underlie the power processes of strategy-making include: (a) the 
strategy-making process remains 
fundamentally political in that it is based on illegitimate or 
legitimate means and normally parochial ends which often generate conflict, whether reflecting 
actions by organizations 
(macro-politicalization) or focused within the organizations (micro- 
politicalization), (b) whether realized 
by deliberate plans or emergent patterns, political 
strategies are more 
likely to take the formed positions and especially ploys rather than 
perspectives, (c) there must 
be a number of actors who either vie with each other or challenge 
vulnerable central actors in a micro-political way to control organizational outcomes, (d) in 
macro politics, organizations promote 
their own individual welfare through aggressive 
deliberate strategies of a political nature, (e) micro politicalization tends to function well in 
times when major changes surface, either 
imposed on the organization externally or else arising 
internally as a result of the alignment of the organization's power system such as the rise of a 
previously weak source of 
influence or the breakdown of an established one, and (f) macro 
politicalization usually reflects 
the closed system nature of an organization, measured by its 
power relative to the external 
influencers surrounding it (Pettigrew, 1977; Cyert and March, 
1963; Mintzberg, 1990, Freeman, 1984; Astley, ý 1984; Pfefffer and Salanik, 1978; Rheman, 
1973; Mintzberg, 1983). 
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The major critiques of the power processists include: (a) the power processists can overstate the 
power related points in that strategy-making is not just only political, (b) organizational foci on 
divisiveness and fractionating can mislead organizations to bypass patterns which do form, even 
in rather conflictive situations, (c) the power process can give rise to severe problems of power 
and collusion in a society of large organizations or in an organization with a large number of 
power-equidistant actors, and (d) it hardly makes sense to regard strategy-making as a power 
process devoid of micro or macro political activities or games (Mintzberg, 1983,1990). 
It can be concluded that the power process of strategy-making can be better, exploited during 
periods of major change when power shifts and conflicts arise, or at the time of blockage when 
strategic change can not take place due to political intransigence, or on occasions of flux when 
organizations are unable to establish any clear direction but to rely on the form of a free-for-all 
(Pettigrew, 1977; Mintzberg, 1990). 
14.2.5.8 Strategy-making as an ideological process 
The ideological processists of the cultural school (e. g. Hedberg and Jonsson, 1977; Edwards, 
1977; Rhenman, 1973; Normann, 1977; Staw, 1976,1981; Westley, 1983; Allaire and Firsirotu, 
1985; Barney, 1986), linking strategy-making to organizational cultures, consider strategy as a 
process of collective cognition rooted in the 
integrated force of organizational ideologies. ' The 
ideological processes concern themselves largely with the influence of rich cultures in 
maintaining strategies and resisting strategic changes as well as provoking discussions about 
issues such as whether culture can be a source of sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 
1986), whether culture mediates between executive personality and strategy (Kets de Vries and 
Miller, 1986), and whether strategy making becomes associated with image-making (Westley, 
1983). 
The basic premises which underlie the ideological processes of strategy-making include: (a) 
strategy-making remains 
fundamentally a collective behavioural process based on the beliefs 
shared by the involved organizations' members, 
(b) strategy inevitably takes the form of 
perspective above all, not ploy or position, and maintains rooted 
in organizational intentions and 
reflected in patterns which make 
it deliberate, (c) control and coordination in the organization 
become largely normative under the influence of the shared beliefs, (d) given the importance of 
the internal belief system, the organization can appear to 
be proactive in comparison with an 
environment the influence of which 
tends to be passive and diffuse, and (e) cultures and 
ideologies tend to perpetuate existing strategies rather than encouraging strategic changes, at 
best allowing for shifts in position within the organization's overall strategic perspective 
(Dunbar et al, 1982; Mintzberg, 1990). 
The major critiques of the ideological processists 
include: (a) the ideological process of strategy- 
making can be faulted for practical conceptual vagueness, (b) the `hard' methods of social 
science can be bound 
to miss the point about a phenomenon as ethereal as culture, (c) the 
ideological process of strategy-making can promote stagnation in organizations in that to overly 
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emphasize tradition and consensus and characterize change as complex and difficult tends to 
discourage strategic revolution (Mintzberg, 1982,1990). 
It can be concluded that the idea that strategy can form from an ideological process promulgates 
organizations' history and thus strategy-making becomes the management of their collective 
cognition and organizational style. The ideological process of strategy-making seems obviously 
particularly applicable to `missionary' type organizations enjoying powerful ideologies; it also 
seems applicable to particular periods of an organization's life, especially ones of reinforcement 
in which rich strategic perspectives are pursued vigorously, or ones of resistance to change in 
which necessary strategic adaptation is blocked by the inertia of a given strategic perspective; it 
can also be used to help strategists understand periods of reframing during which new collective 
perspectives establish and even periods of cultural revolution which can be proven very 
effective in bringing forth strategic turnarounds. 
14.2.5.9 Strategy-making as a passive process 
The passive processists of the environmental school (e. g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Aldrich & 
Pfeffer, 1976), placing environment - which consists of a set of vague forces or kind'of an 
atmosphere which covers everything except organization - alongside leadership and 
organization as the central actors in the process of strategy-making, considers strategy as a 
process by which organizations 
do as the environment tells them so that strategy is 
environmentally conditioned and else such as strategic choice are `selected out' (Aldrich & 
Pfeffer, 1976). 
The premises of the passive processists include: (a) the environment dictates strategy by forcing 
organizations or their attributes 
into ecological-type niches and those which refuse to so adapt 
will eventually die, 
" (b) there is not any real internal strategist nor is there any internal strategy- 
making process, and leadership remains nothing 
but a myth", and (c) strategies are essentially 
niches or positions where organization are sustained as 
long as whatever nourishes them there 
has not run out (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Mintzberg, 1979,1990; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
The critique of the passive processists of the environmental school of strategy-making include: 
(a) the dimensions of the environment often appear to be delineated in an abstract or aggregated 
way despite the fact that strategy 
has to do with the selection of precise niches, (b) it can be 
difficult to tell how great the distance is at which organizational behaviour can be looked, or 
how relevant all this is for those practising and studying strategic management, and (c) to debate 
over the existence of strategic choice rather 
than to consider the conditions which enlarge or 
restrict its breadth will only constrain 
the choice itself (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Mintzberg, 
1990). '2 
It can be concluded that the passive processes encourage strategists to 
learn about the 
environments of organizations and especially about 
the various forms these may take, and to 
take account of the contexts 
in which the environmental ideas seem most applicable. It seems 
that the passive processes might 
be better exploited when an organization is at the niche stage of 
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its life cycle (Goold, 1980; Mintzberg, 1990). 
14.2.5.10 Strategy-making as an episodic process 
The episodic processists of the configurational school (e. g. Chandler, 1962; Miles & Snow, 
1978; Miller, 1982; Mintzberg, 1981,1983,1990; Popescu, 1965), focusing on typologies and 
episodes of various kinds (e. g. types of organizations, " kinds of environments in which 
organizations operate, and periods of history) ideally integrated into stages which are sequenced 
over time in life cycles, consider strategy as a chain of episodes - patterns in action which 
sustained themselves for identifiable periods of time (e. g. growth, flux, and continuity) - each at 
its own time, in its own place, and as an integrated phenomenon. 
The basic premises which underlie the episodic process of strategy-making include: (a) the 
behaviours of organizations are best described in configurational terms as distinct, integrated 
clusters of dimensions with regard to state and time, (b) strategy-making remains an episodic 
process, in which organizations of a particular type and form, which are matched to a particular 
type of environment, engages in a particular form, of the process for a distinguishable period of 
time, (c) the process can be conceptual, formal, analytical, visionary, mental, emergent, power, 
ideological, and passive; the resulting strategies can take the form of plans, patterns, ploys, 
positions, or perspectives; but each must come at its own time and with its own context, and (d) 
the periods of the clustered dimensions appear to sequence themselves over time in a patterned 
way in relation to the life cycles of strategy-making (Mintzberg, 1990; Popescu, 1965). 
The main critiques of the episodic process of the configurational school include: (a) to configure 
is to distort so as to explain, but distortion by means of categorisation can be arbitrary, (b) there 
is a lack of profundity of the work of the configurational school, and (c) the nuances of the 
messy world of strategy-making should not be ignored in that the richest forms of strategy- 
making can exist on the edges - i. e. outside of the pat categories, or beyond configuration 
(Mintzberg, 1989). 
It can be concluded that the episodic processists have brought order to the messy world of 
strategy-making by functioning as lumpers (who assume away nuanced variability to the benefit 
of overall clustering, ignoring outliers 
in favour of central tendencies, and thus seeing the world 
in terms of simple, integrated categories) - rather than splitters, who follow the principle of 
economy by isolating variables, 
laying them out along continuous scales, and then exploring the 
relationships between their pairs (Darwin, 1964). It has also been argued that strategy-making 
involves quantum change - the changing of many elements in coalignment in sharp contrast to 
piecemeal change - which can 
be very rapid or revolutionary rather than incremental although it 
really depends on how closely one 
looks and where (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Miller, 1982). 
However, the message concerning the episodic process is clear: organizations bide their time 
until they incrementally 
learn where to go and then they do leap in revolutionary fashion (Abell 
and Hammond, 1979), and as a result, organizations may witness long periods of the 
maintenance of a given configuration, and then become punctuated by brief periods of 
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multifaced and concerted transition to a new configuration (Miller and Mintzberg, 1984). 
14.2.6 Organizational strategy: the 'W' confusions 
For over half a century, there have been numerous debates among both practitioners and 
academics on strategy (e. g. Chandler, 1962; Sterner, 1979; Porter, 1980; Mintzberg, 1990,1994b; 
Ansoff, 1991,1994; Campbell and Alexander, 1997). However, most debates about strategic 
management have been ended up with nothing more than a bunch of new-business concepts - 
such as competence, portfolio, competitive advantage, and stages - which might have at best 
enriched the literature of strategy management. 14 It becomes evident that those debates over the 
years have hardly solved any of the rooted problems, but they have instead created a dozen of 
confusions for organizational strategies. 
A quick browse at Table 14-3 suggests that, apparently, there are at least twelve major `W' 
confusions worthy of attention, which can be mainly and directly linked to the when, where, 
who and which (ways) paradigms, viz., the confusions of purpose, thinking, structure, style, 
source, complexity, choice, genericness, collectiveness, integration, change, and control. 
The confusions of purpose reflect why organizations need strategy: some organizations pursue 
strategy for consistency. via the mental, ideological, or passive process; some organizations 
pursue strategies to achieve progress via the visionary or process; and others pursue strategies to 
reconcile conflicting forces in order to achieve a balanced cycle of convergence and divergence 
via the formal, emergent or episodic process. 
The confusions of thinking stand for how much strategic thinking organizations need: the mental 
processists claim that strategists overwhelmingly need thinking so as to promote inspiration and 
insights; the conceptual, formal, and analytical processists admit that thinking remains necessary; 
the power and ideological processists claim that strategists can benefit from strategic thinking; 
the emergent processists prefer little thinking but more acting; and, the passive processists claim 
that strategic thinking is unnecessary. 
The confusions of style reflect where the power is generated: the conceptual and formal 
processists admit that organizational strategy powers from rationalizers; the mental processists 
prefer human cognition, the visionary processists prefer individualists such as innovators; the 
emergent processists claim that power comes 
from demystifiers; the passive processists argue 
that strategy powers from splitters; and, the episodic processists declare that organizational 
power comes from lumpers. 
The confusions of structure reflect how strategies are realized or implemented: the conceptual, 
formal, and analytical processists tend to believe that `structure follows strategy'; the visionary, 
ideological, and power processists appear to believe that `strategy follows structure'; the mental 
processists may claim that there 
is no relationship between strategy and structure; and the 
passive and episodic processists might claim that strategy and structure remain inextricably 
reciprocal so that `strategy may 
follow structure and structure may follow strategy'. 
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The confusions of source represent where new strategies could come from: organizations can 
develop their strategies by doing via the emergent process, by thinking via conceptual or 
visionary process, by programming via formal process, by calculating via analytical process, by 
disputing via power process, and by useless waiting via passive process. 
The confusions of complexity stand for how complex a good strategy should be: while the 
conceptual, formal, and analytical processes demand that strategy be simple; the visionary 
process requires that strategy remains simple but dynamic; the emergent process demands that 
strategy be complex; other processes are expected to be in between simple and complex. 
The confusions of choice represent how much choice organizations have to make strategy: the 
passive processists claim that strategic choice belongs to the environment which is dominated by 
uncertainty and literately organizational strategists have no choice; the mental and ideological 
processists claim that every choice can be possibly obtained; the formal, analytical,, and power 
processists claim that much choice can be smartly plucked; the emergent processists claim that 
choice correlates to'learning over time; and, the conceptual and visionary processists maintain 
that strategists have every possible choice. 
The confusions of genericness stand for how generic a good strategy should be: while the 
analytical processists regard strategies as very generic; the passive and power processists (macro) 
regard strategies as somewhat generic; and, the conceptual, visionary and ideological processists 
consider strategies as unique. 
The confusions of collectiveness represent who the strategists or actors are: while the conceptual 
and visionary processes declare that strategy is championed by single actors; the mental, power, 
and ideological processes demand that strategy is co-championed by more than one actor; and, 
the passive, formal, analytical and mental processes maintain that strategy is championed by the 
environmental forces, some techniques, certain analyses, or biological brain, respectively. 
The confusions of integration represent how tightly a good strategy should be integrated: the 
analytical, power, formal, and emergent processists are in favour of loose integration, and the 
visionary, ideological and conceptual processists prefer tight integration. It also represents the 
ways by which a good strategy should be integrated: cognition and vision can be mentally 
integrated, culture can be normatively integrated, and mutual adjustment can be collectively 
integrated. 
The confusions of change reflect how frequently strategy should change: the formal process 
prefers concurrent change; the power process prefers frequent change whenever new challenge 
arises; the emergent process prefers constant change; the ideological and mental processes 
prefers rare change; and, the passive process prefers no change at all. 
The confusions of control reflect how much control organizations should exert on their strategy- 
making: the conceptual, 
formal, analytical, and perhaps visionary processists prefer aggressive 
control; the mental processists 
doubt about the role of control in strategy-making; the emergent 
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processists disfavour deliberate control but promote emergent control; the power processists 
dismiss collective control in favour of individualists' control; the episodic processists want a 
balanced control; and the passive processists prefer no control at all. 
To combine the above confusions one can refer to a general type of confusion or meta-confusion, 
that is, the confusions of paradigms: like the Utz laws of computer programming in which 
programming leads to programmes which in turn lead to further programming which might need 
new computing languages, the process of strategy-making changes the things to be strategized, 
including the paradigm upon which strategy-making is based. When one confusion (e. g. control) 
is disentangled, that means only that one has another confusion on hand which demands a new 
set of dimensions. That is, strategists pass from confusions to confusions while disentangling 
confusions after confusions. 
Feasibly, to solve a problem by means of expanding its narrowness may remain practical to 
solve immediate problems, but self-expanding does not solve all of the problems in the final 
sense; sometimes it can prove useful to contract the narrownesses of a problem so as to 
formulate principles to help solve future problems, although contracting can be less exiting or 
even discouraging. That is, organizational strategists have to get beyond the narrowness of each 
possible process and to know how it lives its life. Moreover, it seems justifiable that each 
process of the strategy-making (i. e. conceptual, formal, analytical, visionary, emergent, mental, 
passive, ideological, power, or episodic) has its own grounds, and each can be both right and 
wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, valuable or useless, when the fundamental dimensions of 
strategy are jointly consulted - including the content (i. e. What is the organizational strategy? ), 
the process (i. e. What are the ways to get organizational strategy formed? ), and the context (i. e. 
What conditions the strategy? ). 
Perhaps a better way to deal with the over-heated debates about the states of a particular 
strategy-making process (e. g. right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, and valuable or 
useless), is to solve the `W' confusions (Figure 14-3) through direct consultation with first 
principles - the principle of economy - so that to produce certain useful meta-principles, by 
persuading organizational strategists, 
(a) to forget at least for a while about the `what' and `which' paradigm which frequently evokes 
the profundity of strategy-making (e. g. what is strategy and which is the best process) in that 
humans can not really appreciate a new paradigm by using the vocabulary of an old 
paradigm - the principle of uncertainty; 
(b) to delay at least for a short period the exploration of the `whether' and `why' paradigm 
which usually provokes extreme but too soon answers (e. g. whether a particular process is 
valuable and why is it valuable? ) in that humans can not fully comprehend a to-be- 
generalized paradigm by staying within a narrowly specified paradigm - the principle of 
complexity; but 
(c) to concentrate at least for quite a while on the `when', `who', `where', and `which ways' 
(how) paradigm which normally expects pragmatic answers (e. g. when is a particular process 
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applicable, who is the actor, where does it fit best, and in which way can it be satisfactorily 
implemented? ) in that human beings can not always afford just to think and act, and we have 
to make sense of both thoughts and actions in a purposively controlled way so as to end 
confusions and unify such scarce resources like capital, effort, time, knowledge and 
information - the principle of unity. 
Figure 14-3: Strategy-making as `W' confusions 
Which What I Who When Where Which way I Whether Why 
Paradigmatic dilemmas 
Style Control Choice Complexity 
Source Change Purpose Integration ýI 
Collectieness Thinking Structure Genericness 
14.3 The aspects of control 
According to Honby (1995), the word control enjoys two dimensions: the noun and the verb. 
The noun dimension remains a content one of a state, condition, authority, ability, measure of 
power, influence, performance, and the 
like; and it concerns, among other things, authority, 
ability, management, restriction, standards of comparison, means of regulation, and places 
from 
which orders are issued or checks are made. 
The verb dimension remains a processual one of 
powering, authorising, regulating, 
limiting, or the like; and it concerns, inter alia, checking, 
testing, verifying, exercising restraints, directing influence, and reducing the 
incidence of 
adverse situations. This suggests that control 
in the full organizational context is bound to 
embrace multiple dimensions, viz., 
it is coming more and more to mean information-control (e. g. 
facts and knowledge) rather than man-control, and the essence of control 
in organizations" is 
coming more and more to mean 
the co-existence of many controls rather than one (or a few) 
super-imposed control(s). 
14.3.1 Control in organizations: the evolving concepts 
Control as a concept has existed since organized effort began, and the concept of control has 
evolved in accordance with 
the evolution of management thought. The concepts of control 
deeply reflect varying premises (complementary and/or contradictory) of the controllers who 
have been intellectually influenced by many distinctive thinkers at different times of the history. 
In the light of the Chinese wisdom, 
for example, while Sunzi (who lived in around 600 B. C. ) 
considers control 
in organizations as calculations with lengthy deliberations, sound plans and 
heavy interests in reward and incentives to conquer the controlled in the line of marshalling 
organizations 
into subdivisions, gradations of rank among officers, and material signals such as 
gongs and flags 
for communications (Sunzi, 1992); Confucius (who lived in about 550 B. C. ) 
regards control as cultivation and 
improvement of the moral nature of people so that cooperation 
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can be secured in any organization at any time throughout the history of the humankind 
(Confucius, 1926,1997; Hahn and Waterhouse, 1972) - what an interesting conflict or 
confusion concerning the basis of control! 
History has witnessed that the basis of control has been shiftily parading, or more precisely, 
waning and waxing in conjunction with periods of contextual contraction and expansion. It has 
been held (e. g. Weber, 1964; Durkheim, 1949; Wren, 1987) that this parade can be ascribable to 
the fundamental tension between Gemeinschaft in which people share common identity and 
enjoy being bound by common values and traditions (Weber, 1964) and Gessellschaft in which 
people partake of, a way of life featured by competition, individualism and calculative self- 
interest (Durkheim, 1949). 
This suggests that there exists such a temporarily sustainable but essentially inevitable shift over 
time of the language, tool, mechanism, and preference for control that whatever dresses and 
shoulders control such as particular strategies remains historically and contextually located 
(Table 14-1, which is depicted to extend Barley and Kunda's (1992) analysis on the link 
between managerial ideologies and bases of control in terms of Etizioni's (1961) interpretations 
of organizations in the operational context). 
Table 14-4: Control as being historically and contextually influenced by managerial ideologies 
(Source: Based upon Wren (1987), Etizioni (1961) & Barley and Kunda (1992)) 
Era of ascent Managerial ideology Major basis of control Surging imperatives 
Before 1870s Laissez-faire capitalism Coercive, plus little normative Management of 'harder' resources (e. g. 
Enlightenment raw materials & land) 
1870, - 1900s 
Industrial betterment Normative, plus little utilitarian Management of labour 
las _ 1920, 
Scientific management Utilitarian Management of capital 
1920, - 1950, Welfare capitalism 
/ human relations Normative, plus some utilitarian Management of labour 
1950s - 1980s Systems rationalism 
Utilitarian Management of capital & information 
1980s - 1990s Organizational culture 
Normative Management of culture 
1990, & beyond Post-modemism / informalization Normative, plus some utilitarian Management of 'softer' resources (e. g. information and knowledge) 
Near Future - far Properization 
/ integrationism & Properly normative, properly Management of purpose, innovative 
future ? collaboratization ? utilitarian, and properly coercive? experience and knowledge ? 
In the era of enlightenment and industrial betterment, the concept of control in organizations 
stresses unilateral command and rigid 
discipline in view of the low esteem with which people 
were held. Control is achieved not only 
by means of power of dogma, military regimen, and 
state fiat, but also by means of specialization of 
labour (Smith, 1952) as well as standardisation 
of parts; and it is since then that accounting emerges 
to be a control mechanism in the Western 
world to provide information 
for decision-making though still remaining in a relatively gross 
state without any sophisticated accounting methods. 
16 For example, James Montgomery, who 
wrote in 1832 what was most probably 
the first Western management text, " conceives the 
control function as 
`avoiding unnecessary severity' in disciplining subordinates as well as `being 
alert to prevent rather than check 
faults after they have taken place' (Baughman, 1968). 
In the scientific management era, the concept of control in organizations stresses accurate 
standards and advancements 
in measuring times and costs, and the focus of control lies in the 
varying facets of production 
function such as materials and schedules by means of graphic aids 
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(e. g. Gantt, 1919) as well as the internalization of goals (e. g. Gantt, 1919; Taylor, 1967) as a 
control device. " For example, Taylor (1967) proposes that costs become an integral part of daily 
planning and control, not just a subject for analysis after a long period of time has passed. Gantt 
(1919) views that the essential element in any control situation is time and suggests that a bar 
chart showing how work is routed and scheduled through various operations to its completion 
can aid control in organizations. Donaldson Brown's famous `DuPont Chart System' (Dale, 
1960) portrays the relative performance of various departments to control by refining the return 
on investment concept into a device for measuring and comparing the performance of various 
departments rather than just measuring overall return on investment for the organization as a 
whole. Fayol (1949) conceives that control consist of `verifying whether everything occurs in 
conformity with the plan adopted, the instructions issued, and the principles established', that 
control can be applied to people, objects, and activities, that control permeates all elements of 
the undertaking including personnel, execution of plans, quality of work, financial activities, 
security, and information, that effective control is based upon prompt action, control has an 
integrative effort on the other four elements of management (i. e. planning, organizing, command 
and coordination) in that it stimulates better planning, simplifies and strengthens the 
organization, enhances the efficiency of command and facilitates coordination. 
During the social man era, the concept of control in organizations stresses the need to modify 
any stringent use of external controls, to open communications channels, to develop 
interpersonal skills of the controlling and the controlled, and to recognize the importance of 
group influences on the task of the controllers. This era of social man leads to a softening of any 
rigorous notions of external control and signals that control is to become more of a democratic, 
internalized commitment to the inducements offered by management and the social skills the 
controllers have displayed. For example, Davis (1951) conceives control as `the function of 
constraining and regulating activities that enter into the accomplishment of an objective'. Follett 
(1987) proposes a new philosophy of control that control is fact-control rather than man-control 
and correlated control rather than a super-imposed control, and maintains that each control 
situation generates its own control because it 
is the facts of the situation and the interweaving of 
the many groups in the situation that determines appropriate behaviour. 
During the modern era (i. e. that of systems rationalism and of organizational culture), control in 
organizations is a twofold concept. The concept of control stresses the role of feedback in 
managerial control as a result of advancing technologies such as IT, CPM/PERT, CAD, and 
artificial intelligence. Control activities 
become more centralized for efficiency's sake and thus 
less flexible in meeting local needs and in allowing for individual discretion. 19 For example, the 
Critical Path Method (CPM) sees control as a network of activities, the relationship and 
interactions of which can be graphed in terms of paths to a given completion date, and to control 
is to focus managerial attention on a critical path in an effort to keep the total task on course 
(Archibald and Villoria, 1967). But, meanwhile, the concept of control in organizations also 
stresses the role of 
`art' over the technique and the tool approach to control. For example, 
Drucker (1954) conceives control as self-control deriving from the inside rather than from 
14-24 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
outside and argues that it is the objective needs of the tasks rather than orders from above that 
effect control. Peters and Waterman (1982) consider control as cultural and argue that control 
should have simultaneous `loose-tight' properties of keeping on target but without stifling 
innovation. This modern era represents both the institutionalization - with a proliferation of rules, 
forms, procedures, and other accoutrements - of control function which has been enhanced by 
modem' technological developments, and the individualization - with a proliferation of 
creativity, norms, and competence - which has been enhanced by modem development in arts 
and other disciplines such as sociology and biology. 20 Although modem concepts of control can 
contribute to efficiency in resource utilization, they can also bring forth a strain between 
individuals and the systems as well as a danger of losing sight of the goal of controlling and the 
means of controlling? ` 
In the post-modern era22 the concept of control in organizations stresses the role of control in the 
organizational context featuring flexible specialization in organization due to increasing 
turbulence and uncertainty (Gergen, 1992) and relative de-differentiation in production due to 
increasing proliferation of differentiated consumption (Clegg, 1990). This post-modernity era 
challenges the view that control concepts should be used as bureaucratic devices to extend the 
mastery of mankind over nature23. Post-modern control in essence calls for the search of 
knowledge-oriented indirect and internalized controls including ideological ones (Heydebrand, 
1989). For example, Simons (1995) conceives control as believing in the innate potential of 
humans to innovate and add value and argues that control consists of four levels (i. e. belief 
systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems) which 
set in motion powerful forces which reinforce one another. 
24 
In the future (hopefully from the early half of the 21st century), the concept, of control in 
organizations might stress the role of proper orderliness, proper 
harmony, proper integration, 
and proper reorganization 
in the full organizational context, and it might re-emphasize the 
preservation of human values which 
have been human's request for a long, long time. To ensure 
controlled performance, controllership, might mean proper orderliness achieved through 
authority in teens of constructive, 
if not completely elite, experience and knowledge (perhaps, 
forming a new leadership elite envisioned by Sunzi (1992) and Gantt (1919)), or mean proper 
harmony in organizational life through a pleasing and productive arrangement of parts within 
the whole which would satisfy the requirements of people and the organization (perhaps forming 
incongruency-reducing organizations envisioned by Laozi (1959) and Argyris (1957)), or mean 
proper integrative arrangement of parts and whole 
in terms of interactive experience and 
collective knowledge 
(perhaps, forming a collective society of experiencing citizens envisioned 
by Confucius (1926) and Follett (1940)), or mean proper creative reorganization (which resides 
in the proper arrangement of formal and informal relations) of the organization (which has not 
yet yielded enough convincing results to 
justify its endurance) in terms of creative (if not virtual) 
experience and corrective 
(if not destructive) knowledge (perhaps, forming professions pursuing 
virtuous properness envisioned 
by Zhang (1988) and Mooney and Reiley (1931)). Only time 
knows! 
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In short, the evolution of the concepts of control can be portrayed as developing along a set of 
continuums featuring contextual expanding and / or contracting, which may, in a practical sense 
(please see Figure 14-3), contain, as the polarised ends of each continuum, centralization & de- 
centralization (in respect to structure? ), formalization & informalization (in respect to style? ), 
conservatism & creationism (in respect to thinking? ), mechanization & humanization (in respect 
to implementation? ), institutionalization & personalization (in respect to collectiveness? ), 
generalization & specialization (in respect to complexity? ), externalization & internalization (in 
respect to source? ), localization or globalization (in respect to integration? ), singuralization or 
multiplization (in respect to choice? ), logicalization & sensitization (in respect to decision- 
making), exploitation & contribution (in respect to purpose? ), simplification & sophistication (in 
respect to design), immaturity & maturity (in respect to behaviour? ), and naturalization & 
nurturization (in respect to genericness? ), to name but a few. Thus, partly due to the discrete but 
somewhat dialectical nature of control concepts, and partly due to the influence of the many 
distinguished philosophers, eminent practitioners and prolific organization theorists, it appears 
unsurprising that there exists a huge body of somewhat constructive (even, perhaps sometimes, 
conflicting, if not completely contradictory) literature on the meaning, the perspective, the task, 
the theory, the problem, and the controllership in regard to control in organizations. 
14.3.2 Control in organizations: the differing meanings 
Historically speaking, organizational theorists have never been restrained about defining the 
concept of control in organizations, and this, perhaps, explains why the control 
literature is so 
discrete. For example, Follett (1987) defines control as `a self-generating process, as the 
interweaving experience of all those who are performing a functional part of the activity under 
consideration'; Hostede (1968) views control within an organizational system as 
`the process by 
which one element (person, group, machine, 
institution or norm) intentionally affects the action 
of another element'; Merchant 
(1985) views control as an involvement `to help ensure the 
proper behaviours of people 
in the organization'; Stacey (1990) suggests that control remains 
the `coherent, rather than haphazard, ways of dealing with change'; and O'Reilly and Chatman 
(1996) hold that `control comes from the knowledge that someone who matters to us is paying 
close attention to what we are 
doing and will tell us if our behavior is appropriate or 
inappropriate'. 
Conceivably, the different meanings of control in organizations can be catalogued into three 
general groups: namely, positive, negative and neutral. 
Control in positive sense indicates order, 
reliability, stability and predictability, and 
the absence of control implies chaos, disorder, 
uncertainty and anarchy. 
Control in the negative sense implies domination, coercion, 
exploitation and manipulation, and the absence of control implies freedom, individuality, 
discretion, responsibility and autonomy. Control may also seem neutral (Salaman, 1981): 
control is demanded by the neutral 
tasks (e. g. socialists' value creation, or capitalists' profit- 
maximization) in 
hand attainable through the application of sciences, technologies and arts, 
which in turn is 
for the benefits of society at large, indeed for the individuals themselves (e. g. 
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citizens, employees, suppliers, financiers, or customers) - outside or inside the specific 
organization which exercises it. 
14.3.3 Control in organizations: the specific views 
It remains evident that, control in organizations involves considerable complexity and is 
confined to the vagaries of the nature of organizations. This suggests that the domains of control 
may differ significantly due to the varying sets of circumstances in which an organization 
operates. 
For example, Etizioni (1961) has better exploited this perspective than anyone else by indicating 
three ideal types of organization, namely, normative, utilitarian and coercive: normative 
organizations exists where an overall organizational goal is shared by most participants; 
utilitarian organizations exist where the goals of participants can become irrelevant to the 
activities of the organization and participants' involvement can remain contractual or 
instrumental; and coercive organizations exist where the values of the participants are opposed 
to those of the ruling coalition within it and the unwilling participants are powered over by the 
coalition. 
This suggests that the mechanisms of control in organizations may differ significantly according 
to their normative, utilitarian or coercive nature. To make things more complicated but more 
practical, varying forms of involvement (i. e. normative, utilitarian and coercive) can even co- 
exist in the same organization spreading through different hierarchical levels; for example, it is 
not very difficult for practitioners to 
find that such co-relations exist that while the top level of 
management commits to normative 
involvement, the middle level of management to coercive 
involvement, and the lower level of management to instrumental or contractual. 
This further suggests that control in organizations can be and should be viewed from different 
angles, depending on the 
dominant set (e. g. economic, psychological, or political) of 
circumstances which dictate the organization. 
For example, in the eves of the economists, 
control becomes an economically necessary activity, and 
if control breaks down, everything gets 
out of hand with resources 
being wasted or spent for virtual work. In the eyes of the 
behaviourists, control remains a psychologically necessary activity for creating stable and 
predictable work conditions 
in which people can function effectively. In the eyes of the 
politicians, control 
is a politically necessary means by which organizations can perpetuate 
inequalities of resources in organizations or sustain competitive advantage in the competitive 
arena. 
14.3.4 Control in organizations: the fundamental tasks 
One of the successful methods to study control in organizations is to link the study to the 
specific tasks of control 
in organizations. It has been argued (Thompson, 1967), although 
opposite to Cyert and 
March's (1963) assertion that organizations do not have goals, that the 
specific tasks of control 
in organizations involve the `satisficing' (Simon, 1957) of three goals: 
14-27 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
(a) the establishment of purpose, (b) the pursuit of effectiveness, and (c) the struggle for 
efficiency. 
The purpose of organization includes survival which serves as the overall minimum purpose of 
any (organization; and the purpose of organization might be stable over long periods of time or 
contingent upon changes both inside or outside the organization. Effectiveness becomes the 
measure of the achievement of purpose; it can remain weaker in the long run than in the short 
run - or vice versa; and 
it may maintain fuzzier in some situations. Efficiency is the relationship 
of outputs to given sets of inputs; it can be higher or lower dependent upon the inputs and 
outputs involved in the operations ZS It has been argued that management is "the profession of 
control" (Beer, 1966). It has been further argued (Follett, 1987), from the vantage point that 
control remains the objective of organization, that control is organization; and therefore it can be 
argued that the tasks of organization are the tasks of control. 
Figure 14-4: The tasks of control in organizations 
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Figure 14-4 is depicted to illustrate this reciprocal nature of control in relation to all factors in a 
control situation -a scenery 
involving both external and internal factors that shape the society as 
it is - which consists of purpose space, effectiveness space, efficiency space, and control space. 
The purpose space is represented by specific purpose-oriented goal states; 
` the effectiveness 
space is represented by path constraints on specific outcome-oriented goal states; 
27 the efficiency 
space is represented 
by path constraints on specific process- oriented goal states; 28 and the 
control space remains the specific arena where control 
takes place and is equipped with all 
possible control states 
(i. e. inputs, processes, and outputs). 29 
Control, in this logic, manifests itself as a sequence of operations leading to the goal states and 
conforms to the path constraints: 
the inputs signal the initial state at which control begins, the 
purpose-related goal states maintains 
the end state to be achieved by control, a set of control 
operators - e. g. people, events, 
things, and change, in the light of Russell's (1912) theory of 
causation - define allowable moves within the control space, and 
two sets of path constraints 
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exert influence on what counts as a winning control. 
14.3.5 Control in organizations: the contending theories 
Although the study of control in organizations involves considerable complexity and is confined 
to the vagaries of the nature of organizations and human behaviour, it still seems very plausible, 
in the light of Figure 14-4, to theorize control by exploiting the horizontal co-relations between 
control states, or the vertical co-relations within the control situation. In fact, control in 
organizations has remained very open to analysis and has attracted many approaches tempting to 
theorize control. Among the most appealing approaches to control in organizations are: (a) 
cybernetic, (b) systemic, (c) organizational, (d) economic, (e) anthropological, (0 political, and 
(g) the contingency. 
14.3.5.1 The cybernetic approaches to control 
The cyberneticians have been concerned with the common rather than specific processes of 
communication and control in people and machines employed in an attempt to attain desirable 
objectives and have attempted to adapt the self-regulating principles found in the human brain to 
organizations so as to derive general principles of control which can be applied in different 
control situations (e. g. Beer, 1966,1972). In general, the cybernetic control remains a logical 
and abstract approach which gives powerful insights into the operation of control, though 
lacking specificity as well as proactiveness. 'o 
Cybernetic control emphasizes deviations between actual process outputs and those which are 
desired, and focuses on negative feedback in contention to explain much apparently purposive 
and adaptive behaviour; thus, the control process remains a process of error reduction under 
control conditions, 
" and the less change (i. e. deviation) there is between the realized state and 
the desired state of the control process, the more control has achieved. Technically speaking, 
cybernetic control'is achieved either 
by error - i. e. feedback (or reactive) control= or by what 
gives rise to error - i. e. 
feedforward (or anticipatory) control. 
Feedback control 
Feedback control waits for the occurrence of an error and takes action to counteract it, and 
control operation follows the route 
(from step 0 to step 5 for a closed loop)32 as shown in Figure 
14-5. The essence of feedback control is to ensure self-regulation so as to maintain a state of 
equilibrium among key variables of the process outputs even when, there exist environmental 
"1 .1 disturbances. 1 11 
Among principles for the proper functioning of feedback control are (Cushing, 1982; Wilson, 
1995): (a) the benefits of control should be at least as great as the costs of developing, installing, 
operating and improving 
it, (b) variances, once measured, should be circulated promptly, to 
decision-makers so that quick control actions can be facilitated, (c) feedback reports should be 
simple, straight forward and 
highlight all control factors which require decision-makers' 
attention, and 
(d) the feedback systems should be neatly integrated with varying aspects of 
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Figure 14-5: The cybernetic approaches to control in organizations: the feedback control 
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Feedforward control predicts the likely occurrence of an error and takes action to prevent it 
occurring, and the operation of control follows the route 
(from step 0 to step 5 for a closed- 
loop)" as shown in Figure 14-6. Successful feedforward control requires good understanding of 
the way in which organizations function (i. e. the predictability of the co-relations between inputs 
and outputs). 
Figure 14-6: The cybernetic approaches to control in organizations: the feedforward control 
( Control space " 
Effectiveness space Purpose space .. Efficiency space 
with constraints with goals states "" pA with constraints 
ý, : , an, , ý. YäG' +1: 'Aibiid3iafYitCäüSti[+YGi. 
ýl. wäYW, dKaiiW Ji: 1arC2. tLfn , 
Output 
p 1 
` ` Process . I vI 11 I 
lnpuc 
Control operators (e. g. change, event, things and people) 
Among useful guidelines for developing 
feedforward control are (Wilson, 1995): (a) 
feedforward control should involve thorough planning and analysis vis-ä-vis the links among 
inputs, process and outputs, (b) 
feedforward control process should be dynamic so that emergent 
influences on outputs can be promptly included, (c) data on significant variables should be 
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regularly gathered and evaluated in order to assess their likely influence on future outcomes, and 
(d) feedforward control demands that control actions focus on preventing up-to-come errors 
rather than correcting past errors. 
In comparison, however, although feedback control (Figure 14-5) has been believed (e. g. Ashby, 
1956) to be much less advantageous than the feedforward control (Figure 14-6), the best 
approach to cybernetic control is perhaps to use both feedback and feedforward control as 
complements because in any control situation few organizations can achieve their purposes both 
'a effectively and efficiently for any length of time if only one type of control is in use. 
14.3.5.2 The systematic approaches to control 
Systematic theories of control pinpoint the view that human and machine behaviour can be 
better explained by studying the interrelationship of parts rather than the nature of the parts 
themselves, and thus stresses the importance of emergent properties which are characteristic of 
the level of complexity being studied and which may not have significant or non-forgettable 
meaning at lower levels of analysis. Seemingly, there are two types of systematic control: the 
first refers to hard systems which involves relatively clear objectives and decision processes 
with quantitative measures of performance; the second refers to soft systems which involves 
vague and ambiguous objectives and ill-defined or irrational decision processes with at best 
qualitative measures of performance (Checkland, 1981). 
35 
Most control systems theories (e. g. Beer, 1972; Buckley, 1968; Boulding, 1956) are derived at a 
relatively low level of analyses which may 
be arranged in a hierarchy, 36 and the attempts are 
then made to transfer each of them to a much higher level of analyses with probable adverse 
consequences in terms of applicability. 
For example, Beer (1972) proposes that the human brain 
and nervous system can serve as a model 
for organizational control, and identifies five levels of 
control as depicted in Figure 
14-7, ranging from the transformation processes required by the 
whole system and the maintenance of 
internal stability, to the maintenance of dynamic 
equilibrium with the external world, and to the self-conscious 
development of goals. 
Figure 14-7: Systematic approach to control in organizations: hierarchies of systematic controls 
(Source: Adapted from Beer, 1972) 
Level five: organization wide self-conscious determination of goals via foresights 
Level four: organization wide maintenance of damic equilibrium with the external world 
Level three: autonomic maintenance of the stability of the internal environment of the organization 
ILevel two: transformation processes demanded by the whole system to prevent uncontrolled oscillation between divisions 
Lever one: organization of divisional management (e. g. monitoring achievement, endorsing routine, and determining actions)" 
In general, systems approaches to control provides a means 
by which real-world control 
problems can be 
dealt with; but it does not provide any theoretical basis for the study of control 
in organizations. It seems evident 
that the application of systems thinking to the study of control 
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in organizations raises more questions than it answers; but it can provide a useful countervailing 
force in developing more comprehensive theories of control. 
Figure 14-8 is depicted to describe systematic control, the process of which can be regarded as 
one of appreciation - i. e. the development of rich and insightful ways of viewing real-world 
situations (Vickers, 1965). It involves conducting a deliberate (perhaps non-systematic) analysis 
aiming to uncover the rich complexity of the systems; it then aims at a root definition (i. e. a 
fundamental statement of the purpose from first principles) of the basic nature of the system 
thought to be relevant to the problem situation; and finally it constructs a conceptual model of 
the system using the minimum necessary system which can help achieve the root definition. 
Figure 14-8: The systematic approaches to control in organizations: systematic control in general 
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Moreover, systems ideas have found their increasing influence on other disciplines related to the 
study of control in organizations such as social, political, 
ideological, economic, and technical 
systems movement 
in organization theory and have thus contributed much to the development 
and / or the refinement of such concepts 
(old and new) like social control, self control, political 
control, insidious control, emergent control, and economic control. 
14.3.5.3 Organizational approaches to control 
Organizational approaches to control focus on the behavioural side of control by locating control 
in the context of social systems (Berry et'al, 1995), and emphasize the behavioural information 
aspects of control under the premise 
that control can be accomplished through performance 
evaluation (Dalton, 
1971). Control, as being reflected in the social perspectives and patterns of 
social interactions 
(Hopwood, 1974; Merchant, 1985), is thus a property of the relationship 
between controllers and the potentially controlled. 
37 Organizational approaches to control stress 
the role of minimizing the 
divergence of behavioural preferences among the members of an 
organization under the assumption 
that organizational members cooperate in the achievement of 
organizational goals 
in that the members understand and internalize organizational goals (e. g. 
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Ouchi, 1979; Hopwood, 1974). It has been argued among organization theorists (e. g. Hopwood, 
1974; Thompson, 1967) that there exists classifiable controls of fundamental importance to any 
organizational context, and they can be generally classified into three types (Hopwood, 1974): 
administrative controls, social controls, and self controls (Figure 14-9). '$ 
Figure 14-9: Organizational approaches to control: an exemplary interaction between controls 
(Source: Adapted from Hopwood, 1974) 
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Apparently, as can be seen in Figure 14-9, the interaction between administrative controls, 
social controls, and self-controls has a significant bearing on the control situation in an 
organization: administrative controls become socially constructed in the sense that they bear 
various assumptions, beliefs and values encoded into their design and mode of operation; the 
impact of administrative controls upon the members - in relation to whose behaviour they are 
supposed to control - becomes further affected since individuals' behaviour may be greatly 
influenced by the various social pressures which occur in the organization; administrative and 
social controls get implemented ultimately through the agency of self-controlled individuals 
(Johnson and Gill, 1993). 
The role of administrative controls 
Administrative controls refer to mechanisms, techniques and processes which are consciously 
and purposefully designed (presumably by particular coalitions of members such as powerful or 
interested parties) to try to control the behaviours of other individuals, groups and organizations 
(Johnson and Gill, 1993). It has been argued (Mintzberg, 1979) that administrative control can 
involve at least three major. mechanisms (Figure 14-10): (a) rules and procedures which are 
aimed to standardize work processes (Weber,, 1964), (b) output control (e. g. budgets, feedback, 
feedforward, and MBO) which is aimed to standardize work output so as to ensure control while 
leaving the everyday accomplishment of tasks to members' judgment and discretion (Ouchi, 
1979), and (c) internalized objectives (Anthony, 1977) - by means of pre-emptive recruitment / 
selection (Armstrong, 1988) or restructuring of attitudes and beliefs (Wood, 1986) - which are 
aimed to ensure that subordinates 
internalize the values, beliefs and attitudes supportive of the 
organization's goals and objectives pre-set by hierarchical superiors (Ouchi, 1979). 39 In general, 
varying forms of administrative control 
distinguish themselves from one another in terms of the 
task aspects which organizational members intend to restrict or influence; in practice, however, 
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administrative attempts to control organizational members' behaviour at work may involve more 
than one type of administrative control. " 
Figure 14-10: Organizational approaches to control: forms of administrative controls 
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The role of social controls 
Social controls essentially refer to the process through which compliance, obedience and 
conformity to predetermined standards of behaviour are spontaneously rather than consciously 
or purposively achieved through interpersonal and group processes (Huczynski and Buchanan, 
1991). This suggests that - according to Mead's (1934) notion that humans experience 
themselves as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other 
individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social 
group as a whole to which they belong' - social controls, in the main, involve the informal 
socialization processes by which members of an organization induct each other into membership 
of particular cultures through reflections of the standpoints of particular kinds of people (or 
reference group) who are, presumably, significant or important in the organizational members' 
lives (van Maanen, 1976; Hopwood, 1974). Seemingly, a reference group such as superiors in 
organizations plays a role as a source of or reference to ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving, 
and evaluating and can eventually help orientate others' conduct, although reference groups do 
not necessarily transit norms and values which agree with those of the particular cultures 
adhered to by hierarchically superior coalitions of members (Turner, 1972). This implies that, 
through establishing, valuing, and enjoying social relationships with other organizational 
members (hierarchical peers, superiors or subordinates), 
" some members of an organization can 
become socialized into accepting the particular norms and values dominant within that social 
network (Ouchi, 1980). 
In brief, social controls mean `getting right person for the job' or training and culture (Merchant, 
1985); 42 they emerge from the mundane everyday interactions of organizational members; as a 
kind of backdrop for action they are made up of the shared values, norms, and beliefs which are 
adhered to by group members; they can not only affect the operation of any administrative 
controls but they also can exert a 
direct influence on the ways by which administrative controls 
are designed in the first place. 
In practice, however, social controls can remain difficult to 
distinguish themselves from less obtrusive forms of administrative controls in that social 
controls and unobtrusive administrative controls (i. e. insidious controls), 4J which affect human 
14-34 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
behaviour and attitudes in ways (e. g. deceptive, elusive, and unresponsive) which do not involve 
the experience of being controlled or manipulated), can merge; besides, the motivations, 
expectations, and personal relationships of all the members of an organization can literally exert 
a significant effect on the outcome of the control processes. 
It has been argued (Pfeffer, 1997) that among those major mechanisms of social control are 
(Figure 14-11): (i) rewards, incentives, sanctions, and surveillance, (ii) commitment and 
socialization, (iii) organizational culture, and (iv) leadership. Consider rewards, incentives, 
sanction and surveillance, research evidence seems persuasive that rewards (e. g. pay) have 
important symbolic and legitimating aspects (Wood, 1996), although the efficacy of financial 
incentives still remains substantially more equivocal (Besser, 1995); that organizational 
sanctions have a symbolic, public face to the controlled regardless of the (punitive or non- 
punitive) nature of the control strategies (Gavin et al, 1995; O'Reilly and Weitz, 1980); 44 and 
that the rapid development of electronic monitoring capacity has undoubtedly enhanced the 
significance of surveillance in monitoring behaviour (Aiello and Svec, 1993). 45 
Figure 14-11: Organizational approaches to control: mechanisms of social control 
As regards commitment and socialization, research evidence seems more persuasive that control 
premised in socialization and commitment processes remain quite effective: commitment 
resulting from a process of self-perception (Bem, 1972) and dissonance (Festinger, 1957) under 
the conditions of choice, publicness and explicitness (Salancik, 1977), 46 can function as a form 
of internal control, which does not really rely on continuing surveillance and reward, thus 
remaining a more efficient as well as more effective means of coordinating behaviour (Simmon, 
1991) despite the worry that commitment may also be a means of resistance to change or an 
irrational perseverance in behaviour (Staw, 1976,1977; Brockner, 1992); 47 and institutionalized 
commitment has obvious positive effects for organizations as well as individuals in that the 
socialization process when coupled with suitable tactics can produce less role stress and higher 
job satisfaction (Pascale, 1985; Ashforth and Saks, 1996; van Maanen and Schein, 1979). 48 
Organizational cultures, "' though closely related to the idea of control through commitment and 
socialization, " also, exhibit distinct contribution to control in organizations; this is because 
control through the management of cultures' offers distinctive advantages over external control 
accomplished through rewards and sanction52, although empirical evidence suggests that the 
relationship between strong culture and performance can be complex (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). 
With respect to leadership, it has been widely believed (e. g. Pfeffer, 1977; Calder, 1971) that. 
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leadership effects are attributed, particularly in uncertain situations, to achieve a feeling of 
mastery or control; ` however, evidence (e. g. Eccles and Nohria, 1992) shows that control 
premised in managerial language is believed to become very effective (Peters, 1978). "' 
The role of self controls 
Self controls generally refer to controls which people exert over their own behaviour (Johnson 
and Gill, 1993) and entail controls which are derived from the inside rather than from outside 
the stricter in that it is the objective needs of the tasks rather than orders from hierarchical 
superiors or influences from peers that effect control (Drucker, 1954). It has been argued 
(Hopwood, 1974) that, for social and administrative controls to be effective, orders or influences 
on members' organizational behaviour have to be expressed through the actions and attitudes of 
the controller and the controlled; that the norms embodied in the administrative or social 
controls to be exerted have to operate as personal controls over individuals' attitudes and 
behaviour; and that the administrative and social controls to be exerted have to convey rewards 
the individual members actually value and desire. In essence, self controls derive from the 
conformity of members of an organization to the prescribed norms regarding (the behavioural 
aspects of) the inputs, processes and outputs of any operations, and this conformity of norms 
manifests itself by three possible forms which underpin three different forms of self control 
(Kelman, 1961): (i) compliance, (ii) identification, and (iii) internalization. 
According to Kelman (1961), compliance refers to the mode of conforming behaviour adopted 
by an individual who is motivated by a desire to gain a reward or avoid a punishment; 
identification refers to the conforming response to social influence brought about by a desire of 
the individuals who are receiving the influence to be like the individuals who are exerting the 
influence; and internalization refers to the development of the internal moral imperatives of the 
individuals who are receiving influence in their perceptual world as they adopt the beliefs, 
norms, and values of the individuals who are exerting the influence. 
Arguably, the processual nature of self control in practice may witness the involvement of 
different forms of self controls: as can be seen from Figure 14-12, the individuals may initially 
`obey' external demands due to sanctions, and then, through daily social interactions of various 
kinds, emotional attachment develops and eventually leads to identification, and ultimately 
identification leads to internalization, all hugely dependent on, inter alia, the influencees' 
expectations on what is demanded and what can be achieved, and the influencees' motivations 
to commit themselves to the norms towards the conformity of norms such as the rewards on 
offer. 
For example, individuals may perceive that certain kinds of demands have (or don't have) 
economically (or socially or politically) positive or negative valency; individuals may perceive 
that control remains the trade-off for their physiological, safety, social, ego-esteem or self- 
actualization needs. Figure 14-13 is depicted to demonstrate how expectations, motivations and 
perceptions jointly affect the performance obtained by those who are influenced. 
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Figure 14-12: Organizational approaches to control: the dynamics of control at work 
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Figure 14-13: Relationships between performance, motivations, expectations and perceptions 
(Sources: Adapted from Porter and Lawler, 1968) 
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In brief, practical control situations in any organization can only he understood and explained 
fully in terms of the interaction of administrative, social and self controls (please see Figure 14- 
9), and they can involve, from the systems vantage point, a variety of possible interrelationships 
between different types of control (please see Figures 14-10 & 14-11 ), various kinds of control 
operators (e. g. people who 
design the control space), changeable sets of tasks, and varying 
control spaces (please see Figure 
14-7). 
14.3.5.4 Economics approaches to control 
Economics approaches to control have involved different interpretations: historically, control in 
the main stream analyses, influenced by Smith's (1893) doctrine of the `invisible h. ºnd' of the 
price system, has 
focused on exchanges between individuals actin; through equilibrating 
markets and promoted the superiority of the market over 
hierarchy as a mode of' optimal 
allocation of resources with the consequence that controls other than general equilibrium remain 
unnecessary (Bator, 
1957); 5 modern interpretations of control in favour of disequilihrium, 
inspired by Keynes' (1936) critique that the `invisible hand' could send the wrong signals, have 
spawned the view of `economics as a process' which 
has promoted limited perspective (e. g. 
rational expectations) on control 
(I. eijonhufvud, 1968); the more modern interpretations of 
control emerge 
from the `new institutionalist' economics, which, based on the beliefI that 
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production function is not technologically determined, emphasizes the contractual perspectives 
and promotes the idea that controls other than general equilibrium theory remain necessary in 
that the production function is imperfectly specified as the result of informational asymmetries, 
bounded rationality, opportunitism, small numbers, atmosphere and other lacunae of the 
contractual world (Spicer and Ballew, 1983). However, it seems that economics approaches to 
control prevailing in the micro level theoretical economics / accounting literature (e. g. Meyers 
and Nicholas, 1984; Emery and Finnerty, 1997; Croutchley and Hansen, 1989) have mainly 
focused on agency theories (Seal, 1993; 1995). 56 
Agency theories consider an organization as a nexus of contracts and a legal myth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), " and argue that, with the traditional interest in contracting, organizations set 
for the optimal contract form for the ubiquitous control relationship in which some members of 
an organization, the principals, delegate work to others, the agents (Ross, 1973). Agency 
theories originally stem from Berle and Mean's (1932) recognition that separation of ownership 
and control of modem corporations gives rise to the difficulty of controllers' pursuit of the best 
interests of the owners beyond the minimum and legal requirements; modern agency theories are 
primarily based from Jensen and Meckling's (1976) classic analysis on agency costs; and the 
more modem agency theories are derived from the refinement of Jensen and Meckling's (1976) 
analysis by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Theoretically speaking, agency theories boast two distinguishable streams (Eisenhardt, 1989): (i) 
the positivist approach (e. g. Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1984) with its focus on the special case of 
relationships between enterprise owners and appointed managers, and (ii) the principal-agent 
approach (e. g. Harris and Raviv, 1978) with the intent to achieve a general theory of agency 
relationships covering a wide range of relationships between various principals and agents. 
Practically speaking, however, agency theories essentially deal with the problem of moral 
hazard which arises either when information remains asymmetric (i. e. hidden information) or 
when the agent's actions remain unobservable (i. e. hidden action), and this problem can 
deteriorate in the face of ex ante and ex post uncertainty (Arrow, 1985; Tiessen and Waterhouse, 
1983). To tackle this, the principals have two control options (Eisenhardt, 1985) which directly 
contribute to two recognized forms of contracts - behaviour contract and outcome contract 
(Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1983). Figure 14-14 is depicted to illustrate the role (of control) of 
agency theories in providing measures and rewards such that members of organizations pursuing 
their own individual self-interests will also pursue the collective interests. 
Seemingly, the principals can either reward the agents based on outcomes such as profitability 
although risking rewarding the agents 
in an unfair way in that good outcomes can occur despite 
poor efforts and poor outcomes can occur despite good efforts, or purchase information about 
the agents' behaviours and then reward or punish those behaviours by means of purchasing 
surveillance mechanisms such as cost accounting measures, budgeting systems or additional 
layers of management. 58 
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Figure 14-14: Economics approaches to control: the 3C control model of agency theories 
C Choose the least expansive alternative, implement and evaluate the chosen option 
I When immediate action is desirable 
(a) If the cost of behaviour control is less than that of the outcome control, consider behaviour contract 
(b) If the cost of outcome control is less than that of the behaviour control, consider outcome contract 
(c) If the cost of outcome control is analogous to that of the behaviour control, consider either or both 
2 When immediate action is not desirable 
(a) Reserve options by not immediately choosing any contract 
(b) Create options by choosing strategic contracts 
(c) Go back to observations leading to new information 
3 When a large body of information turns out to be inconsistent with the current knowledge 
(a) Check everything including assumptions, theories, and evaluation methods 
(b) Conduct more research to find out why and then search for new solutions 
(c) Adopt new ways of thinking and conduct new observations or new experiments 
B Compare the data and the results (costs of behaviour control and of outcome control) carefully 
Performance evaluation on both behaviours and outcomes 
(a) Gather standards 
(b) Select methods 
(c) Prepare for the measurements 
(d) Go back to standard gathering if measurements are incomparable 
(e) Conduct the comparison calculation if measurements are comparable 
(f) Conduct new observations, or select new methods or standards if measurements are unsatisfactory 
(g) Provide a report on the performance evaluation 
A Check performance by means of observations or experiments, and record the data & results 
Information asymmetry 
(a) In the case of complete information, consider behaviour contract 
(b) Hypothesis one: the more symmetric the information, the more optimal the behaviour contract. 
(c) In the case of incomplete information, 
i Purchase information on behaviour via surveillance mechanisms (e. g. PCA) 
ii Reward the agent based on outcomes (e. g. profitability) 
Outcome Uncertainty 
(a) In the case of outcome certainty, the choice between behaviour and outcome contract reduces to 
simply their comparative measurement costs 
(b) The hypothesis: the more uncertain the outcome, the more complex the choice between behaviour 
and outcome contracts, and the more likely control is to be based upon behaviours 
(c) In the case of uncertainty, apply modern techniques to approximate the uncertainty (e. g. 
probability) 
Risk averse 
(a) In the case of risk sharing, the choice between behaviour and outcome contract reduces to simply 
their comparative measurement costs 
(b) The hypothesis: the more risk aversive, the more complex the choice between behaviour and 
outcome contract, and the more likely control is to be based upon outcome 
(c) In the case of risk averse, consider outcome contract to share risks among organizational members 
The optional choice between the two options or contracts, perhaps, rests upon, as suggested by 
both Eisenhardt (1985) and Tiessen and Waterhouse (1983), the trade-off between the costs of 
measuring behaviour and the costs of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agents, 
bearing in mind that uncertainty plays a role in the choice of control strategy through its impact 
on risk sharing costs 
and that information systems play a role in maintaining behaviour control 
as an alternative to outcome control when 
information about the agents' behaviour remains 
otherwise incomplete. 
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14.3.5.5 The anthropologic approaches to control 
Anthropologic approaches to control have exclusively emphasised the importance of the cultures, 
ideologies, and values of both the controllers and the potentially controlled. "' Research evidence 
(e. g. Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Smircich, 1983) shows that control-relevant literatures on 
cultures, ideologies and values, seem to have a diverse nature: some perceive them as the 
proactive tools of the controller, some see them passively as constraining influences, and some 
with mixed feelings view them as spontaneous control devices. 
Cultural controls 
The anthropologic control in the line of cultures has been centring on three promising 
mechanisms towards cultural uniformity in organizations: integration, differentiation, and 
ambiguity (Martin and Meryerson, 1988). 60 The use of cultural control as an integrating 
mechanism has been popularized by Peters and Waterman's (1982) assertion on cultures that 
organizational culture remains a variable or contingency which can be manipulated in order to 
achieve organizational excellence; the thesis of this cultural approach lies in that the role of 
management is to promote appropriate culture from which control will naturally flow, resulting 
from internal self-control rather than externally imposed bureaucratic rules and regulations; 61 
and, seemingly, the control operator in this active approach to control consists of cultures 
(which has been conceived as things which can be imposed or encouraged by the controllers and 
the ability of the potentially controlled to develop their own culture or resist cultural control are 
simply assumed away). 
On the other extreme end of the cultural control continuum is the view that culture remains a 
mechanism of differentiation: culture maintains a 
dynamic and symbolic element which needs to 
be taken account of but which cannot be determined externally (Dyer, 1984; Martin, 1992); this 
approach regards cultural control as 
both ineffective and inefficient in that cultures are more 
likely to act as a factor only to resist strategic change (Dyer, 1984); and, seemingly, the control 
operator consists of varying 
factors entailing people, things, change and events. 
Cultures as the mechanism of ambiguity simply accepts that ambiguity is an integral and central 
part of, organizational reality in which members of an organization agree on some viewpoints, 
disagree about some, and are ignorant of, or indifferent to, others (Martin and Meryerson, 1988); 
this, approach regards cultural control as playing a mediating role such as `organization 
development', 62 though not necessarily the operational (e. g. instruments of administrative 
control) for the controllers; and, seemingly, 
the control operator in this vein consists of change 
only. 63 
Consider organization development, 
for example, research on the organizational life-cycle 
(Schein, 1985; Deal and Kennedy, 1982) reveals that, cultural control at the founding stage may 
`Ai powerful elements like (a) the things to which controllers attention, b entail such pay () 
controllers' reactions to organizational crises, (c) role modelling and coaching, (d) criteria for 
allocating rewards and 
(e) criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, and retirement (Schein, 
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1985), and " that cultural control for organizations in mid-life might more often than less see 
flexible rather than `strong', monolithic cultures (sometimes, perhaps, to the extent that cultural 
control simply means cultural change). 
Ideological controls 
Anthropologic control in the line of ideologies has been enriched by Brusson's (1985) notion 
that actions are often promoted by ideologies - predetermined ideas about what is the 
appropriate way for individuals to proceed actions. This suggests that control in organizations 
differentiates between weak and strong consideration: strong ideologies indicates greater 
agreement on the way actions should proceed, and weak ideologies make actions less likely to 
proceed. " This suggests that ideological control becomes plausible in that the alignment of the 
controllers' ideology to that of the potentially controlled can facilitate easier control 
mechanisms required for the management, although ideological control may not necessarily be 
able to provide an insight of how to ideologically operationalize a control system. 
Clan controls 
: Anthropologic control in the line of values can be richly reflected by the notion of `clan control' 
(Ouchi, 1980) which refers to the social control exerted on individual members of an 
organization because they are part of a group and 
identify with the group and the common 
values of the group. Within an organization, according to Ouchi (1980), there are three 
organizational control mechanisms, namely, markets, 
bureaucracies and clans (Table 14-5). 
Market controls are achieved through price mechanisms under the umbrella of a shared norm of 
reciprocity embedded 
in trust; bureaucracy controls are achieved through formal rules under the 
umbrella of a shared norm of reciprocity embedded 
in honesty in addition to an agreement on 
the legitimate source of authority; while clan controls are implicitly achieved through traditions 
under the umbrella of, a range of shared values and 
beliefs on the forms of proper behaviours, 
and of high level of commitment 
to those behaviours. 
Clan 'controls can prove to be very effective on many occasions especially when the outputs are 
ambiguous and 
difficult to measure or behaviour controls are inappropriate, due to, say, the 
ünknöwn transformation process (Ouchi, 1980). It has been argued (Alvesson and Lindkvist, 
1993) that there are at least three types of clan control: economic, social, and blood relationship. 
The logic of economic clan controls 
lies in the beliefs that co-operative behaviour is a good way 
for an organization to achieve 
higher output which scores the organization's financial equity and 
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hopefully results in long term prosperity; the social clan controls are grounded on the emotional 
and social needs of the members of the organization to belong and communicate with each other 
as part of an organization; the blood relationship clan controls is based upon biological 
imperatives (i. e. family relationships). In brief, most, if not all, of modem organizations rely to 
some extent on clan controls, although a clan exists on the ground that there exists shared values 
and beliefs and organizational commitment. 
14.3.5.6 The politics approaches to control 
The politics approaches to control in organizations consider control as much more of a political 
rather than an economic or social act (Pettigrew, 1979): that is, control involves working within 
the political system and moulding it rather than seeking to `knock it into shape' (Pfeffer, 1980). 
From the political perspective, control in organizations becomes necessary not only because of 
the efficiency inherent from the `division of labour' (Taylor, 1967), 65 but also because of the 
reciprocal and/or conflicting needs between the controllers and the controlled due to the 
inequalities of power between them (Marx, 1973). 66 
Seemingly, `division of labour' signifies central authority engaging in setting up reward and 
sanction systems, appointing leaders, and establishing cultures; but the conflicting needs and 
wants for task accomplishment as well as for individual benefits, demand less formal and less 
hierarchical ways of getting things done. Literately speaking, the formal line of control has been 
essentially linked to bureaucracy (Weber, 1958); while 
in the less formal (or informal) line of 
control, scholarly attention 
has heavily drawn upon power and influence (Follet, 1987), and 
negotiations among organizational participants 
(Pfeffer, 1997). 
Bureaucracy as a control device 
political control in the line of bureaucracy suggests that the more systematic way for any large 
organization to achieve effective control 
is control by the office or position rather than by a 
person or patrimonial 
(Weber, 1958). It is believed (e. g. Weiss, 1983) that bureaucracy 
essentially remains an effective control construct 
to ease an organization's transition from small- 
scale entrepreneurial to 
large-scale professional management". It has been argued (Weber, 1958) 
that bureaucratic control is exercised upon the 
basis of knowledge and control is achieved 
through structural relationships and/or the co-relationships between authority and activity. 
Weber (1958) postulates three pure types of socially acceptable (i. e. legitimate) authority, 
namely, (a) rational-legal, 
(b) traditional, and (c) charismatic. 68 
In rational-legal authority, which 
is based on `legality or the right of those elevated to authority 
to issue commands'(Henderson and Parsons, 
1947), the obedience of the controlled in an 
organization 
is owed to the legally established hierarchy such as a strategic business unit, an 
office in the headquarter, or a sub-business, and control 
in terms of obedience to authority flows 
through established positions and 
/or ranks. In the case of traditional authority, which relies on 
`a belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those 
exercising authority under 
them'(Henderson and Parsons, 1947), control is obtained through 
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those persons who occupy the traditionally sanctioned position of authority. In charismatic 
authority, which rests on `devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or 
exemplary character of individual persons'(Henderson and Parsons, 1947), the controllers 
enjoying `the gift of grace' achieve control by virtue of the controllers' personal trust and belief 
in the controllers' powers and revelations (Weiss, 1983). 
For the Weberians (e. g. Weber, 1958; Weiss, 1983; Henderson and Parsons, 1947), the rational- 
legal authority provides the basis for a bureaucracy which directly facilitates administrative 
controls, " while charisma or tradition as authority might lay down foundations for self-control 
or social control respectively. As regard the controllers in the bureaucratic control space, there 
are technical competences in leaders who can lead by virtue of fact and not whim, and by ability 
and not favouritism. 70 Among Weber's essential elements of bureaucratic control are: (a) a 
division of labour in which authority and responsibility are clearly and legitimately defined for 
both the controllers and the controlled, (b) the offices or positions are organized in a hierarchy 
of authority resulting in a chain of command or the scalar principle, (c) all organizational 
members are recruited or selected on the basis of merits or by virtue of training or education, 
and (d) the rules, disciplines, and procedures set for the controllers and the controlled apply in 
all cases (Henderson and Parson, 1947). 
Power as a control device 
Political control in the line of power and influence suggests that `being in control' means the 
controllers are `actively engaged in applying power' (Storey, 1983), and that to control in 
organizations is to exercise power by the controllers so as to funnel the controlled into the 
production or service operation processes (Johnson and Gill, 1993). In general, the literature on 
power with particular reference to control in organizations seems to suffer from ambiguous 
definitions and applications deriving from conflicting philosophical assumptions including the 
functional, radical and plural (Clegg, 1989). 
The functional interpretation of power rests on the assumption that the exercise of power 
remains something which 
benefits an organization's whole membership (Parsons, 1951), and 
power in this sense becomes a generalized resource created by organizations for regulating 
social relations and therefore relates to the collective ability of all organizational members to 
maintain a social system 
by achieving their common objectives. This unitary approach to power 
suggests that control 
in organization bears a non-zero sum effect and becomes inextricably 
linked to bureaucracy. " Thus, effective control drives directly from effective authority in the 
interests of all, and any conflicts can be explained in terms of various pathological causes (e. g. 
ignorance or stupidity) rather than the rational, natural, or inevitable (Fox, 1974), regardless of 
the hierarchical nature of power and the clash of the divisions of interest which characterize the 
modern world (Knights and 
Willmott, 1985). 
The plural interpretation of power emphasizes the zero-sum nature of the exercise of the power- 
related control (i. e. control 
benefits one group at the expense of another), and considers conflicts 
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not as abnormal between the controllers and the potentially controlled so long as they are not so 
great that they cannot be accommodated and harmonized through compromising procedures 
(Fox, 1974). To pluralists (e. g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), power becomes a medium through 
which conflicts of interests are resolved as individuals with conflicting interests secure and 
mobilise different power resources in their pursuit of sectional or self interests, and there exists a 
balance of power between these conflicting parties so that no group of members can dominate 
others continuously (i. e. countervailing power). This suggests that administrative controls in the 
line of bureaucracy can not function effectively until proper attention has been paid to both the 
controllers and the controlled (Dahl, 1961), 72 and encourages the pluralist controllers to consider 
the effects of power as well as the distribution of power resources. 
For example, Dahl's (1957,1961) view on power based upon the power-effects research 
suggests that control means being able to realize objectives in the face of oppositions, that is `A 
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that 13 would not otherwise (10' 
(Dahl, 1957); French and Raven's (1959) analysis of power resources enlists a Fivefold 
classification which can be all possessed and used by the controllers to gain control over the 
potentially controlled: (a) rewards such as cash, promotions, recognition and job satisfaction, (b) 
coercive resources such as disciplines rested on the fear of psychological and material 
punishment, (c) referent power such as charisma, (d) expert power associated with specialized 
knowledge or technical skills, and (e) legitimate power derived from formal authority; " 
Hickson et al's (1971) strategic contingency theory of intraorganir. ational power (i. e. ability to 
cope with uncertainty, centrality, workflow 
immediacy and substitutability) suggests that there 
exists such an imbalance 
in the interdependencies between organizational segments that, the 
more central a segment 
is, the more uncertainty it can cope with and the less substitutable it is, 
then the more power it can have; 
" and Marchington (1982) recognizes that there exists a 
potential gap between structural power-resource possession and the subsequent exercise of that 
power (Figure 14-15), and proposes that 
the management might he able to attcnlht to control the 
manifestations of such power via 
(a) reducing dependency on a particular group of members 
such as stock-piling 
in the automobile industry, (h) inhibiting the development of solidarity and 
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(Source: Adapted from Marrhington, 19X2) 
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beliefs in the legitimacy of industrial action such as the use of personal letters in times of 
conflicts, or (c) ensuring that, if power is tested, the outcome is to weaken rather than affirm the 
group's perception of its power. 
The radical interpretation of power also emphasizes the zero-sum nature of the exercise of the 
power-related control (i. e. control benefits one group at the expense of another), but considers 
conflicts between the controllers and the potentially controlled as fundamentally opposed and 
principledly abnormal due to their irreconcilable class-based vested interests (Brown, 1978; 
Clegg, 1979; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974). In essence, the radical approach to 
control concentrates on the countervailing power of the members in an organization. 
It has been claimed (Lukes, 1974) that there are arguably three dimensions of power, namely, (a) 
power of the controller over the controlled - whereas control aims at the overt conflicts in 
decision-making situations (Dahl, 1961), (b) the rebellion of the controlled against the benefits 
held by the controller relative to the controlled - whereas control refers to subtle and less visible 
activity such as agenda setting (i. e. output control) through which power is exercised to prevent 
decisions being taken over potential issues which can result in a conflict of interests (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962), 75 and (c) the powerlessness of the controlled relative to the controller - 
whereas control means to shape preferences, perceptions, and cognitions so that the potentially 
controlled `accept their role in the existing order of things either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they 
value it as divinely ordained and beneficial' (Lukes, 1974). 
Theoretically speaking, the multi-dimensional nature of power infers that exercising power 
through control of values, opinions, ideologies, and cultures eventually leads to socializing 
organizational members into their unquestioning acceptance of the traditional, natural order of 
things, and this multi-dimension view of power is coincidentally in parallel to Marxist analyses 
of the deeper roots of domination. 
Practically speaking, however, the multi-dimensional nature of power draws much attention to 
the further aspects of the impact of output controls orientated towards avoiding the articulation 
of existing conflicts into organizational agendas and those of behavioural controls orientated 
towards forestalling conflict in the first place by means of shaping organizational members' 
cognitions and preferences 
(Clegg, 1975), 76 the latter of which pinpoints the role of `managerial 
prerogative' - which refers to the management's right to manage (Storey, 1983), 
" and has been 
frequently likened to the `divine right of kings' or the `calling' by God or Heaven (Weber, 1958, 
Sunzi, 1992) - as fundamental basis of any managerial attempt at control in organizations 
(Storey, 1983). 
It is believed (Storey, - 1983) that, although the boundaries of managerial prerogatives which 
serve to delineate those 
functional tasks which in turn engender management its distinctiveness, 
are constantly shifting, 
depending upon the managerial ideologies, " the controllers' right to 
control remains somewhat taken-for-granted, that 
is, the sheer status of being an controller is 
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enough to ensure the compliance to orders of the potentially controlled. Some have attributed 
this tendency of not challenging management prerogatives to the prior socialization of the 
controlled, which promotes a tendency to accept most aspects of the status quo and to narrow 
down any changes to `aggressive economism' (Storey, 1983). 
Evidence (Knights and Wilmott, 1985; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983) seems to support the 
importance of the managerial prerogatives which have been practically employed to 
precondition the potentially controlled culturally into accepting their being controlled and the 
controllers' right to control. 79 This leads management theorists to further suggest that 
management's control may become impossible without first establishing such a prerogative 
which in some way legitimises the right to control, partly because the establishment of control 
and prerogative largely relies on the dyadic cultural aspects of power, which, in effect, forestall 
the generation of non-negotiable demands in the first place and in a way independent of 
managerial strategies and actions (Storey, 1983). 
As regards how to exert power to achieve effective control, Pfeffer (1992) has articulated a 
number of tactics for exerting control via the use of power, and among the most useful are: (a) 
those having to do with timing including delay, waiting, and moving first (Schwartz, 1974), 80 (b) 
interpersonal influence strategies such as social proof, liking, commitment, contrast, reciprocity 
and scarcity (Kipnis et al, 1980; Cialdini, 1988; Schmidt, 1988), 81 (c) strategic presentation of 
information and analysis and selective use of data to strengthen one's case (Pfeffer, 1997), (d) 
reorganization to consolidate power or to break up the ability of one's opponents to coalesce 
(Pfefer and Salancik, 1977), (e) use of evocative, emotion-producing language to mobilize 
support or quiet opposition (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991), 
$2 and (f) use of task forces and 
committees to co-opt opposition (Gargiulo, 1993). 
83 
Negotiation as a control device 
Political control in the line of negotiations emphasizes the cognitive biases inherent in the 
process of interpersonal or 
interorganizational influence, and contrasts with the game theoretic 
approach to analyzing strategic interaction 
in economics (e. g. the zero-sum or non-zero sum 
paradigm) which implies that `the structure of the negotiation determines its outcomes' (Neale 
and Northcraft, 1990). This cognitive-bias approach also contrasts itself with the study of the 
effect of personality and 
individual differences such as gender, locus of control, self-esteem, and 
risk preference on negotiation processes and outcomes (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). 
Broadly speaking, the cognitive bias approach is built upon the extensive work on biases in 
decision-making (e. g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) under the premise that `negotiations 
represent a special case of 
decision-making' (Neale and Northcraft, 1990). It has been argued 
that `a variety of heuristics have been identified which systematically distort the negotiation 
process and potentially 
bias negotiation outcomes', and among those most crucial cognitive 
heuristics are framing, anchoring-and-adjustment, availability, and over-confidence ((Neale and 
Northcraft, 1990). 
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Evidence seems to support that, people who negotiate control tend to rely so much on available 
information that colourful, dynamic, concrete, or otherwise vivid or distinctive' stimuli often 
disproportionately attract attention and influence decision-makers' deliberation (Neale, 1984), 84 
that the same outcome can be framed as a gain or a loss depending on the control negotiators' 
initial negotiating position and expectations in that they can become risk-averse when choosing 
between certain gains and the risk of larger or no gains, but become risk-seeking when choosing 
between certain losses and the risk of larger or no loses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), that an 
initial offer in bargaining which represents an arbitrarily chosen reference point can significantly 
anchor subsequent adjustments (Northcraft and Neale, 1987), and that control negotiators tend 
to build up overconfidence in their ability to accomplish their favourable outcomes (Neale and 
Bazerman, 1985), thus decreasing their willingness to, make concessions (Neale and Bazerman, 
1985), overlooking the opportunity to negotiate for mutual gains partly due to the assumption 
that the situation is zero -sum (Bazerman et al, 1985), as well as becoming trapped by 
previously chosen positions in a process of commitment (Northcraft and Neale, 1986). 
Research evidence also shows that, control negotiators can achieve effective control by the 
presumed presence of a social context which makes the control negotiators accountable (Kramer 
et al, 1993) or by the induction of a particular social 
identity (Tetlock, 1985), because social 
identity and accountability, when accomplished on occasion by subtle changes in task structure 
(Larrick and Blount, 1985), can have significant consequences for activating cooperative or 
competitive behaviours (Kramer et al, 1993). 
85 
Moreover, it is also found that the induction of a positive mood facilitates integrative bargaining 
(Carnevale and Isen, 1986), and that control negotiators higher in self-esteem become more 
confident and optimistic prior to negotiating and more confident about their 
doing well in the 
negotiation process (Kramer et al, 
1993). In brief, the negotiation approach to control through 
bargaining and compromise, remains one of the most effective, if not the only, processes by 
which control policy can 
be adjusted (Follett, 1987), however, the negotiation approach to 
control lies in the potential 
for managing self-enhancing or self-decreasing bias towards the 
relationship between the controllers and the potentially controlled. 
14.3.5.7 The contingency approaches to control 
Contingency theories can be regarded as being fundamentally based on the idea that 
organizations are not merely a social system, nor an information-decision system, but an open- 
ended system of many 
interrelated parts (Tilles, 1963); and they well reflect the recognition 
among numerous great thinkers 
(e. g. Follett, 1973,1987; Taylor, 1967; Fayol, 1949; Sunzi, 1992) 
that there always exist different ways to organize and manage. This suggests that not only 
management techniques, 
but also principles, should be flexible (Sunzi, 1992) so that decision 
makers in organizations can 
literately act, decide, and do, all depending on the specific situation 
- there are no universals, no 
one best way (Odiorne, 1966). 86 
In essence, contingency theories echo the phrase `it depends... ' and denote that controllers have 
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to identify the variables in each control situation, understand the relationships between the 
variables and their interactions, and recognize the complexities of cause and effect in every 
control situation. Figure 14-16 is depicted to show possible environmental contingencies that 
might influence control in organizations. 
Figure 14-16: The contingency theory approach to control in organizations: a general view 
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Practically speaking, contingency theory implies possible procedural shifts of control 
mechanisms in the face of increasing uncertainty: control in organizations tend to shift Bronn 
behavioural control, first by personal means and then by impersonal means reinfi)rcecl by 
hierarchical supervision, to short-run output control with centralized coordination, and 
subsequently to long-run output control with decentralized coordination, eventually the 
uncertainty may become so great that output goals can no longer be set and the prime form of 
control shifts over 
inputs, especially personnel training and selection, and technology. 
"Theoretically spcaking, however, contingency theories can be argued to entail five a1)1)1-oaches: 
technological contingencies, environmental contingencies, organizational fit, structural 
contingencies, and hohulation-ecology 
(l osi and Slocum, 1984). 
'I, hc technological contingency theory 
1 /r(- wchnologicell ( o/ltilr, 'Xnrc)' thu'on' (Woodward, 1965-, Perrow, 1967) corresponds to the 
hclicl- (Frederick, 1963; Odiorne, 1966) that there exists a general theory of nianagcnfcrit but it 
hasn't yet been uncovered nor described, and emphasizes that the answer to it depends ... 
' in 
organization 
design lies in technology that is, technology functions as the dominant control 
operator (please sec 
Figure 14-I6) consists of'technologics (i. e. things). 
F; y classifying organizations through the complexity of the technology, fhr example, Woodward 
1965) proposes that technology influences organizational structure anti consctIucntIV ('0111101 
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mechanisms: organizations with the less complex and more advanced technologies tend to exert 
less personnel control (e. g. less emphasis on precise job descriptions, loosely organized work 
groups, and, more interests in self-controls); successful organizations with averagely complex 
technologies tend to exercise more administrative controls (e. g. closer supervision over 
personnel, and more elaborate control techniques). This leads management theorists such as 
Woodward (1965) and Perrow (1967) to assume that what matters in terms of organizational 
success is to adapt organizations to their technology, that is, to control is to be able to adjust 
readily to customers' needs through scientific advances in technology so as to gain suitable 
organizational flexibility in the competitive arena (Figure 14-17). 
Figure 14-17: Contingency theory approach to control: the technology as control operator 
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The environmental contingency theory 
The environmental contingency theory (e. g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) accords with the 
maxim that there is no one best way to control (Follett, 1987) and assumes that the solution to 
control problems depends on environmental exigencies such as the market, the technical- 
economic and the scientific. This suggests that the dominating control operator now consists of 
the interaction among those exigencies (i. e. events) closely related to the market, the marketing 
subsystem and the R&D subsystem - i. e. general economic conditions, capital, natural and 
human resources, culture, technology, market, industry, and government (Figure 14-18). 87 
Figure 14-18: Contingency theory approach to control: the environment as control operator 
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By using the term of `differentiation' which refers to the degree of segmentation in an 
organization's subunits with respect to 
how they relate to the external environment and by using 
the term of `integration', 
" which can be achieved either by more formal means (e. g. the use of 
formal management hierarchy of authority, plans, procedures, rules and other formal 
management practices), or 
by more flexible adjustments (e. g. the use of cross-functional means 
of coordinating efforts), 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) notice that the more successful 
organization are those which adjust themselves to their relevant environments: organizations 
featuring less differentiation can successfully achieve integration through more formal means of 
control while maintaining more centralized; organizations featuring more differentiation can 
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successfully achieve integration through more flexible means of control while maintaining more 
de-centralized. 
The organizational fit theory 
The organizational fit theory, which is coined by Galbraith and Nathanson (1978), unnoticeably 
echoes Follett's (1987) observation that effective control is bound to permeate all elements of 
the undertaking including personnel, technology, execution of plans, quality of work, financial 
activities, security and information. In essence, the organizational fit theory remains an extended 
contingency theory which promotes the possibility control mechanisms, strategy, general 
management and organization theory can be more closely incorporated (Wren, 1987). 
For the organizational fit. theorists, any way of controlling is not equally effective (Galbraith, 
1973) and what contributes to an organization's successful control lies in its ability to maintain a 
`match' or `congruence' between varying factors such as structure, size, technology, people, 
tasks, rewards, culture, and leadership (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978). It thus seems that in 
principle, successful control results from the fitness of the organization (Figure 14-19). 
Figure 14-19: Contingency theory approach to control: the organizational fit theory 
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In practice, however, it seems that the control operator consists of internal conditions or 
competence -i. e. people, events, things, and change; and that to effect successful control in 
organizations is to contract or stretch organizational resources 
from time to time so as to create, 
nurture and/or maintain the 
internal conditions which promptly match the external environments 
of the organization. 
Structural contingency theory 
Structural contingency theory remains an offspring of the organizational fit theory and 
emphasizes the match 
between an organization's structure and other variables such as 
technology, strategy, size, and environment. 
89 In principle structural contingency theory follows 
Fayol's (1949) observation that an organization's structure has to be `consistent' with its 
`objectives, resources, and requirements'. 
In practice, however, it has twofold 
implications: first, it indicates the consonance hypothesis 
(Pfeffer, 1982) that `organizations that have structures that more closely match' or fit `the 
requirements of the context, will 
be `more effective than those that do not'; and it implies that 
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organizations adapt their structure by moving out of misfit so as to restore effectiveness and 
performance (Donaldson, 1995). 
Evidence (e. g. Rumelt, 1974; Hage and Aiken, 1969; Child, 1973; Burns and Stalker, 1961) 
seems to suggest that, in general, organizational structure varies predictably in association with 
such variations like strategy, size, technology and environment - i. e. control operator consists of 
things and events (please see Figure 14-5): 90 for example, more diversified organizations tend to 
adopt a divisionalized structure (Rumelt, 1974); larger organizations tend to be more formalized, 
more specialized and less centralized (Child, 1973); organizations employing non-routine, 
variable or unpredictable technologies tend to employ decentralized and informalized structures 
(Hage and Aiken, 1969); and organizations in a more stable and certain environment enjoy more 
bureaucratic structures (Burns and Stalker, 1961). 
The research evidence has supported the view that the . variation of organizational structure can 
significantly relate to the structure of control in that the structure of control is heavily `nested' in 
organizational structures (Child, 1973; Mintzberg, 1979); and Tables 14-6 & 14-7 provide a 
bird's eye view of the possible relationship between the structure of organization and the 
structure of control. 
Table 14-6: An overview of the major structural contingency theory (Source: Pfeffer, 1997) 
Major contingencies which affect structure Structural elements affected 
Strategy: Form 
Product differentiation, price Multidividsional, functional, and matrix 
Size Size of the administrative component 
Technology: Degree of bureaucratization 
Production process, Information technology, Formalization, standardization, functional 
amount of variability specialization, centralization, formalization, 
Environment: Differentiation: 
Amount of change, resource munificence degree Number of levels, number of departments / divisions 
of competition, unpredictability, uncertainty 
Table 14-7: Structural contingencies and control mechanism (Source: Mintzberg, 1979) 
Organizational forms 
Simple structure 
Prime control mechanism 
Direct supervision 
Machine bureaucracy Standardization of work processes 
Professional bureaucracy Standardization of skills 
Divisionalized Form Standardization of outputs 
Adhocracy Mutual adjustment 
The population ecology view (e. g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979), though still far 
from a theory which permits knowledge to be translated into action (Pfeffer, 1997), sees the 
environment 
in which organizations operate as more active in shaping and controlling the 
organization: environment provides a natural selection process 
for organizations, those which 
survive being ones which are suitable 
for the given environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977); 
and thus organizations are seen as 
less able to adapt to the environment, and survival depends 
upon fitness for the changing environment (Aldrich, 1979). 9' 
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In principle, the population ecology view supports the social Darwinists' allegations (Hofstadter, 
1945) that it is nature that provides that the `most fit' in a competitive situation wins, and that 
through unrestricted competition, the fittest organizations or individuals survive and move up 
the social ladder of success and the unfit occupy the lower class structures and eventually be 
eliminated through evolution (Jones, 1968). " 
As a theory of control, however, population ecology practically focuses on some factors - e. g. 
age, size and the number of competing organizations - which may be substantively significant 
but over which there is virtually no organizational control except to the extent organizations can 
choose their competitive niche arena. Population ecology indicates that, once a niche is chosen 
and inertia starts to build, an organization's fate lies in the hands of others and selection forces 
which are outside of its very own control. 
This suggests a paradoxical concern: control mechanisms which have insulated organizations 
from competitive pressure and therefore enhanced their life chance, can also insulate 
organizations from the selection pressures which foster learning - the choice posed is between 
enhanced survival and enhanced learning from competitive pressure. This implies that control in 
organizations can be just an illusion (derived from the common human desire for a feeling of 
mastery and control) that individuals act as if they have control even in situations where they 
don't (Singh and Lumsden, 1990), and that there is never a best way to control - only a way 
which has out-controlled the controlled 
in the past, given the conditions of the environment 
which prevailed at that time 
(i. e. the control operator consists of change). 
In short, contingency theory approaches to control may well explain that organizations 
prospered because of their successful matching 
between control structure and strategy or 
whatever, but it can not really predict what 
`fits' will lead to successful control of organizational 
activities in the future. 
Therefore, the solution to control problems is more complex than `fit' or 
`congruence' between a definite number of factors between two ends of a continuum (e. g. 
hierarchies and markets); perhaps the best way to achieve control efficiency is to employ 
various levels of combination of all contingencies. 
14.3.6 Control inorganizations: the common problems in practice 
Experience reveals that organizational control systems do not always function in the ways which 
are required or expected. 
It seems evident that control contains a limit to how much control can 
be exerted on organizations compressed 
by human needs, drives, biases and suchlike, because, 
perhaps due to natural selection, human beings living and working in today's modem 
civilisation still retain such 
hardwired mentalities that, emotions can triumph over reasons, 
confidence over realism, and classification over calculus. 
This suggests that there exist some 
major problems 
for managing control in organizations which may run counter to the 
performances which the management are sought after. 
First, control, inevitably (perhaps partially, though) relies on the existence of hierarchical levels 
formal or informal, and thus 
inheres the disadvantages of bureaucracy (Nicholson, 1998) which 
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include that establishing rules is always easier than discarding them and that there is always a 
danger that organizational members become so used to automatically following rules that they 
stop thinking and learning for themselves (Blau, 1955). 
Second, control, related to the first problem, can especially lead to `rigid bureaucratic behaviour' 
such that organizational members may undergo a natural selection process and behave in ways 
required by the control systems or the leaders rather than in the absolute interests of the 
organization as a whole, ' because it is normally the pre-set standards in the control process that 
dictate what to do and who receives promotion (Lawler, 1976). 
Third, control can lead to resistance' to change when it threatens needs satisfaction or creates 
hostility (Dunnette, 1976), and this can become commonplace, especially when the control 
systems actually involve themselves in automating human skill and expertise, creating new 
experts with new sources of power, disrupting social grouping opportunities, or reducing 
opportunities for intrinsic need satisfaction (Ridley, 1998). 93 `I 
Fourth, control can become handicapped by the incompetent leaderships in that, for example, 
control systems can fail under the direction of a leader who does not have the desire to lead or 
the passion for efficiency (Wright, 1994). 
Fifth, control can be initiated by poor objectives (such as those unmeasurable or unchallenging) 
to such an extent that poor objectives directly linked to poor standards of performance for 
comparison with actual results can make control systems improbable (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 
1984). 
Sixth, control involves management by negative exception and poor evaluation of performance 
(such as concentrating on poor performance only), and this can exert a negative impact on the 
control process in that successful control depends on an appreciation process premised on good 
communication and sound evaluation of reasons underlying significant deviations from plans, 
both positive and negative (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). 
Seventh, poor performance appraisal can be brought into the control process and jeopardise the 
control systems because good performance demands that sufficient attention is paid to the 
integration of short-and long- term organizational needs, and requires the reinforcement of 
behaviour consistent with objectives (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). 
Eighth, control can become naturally involved in avoiding and embracing errors because control 
practices can entail both a strict avoidance of error and a strict reinforcement of error - prone 
rules, but avoiding and embracing errors can give rise to a strong concern with defensibility of 
action and may foster conservatism and rigidity of behaviour (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). 
Ninth, control designs (plan and / or mode) may not always provide appropriate criteria for 
action, and this 
is particularly true when organizations are dealing with complexity via 
differentiated structures and procedures or when organizational members are not pursuing the 
same goals (Hofstede, 1968). 
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Tenth, control involves uncertainty avoidance in that organizational members can set out to 
avoid rather than engage in uncertainty especially when they cannot predict anything accurately 
(Nicholson, 1998), 94 and this can lead organizations to create and mirror the varieties of chaos 
which they face such as letting uncertainty tumble in across their defences and randomly disturb 
what are believed to be orderly patterns (Schon, 1983). 
Eleventh, the faulty information processing capabilities can be insufficient for the control 
process in that insufficient communications or poor operating structure can result in incomplete 
information due to the difficulties in collecting information (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). 
Twelfth, inaccurate information can be led into the control process, and it becomes even more 
likely to so happen when the measure is important or when organizational members feel that the 
standards of the control process imposed on them are unfair or unreasonable (Lawler, 1976). 
14.4 Strategic control of investments: towards successful controllership 
14.4.1 Controllership in organizations 
However frightening, the above control problems can be managerially resolved in a composite 
manner (Emmanuel et al, 1990). For 
instance, the management can largely rely on an effective 
as well as efficient controllership, which, 
in theoretical terms, refers to a process by which a 
controller nurtures, exercises, and evaluates 
influence over and/or with the potentially controlled 
so as to help achieve pre-established performance, viz., management can simply try to avoid 
some behavioural problems 
by the use of good control problem-avoidance techniques, or, 
alternatively, if the above control problems simply remain, try to engage themselves proactively 
in protecting the organization against the remaining problems. 
In practical terms, controllership pertains to the relationship 
between the controllers and the 
potentially controlled and permeates 
through all control activities, and, if effectively managed, 
controllership can actually enhance an organization's chances of successful accomplishment of 
the goals of all organizational activities as well as 
increasing its ability to meet all the 
contemporary challenges 
including the need to obtain a competitive advantage, the need to 
foster ethical behaviour, and the need to manage a diverse workforce fairly and equitably. 
However, a competitive controllership demands not only the qualities of some individuals or 
groups, or some systems that make 
them controllers, but also the willingness of the controllers 
and of the potentially controlled 
to exercise self-control such as giving modest instructions or 
complying with 
instructions. This implies that successful controllership in organizations should 
at least embrace 
imperial control principles, competent leadership styles, healthier control 
mentalities, structurally-fit control strategies, workable control 
techniques, suitable control 
processes, solid 
foundations for the implementation of control, and, above all, the effective as 
well as efficient management of varying control paradoxes 
in the full organizational context. 
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14.4.2 Successful controllership: the first principles . 
It seems that, a careful examination of various approaches relevant to control in organizations 
(please see Figure 2-5; Figure 3-2, Figure 4-3; Figures 12-3,4,5,8,9&10; Figures 14-5,6,7,8, 
9,12,14,15,16,17,18&19; Table 5-3; Tables 14-5&6), gives rise to the concern that one of 
the most arresting elements of control lies in the fact that control has to be a continuing activity, 
a fact that corresponds with Follett's (1987) more psychological attack on the problems 
concurrent with control in practices. ' Controllers in organizations can never really get out of the 
fallacy that they can solve problems until they look on control as a continuing activity, because 
they themselves are living, changing, developing and decaying organisms (Follett, 1987). 
Besides, once a problem is `solved', the very process of solving invites new elements or forces 
into the situation and thus ignites new problems which require new processes (Davis, 1951). 
This suggests a practical control paradox that men solve a control problem but create a new 
control problem. Thus, theories and processes can become obsolete after they are documented 
(Popper, 1959), and human's only guides to actions rest on the first principles which may serve 
as convenient or shorthand method of thinking for people to observe the control world and to 
articulate new, more pertinent principles which might eventually contribute to the solution of the 
emerging problems. 
It can be argued that, it remains unwise to pretend that the understanding of the principles 
relevant to control in organizations is as yet perfect, and that, even in their present incomplete 
form some principles are a far better guide to the effective as well as efficient integration of 
resources than personalities or politics or a precarious balancing of power between various 
vested interests. Among the articulated principles relevant to control in organizations are: 
uniformity, comparison, utility, the exception, and unity. 
The principle of uniformity (Urwick, 1974) maintains that all figures and reports used for the 
purposes of control should be in terms of the organization structure. This suggests that authority 
and responsibility must correspond: because responsibility is accountability for the discharge of 
duties, the figures in which the accountability is recorded must equally correspond with 
individuals' authority (Child, 1984). The managerial implication derived from this principle of 
uniformity is that no individuals' effort should be expressed in any figures which they are not in 
a position to influence (Holbrook and Prichard, 1964). 
The principle of comparison maintains that all figures and reports used for the purposes of 
control should be in terms of standards of performance required, and, where necessary, of 
previous performance (Urwick, 
1974). This suggests that, no figures or reports remain very 
informative which merely show a comparison between performance in some arbitrary period 
and some other, equally arbitrary, period 
in the past; and, that, in contrast, figures set against 
pre-planned performance 
(e. g. behaviours and outcomes) which the management intend to reach 
at least exhibit whether the 
intentions are being realized or not and trigger enquiry into the why 
and the wherefore of discrepancies (Urwick, 1974). One primal practical implication of this 
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principle of comparison is that the controllers should always have a kind of mark to aim at and 
force themselves to examine and to explain all the reasons for deviation from that mark, 95 even 
if the mark itself does not approximate an accurate estimate of what the actual achievement such 
as in cases where common sense prevails in the face of reason (March and Sevon, 1984; 
Northcraft and Wolf, 1984). 
The principle of utility (Urwick, 1974) maintains that all figures and reports used for the 
purposes of control should have usable value directly associated with the appropriateness of the 
period covered to the end in view as well as the time separating the end of the period covered 
from their use. This suggests that figures and reports which are completed some time after the 
close of the period to which they refer become progressively less useful with every second that 
elapses, and, thus, the management need to engage in detailed and immediate control actions. 
This principle of utility reinforces a lesson that a piece of information in time saves a great deal 
of knowledge or capital, a lesson from which so many new business school MBAs or PhDs are 
still learning; it also encourage professions such as management accountants to search for 
figures of useful value and reports of practical value. 
The exception principle (Taylor, 1967) dictates that the top management should process `only 
condensed, summarized, and invariably comparative reports, covering, however, all of the 
elements entering into the management'. This suggests that even those chosen summaries should 
be `carefully gone over by an assistant' to the top management before they reach the top; this 
also suggests that the summaries should cover `all of the exceptions to the past averages or to 
the standards pointed out, both the especially good and the especially bad exceptions' (Taylor, 
1967). The underlying implication of the exception principle is that the effective as well as 
efficient control is more likely to be achieved by the management's being free to consider the 
broader lines of policy and to study the character and fitness of the controlled or being able to go 
through in a few minutes a full view of progress which is being made (Taylor, 1967). 
The principle of unity refers to the reciprocal relating, co-ordinating, unifying process in which 
solution to problems depends on the 
interacting of the elements of an environmental complex 
(Follett, 1940). It is held (Follett, 1987) that, the parts of an organization, `should so move 
together in their reciprocally adjusting activities that they make a working unit, not a congeries 
of separate pieces', and that, the reciprocal activity of the parts changes the parts while it is 
creating the unity. However, this 
bears an implication for the management that genuine authority 
arises spontaneously 
in the process of building up an integrated unity - i. e. the show runs itself- 
all the management should 
do is to weave the accumulative authority out of the interrelated 
experience of all those who are performing some 
functional part of the total activity in the belief 
that the relating of different functions has a value beyond the addition of the parts. 
14.4.3 Successful controllership: the competent leadership styles 
Given imperial principles of control, the`psychology of control will recede to occupy the whole 
story of control 
in organizations although it still remains very important and relevant. Agreed 
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principles imply that organizational members can be entirely committed to management's goals 
and policies, and thus, the solving of control problems is simply one of finding a style of 
leadership which is acceptable. 
Obviously, the power found in the controller is a key component of effective controllership 
because the wise use of legitimate, reward, coercive, expert, and referent power can significantly 
benefit control activities in organizations (French and Raven, 1959). Empowerment, which 
refers to expanding the tasks and responsibilities of the potentially controlled, can also be a 
useful tool of effective controllership (Simon, 1995). Traits and personal characteristics related 
to effective leadership such as intelligence, knowledge and expertise, dominance, self- 
confidence, high energy, tolerance for stress, integrity and honesty and maturity, can greatly, 
though not necessarily, contribute to effective controllership (Kirpatrick and Locke, 1991). 
Controllers engaging in both consideration (by means of trusting, respecting, and caring about 
the potentially controlled) and initiating structure (by means of ensuring that tasks get 
acceptably done and that organizational activities are effective and efficient) may also, though 
not sufficiently, contribute to effective controllership. 
Effective controllership can also be obtained through taking account of the complexity 
surrounding controllership and the role of `the 
law of the situation' (Follett, 1987). For example, 
Fiedler's (1967) study on leader style (i. e. relationship-oriented or task- oriented) and situational 
characteristics (i. e. leader-member relations, task structure, and position power) reveals that 
relationship-oriented leaders as controllers can greatly 
improve organizational effectiveness in 
situations where control by 
leading is moderately favourable and that the task-oriented leaders 
as controllers can significantly enhance organizational effectiveness 
in situations where control 
by leading is either very favourable or very unfavourable. House's (1971) path-goal theory 
suggests that, aided by 
four kinds of behaviours (i. e. directive behaviour, supportive behaviours, 
participative behaviours, and achievement-oriented 
behaviours), 96 leaders as controllers can be 
guided to improve organizational effectiveness through 
(a) finding out what outcomes the 
controlled aim to achieve 
from the tasks and the organization, (b) rewarding subordinates as the 
controlled for high performance and goal attainment with 
the outcomes they desire, and (c) 
clarifying the paths to goal attainment 
for subordinates, removing any obstacles to high 
performance, and expressing confidence 
in the capabilities of the controlled. Kerr and Jermier's 
(1978) situational leadership model implies that sometimes the controlled can perform highly 
without the presence of controllership 
in that both personal characteristics of the controlled such 
as skills, abilities, experience, 
knowledge, and motivation and the situational characteristics such 
as the extent to which the 
task is interesting, enjoyable and fulfilling, can in general, though not 
necessarily, become substitutes 
for controllership (Podsakoff et al, 1993). 
The transformational leadership of the controllers can also have dramatic effects on the 
organizational controllership as well as 
inspiring and energizing the potentially controlled to 
solve control problems and 
improve organizational performance (e. g. Bass, 1985; Miller, 1995): 
for example, by being a charismatic 
leader, by intellectually stimulating the controlled, by 
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engaging in developmental consideration, and / or by engaging in transactional leadership 
through the use of reward and coercive powers to encourage high performance, transformational 
leaders as controllers can, (a) make the potentially controlled aware of the importance of their 
tasks and the necessity of performance to the organization, (b) make the potentially controlled 
aware of their needs for personal growth, development, and accomplishment, and (c) motivate 
the potentially controlled to work for the good of the organization as a whole, not just for their 
own personal vested interests. 
14.4.4 Successful controllership: the healthier control mentalities 
A successful controllership rests on healthier control mentalities. A problem is not solved unless 
it does not start or until it is solved. Once a problem looms large, however, the solution rests on 
the ways the problem-solvers perceive and deal with the dynamics of the problem which per se 
evolves over time. 
14.4.4.1 The `putting prevention first' mentality 
It seems arguable that the most efficient controllership rests on the mentality of putting 
prevention first in the work of control (i. e. preventionist mentality) simply because `a stitch in 
time saves nine'. Among techniques established to prevent control problems are (a) automation, 
(b) centralization, (c) risk-sharing, and (d) elimination of an entity or operation. Automation 
becomes more and more appealing by the advent of advanced computers and automata because 
the use of automation reduces organizations' exposure to control problems due to human 
inconsistency, even though some times at the cost of de-humanization. 
Top management can try to reserve some important control decisions to themselves and thus 
avoid some control problems which can 
deteriorate in the face of sophisticated inter- 
relationships, even though 
its effectiveness can be limited due to possible information overload. 
Risk sharing arrangements can be partly relied on to reduce the potential harm which might 
befall the organization if organizational members behave inappropriately. Elimination of control 
operations or duties by 
divesting the involved of the control activity or restricting them to 
activities that they have not 
been over confident or under confident, can greatly cool off the 
control problem-and 
become effective, especially when the concerned do not seem to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the problems to 
be tackled. 
14.4.4.2 The `putting process first' mentality 
It seems equally arguable that the most effective controllership rests on the mentality of putting 
process first in the work of control 
(i. e. protectionist mentality) because `a man reaps what he 
sows'. To prioritise process 
in resolving control problems, the controllers need to be aware of 
the fact that, desired solutions to control problems, can relate to, problem representation (please 
see Figure 2-5), problem-solving paradigm 
(please see Figure 2-1 for an example), and structure 
(please see Figure 2-6). It can, also, appear in varying patterns (please see Figures 2-4&8), 
demand unique techniques (please see Figure 2-9), require the adoption of varying strategies 
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(please see Figures 2-10&11). Moreover, this `putting process first' mentality should also dig 
into the realm of cognitive traps (please see Table 2-4 for examples), contexts (please see Table 
2-3 and Figure 3-1 for examples), and procedures (please see Figure 2-5 for an example). 
Consider the operators' (please see Figure 2-5), for example, emphasis on the process of events 
(i. e. the situationalist mentality) promotes self-fit and encourages integration of situational 
forces; emphasis on the process of `hard' things such as technologies (i. e. the determinist 
mentality) promotes technologic development and encourages innovations and creativity; and 
emphasis on the process of `sot' things such as structure and capital (i. e. the rationalist 
mentality) promotes competencies and encourages maximum utilization. 
14.4.4.3 The `putting people first' mentality 
However, the argument that, the fact that problems can never be eliminated in that the solution 
to one problem will lead to the birth of another problem, is, because humans fail to discover 
uniformity (please see Table 5-2 and Figure 2-4), suggests that the most ultimate efficient 
controllership rests on the mentality of putting people first in the work of control (i. e. the 
determinist mentality) in that there is not any absolutely self-efficient or self-effective 
controllership in any control space, and, therefore, organisations need to constantly invest in 
people to improve their experience, and knowledge because it is people that ultimately create or 
discover solutions to problems and because human behaviours in organizations are still so 
hardwired as they were two hundred thousand years ago that both the controlling and the 
potentially controlled can work against their inner circuitry. 
To put people first, the controllers need to look inward into their inner world as well as looking 
outward into the outside world surrounding them. Human beings are still seeking those traits 
which made survival possible 
long before and having an instinct to fight frantically when 
threatened. Consider the nature of humans as operators (please see Figure 2-5), for example, 
genetically potential emphasis, on 
individuality (i. e. the individualist mentality) promotes self 
interests and thus encourages competition for scarce resources; genetically potential emphasis 
on collectivity (i. e. the communalist mentality) promotes common values and thus encourages 
cooperation; the emphasis on the combination of people, event, change and things (i. e. the 
pluralist mentality) promotes sectional 
interests and encourages conflict-resolving through the 
medium of power; and the emphasis on the 
interaction between people, event, change and things 
(i. e. the experimentalist mentality) promotes unbounded 
definition of interests and encourages 
non-relativist synthesis. 
14.4.4.4 The `putting change first' mentality 
The argument that the problem can never be eliminated in that the solution to one problem will 
lead to the birth of another problem is because the environment is so turbulent that change 
becomes inevitable, suggests that, the most ultimately effective controllership rests on the 
mentality of putting change 
first in the work of control (i. e. the evolutionist or revolutionist 
mentality), because an organization, 
living in an environment sophisticated by the interactions 
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between people, event, things, change, has to be constantly strong, wise, fit, and leaner, viz., 
always seeking for the organization's situational fit or optimisation. 
To focus on change in the process of control, the controllers need to look at both the driving and 
constraining forces in the environment (e. g. historical, operational and social) in which control 
takes place. This suggests that the processes or driving forces that account for past successes 
must not be used without any doubt as the footprints which will be made in the future. Focuses 
on the process of change suggests that to control is to organize, disorganize, and reorganize 
activities so as to transform inputs and add value to them, depending on whether the 
environment surrounding the organization is stable or unstable, healthy or unhealthy, and 
progressive or malfunctional. For example, emphasis on the process of rapid change (i. e. the 
radicalist mentality) promotes destructive methods and encourages reorganization via revolution 
(be it quiet or abrupt); and emphasis on the process of steady change (i. e. the conventionalist 
mentality) promotes constructive methods and encourages reorganization via evolution. 
14.4.4.5 Successful controllership: the structurally fit control strategies 
Child (1984) looks at the selection of control strategies by focusing on organizational choices on 
control in respect of varying structural dimensions, and maintains that there exist several 
structural design dimensions which need to be consulted 
before an organization selects a control 
strategy to pursue effective controllership: (a) the degree of centralization and delegation, (b) the 
relative emphasis between 
formalization and informality, and (c) the degree of personal 
supervision. It is argued (Child, 1984) that the choice of control strategy (whether 
it is a single 
method or a combination of many methods) can 
be accordingly made dependent on the 
controllers' judgment (which can 
be informed by theory and practice on the appropriateness of 
the intended as well as the alternatives) on the choices for particular situations. 
It is argued (Child, 1984) that the choice between centralized and delegated control needs to be 
made first, in respect of the strategic 
importance of the decision, and second, for the whole range 
of organizational decisions 
in the light of varying contingencies and capabilities relevant to the 
full organizational context. 
For instance, centralization strategy, which means that control is exercised by confining 
decision-making to a small group of senior controllers or even one controller (Child, 1984), is 
believed to be promising, under circumstances such as the following (Carlisle, 1974): (a) when 
the control situation demands co-ordinated activities of the sub-unit or 
individuals who report up 
to senior controllers, (b) when senior controllers are 
in a better position to know what is going 
on and how far it confirms to 
the organization's chosen strategy, (c) when the control situation 
demands an appropriate balance among various functional areas of the organization (e. g. 
marketing, finance, operations, and R&D), (d) when it is desired to economize on managerial 
overheads, (e) when the control situation requires a significant amount of 
judgment and 
experience from the controllers. 
Delegation strategy, which means that decision-making is passed downwards or outwards within 
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the formal structure given that there are strict limits imposed on the scope and the type of 
decisions that can be made without referral upwards (Child, 1984), is also believed to be 
appealing on occasions where, (a) there is a need to relieve senior controllers from becoming 
over-burdened, (b) there is a surging need for motivational considerations, (c) there is a need for 
judgment developed through appropriate. experience to cope with uncertainty, (d) there is a 
request for greater flexibility due to larger organizational size or geographical dispersion, (e) 
there is a request for understanding of local conditions of the problem, and (f) there is a demand 
for establishing relatively independent sub-units within an organization (Child, 1984). 
It has been argued (Weber, 1969) that organizations tend to start in an informal way but become 
more formalized as they grow. Formalization means that control is first established through 
written policies, procedures, rules, job definitions and standing orders which prescribe correct or 
expected action, and then backed up with systems for the documented recording of what has 
taken place in the way of communication and performance results (Child, 1984). It can be a 
complement to moves along the centralization - delegation horizon especially in conditions 
where delegation becomes desirable, where relative stability in organization becomes substantial, 
and where a framework of rules and systems is needed within which decision-making can be 
delegated with reasonably predictable results (Child, 1984). However, informality can also 
become beneficial on occasions where initiatives are superior to conformity, where spontaneous, 
innovative, and organic type of approaches to problems are needed, and where informal ways of 
doing things substantially improve coordination among organizational members(Child, 1984). 
It is claimed (Child, 1984) that modern thinking of organization favours moves towards a 
reduction of supervisory emphasis, by encouraging `self-control' (Follett, 1940) among those 
doing the work, or by substituting `technological control' with the aid of microelectronic 
technology for human supervision (Boulding, 1956). Supervisory emphasis generally refers to 
superiors' supervision of subordinates' activities through the imposition of checks or limits on 
the discretion subordinates can use. 
It is believed (Child, 1984) that, personal supervision can be used as a complement to 
formalization in situations where there is a need to check that the controlled are keeping to 
formally laid down rules, procedures, or job specifications; that a high supervisory involvement 
may also become necessary on occasions where the control situation requires that the controllers 
coordinate widely disparate types of activity or remain on 
hand to discuss complex or novel 
technical problems; that supervisory emphasis can become very suitable to situations in which 
the potentially controlled are lacking 
in skill and commitment to their organizational roles; and 
that human supervision can also become appropriate to periods of rapid development in which 
formalization has lagged behind. However, supervisory emphasis can incur significant 
disadvantages of overhead cost and attenuation of the hierarchy, and this inevitably leads to the 
incorporation of human capability into the structural considerations of control - i. e. the study of 
the optimum span of control 
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14.4.5 Successful controllership: the optimal span of control 
Span of control refers to the number of the potentially controlled for whose performance a 
controller is responsible. Seemingly the concepts of span of control and hierarchy are closely 
related: the broader the span of control, the fewer the number of levels in the hierarchy is 
required, and the fewer the number of relationships between controllers and the controlled exist 
at each hierarchical level. 
This indicates that a narrow span of control creates vertical differentiation and a tall hierarchy 
which may facilitate promotion but may also deteriorate communication, and that a broad span 
of control encourages effective delegation and a flat hierarchy which may facilitate 
communication but can also hamper promotion (Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991). Evidence 
shows that organizational members enjoying high self-actualization needs prefer flat hierarchies 
with a broader span of control, while those focusing on security needs tend to gravitate towards 
tall hierarchies with a narrow span of control (Koontz, 1966). 
Literature on the desirable span of control is inconsistent but generally recommends a span of 
less than twelve. Evidence shows that for the ancient Chinese, Roman, Incas, and Egyptian, the 
popular span of control is the `rule of ten' (Polo, 1954; Thorndike, 1979; Flinders-Petrie, 1924). 
For the earlier industrial revolutionists, the span of control records an average of one first line 
supervisor for every 28 workers in British mining, construction, and textile organizations 
(Pollard, 1965). In the scientific management era, the span of control is reduced to `less than six, 
normally' and `only the first line supervisor' can have more' (Fayol, 1949). 97 In the social man 
era, the span of control recommended by the practitioners `seldom runs beyond six to twelve 
people' (Dennison, 1931); for military leaders, whether the span of control is three, four, five or 
six depends on a by-law that `the smaller the responsibility. . . the 
larger may be the number of 
the group [of the controlled] - and vice versa. . . the nearer we approach the supreme head of the 
whole organization, the more we work toward groups of six' (Hamilton, 1921); and for 
management theorists, according to Urwick's (1938) principle of span of control, `no superior 
can supervise directly the work of more than five or six subordinates whose work interlocks'. 
Experience reveals that the controllers in organizations are frequently hampered by trying to 
control (or lead, or supervise, or coach, or manage) too many subordinates, and this is reported 
(Gulick and Urwick, 1937) to be due to the controller's desire `to enhance their prestige and 
influence' by means of simply adding more subordinates and more departments to their 
responsibility. This ego bolstering can 
be deadly, from the standpoints of delays, lack of 
coordination and confusion resulted from trying to control too many subordinates, and this 
generates much support 
for the argument (Graicunas, 1937; Robbins, 1990) that a narrow or 
limited span of control can remain more desirable. 
For example, Graicunas (1937), the American consultant, under the influence of Hamilton (1921) 
and Urwick (1938), generalizes 
from his observational data gathered from industrial managers 
that organizations need limited rather than broad span of control because that human brain can 
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not cope with too many variables at any one time98 and that there exists an exponential increase 
in the number of the total relationships (i. e. the sum of direct single relationships, direct group 
relationships, and cross relationships) between the controllers and the potentially controlled 
when the span of control increases, arithmetically (Table 14-8 and Figure 14-20). 99 
Table 14-8: Relationship between span of control, hierarchical level and total employees 
(Source: Developed from Graicunas, 1937) 
Specifications Total hierarchical managers Total shop floor workers Total employees required 
Formula E NKi-I M*NK-I Z NKi-1 + M*N K-I 
If N=5, K=8, and M=12 19531 187500 207031 
If N=8, K=8, and M=15 299593 2097152 2396745 
Figure 14-20: Contrasting spans of control (Source: Developed upon Robbins (1990) and Graicunas(1937))10° 
Level t The hiýhestý /i 
Level 2 
Level 3 
-.. -.. --"-"" -" 
teý. el 4 
--"- - ^-°- 
512 
Level5 4096 
......... 
Levcl G 
............ 
32768 
5 
-.. -.. - _Level 
7_ 
.. -... "- 
262144 
t Level K1 tK-21 
ýI ýýý u (M <20) \-- -Level 
K M"81K'll M <20 
Span uP ;, , gun, n r, o il e eonvc, lkd ai rach I. '. el Hierarchical levels Span of 8: numbers of the controlled at each level 
Apparently, when the span of control increases from four to five (Table 14-9), the working 
capacity increases 20%, the increase 
in the possible number of relationships increase by 56 (or 
127%); and this favourably supports the argument (Graicunas, 1937) that the span of control 
should be limited to a `maximum of 
five and most probably, only four'. 10' 
Table 14-9: Span of control and total relationships (Source: Adapted from Graicunas, 1937) 
Span of control (N) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Total relationships TRN = N"(2"/ 2+N-1) 
1 6 18 44 100 222 490 1080 2376 5210 
Increase in relationships 1 5 12 26 56 122 268 590 1296 2834 
14.4.6 Successful controllership: criteria for selecting control techniques 
Hofstede (1981) looks at the selection of appropriate control techniques by examining the ways 
in which organizational activities can / cannot be controlled, and articulates four criteria for 
selecting control techniques, namely, 
(a) whether the objectives of the intended activity are 
unambiguous or ambiguous, 
(b) whether the outputs of the intended activity are measurable, (c) 
whether the effects of the controllers' 
interventions are known, and (d) whether the intended 
activity is repetitive. 
It is argued (Hofstede, 1981) that the selection of control techniques can be 
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accordingly made dependent on the extent to which all of these criteria are satisfied. 
For example, according to Hofstede (1981), when all of the four criteria are met, the hill 
climbing techniques (Mayer, 1993) such as `routine control' (Hofstede, 1981) with the aid of 
computers can become immediately useful; when control is of `one-off nature, such hill 
climbing techniques like `expert control' can become more efficient (Hofstede, 1981); when the 
effects of intervention are unknown and the control activity is repetitive, the random trial and 
error techniques (Newell and Simon, 1972) - in terms of new controllers, new departments, new 
services and/or new treatments - can become effective (Johnson and Gill, 1993); when the 
output is measurable and the objectives are unambiguous, the means-ends techniques (Mayer, 
1993) - in terms of management by objectives and budgetary control can become fruitful 
(Anthony and Welsch, 1971); when the effects of management interventions are unknown, but 
the activity is not repetitive, the intuitive control can become efficient (Bower, 1971; Hofstede, 
1981). 
14.4.7 Successful controllership: solid foundations for successful implementation 
It has been argued (Emmanuel et al 1990; Jones et al, 1998; Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991) 
that control, as one crucial element of management (Argyris, 1960,1977; Taylor, 1967; Fayol, 
1949; Drucker, 1954), is still much needed in modem organizations. What seems to make 
control a necessary activity in today's organizations include that, first, the control process 
provides organizational members with feedback on their performance (Huczynski and Buchanan, 
1991) so that learning can be facilitated and performance can be further improved (Argyris, 
1977); second, control processes give organizational members structure, define methods and 
indicate how their performance is to be measured (Emmanuel et al, 1990; Huczynski and 
Buchanan, 1991), and this can prove particularly useful for those who do not enjoy inborn 
personalities which contribute to effective self leadership (Wright, 1994); and third, control 
encourages dependency (Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991) 
in that it becomes inevitable, though 
rarely noticed, that some organizational members seem to enjoy much more by submitting 
themselves to authority rather than to challenge their instincts (Ridley, 1998). 
However, what also seems apparent is that control processes, per se, no matter how advanced 
they are, do not guarantee sufficient problem solving simply because they do not correspond 
well to the principle of universality 
(Hume 1951, Russell, 1912) in that control processes which 
worked yesterday may not work today and can 
have little chance to be applicable tomorrow. As 
this author's family motto (Zhang, 1988) says, 'WI; Gang Wü Zhu, Wü Zhu Wü Gang; Wü 
Gang WO Zhu, Wt) Zhu Wt) Gang' - i. e. `no (or wrong) principle makes no (or wrong) principal, 
and no (or wrong) principal 
leads to no (or wrong) principle; principle worthies nothing without 
passionately determined principal, and principal 
is nothing without fitly determined principle'. 
This implies (Zhang, 1988) that, control with wrong principals or wrong principles yields 
wrong-or-anti control, and that control with uncontrolled principals or uncontrolled principles 
yields little or no control. 
This suggests that control has not only the authoritative but also the 
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psychological side: first class intelligence about competitors and admirable managerial know- 
how about his own men help a man to win battles, but the true worth of such apparatus which 
have proved to be absolutely essential and of priceless value for so many successful politicians, 
generals, and businessmen, lies in not only what the man does about it, why he does it, and how 
he does about it, but also in how it is practically and spiritually apprehended, how it is 
operationally adjusted, and how it inspires men's passions, enthusiasms and initiatives (Zhang, 
1988). 
The issues on `Gang' and 'Zhu'- i. e. principles and principals suggest that, for principals (i. e. 
controllers, administrators, headmasters, governors, head coaches, and business leaders, etc. ), 
the extent of control to be exercised will partly depend on how healthily desiring they want to 
control, and partly depend on how far they can unite successfully the forces of nature around 
them including men, ideas, capitals, positions, friendships and even gossips (Zhang, 1988). That 
is, to put it differently, it is the desire for unity that makes the implementation of control perfect 
in its own ways - `Bu Zhi Er Zhi'. and `Zhi Er Bu Zhi' (Zhang, 1988) - i. e. no control (which 
means not exercising the option of control from time to time) can mean effective control and 
man-made control can lead to no control (which means using up the option of control) in the end. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the psychology of control in this vein is the lecture delivered by 
Follett (1987) in London in the 1920s in which she argued that control can be accomplished 
through securing coordination, under the umbrella of four coordinating principles: direct contact, 
early stages, reciprocal relating, and continuous process (Follett, 1940,1987). The principle of 
direct contact dictates that `adjustments should be made by direct contact between those who 
exercise responsible authority in the 
matter concerned' (Follett, 1987); it implies that, the 
controllers need not only to delegate themselves well but also to ensure that each of the 
potentially controlled delegates equally well, and that both the controlling and the controlled 
need to endure a certain percentage of human errors partly due to the under-evolved hardwired 
mentalities dating back to the Stone Age (Nicholson, 1998). The principle of early stage dictates 
that `the direct contact should begin in the earliest stages of the process' and that a control 
decision is `only a moment in a process' (Follett, 1987); it implies that it becomes 
psychologically very difficult, if not completely impossible, for any organizational members, 
who has failed to participate from the beginning in the processes of mental development out of 
which the principle or decision has been built up, to enthusiastically commit themselves to any 
new principle formulated or decision made (Urwick, 1974). The principle of the reciprocal 
relating postulates that all the 
factors in a control situation are reciprocally related to one another 
(Follett, 1987); it suggests that, `this interrelating of every part of an organization with every 
other part and again with every other part as it has permeated by all the others', remains a 
reasonable and practical mark to aim at, an 
ideal that drives people crazy but never gets itself 
perfectly realized in practice 
(Ackoff and Emery, 1972). The principle of continuous process 
maintains that coordinating varying relationships remains a self-activity, going on all the time, 
so that the process itself 
is not broken from planning to activity and from activity to planning 
(Follett, 1987); the practical implication underlying this principle of continuous process rests on 
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the potential incentive to develop precedents (i. e. to discover the principles which can serve as 
guides for future similar cases) through first dealing with an individual problem, then classifying 
the problems, and eventually evolving any potential principles for tackling cases of similar kind. 
Briefly put, the bases for implementing control seem to be within varying sets of continuums 
composed of polarised as well as neutral perspectives concerning all possible relations between 
the human and the nature, with each relation, especially the psychological, operational, 
economic, social, political or anthropologic, being a replica of its own limitations - that is, 
ruthlessly speaking, control can take organizations out of the problems, but control cannot take 
problems out of organizations. 
14.4.8 Successful controllership: the contending processes 
Control can be chaotic unless it has a clearly articulated process. It seems that the most 
economic way to look at the process of control 
is to break it into several identifiable steps. 
Seemingly, there exist numerous approaches following this line to portray the process of control 
(please see Figure 2-5; Figures 14-5,, 6,7,12,13,14,15,16&19), and among the most 
distinctive approaches to the process of control existing in the control literature are the Lawler 
and Rhode's (1976), the Child's (1984), the Davis's (1951), and the 
Otley and Berry's (1980). 
Lawler and Rhode's (1976) four step model 
Lawler and Rhode (1976) propose that the control process actually consists of four steps (Figure 
14-21): establishing standards of performance, then measuring, comparing, and evaluating 
actual performance. Lawler and 
Rhode (1976) argue that the controlling process can be 
described as follows: initially, the controllers decide on the standards of performance, goals and 
such like that are to be used 
in the future to evaluate the performance of the potentially 
controlled - say, by 
focusing on efficiency, quality, responsiveness to stakeholders, and 
innovation (Hill and Jones, 1997); then they measure or evaluate the actual outputs that result 
from the behaviour of the controlled as well as the behaviours themselves102- say, by using both 
output control and behavioural control 
(Ouchi, 1978); and then they evaluate whether and to 
what extent performance 
deviates from the previously chosen standards of performance - say, 
by raising 'them for the next time period to challenge the controlled 
if they are proved to be 
Figure 14-21: Lawler and Rhode's (1976) four step control process 
(Source: Adapted from Lawler and Rhode (1976)) 
Establish the standards of performance, goals, or targets against which performance is to be evaluated 
Measure actual performance 
Compare actual performance against chosen standards of performance 
Evaluate the result and initiate corrective action if the standard is not being achieved 
14-66 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
higher than expected, or by deciding whether to take corrective action if standards are proved to 
be too high to reach or performance is too low and standards are not reached (Newman, 1975); 
and finally the controllers evaluate the results - say, by trying to solve the problem if they see 
that the level of performance is unacceptable, or by changing the way the resources are utilized 
if they see that something in the control situation is causing the problem (Anthony, 1988). 
Child's (1984) basic model 
The process of control has also been vividly described in its basic terms, and one example of 
this is Child's (1984) process of management control which, so argues Child (1984), applies to 
any authority or power-based relationship across one or more levels of formal or informal 
hierarchy. Child (1984) sees the process of control as consisting of two major parts (Figure 14- 
22), namely, executive instruction (featuring goals, standards, and operating behaviour) and 
feedback (featuring results, measurement, and evaluation and reward), which jointly enable that 
a management's choice of control strategy is compatible with the requirements of the operating 
situation and with what best motivates people to carry out their tasks in a desired manner. 
Figure 14-22: The process of management control (Source: Adapted from Child (1984)) 
The controller Goals Evaluation and reward 
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Davis's (1951) two phase model 
A more insightful view of the process of control, perhaps, goes to that of Davis (1951), a great 
engineer - turned management theorist and consultant, who proposes an eight step control 
process which entails eight control 
functions, namely, routine planning, scheduling, preparation, 
dispatching, direction, supervision, comparison and corrective action. Davis (1951) suggests that 
there are two distinctive phases of control, namely, preliminary and concurrent. 10' Preliminary 
control aims to design in advance constraints and regulations which assures proper execution of 
the plan, and consists of routine planning, scheduling, preparation and dispatching; concurrent 
control operates while performance 
is in progress and consists of direction, supervision, 
comparison and corrective action 
(Figure 14-23). 
Davis (1951) is probably the very first person in the history of management who highlights the 
importance of the timing of control, and recognizes that controlling remains a cyclical 
continuing activity with the corrective action completing the concurrent phase of control but 
starting the preliminary phase of control again through identifying deviations and through re- 
planning, resetting of objectives, or taking other actions to prevent recurrence of deviations. 
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Figure 14-23: Davis's (1951) two phase control process (Source: Adapted from Davis (1951)) 
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Otley and Berry's (1980) comprehensive model 
The more comprehensive view about the process of control, perhaps, belongs to Otlcy and 
Berry's (1980) model which views control operations from the organizational perspective 
covering a set of administrative and behavioural factors including objective setting, performance 
measurement, comparison of outputs with objectives, generation and evaluation of corrective 
actions, and implementation of corrective actions (Figure 14-24). 
Figure 14-24: A tentative model for organizational approaches to control 
(Source: Based on Otley and Berry, 1980) 
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Consider implementation of chosen actions (the step which distinguishes itself from most of 
other approaches), 
for example, it is argued (Otley and Berry, 1980) that, (rr organizations to 
achieve effective control, the controllers need to ensure that available are corrective actions, 
which can include 
(i) actions which help change the control inputs, (ii) change the control 
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objectives, (iii) change the activity under control itself, and (iv) change the predictive model in 
use, the measurement processes and the comparison processes. 
However, practical experience shows that this kind of isolation can prove very costly - and if 
not as costly as other approaches - as costly as what many accountants have done by 
concentrating on the technical ease of accounting-derived feedback controls at the expense of 
their social as well as behavioural contexts. 104 
14.4.9 Successful controllership: the effective and efficient management of control 
paradoxes 
History has witnessed that control in organizations deeply reflects numerous paradoxes. This 
suggests that control in organizations can act as a double-edged sword. For example, control is 
frequently used by organizations to consolidate stability, continuity, and suchlike, but it is often 
the same control philosophy which brought prosperity to the organization that brings demise to 
the organization, because stability or continuity driven control can'burn out the organization's 
kernel ability to cope with future instability or discontinuity, an ability that can be essential for 
its ultimate survival at crucial times. The short run `must' can prove to be the long run `mustn't'; 
the short run `mustn't' can prove to be the long run `must'. Thus, successful controllership 
demands successful handling of managerial paradoxes essentially related to control in 
organizations. 
14.4.9.1 Controllership as both a process and a system to ensure desired performance 
The first control paradox is that controllership in organizations can function as both a control 
process and a control system. Control in organizations, by definition, can mean a general 
process by which some individuals or some groups are able to initiate and regulate the conduct 
of activities so that their results accord with the goals and expectations; it can also mean a 
specific control systems (e. g. specific mechanisms) which are employed by some individuals or 
groups so as to convey information within a general process to assist the initiation and 
regulations of (rather than carry out) the activities. 
Thus, successful controllership demands that control in organizations needs to be perceived as 
well as designed to incorporate both the content and the process dimension. Employing control 
as specific mechanism, which can be used to assist organizational fulfilment, is not complete; 
nor is devising control as an escorting process that ensures the realization of organizational 
intents. A winning package of controllership, thus, must entail both control systems and control 
processes so that the combination of them can better meet the needs of control in organizations. 
14.4.9.2 Controllership as both influence and counter-influence 
The second control paradox is that controllership in organizations can function as both influence 
and counter-influence 
between the controlling and the potentially controlled. This means that 
both the controlling and the potentially controlled actually attempt to exercise control, although 
the magnitude of influence that each side has can vary significantly, ranging from very little to 
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extremely overwhelming. This suggests that where there is a control, there is a counter-control, 
although the latter of which, effect-wise, may not manifest itself significantly all the time. For 
example, control can be aimed at the subordinates by the superior, it can also be aimed at the 
superiors by the subordinates especially when there exist conflicting objectives between both 
sides of the control. 
To compare it to a game of tennis, for example, one can expect a serve and volley game, a 
baseline rally game, a net game, or an all court attacking game. However, for a game to proceed 
on court, both players have to influence each other through controlled exhibition of, among 
other things, their experience and knowledge of the game, physical and mental strength, and 
predetermined as well as emergent strategies and tactics of the game. Even in an extreme 
situation where one giant server attempts to produce aces, the seemingly helpless receiver will 
tend to exhibit his or her influence through constant re-positioning, earlier preparation, and/or 
technical disguise in order to disturb the big server's rhythm of serve. 
14.4.9.3 Controllership as individual as well as total phenomenon 
The third control paradox is that controllership in organizations tends to be both an individual 
and a total phenomenon. Follett (1987) illustrates this, perhaps, better than anybody else, by 
stating that in the domain of control there exists a total relativity expressing a relational total 
where each part has been permeated by every other part. This implies that control can not be 
regarded as being designed to succeed unless there exists influence from one factor (e. g. one 
organizational member) to another factor (e. g. another organizational member) with all factors 
each making their own contribution to the whole. 
It is obvious that control relates to those who hold direct responsibility for the specific control 
situation such as the competing players on a tennis court who are trying their best to influence 
their opponents in order to achieve what is desired (e. g. to win, to compete, to enjoy, to lose, or 
to make a fuss), and that control relates to those who hold indirect responsibility for the specific 
control situation such as the audience of the game (e. g. friends, and foes) who cheer for or 
against the players. However, control also relates to other relevant factors which can affect the 
specific control situation: examples include the pre-match food and warm-up exercises, 
encouragement or discouragement from parents or coaches, match experiences, expectations of 
the players from the match such as rating points, and knowledge about the game and about the 
opponent's strengths and weaknesses. 
This suggests that control in organization needs to be considered in a total situation which 
entails not only control-specific situational 
factors (e. g. obvious, prompt, and direct influence) 
but also non-control-specific situational factors (e. g. indirect, less obvious, and accumulative 
influence). Thus successful controllership means getting all relevant factors into the control 
problem which each affect every one of the others. 
14.4.9.4 Controllership as a two-way process for both the controlling and the controlled 
It appears that control-orientated influence entails several stages which can be argued to include 
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participant's self intents, reactions based upon his or her perceptions on the opponents' actions 
and thoughts, resultant behaviours, and fulfilment as compared to his or her intents (Figure 14- 
25). However, the flow of influence can work both forwards and backwards, just like a two-way 
valve, and this gives rise to the fourth control paradox that controllership in organizations can 
be a two-way process for both the controlling and the potentially controlled. 
Figure 14-25: Organizational control taking the form of reciprocal influence 
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This implies that, as can be seen in Figure 14-25, both the controlling and the controlled can 
influence their opponents in fundamentally different ways. For example, (please sec the 
clockwise direction in Figure 14-25), they each can normally start from their own intents; then 
they engage themselves in influencing each other in varying ways each aiming for what they 
each perceive as valuable or beneficial, although they each may work under the same 
organizational banner; and then they react to what they perceive is going on and what they 
perceive is appropriate in regard to their counterparts' thoughts and actions; and, eventually, 
they achieve some results and evaluate their fulfilment against their intents so that any deviation 
from the intents triggers the next round of adjustments of intents, influence attempts, reactions 
to perceptions, and evaluations of pcrformancc. 
However, the flow of the process can also be reversed (please see the counter-clockwise 
direction in Figure 14-25): both the controlling and the controlled can reserve their options of 
influence and work backwards from perceiving what is achieved, what end behaviour can bring 
forth that achievement, what inputs in terms of action and thoughts are needed to enable the 
desired outputs, what kind of influence is required, and what intent needs to be addressed or 
aimed at, or what 
level of pre-fulfilment is required at the initial stage. 
Moreover, this second possible flow of influence also gives rise to the third possibility that one 
side can follow the clockwise 
flow of influence and another side the counter clockwise flow of' 
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organization more challenging 
(please see the counter-clockwise as Well as the clockwise 
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14.4.9.5 Controllership as both a solo and a trilogy 
As to the process of influence per se, it appears to be cemented by varying purpose-related 
variables (e. g. survival, economic, technological, political, cultural, and societal), engraved by 
operation-related variables (e. g. bureaucratic, marketed, and transactional) and ended up with 
effectiveness-related variables (e. g. the extent to which individuals' or groups' goals are 
achieved as reflected by the extent to which organizational goals are achieved) and efficiency- 
related variables (e. g. the extent to which organizational, group, and individual desires are 
satisfied). It is obvious that, while some of these variables are complementary, some are 
paradoxical; and paradoxical inputs can result in paradoxical processes of transformation. 
Superficially, the processes of influence can be catalogued into three groups, depending on the 
control participants' thoughts and actions: divergence, dilemma, or convergence. This gives rise 
to the fifth control paradox that controllership in organizations can be a solo like activity or a 
trilogy-like activity, viz., control activities can be regarded as possessing, spontaneously or 
separately, paradoxical tracks of influence: divergence, dilemma, and convergence, depending 
on, inter alia, the content, the process, and the contributions of varying relationships towards the 
organization (Figure 14-26). 
As can be seen from Figure 14-26, when the control activities are mapped against their 
contributions towards organizational progress, there are at least eight significant generic 
scenarios of control, each of which represents a unique pattern of influence. As social and/or 
psychological contact takes place between the controlling and the controlled, there will be a net 
vector force resulted from the thoughts and actions of both the controlling and the controlled, 
and this net vector force can facilitate, hamper, or even bewilder organizational progress. 
Figure 14-26: Controllership in organizations as solo as well as trilogy 
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14.4.9.6 Controllership as periodic as well as continuous improvement to progress 
Undoubtedly, all of the eight possible scenarios of influence in organizations (Figure 14-27) 
have an element of timing: they can each dominate the organization for a period of time; they 
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can become very versatile, temporarily switching from one to another; and, they could also co- 
exist with one being overt and another covert, or with one occurring to some organizational 
members and another to other members. This leads to the sixth control paradox that 
controllership in organizations can be task-specific improvement which lasts for a period of time 
and it can also be a continuous process of improvements to organizational progress throughout 
the organizational life from birth, growth, maturity, decline, to death. 
Plausibly, it can be argued that the process of influence largely depends on how well both sides 
(i. e. the controlling and the potentially controlled) socially and psychologically communicate in 
respect to their perceptions, motivations and expectations. Theoretically, each pattern of 
influence can carry on and on, until either the pre-established intents are satisfactorily reached 
so that the organizational activities naturally end, 
105 or the process itself is disturbed, postponed, 
transformed, or even eliminated by externally or internally imposed forces due to unsatisfied 
match between the intents and the fulfilment. 
Therefore, the existence of the controlling influence (be it any of the eight possible scenarios 
based upon divergence, dilemma or convergence) depends on the control situations: it is unwise 
to predict that certain cycles will exist forever along an organization's life cycle, and that certain 
cycles have never lurked in the organizations. Perhaps, what appears to be acceptable is that, to 
a large extent, control in organizations involves a mixture of 
distinctive kinds of control 
activities so that continuous improvement becomes the norm and periodic flourishing is 
phenomenal. It is perhaps the 
interrelationships between these activities that make control in 
organization more complicated and organizations more 
liveable than what is conventionally 
perceived. 
14.4.9.7 Controllership as a reality as well as an illusion 
The seventh control paradox is that controllership 
in organizations can be both a reality and an 
illusion. Evidence suggests that control is attainable. The management can successfully initiate 
and regulate the conduct of organizational activities so 
that their results accord with the goals 
and expectations held by the organization, say, 
by use of specific systems (i. e. control) designed 
to convey information to assist the 
initiation and regulation of the activities. This suggests the 
specific reality of control 
is that control can be attained given a specific control situation. 
What fascinates the management most and renders control in organisations most challenging, is, 
perhaps, the realization (especially among practitioners) that total control is an illusion in that 
the environment in which an organization operates 
is ever-changing despite the fact the 
idealization of it never stops in everyday life as can be reflected by such phrases as `everything 
is under control'. For example, either of the previously considered tennis players, can rely on a 
certain strategy or tactics to win a game 
but not necessarily the whole match; he or she can rely 
on certain control strategies 
to win a match against someone somewhere but not necessarily 
everywhere; he or she can win as many as possible matches against the same opponent and may 
lose control the next day. 
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Simply put,, there exists a best controllership for an organization at a certain time, but exists no 
such best-for-all controllership for all organizations or for an organization throughout its 
organizational life. This implies that new ways have to be constantly sought for improving 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency, and that control in organizations is bound to be a 
continuously improving process. 
14.4.9.8 Controllership as a medium for both success and failure 
The eighth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations can lead to success but it 
may also lead to failure. Empirical evidence suggests that control leads to success in that control 
helps organizations achieve superior efficiency, quality, responsiveness to stakeholders, and 
innovation (Jones et al, 1998). Without control, organizations will have no idea how well they 
perform and how much they improve themselves, nor can they make continuous improvement to 
quality or raise the level of innovation in the organizations. 
However, historical evidence suggests that the backward part of many civilisations new and old 
lies in the fact that most civilisations fail themselves right from the outset: people tend to fall 
into the trap of entropy, and so do the organizations. For example, organizations such as Qing 
Empire are idealistically built to survive and thrive, but are, considerably due to their `closed' 
nature of control, actually doomed to lose their ability to control themselves and thus to dissolve 
and disintegrate. 106 
14.4.9.9 Controllership as an open as well as a closed loop 
The ninth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations can take the form of both an 
open or a closed loop. The open loop form admits that an organization makes an attempt to 
achieve some desired goal in a manner that no objective adjustments are made to its actions 
once the sequence of intended acts is under way. This open loop can be better illustrated by 
using an analogy of a tennis game: the server who attempts to serve an ace will take into account 
the opponents' position, the hazards, the trajectory, and so forth, prior to smashing the ball; but 
once the ball is in the air there is nothing that the player can do immediately but pray that he did 
things right. This can be particularly true in organizations if the potentially controlled happen to 
be events or change or people rather than things: to control such control operators like events or 
people or change can, some times, prove to be simply fruitless. 
The closed loop form of control refines the open loop by the introduction of a monitoring device 
for the continuing scanning of both the control situation (e. g. the external environment) and the 
control condition (e. g. the transformation process) or for the continual monitoring of the 
fulfilment against intents so that corrective actions can be taken if deviation exists. Consider the 
previously mentioned tennis game, once the server has served, it becomes an open loop. 
However, if the ball is blocked back the server has to end his or her dream of aces and modify 
either initial plans (e. g. from aces to stroked winners) or the transformation process itself (e. g. 
via a process of deciding the target, tossing the ball, dropping and raising racket head, powering 
into the ball; following the route, and splitting steps, to a process of anticipating the return, 
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move into attacking or defending position, preparing for the next to come stroke, striking, 
touching, or volleying the'ball, and balancing himself or herself). Once a game is over, one 
needs to think for the set and for the match, the player needs to monitor from time to time the 
game results against his or her intended outcome and take, if necessary, corrective actions which 
can entail strategies, tactics, and the transformation processes. For example, the player can 
exploit his or her own superior strength, the opponent's weaknesses, or even the control 
environment such as the wind, the sunshine, the court fence and suchlike. 
This indicates that control in organizations can take the form of both open loop and closed loop, 
depending upon how adjustable organizational actions are and how predictable the resultant 
outcomes are. Given a full understanding of the processes and a high predictability of the future, 
organizations can rely on open loop systems to achieve the end which is desired (i. e. analogous 
to the service game in a tennis match); given a limited knowledge of the operating processes, 
increased complexity of the environment, and enhanced uncertainty that clouds the likely 
outcomes of future events, organizations may have to rely on the closed loop systems to achieve 
the end which is expected (i. e. analogous to the rally game in a tennis match). 
14.4.9.10 Controllership as both rationality- driven and image- driven activities 
The tenth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations can be both rationality driven 
and image driven. Experience tells that, in practice, there exist control situations in which the 
`closed' framework is designed to enhance the controllability of organizational activities. For 
example, due to the scarcity of resources, the solution to control problems can rest on the 
concept of rationality exemplified by linear programming and games of strategy; successful 
controllership, then, means logical and methodical controllership by means of optimization or 
maximization. However, this logical and methodical controllership by means of optimization 
can also become the hotbed of failure, especially when control situation changes so much that 
the then dominating rationality becomes no longer fit for the organization. 
Partly due to limitations of human cognition and the complexity of the milieus of interest, there 
also exist control situations reflective of controllers' inability to recognize all goals and feasible 
alternatives. Such `growing' control situations (Simon, 1957a), then, have to be considered as 
consisting of a complex mixture of many elements such as culture, aspiration, personality, 
politics, and structures. Successful controllership thus rests on what Boulding (1956) calls the 
images (which include more than just the objective facets of the control situation), such as 
perceptions (about people, roles and organizations), values, and emotions of both the controlling 
and the potentially controlled. Apparently, the open control framework not only offers a richer 
view about the dynamics of control process but also brings to bear the totality of forces to 
successful controllership. 
14.4.9.11 Controllership as context-specific as well as context-synergic forces 
The eleventh paradox of control is that controllership in organizations can be both a context- 
specific as well as context-synergic 
force. One of the most important milestones in the history of 
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management thought in respect to control in organizations, perhaps, lies in the management's 
manifestation (Ackoff, 1971;. 1995; Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Emery, 1981; Thompson, 1967) 
that control activities should go beyond how to influence behaviour within organizations to 
consider how to control the organization's relationship with its external environment. This 
suggests that control activities requires consideration of the totality of forces and conditions that 
operate internally as well as externally to an organization but affect the management's ability to 
acquire and utilize resources such as raw material, capital, human, time, management, 
technology, information, experience, and knowledge (Thompson, 1967). 
This suggests that, as depicted in Figure 14-27, control can consist of three sets of forces (i. e. 
macro, intermediate, and micro) that each can affect control significantly, thus giving birth to 
many possible, distinctive concepts of control which include political control, legal control, 
economic control, technological control, philosophical control, socio-cultural control; 
demographic control, global "control, control of competitors, control of suppliers, control of 
customers, control of distributors, control of workforce, control of investors, control of task- 
specific resources, (e. g. inventory control), control of task-specific packages (e. g. 
standardisation), control of task-specific activities (e. g. quality control and JIT), and control of 
task-specific forces (e. g. self-control, collective control, and mental control). 
Figure 14-27: Control as a synergic force in the full organizational context 
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It can be, then, argued, in this sense, that to 
determine the relative success of controllership is to 
consider how effective the management are at obtaining, and 
how efficient they are at using, 
scarce and valuable resources 
in the full organizational context. This implies that the relative 
success of control in an organization, eventually 
but primarily, rests on its synergic force in the 
full organizational context, viz., organizational efficiency and effectiveness are gained through 
synergy of the macro, 
intermediate and micro set of forces and conditions. 
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14.4.9.12 Controllership as both organization- and reorganization- oriented activities 
The twelfth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations can become both 
organization-oriented activities and reorganization-oriented activities. The `open' framework of 
control in organization (Katz and Kahn, 1966) admits (Figure 14-28) that an organization 
remains an open system which takes in resources from its external environment and converts or 
transforms them into goods and/or services which are sent back to that environment, where they 
are directly or indirectly contributed to customers, citizens, suppliers, competitors, investors, or 
suchlike (Thompson, 1967; Katz and Kahn, 1966). From this viewpoint, therefore, organization- 
specific control conditions can be regarded as varying from time to time and from organization 
to organization, depending upon, amongst other things, the meaning and content of the pair of 
controlling vs. the controlled (e. g. the shift from some organizational members vs. other 
organizational members, to some organizational forces (e. g. the management) vs. other 
organizational forces (e. g. the bottom level employees, technology, and organizational designs)). 
It. seems that successful controllership demands that the management of control activities be 
done through organization (Follett, 1987), because proper, orderly arrangement of formal 
relationships remains perhaps one of the most efficient ways to rationalize resource utilization in 
organizations (Urwick, 1974; Mooney and Reiley, 1931), viz., due to the capability limit of 
human mind (e. g. Mead, 1934), organizational members genetically tend to prefer order and 
certainty and perform better within a well-structured system (e. g. Pinker, 1997). This suggests 
that successful controllership means organization via the practice of sound organizational 
principles. 
Figure 14-28: Organization-specific control conditions - An open systems view 
(Source: Adapted from Jones et al, 1998) 
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However, successful controllership also demands effective management of control activities in a 
continuing sense. Successful controllership 
demands flexibility and adaptability in that 
reorganization becomes an accepted 
beauty of modem times management, viz., change has 
become a necessity. This reorganization process can become extremely crucial for organizations 
to better insure economic survival when the organization is experiencing economically or 
politically difficult time within an economy 
(e. g. excess productive capacity due to an economic 
recession) or different phases of 
its own organizational life (e. g. general contraction in activities 
after the organization's maturity). When ongoing activities are yielding unexpectedly 
unsatisfactory results or when there is a signal for management that the way the organization 
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operates needs to change, the management need to be able to reorganize organizational activities 
by first assessing the need for change, then deciding on the change to make, and finally 
evaluating the change, so that the organization can continue to thrive in the fast changing 
environment in which it operates (Figure 14-29). 
Figure 14-29: Control as a periodic shift between organization & reorganization - an open systems view 
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14.4.9.13 Controllership as being shaped by both emergent and synergic conceptualization 
The thirteenth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations is being shaped by both 
emergent and synergic managerial conceptualization. From Figures 14-28&29, it is not uneasy 
to sensitise that management of control activities in organizations finds its basis, not only in the 
economic acquisition and utilization of organizational resources (including human and physical) 
in order to attain organizational objectives, but also in the conceptual function (which are 
mirrored by the evolving management thoughts) of human's moulding resources into an 
appropriate, organization-specific mix within varying facets of its environment (such as 
economic, social, and political, please see Figure 3-1 and Table 2-3 for further examples). 
The evolution of management thoughts has seen the management of organizational activities 
covering if not trespassing more disciplines than any of the sciences or arts; and the ideas of 
management which are related to control in organizations evolve as technologies, institutes, and 
people change (please see Table 14-4). Internally, management thought has passed through 
phases of differing emergent emphases on the human and on the organizational and methods 
facets of the problems encountered in escorting goal-directed activities; while, externally, it has 
been affected by numerous emergent factors such as evolving technology (e. g. integrated circuit, 
and computers), the dynamics of economic, social, political and other emergent contextual 
values (e. g. utility and profit maximization), and shifting assumptions about the nature of people 
(e. g. X, Y, and Z theories). 
However, today's conceptualization of control always remains a synergism of all yesterday's 
and tomorrow's will be the same, although there is no doubt that today's is not like yesterday's, 
nor will tomorrow's be like today's (Figure 14-30). Besides, no matter how fast or diverse the 
evolution of control concepts 
is, what has constantly confronted nearly every organization new 
or old for centuries 
is the attainment and utilization of scarce resources to meet the manifold 
desires of human society, viz., put it euphemistically, organizations commit themselves to 
14-78 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
practical conceptual problem solving in pursuit of organizational progress. 
Figure 14-30: Control as synergism of the evolving conceptualization of human problem-solving 
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14.4.9.14 Controllership as stretching as well as balancing 
It can be argued that, in general, controllership in organizations relates to the divergence and 
convergence of the nature of human problem-solving (please see Figure 14-26 for detail), and 
this inevitably links to the fourteenth paradox of control that control in organizations is both a 
stretching and a balancing act. This means any form of control can dominate the whole control 
process for at least a period of time, while the complete controllership rests on the proper 
balance between varying control devices. 
Organizations need to stretch themselves to exert certain control mechanisms if it is absolutely 
necessary to do so. Organizations operating in a turbulent environment can often find 
themselves from time to time stretching for either organizational efficiency or organizational 
effectiveness. For an organization to continuously consolidate organizational members' 
contributions, to the organizational progress, 
its management might stress, other things being 
equal, the role of such mechanisms like the systematic or cybernetic controls during the set-up 
stage of its organizational life 
in order to achieve both better organizational efficiency and better 
organizational effectiveness, or the role of such mechanisms like the economic or cybernetic 
controls during the maturity stage in order to achieve optimal organizational efficiency, or focus 
on political or anthropologic controls 
during the declining stage in order to achieve optimal 
organizational effectiveness. 
Consider an organization's stretch towards optimal organizational efficiency via economic 
controls (please see the 3C model as 
being depicted in Figure 14-14) during the maturity stage 
of its organizational life, 
for example, the principal (or the legal owner) of the organization has 
legitimate rights to select his or her agents and specify procedures (i. e. production/service 
procedures and visibility-of-consequences-procedures) for the agents (i. e. the managers) in an 
efficient manner that the organization can actually stretch the organization's scarce resources to 
maximize the benefits of coordination 
between the principal and the agents. 1°7 Figure 14-31 is 
depicted to illustrate how organizational control as stretch works in accordance with task- 
environment interaction, procedures specified, and visibility of consequences: for instance, 
given high complexity of task-environment, the principals will find it more efficient not to 
14-79 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
specify production procedures (by, say, employing employees who can specify' their own 
procedures) but to better and specify visibility of consequence procedures (by, say, dividing the 
organization into sub-components with authority patterns matched to the appropriate task- 
environment). 
Figure 14-31: Stretching organizational resources towards optimal organizational efficiency 
(Sources: Adapted from Becker and Neuhauser, 1975) 
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However, organizations also need to balance their control activities so that they can attain a 
solid basis for exercising control as well as gaining enough operational freedom to deal with 
future control problems caused by, inter alia, low visibility of the consequences of the action 
being taken; they also need to balance their control activities so that scarce resources can be 
more pertinently utilized in a continuing sense and future opportunities can be better exploited 
to achieve some sustainable goals that are desired. This suggests that in order to prevent the 
`lock-out' effect (please see Figure 13-1), organizations need to find a balanced portfolio of 
control strategies entailing the systematic, the behavioural, the anthropologic, the political, the 
economic, the contingent, and the cybernetic (Figure 14-32), and the proportion of each 
component at each time (i. e. Pa, Pb, Pc, Pe, Ps, Pp, and Px as can be seen in Figure 14-32) will 
largely depend on the conditions of the demand and supply of the specific control situation. 
Figure 14-32: Control in organizations as the stretching as well as the balancing act 
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14.4.9.15 Controllership as both an ever-changing and a never-changing mind game 
The fifteenth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations remains both an ever- 
changing and a never-changing mind game. Control is much needed in organizations in that 
practical human problem-solving necessitates it. The inputs of a control situation are changing; 
the outputs of a control situation are changing; the transformational processes of a control 
situation are also changing. Thus, control is an ever-changing game: today's control is not likely 
to be the same as yesterday's, nor will tomorrow's be the same as today's. Besides, people are 
learning and so are organizations. As time flies, control environment is changing, and so is 
control situation, control condition, control space, and control operators. With ever-improving 
knowledge, ever-updating technologies, and ever-enhancing human's understanding of the 
nature, it is easy to prescribe that control in organizations as practical human problem-solving is 
an ever-changing mind game. 
However, control, is also a never-changing mind game, and this is because of the limitations that 
humans have always had in themselves (please see Table 2-4 for further examples). Evolution 
has changed some part of the human nature; yet some part of it has not been changed too much 
despite millenniums of natural selection. For example, it has been argued (Pinker, 1997; Ridley, 
1998; Nicholson, 1998) that there is a limit to how much the human mind can be remoulded to 
offer and receive instructional orders because, 
due to natural selection, human beings living and 
working in today's modern civilisation retain the hardwired mentality of 
Stone Age hunter- 
gathers in terms of thoughts and actions concerning needs, 
drives and biases. 
Evidence generated by evolutionary psychologists (e. g. Wright, 1994) shows that organizational 
members tend to use emotions as the 
first screen for all conflicting information received: people 
may feel more comfortable 
in communities with no more than 150 members, - perhaps, 
particularly true of people 
in Western organizations; they can feel more self-confident than 
reality justifies; and, they may, also, quickly and often according to what they 
feel like, rather 
than in pursuit of time-consuming and nuanced analysis, classify - as obviously as academics do 
so in classifying theories - people, situations, and experiences 
into simple categories such as 
good or bad, in or out, and obedient or 
disobedient. 
Evidence (Nicholson, 1998) also shows that, organizational members spend more time (and 
perhaps for some, even a life-time) participating 
in competition for status and chest thumping 
about their success - perhaps, particularly true of men 
in Far Eastern organizations: they can 
spend time enjoying gossiping about unofficial news along their own way to anticipate power 
shifts so as to position themselves 
into the right post at the right time; and, they can proactively 
but naturalistically seek superiority or security in hierarchical systems. 
One thing that has never changed is that people in organizations can be easily caught in 
emotional battles (Pinker, 
1997): organizational members genuinely attempt to avoid risky 
situations when feeling relatively secure, 
fight furiously when feeling threatened, or muddle 
through when feeling temporarily uncertain about future events. 
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14.4.9.16 Controllership as everybody's dream-machine but not everybody's shot-gun 
The seventeenth paradox of control is that controllership in organizations is every organizational 
member's dream-machine but not every organizational member's shot-gun. This is close to the 
eternal debate between nature and nurture in relation to leaders in organizations. To a great 
extent, to control is to lead. It has been argued (e. g. Levicki, 1998) that organizations can be led 
by varying leaders in different ways and have controllers of varying sorts. Experience reveals 
that everyone in organizations dreams of leading or controlling but not everyone is born to lead 
or to control, nor has everyone always had the passion to lead or to control. 
It seems obvious that every organizational member attempts to put the total environment in 
which he or she lives (e. g. people, event, change, and things) under control in his or her pursuit 
of the vested interest and loss of control means loss of interests. Control appears to be the 
dream-machine that helps monitor that the dream comes true in that control leads to enhanced 
efficiency, improved quality, increased responsiveness to stakeholders, and continuous 
innovation (Jones et al, 1998). 
However, it can be argued that controllers need to be born with a set of genetic characteristics 
which create the raw materials from which controllership may be nurtured, although it is not 
always clear that an organizational member is a burn controller, nor can one always see clearly 
which organizational member has the potential to become a great controller. This implies that 
control may not be the shot-gun for every organizational member despite the fact that everyone 
is using it from time to time. Every organizational member can be highly driven if need be and 
have some good control skills; yet he or she might lack essential controllership skills which fail 
him or her in developing the guts of successful controllership even though he or she has climbed 
to the top controller position. Moreover, this nature of control has two practical implications: the 
first is that there can exist potentially successful controllers in any organization who seem to get 
to the controller position without training or management development; and the second is that 
people holding the controllership positions 
in an organization may be just mere holders of the 
position of controller. 
14.4.9.17 Controllership as both an old and a new journey circulated by idealization and 
actualization 
The blend of organizational environment of the expanding nature and the relatively non- 
expanding, hardwired nature of 
human beings, admits that, control in organization, can never be 
merely a means to an end, 
but is a prologue to an epilogue which serves as a new prologue to a 
new epilogue. In this sense, control 
is like the animal footprints in the jungle, with one linking to 
another; the hunters can try to 
locate the animal being chased via sensing and analysing its 
traces but often find himself or herself embarking on a new journey. This leads to the eighteenth 
paradox of control that controllership 
in organizations reflects both an old and a new journey 
circulated by idealization and actualization. 
Theoretically speaking, an organization's control towards progress can be regarded as an 
14-82 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
idealization process in pursuit of the ideal states of GOOD, HOMONOMY, BEAUTY, and TRUTH 
(Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Emery, 1981), although this process which itself occurs in an infinite 
sequences (please see Figure 12-8) can be full of contradictions (e. g. orderliness vs. chaos in 
respect to BEAUTY, harmony vs. disharmony in respect to HOMONOMY, integration vs. 
disintegration in respect to GOOD, and change vs. stagnation in respect to TRUTH). 
Practically speaking, however, control in organizations is more likely to become a process of 
actualization along the organizations' progress towards ideals (please see Figure 12-8), and this 
actualization process is essentially a cyclical process which is essentially featured by varying, 
but often conflicting or paradoxical, facts and images that concern the nature of organizational 
activities. Following this logic, it can be generally argued that actualization generates facts and 
that idealization generates images. Yet, a set of facts and images that emerge at a certain period 
of time, serve as nothing but a prologue to the emergence of a new set of facts and images. This 
is because idealization inevitably leads to either re-actualization if the idealization is 
immediately adjustable or conceptualization followed by operationalization and then re- 
actualization if the idealization is not immediately adjustable (Please see Figure 12-5&8). 
Historical evidence in the light of the evolution of management thoughts shows that there can be 
four major categories of conceptualization, namely, orderliness, integration, harmony, and 
change, and these conceptualizations can be then operationalized under the name of 
organizational commitment which 
is used to measure the facts of nature and to process the 
images of nature (please see Figures 13-1&2), by the use of formal sciences such as philosophy 
and economics as well as the related 
disciplines such as methodology and accounting (Figure 
14-33). 
As can be seen from Figure 14-33, the varying facts and images (i. e. the direction of A, B, A&B, 
and C in Figure 14-33) of the nature of organizational control activities, 
deliver at least four 
important implications for organizations: (a) the organisational world is changing and evolving 
rapidly, control is necessitated 
by this somewhat chaotic nature of the organizational activities, 
and orderliness rather than chaos uplifts organizational efficiencies; 
(b) the relationships 
between organizational members become more and more versatile and sophisticated, control is 
necessitated by the expanding nature of 
human desires and interests, and integration rather than 
compromise or disintegration of conflicting 
interests among organizational members enhances 
organizational effectiveness; 
(c) the relationships between people and the organization in which 
they work become more and more complex so that organizational designs can hardly bring forth 
both individual and organizational satisfactions, control is necessitated by the disharmonious 
nature of people and organization, and 
harmony rather than disharmony between people and 
organization (e. g. structure) 
improves both effectiveness and efficiency; and (d) as the universe 
is expanding the organizational world 
is changing much more quickly than ever before - with 
new things coming out more 
frequently and old things dying out more quickly, control is 
necessitated by the ever-changing organizational environment, and change via reorganization 
rather than changeless 
iso-prototype organization is more likely to lead to improvement on 
organizational performance 
through the timely establishment of new equilibrium of productivity 
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Figure 14-33: Control as an old as well as a new journey circularized by idealization and actualization 
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Following this line, therefore, it can be argued that, control in organizations - as it was in the 
past, and, still will be in the future - becomes, 
(a) a process or system which searches for harmony of people and organization, through a just 
adaptation of human needs and aspirations to the requirements and goals of the organization, 
under the assumptions that, organizational members genuinely anticipate a responsible 
position in the organization, that the premises the controllers made about the potentially 
controlled determine the potential managerial styles in the organization, and that an 
agreement between the parts of design or composition (i. e. people and organizational 
structure) offers a pleasing unity of effort and thus leads to improvement of performance; 
(b) a process or system which searches for change through reorganization in terms of modifying 
the tasks, people, structures and the technologies of the organization, under the assumption 
that change is inevitable in organizational lives, and that change brings about positive 
consequences in relation to organizational performance; 
(c) a process or system which searches for orderliness through management science (such as 
total quality management, operations management, management information systems, ' or 
quantitative management), under the assumptions that, organizational members unanimously 
feel relatively secure in terms of needs, share with the same goal in mind, and genuinely 
cooperate with each other in actions, and that the function of management can be 
decomposed into quantifiable variables so as to bring order from chaos by means of 
systematization; and, 
(d) a process or system which searches for integration through conflict-resolving, under the 
assumptions that, organizational members each pursue varying objectives so that resistance 
and counter-control can prevail in organizations, and that the mutuality of interests leads to 
improvement of organizational performance. 
14.4.10 Controllership as commitment to harmony between people and organization 
The huge influx of the behavioural scientists into business schools has had a significant 
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contribution to the philosophy of organizational humanism which is set to further explore 
Barnard's (1948) issue on how individual and organizational goals can be net simultaneously 
and satisfactorily. Organizational humanism seeks to offset the alleged authoritarian tendencies 
of organizations, to provide for democracy and self-determination at work, to integrate 
individual and organizational goals, and to restore individuals opportunity for self-realization at 
work (Scott, 1967). 
In essence, as can been seen in Figure 14-34, controllership in organizations refers to, what the 
organizational humanism has called for, redesigning organizations to promote individual 
maturity (Argyris, 1957), and posits that the assumptions people make about themselves (X, Y, 
Figure 14-34: Controllership as commitment to redesign organizations to promote individual maturity 
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Z theories) determine their managerial style (Davis, 1957). When viewed in the light of its 
foundations, harmony means a pleasing combination of related things or an agreement in 
interests, feelings or opinions, and thus, controllership in any organization becomes the 
organization's quest for the harmony between people and organization, viz., the quest for a just 
adaptation of human needs and aspirations to the requirements and goals of the organization. 
14.4.1 1 Controllership as commitment to change in the organizational environment 
"Change is the biggest story in the world today, and we are not coping with it adequately'' 
(Bennis, 1969). It has become an accepted truth of our times that organizations have to adapt to 
a fast-expanding world 
in order to survive. Ilowever, saying to change is easy, but to practise it 
is not. If fact, evidence has found that it remains extremely diflicult to prim; about change in 
organizations. As one Chinese general manager put 
it, "To change is to fail earlier, and history is 
the mirror". This demands that organizational decision-makers have to commit themselves to he 
change initiators, change implementers, change controller, and change improvers. 
Broadly speaking, change is needed because of, inter alia, managerial effectiveness criteria and 
employee criteria such as 
increasing the organization's capacity to provide desirable outcomes 
and satisfying work. 
Seemingly, it is pleasing for organizations to maintain consistency between 
elements of structure and strategy. 
I lowever, as circumstances cl aiigc, it remains incumbent on 
the investment decision-makers to examine the implications of' the change für organizational 
operations. This suggests that controllership In organizations embraces the commitment of the 
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whole organization towards change, which is aimed at the improvements in efficiency or 
flexibility so that these organizations can enhance their capacity to absorb risks by, either 
reacting successfully to changes from the environments to secure desirable performances at the 
micro stage, functioning proactively on management's part to seize new development 
opportunities at the intermediate stage, or looking forward about new ideas, subtle shifts in 
themes, and emerging environmental events to evolve organizational progress at the macro stage 
(Figure 14-35). 
Figure 14-35: Controllership as commitment to bring about improvement in efficiency and flexibility 
--------- 
14.4.12 Controllership as commitment to orderliness in the organizational world 
Humankind has always held a fascination for numbers: most people ascribe magical power to 
some numbers and malignancy to others. By doing this or that, throughout history, people treat 
numbers as symbols of the quest for knowledge in that they lend a preciseness and orderliness to 
human society. Observing the world around us carefully can lead to people's inquisitiveness that 
there is a natural rhythm of all seasons, all organisms, and of all life and death in things, and this 
inquisitiveness can further urge us to identify, explore, and explain the inexplicable thins or 
phenomena by searching 
for a great force which hinds the conihlexities observed in human or 
environmental nature 
into certain rational order of events. 
In the investment decision-making context, it can also be held that investment decision-makers 
commit themselves to 
bring order from chaos by searching tör interrelationships between 
observed events occurring 
in the investment decision-making process and investment-related 
activities. This is to say that, although they can 
he curious and seek variety in investment 
decision-making, investment decision-makers can also be driven by a born need for closure, a 
self-energized need to 
bring observations about the investment situation into sonic unity of 
perception, because 
humans are basically orderly, rational beings who desire to control the 
environment insofar as 
it is Possible. Therefore, it is not suurprising to find that organizational 
decision-makers vigorously commit themselves to search 1'Or order by rationalizing investment 
opportunities ng the workplace 
filled with resources, measuring organizational 
operations, and controlling the accomplishment of performance. 
Flic search for ordcrlincss 
demands the quest for quantification Ui terms of commitment to order 
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and predictability. It implies that investment decision-makers tend to commit themselves to 
Aristotelian scientific methods which have denoted a rational approach to problem solving 
through the articulation of hypotheses, the accumulation of data, the identification of alternative, 
the testing of the hypotheses, verification, and selection of a course of action (e. g. Figure 6-2). 
The search for orderliness can also be reflected by investment decision-makers' rigor to deal 
with challenges in such areas as productivity and quality. Orderliness in quality has been 
pursued by means of quality circle which has been nowadays planted everywhere, and the 
search for orderliness in productivity can be seen from organizations' increasing commitment 
towards the use of IT to deal with production and inventory planning and control. In fact, the 
advancements in IT and in the sophistication of quantitative methods have never been more 
encouraging to educate investment decision-makers to transform themselves through 
educational institutions or through self-learning into a generalist who can not only manage 
specialists but also integrate people and investment activities in an orderly, rational, systematic, 
goal-directed fashion. 
14.4.13 Controllership as commitment to integration of interests among organizational 
members 
Organizational life seldom falls short of conflict, and `control must be seen in relation to conflict 
and sources of conflict and in relation to the potential terrain of compromise and consensus' 
(Littler and Salaman, 1982). It has been argued that organizational conflict occurs when both the 
controlling and the controlled perceive that one or both sides receive 
frustration (Littler and 
Salaman, 1982). Conflict can spring from a variety of sources, '" and to successfully deal with it 
requires a lot of human problem-solving skills. To a great extent, to control means to resolve 
conflict, given the fact that 
it is organizational conflict that truly makes control in organizations 
more and more complex and renders the task of management more and more challenging 
(Figure 14-36). 
However, conflict has received differing attention in the literature of control in organizations. 
The traditional perspective, which is drawn on the non-zero sum assumption, holds that conflict 
represents a malfunction within an organization and should 
be avoided, because management 
practice starts from `industrial peace' and 
individuals' effort has been welded into a common 
effort (Drucker, 1968). It also 
holds that the conflict-free organization involves goal-setting in 
agreement with individuals and groups, so that 
the conflict which does occur has to be explained 
away into, say, mismanagement, 
bad communication, or bloody-minded shop floor employees 
(Salaman, 1978). 
The plural perspective, drawn on the zero-sum assumption, sees conflict as an inevitable, natural 
phenomenon existing 
in every organization, or as a means of balancing the status quo, or as a 
safety valve which assists evolutionary rather than revolutionary change and 
keeps organizations 
responsive to internal and external changes, so that 
individuals and groups can each pursue their 
own interests and objectives while an organization's essential elements such as the 
organizational hierarchy or power 
distribution are still retaining intact (Pondy, 1967). This 
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underlines the pluralist's belief that conflict can be resolved through compromise which is 
acceptable and workable to all, and organizations have to achieve a compromise so as to 
maintain a viable collaborative structure within which all the stakeholders can each pursue their 
own aspiration with varying degree of success (Dalton, 1959). 
Figure 14-36: Manifestations of organizational conflicts 
(Sources: Varying materials including ChiH( 1984), Thomas (I992), and Jones et al (1901)) 
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In regard to conflict-resolving, it seems evident that any conflict of interests can be resolved in 
any one of four ways (Figure 14-35): `voluntary submission of one side, struggle and the victory 
of one side over the other, compromise, and integration' (Follett, 1924). However, it remains 
clear that both voluntary submission (either by one side or by both sides) and struggle-resulted 
victory are not always acceptable, although they do occur in practice, in a such fashion that an 
increase in control achieved by one side over an issue which is in dispute is at the expense of the 
amount of control available to the other side. Compromise, which means each of the two sides 
give up some aspect of their concern, can likewise be futile because it postpones the issues and 
because the truth does not lie between the two sides. Integration involves the finding of a 
solution which satisfies both sides without the sacrifice of one side to another, and, thus, in 
essence, remains the paramount way to resolve conflicts so as to achieve controlled 
performance. 
As can be seen in Figure 14-37, too little conflict can cause performance to suffer: too little 
conflict arises when the management become so obsessed with the unitary worldview striving 
for agreement rather than effective decision-making, and this over-emphasized conformity at the 
expenses of new ideas usually results in resistance to change when it is needed and thus 
downgrades performance. Too much conflict can also cause performance to suffer: in an 
organization in which high level of conflict predominates, the management can become so 
obsessed with the radical worldview and so determined to struggle for victory through conflict 
that they become more and more willing to lever organizational resources into wining political 
battles or competing for self interests; and this struggle syndrome eventually makes them 
become too busy to do what really contributes to the organization's sustainable advantage. 
Figure 14-37: Controllership as commitment to integration-oriented conflict-resolving 
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Since too little conflict results in the waste of organizational ophortunities and inevitably lead to 
poor organizational eflcctiveness and too much conflict results 
in the waste of' organizational 
resources and unavoidably 
leads to poor individual or organizational efficiencies, the immediate 
task of control fier the management, therefore, rests oil avoiding either too niuclh or too little 
conflict, viz., putting 
it differently, searching for an optimum level of' conflict (i. c. point 1) in 
Figure 14-37). 
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It can be argued that, given a control situation, there exists an optimum level of conflict (point D 
in Figure 14-37, before which performance increases as conflict increases and after which 
performance decreases as conflict increases), which leads to the optimum performance (i. e. line 
segment DK in Figure 14-37), even though it can remain tough to locate it in that this optimum 
level of conflict can vary from organization to organization depending on, inter alia, the internal 
forces such as organizational culture and management practices prevailing in the organization, 
and external forces such as macro-economic situations of the economy. 
Seemingly, at the optimum level of conflict, both the controlling side and the controlled side 
become both the controller (to control performance as a result of the attempted mastery of nature) 
and the controlled (by the organizational control situation which is a part of the nature via the 
pursuit of balanced organizational purposes); and they both are likely to be open to, and 
encourage, a variety of worldviews in regard to conflict as well as to promote change efforts 
which can benefit the organization as a whole. 
This corresponds to an organization's progress orientation towards the pursuit of the 
ethicomoral state of GOOD (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) or HUMANITY 
(Emery, 1981). To visualise 
this pursuit, imagine control of an investment (please see Figure 1-4-5&8), in which the 
ethicomoral state of GOOD means 
increasingly intensifying organizational members' interest to 
an end (such as growth, welfare, self-achievement, or profit) which 
is desired by all stakeholders 
including both the controller and the potentially controlled (please see Figure 14-27). For 
investment controllers, to integrate conflict is to recognize the existence of conflict in the work 
force in the hope that in the short run conflict can be constantly controlled at an optimum level 
at which the highest level of performance 
is achieved (i. e. line segment DK in Figure 14-37): 
they first conceptualize conflict-resolving by formulating an image of nature of the investment 
and of its environment, then operationalize 
it via the use of a set of formal sciences, actualize it 
by reaching certain level of conflict which is closer to the truly optimum point at which 
performance remains highest, and 
finally idealise it by re-actualising it if it is immediately 
adjustable or re-conceptualising 
it if it is not immediately adjustable; this perpetual commitment 
to the optimal point of each equilibrium of conflict between both sides of influence so as to 
promote in the highest 
degree regular realization of organizational objectives carries on and on 
indefinitely, moving towards the ethicomoral state of GOOD which is ultimately unattainable but 
always approachable 
in the organization's life time. 
Following this line (i. e. controllership as commitment to integration of conflicts), therefore, it 
seems that organizational controllership means co-control among organizational members over 
the control situation of interest rather than some organizational members over other members, 
although it also seems evident 
that each of the organizational members can specialise in a 
function or a part of co-actions which are demanded by the situation covering the whole range 
of organizational activities 
day-in and day-out. It remains arguable that control in organizations, 
can be regarded as organizational commitment towards optimal conflict-resolving 
(i. e. achieving 
an optimum level of conflict at which optimum performance can 
be effectively and efficiently 
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obtained) through integrative conflict-resolving processes which are of cyclical nature. 
That is, control in organizations initiates itself by virtue of the fusion of knowledge as well as 
experience available in the organization, and is principally based upon opportunities which are 
created by the organization, or emerged from the situation, or infused by the bigger situation 
(e. g. global market or local economy). These opportunities give birth to varying levels of 
conflict in vested interests among organizational members and enable organizational members 
to influence each other through, among other things, open integration such as organization-wide 
disclosure of situational information on expectations, costs, and benefits. Organizational 
members, then, con-commit themselves so as to obtain the optimum level of conflict by 
organizational co-actions dictated by functions rather than sheer personalized, bureaucratic 
authorities so as to produce the optimum level of performance - or otherwise, if integration has 
not been perceived as worthwhile or visible, organizational members commit themselves to 
individual vested interests through furious coercion, or helpless, voluntary submission. As time 
goes by, organisational members escalate or de-escalate their commitment in order to smoke out 
the optimum level of conflict. As the situation evolves, and knowledge as well as experience 
accumulates, the accumulative knowledge as well as experience provides a new, circular 
response to the situation and helps identify or create new opportunities embracing a new set of 
conflicting interests. 
However, in practice, the notion that control is organizational commitment towards integration 
so as to achieve optimal conflict-resolving, implies that a portfolio of, rather than just one, 
control strategies need to be adopted 
in an organization, so that different strategies are directed 
towards different issues according to the level of conflict and different strategies are followed by 
different individuals or groups within the organisation (Figure 14-36). Graphically speaking, it 
means not only that the performance curve alternates which results 
in variations of the optimal 
level of conflicts from time to time for the same organization, but also that there can also be sub- 
optimal levels of conflicts within each of the 
four zones of conflicts (submission, compromise, 
integration and struggle) at the same time. This suggests that, given control condition, 
organizations need to commit themselves to approach the most 
beneficial but practically 
available optimal level of conflict so as to achieve 
(sub-)optimal level of performance (Figure 
14-38). 
Figure 14-38: controllerships as commitment to a portfolio of sub-optimal conflict resolving 
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The cyclical process of optimal conflict-resolving implies that organizationally controlled 
performance will become impossible if control activities do not rest on self-regulating, self- 
directing individuals with their conflict in interests co-reconciled in the full organisational 
context in the light of perceived unity of organizational purposes. To achieve this organizational 
commitment towards integration-oriented optimal conflict-resolving in practical terms, 
organizations can, actually engage themselves in promoting what is congruent with the 
organizational purposes, in preventing what is incongruent with the organizational purposes, or 
in nurturing organizational activities which are featuring zero-sum assumptions through 
evolution, convolution or revolution into those through which the win-lose zero-sum character 
disappears. 
14.4.14 The meta-principle of strategic control of investments 
The reasoning of the above-mentioned investment controllership in organizations, tends to 
suggests that, strategic control of investment, essentially becomes, the effective and efficient 
management of organizational commitment towards orderliness in pursuit of the ideal state of 
HOMONOMY; the effective and efficient management of organizational commitment towards 
harmony in pursuit of the ideal state of BEAUTY; the effective and efficient management of 
organizational commitment towards integration in pursuit of the ideal state of GOOD; and the 
effective and efficient management of organizational commitment towards change in pursuit of 
the ideal state of TRUTH. 
As a whole, ' strategic control of investment remains the unifying of varying organizational 
commitment that escorts organizational progress. Therefore, the meta-principle of strategic 
control of investment lies in the principle of unity which acts to monitor the four major possible 
control operators in organizations, 
i. e. harmony, change, orderliness, and integration. Harmony 
reflects the principle of unity as primarily applied to the context of things (e. g. structure and 
factory). Change reflects the principle of unity as primarily applied to the context of changes 
(e. g. time and market). Orderliness reflects the principle of unity as primarily applied to the 
context of events (e. g. coordination and competition). 
Integration reflects the principle of unity 
as primarily applied to the context of people 
(e. g. workers and managers). 
14.5 Conclusion and recommendation 
As noted by Quinn (1980), Mintzberg and Waters (1985), Dermer (1988), and Hamel (1996), 
the concept of strategic control has evolved to show that forces other than senior management 
can and do shape strategic evolution, thus, 
for any organization, controllership of investments 
may be no longer goal-related 
but should be evaluated in terms of adaptability and, ultimately, 
survival. In practical terms, 
it suggests that the successful strategic control of investments should 
involve the use of first principles, competent leadership styles, healthier control mentalities, 
structurally fit control strategies, optimal span of control, clearly articulated criteria for selecting 
control techniques, solid 
foundations for implementation, and contextually fit control processes. 
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To achieve the goal of strategic control of investments, investment decision-makers are 
recommended to pursue effective and efficient management of control paradoxes. That is, to 
ensure desired performance, successful strategic control of investments requires that 
controllership, meaning both a process and a system, act as both influence and counter-influence; 
be both an individual and a total phenomenon; function as a two-way process for both parties 
involved in the process; reflect both a solo and a trilogy; remain both a periodic and a 
continuous improvement to progress; be both a reality and an illusion; perform as a medium for 
both success and failure; work as an open as well as a closed loop; be both rationality-driven and 
image-driven activities; behave like context-specific or context-synergic forces; involve both 
organization and reorganization activities; 
be shaped by both emergent and synergic 
conceptualization; be an art of both stretching and 
balancing; look like both an ever-changing 
and a never-changing mind game; act as every 
investment decision-maker's dream-machine but 
not as everybody's shot-gun; and, remain 
both an old and a new journey circulated by 
idealization and actualization. 
In terms of research, future research needs to involve more empirical work to testify as well as 
advancing, by means of both qualitative and quantitative 
designs (e. g. case study, survey, oral 
history), the above-outlined propositions that successful strategic control of investments 
demands organizational commitment towards orderliness, harmony, integration, and change, in 
pursuit if the idea state of HOMONOMY, BEAUTY, GOOD AND TRUTH, respectively, that successful 
strategic control of investments as a whole essentially 
involves the unifying of varying 
organizational commitment which escorts organizational progress, and that the principle of unity 
assumes the meta-principle of strategic control of 
investments. 
In addition, specific practice- or research- oriented considerations regarding strategic control of 
investments can include the following: 
Q14-1. How do academics and practitioners portray the relationship 
between strategy and 
control? Should the relationship between strategy and control be both described with a 
focus on administrative planning and control systems and considered within a frame 
which embraces various important dimensions? 
Table 14-10: The relationship between strategy and control 
A focus on administrative planning and control systems A frame of thinking embracing varying perspectives 
Being the prerogative of top management to ensure conformity 
with the central organization-wide intent of top management 
Econ 
omic 
Psycho 
logical 
Politi 
cal 
Environ 
mental 
Socie 
tal 
Techno 
logical 
others 
? ? 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Q14_2. What does business level organizational strategy mean 
in practice? Does it echo any of 
the connotations prescribed by various management thinkers? 
Table 14-1 1: The meaning of organizationa l strategy 
A plan as the The The means for A 
formal logic Organiz Comp Increme Revolution whereby A game A label that 
end product attainment of an organization which treads ational etitive ntal an organization which applies to 
of strategy organizationa to achieve business purpose positi evolutio breaks the rules of people patterns in 
formulation I objectives certain ends activities s oning n competition play action 
? ? ? ? ? 
Q14.3, What are the characteristics of the strategy adopted 
by the organization of interest? Can 
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it be stereotyped as classic, evolutionary, processual or systematic? What are the key 
approach, key rationale, key focus, key processes, and key influences of the chosen 
strategy? 
Table 14-12: Characteristics of organizational strategy 
Classic Evolutionary Processual Systematic 
The stereotypes 
Key approach ? 7 7 ? 
Key rationale ? ? ? ? 
Key focus ? ? 7 7 
Key processes 7 7 ? 7 
Key influences ? ? ? ? 
Q14-4. What are the major concerns of the strategy adopted by an organization? Is it a version 
of analysis in the line of positions, processes, or the match between positions and 
processes? 
Table 14-13: Differing concerns of organizational strategy 
Themes Position Process The match between position and process 
Major 
concerns 
Market niche, product-market 
domain, competitive position 
Individuals or groups 
in an organization 
Environmental niches, positioning strategies 
(prospectors, analysers, defenders and reactors) 
In reality ? ? ? 
Q14-5. What is the strategy situation of the organization of interest? Can it be viewed as a 
gaming process? If so, what are the specific components and/or parameters of the game? 
Table 14-14: The situation of an organizational strategy 
Game The choice Availabil Possible The efficiency of The probability of The relative The 
players environment ity of outcomes an action for an choice of action value of probability of 
choices outcome outcomes outcomes 
Q14-6. How is strategy made in an organization? Does 
it match any of the strategy-making 
stereotypes? Are the strategy-makers aware of the advantage and disadvantage of the 
particular strategy-making process the organization has followed? 
Table 14-15: Strategy-making process in practice 
Stereotype Conceptual Formal Analytical Visionary Mental Emergent Power Ideological Passive Episodic 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-7. What are the confusions that have really occurred in the strategy-making process? Does 
the strategy-making process change the things to be strategized such as the paradigm 
upon which strategy-making is based? 
Table 14-16: Confusions inherent in the strategy-making process 
Confusions Pu se Thinkin Structure Style Source Com lexi tyl Choice enericnes Collectiveness Integration han g e Control 
in reality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-8. Do confusions of strategy-making 
lead to further confusions of strategy-making? Which 
first principles can be most effective in solving the strategy-making confusions? 
Table 14-17: The 8Ws model solutions to the strategy-making confusions 
Confusions Which What Who When Where Which wa Whether why 
Meta- rinci les The principle of uncertain The rind ple of complexity The princi ple of uni 
Q14_9. What are the most 
influential managerial ideologies that typically reflect the control 
reality in the organization of interest? What is the major basis of control in the 
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Table 14-18: The basis of control in an organization 
Basis of control Coercive Normative utilitarian 
In reality 7 ? ? 
Q14-1o. How is control conceived by managers / accountants in the organization of interest? Is 
control viewed in positive, negative or neutral sense in the organization? 
Table 14-19: Meanings of control in an organization 
Meaning Positive (e. g. order, reliability, Negative (e. g. domination, coercion, exploitation Neutral (e. g. 
of control stability and predictability, with the and manipulation, with the absence of control socialists' value 
absence of control implying chaos, implying freedom, individuality, discretion, creation, capitalists' 
disorder, uncertainty and anarchy) responsibility and autonomy) prof it-maximisation) 
In reality 7 ? ? 
Q14-1 i. From which angle is control most likely to be viewed in the organization of interest? Or 
from which perspectives has control been predominantly conceived by the managers and 
/ accountants of the organization of interest? 
Table 14-20: The specific views of control in an organization 
Dominant angle of 
views of control 
Economist Politician Psychologist Environmentalist Strategist Ideologist Others 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-12. What are the specific tasks of control in the organization of interest? Do they involve, as 
suggested by some management theorists (e. g. Thompson, 1967), the `satisficing' of the 
establishment of purpose, the pursuit of effectiveness and the struggle for efficiency? 
Q14-13. Which theory of control existing in the literature seems more relevant to the investment 
decision-making in the organization of interest? And which mechanisms or forms of 
control do the organization normally engage in? Are decision-makers fully aware of the 
principles for the proper functioning of the control mechanisms adopted in the 
organization? 
Q14-14. 
Q14-15. To what extent do the five levels of hierarchies of systematic control manifest 
themselves in the investment decision-making process? Is it acceptable or meaningful in 
practice that the process of systematic control remains in essence a process of 
appreciation (Vicker, 1965)? Do systems ideas exert any influence on other disciplines 
related to the study of control in organizations such as social, political, ideological, 
economic and technological? 
Table 14-22: The manifestation of systematic control in an organization 
Level of systematic control Major functions In reality 
Level one 
Organization of divisional management via monitoring achievement, endorsing 
routine and determining actions 
Level two 
Transformation processes demanded by the whole system to prevent 
uncontrolled oscillation between divisions 
Level three 
Automatic maintenance of the stability of the internal environment of the 
organization 
Level four Organization wide maintenance of dynamic equilibrium with the external world ? 
Level five Organization wide self-conscious determination of goals via foresights ? 
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To what extent does the organization favour feedback or feedforward control in the light 
of cybernetic control? Are the guidelines for developing feedforward control useful in 
promoting cybernetic control in practice? And are the principles of effective feedback 
control pertinent to managing commitment in organizations? 
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Q14-16. How can control situations in an organization be understood as well as explained (fully) 
in terms of the interaction of administrative, social and self-control, if organizational 
approaches to control are adopted in the organization of interest? Which one of the 
behavioural control mechanisms appears to be the most dominant one in the organization? 
Do investment decision-makers' motivation, expectations and perceptions all correlate to 
organizational performance? 
Table 14-23: Behavioural control mechanisms at a glance 
Behavioural Administrative control Social control Self-control 
control Rules and Internalized Output Leader Organizatio Commitment, Sanctions, incentives, Identif Comp] internali 
mechanisms procedures objectives control ship nal culture socialization rewards, surveillance ication lance zation 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-17. Is the problem of moral hazard arisen more from hidden information or more from 
hidden actions? Can both behaviour contracts and outcome contracts provide appropriate 
measures and rewards for investment decision-makers in the organization of interest, and 
what are the roles they each play? Can the 3C control model (please see Figure 14-14) 
be utilized to ensure that the "agents" pursuing their own individual self-interests will 
also pursue the collective interests? 
Table 14-24: The 3C model of agency theories to solve the moral hazard problem in an organization 
The 3C control model Contents In reality 
First C Check performance by means of observations or experiments and record the data & results ? 
Second C Compare the data and the results (costs of behavioural control and of outcome control) carefully ? 
Third C Choose the least expensive alternative, implement and evaluate the chosen option ? 
Q14-l8. Are cultures, ideologies and values - which prevail in the organization of interest - 
proactive tools, constraining influences or spontaneous devices of control? How might 
the role of cultural control evolve along the life-cycle of the organization? How does the 
relationship between ideologies and likelihood of control actions manifest across various 
stages of the life-cycle of the organization? And which form of the clan control (i. e. 
economic, social or blood relationship) plays a dominant role in the organization? 
Q14-19. Are there any practical reasons - other than the efficiency 
inherent from the "division of 
labour" (Taylor, 1967) and the reciprocal and conflicting needs between the controllers 
and the controlled due to the "inequalities" of power between them (Marx, 1973) - why 
politics approaches to control can dominate organizational decision-making? On which 
occasions does bureaucracy, power or negotiation become the more systematic device 
for an organization to achieve effective control? 
Q14-20. Which contingency theory to control 
has been approached by the organization of interest? 
Are there possible procedural shifts of control mechanisms in the organization - e. g. 
from behavioural control (first by personal means and then by impersonal means 
reinforced by hierarchical supervision) to short-run output control with centralised 
coordination and eventually to input control (especially in the form of personnel training 
and selection, and technology)? 
Table 14-25: The contingency theory to control in an organization 
Contingency 
approaches 
Technological 
contingencies 
Environmental 
contingencies 
Organizational 
fit 
Structural 
contingencies 
Population- 
ecology 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14.21. What are the control problems 
for managing organizational commitment which have 
occurred to the decision-makers in the organization of interest? To what extent do they 
affect organizational performance? 
Table 14-26: The common control problems in an organization 
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Theoreti Resistance Failure of control Handicapped Inaccurate information Conservatism and Negative impact on the 
cal to change systems due to thinking and due to unfair or rigidity of behaviour control process due to 
problems poor performance learning due to unreasonable standards because of both negative exception and 
appraisal automatic rule- of the control process avoiding as well as poor evaluation of 
following embracing errors performance 
In reality ? ? ? '? 7 7 
Theoreti Rigid Failure of control Improbable control Incomplete information The creation of a Difference in goals among 
cal bureaucrat systems due to systems due to poor due to faulty variety of chaos due organizational members 
problems is incompetent objectives information processing to uncertainty due to inappropriate criteria 
behaviour leaders capabilities avoidance for actions 
In reality 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Q14-22. What does controllership really mean in organizations? how can an effective as well as 
efficient controllership be practically described? To what extent is it a process by which 
a controller nurtures, exercises and evaluates influence over and/or with the potentially 
controlled so as to help achieve pre-established performance? Does controllership 
pertain to the relationship between the controllers and the potentially controlled and 
permeates through all control activities. 
Q14-23. Are the articulated principles really relevant to an organization's successful 
controllership in practice? Which one ranks the highest? What else can contribute to 
successful controllership? 
Table 14-27: The first principles of successful controllership in an organization 
First rinci le uniformi Com arison Utili The exce tion Uni 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-24. What counts for the most competent 
leadership style in the organization of interest? 
Does effective controllership derive from empowerment, "the law of situation", or 
transformational leadership? Are traits and personal characteristics related to effective 
leadership in organizations? If yes, in which ways? 
Q14-25. Does successful controllership 
demand healthier control mentalities? What consists of a 
healthier mentality? Should control mentality evolve along with the evolution of control 
problems? 
Table 14-28: The healthier control mentalities in an organization 
Control mentality Putting prevention first Putting process first Putting people first Putting change first 
[n reality ? ? ? ? 
Q14-26. What consists of a structurally 
fit control strategy? Has the organization of interest 
started in an informal way but become formalized as it grows? What is the control 
strategy selected by the organization? How was 
it defined, chosen, implemented and 
evaluated? 
Table 14-29: The structurally fit control strategies selected by the organization of interest 
Control strategy Centralization Delegation Formalization Informalization Self-control Supervision 
In reality ? ? ? 7 ? 
Q14-27. What seems to the optimal span of control 
for the organization of interest? What was the 
actual span of control in the organization? 
Q14-28. Does the organization of 
interest have pre-established criteria for selecting control 
techniques? To what extent have the pre-set criteria been satisfied when the decision- 
makers in the organization chose their control techniques? 
Table 14-30: The extent to which the criteria for control techniques are satisfied in an organization 
Criteria for Whether the objectives of the Whether the outputs of the Whether the Whether the effects of the 
control intended activity are intended activity are measurable intended activity is controllers' interventions 
techniques unambiguous repetitive are known 
In reality (%) ? ? ? ? 
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Q14-29. Does the implementation of control in the organization of interest have solid foundations? 
Does the control process provide organizational members with feedback on their 
performance, structures, and the methods of measurement of performance? Does the 
control process encourage dependency, inspire organizational members' passions, 
enthusiasm and initiatives? To what extent are Follett's (1987) four coordinating 
principles (i. e. direct contact, early stages, reciprocal relating and continuous process) 
applicable in practice? 
Q14-30. What does the control process in the organization of interest look like? Does it mirror 
any of the four classic models (or others) prescribed by some management theorists? 
Table 14-31: The control process in an organization demystified 
Control process Figure 14-21 Figure 14-22 Figure 14-23 Figure 14-24 Others (e. g. Figure 12-3,4,5,7,8,9&10) 
In reality ? ? ? ? ? 
Q14-3l. Does it make sense that successful controllership in organizations demands effective and 
efficient management of control paradoxes? Are the pre-articulated control paradoxes 
relevant to the control practice in the organization of interest? 
Table 14-32: The practicality of management of control paradoxes in an organization 
No. Control paradoxes In reality 
I Controllership as both a process and a system to ensure desired performance 
2 Controllership as both influence and counter-influence ? 
3 Controllership as both an individual and a total phenomenon ? 
4 Controllership as a two-way process for both the controlling and the controlled ? 
5 Controllership as both a solo and a trilogy ? 
6 Controllership as both periodic and continuous improvement to progress ? 
7 Controllership as both a reality and an illusion ? 
8 Controllership as a medium for both success and failure ? 
9 Controllership as an open and a closed loop ? 
10 Controllership as both rationality-driven and image-driven activities ? 
11 Controllership as both context-specific and context-synergic forces ? 
12 Controllership as both organization-and reorganization-oriented activities ? 
13 Controllership as being shaped by both emergent and synergic conceptualization ? 
14 Controllership as stretching as well as balancing ? 
15 Controllership as both an ever-changing and a never-changing mind game ? 
16 Controllership as everybody's dream-machine but not everybody's shot-gun ? 
17 Controllership as both an old and a new journey circulated by idealization and actualization ? 
Q! 4-32. Does successful controllership really mean organizational commitment to redesign 
organizations to promote individual maturity? To what extent is control in the 
organization of interest a process or system which searches for harmony of people and 
organization? Do organizational members genuinely anticipate a responsible position in 
the organization? Do the premises the controllers made about the potentially controlled 
really determine the potential managerial styles in the organization? Does an agreement 
between the parts of design or composition (e. g. people and organizational structure) 
exists that offers a pleasing unity of effort and gives rise to improvement of performance? 
Is the harmony achievable by means of a just adaptation of human needs and aspirations 
to the requirements and goals of the organization? Does the optimum level of individual 
maturity exist in organizations, if so, does it lead to high performance? 
Q14-33. Does successful controllership really mean organizational commitment to bring about 
improvement in efficiency and flexibility? To what extent is control in the organization 
of interest a process or system which searches for change through reorganization? Is 
change really inevitable in organizational lives? Does change always bring about 
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positive consequences in relation to organizational performance? If not, how can 
positive consequences of change be accomplished in the organization of interest? Do the 
organizational decision-makers have to commit themselves to be change initiators, 
change implementers, change controllers and change improvers. 
Q14-34. To what extent is control in the organization of interest a process or system which 
searches for orderliness? How can orderliness be better achieved in the age of unknown 
and unreason? Do organizational members feel secure in terms of needs? Do they share 
with the same goal in mind? Do they genuinely cooperate with each other in actions? 
Can and should the function of management be decomposed into quantifiable variables? 
Can systematization bring forth order from chaos? 
Q14-35. Does successful controllership really mean organizational commitment to integration- 
oriented conflict-solving? To what extent is control in the organization of interest a 
process or system which searches for integration through conflict-resolving? Do 
organizational members each pursue varying objectives? Do resistance and counter- 
control prevail in the organization of interest? Does the mutuality of interests necessarily 
lead to improvement of organizational performance? How does conflict manifest itself in 
the organization? Does an optimum level of conflict exist in the organization? How can 
it be identified and located in the organization? How does controllership exhibit itself as 
organizational commitment to a portfolio of sub-optimal conflict resolving? 
Q14-36. To what extent does the practice of strategic control of investment in organizations 
reflect that the meta-principle of strategic control of investments lies in the principle of 
unity? How relevant are the four major possible control operators in organizations (i. e. 
harmony, change, orderliness and integration) to the principle of unity? How can these 
control operators be practically monitored in the world of investments? 
For example, Friedman (1953) famously argues that 
it hardly matters if decision-makers do not rationally prof it-maximize so 
long as competitive markets ensure that only those who 
do somehow achieve the prof it-maximizing position will survive over 
the long-run. 
2 The right-handed planners refer to strategic programmer who 
deal with machine bureaucratic contexts which are relatively 
simple and stable or at 
least predictable. 
3 There are arguably three waves of the positioning school's analytical process: the first wave refers to the 'military maxims' 
with conclusions on strategy 
being expressed in imperative terms (e. g. Sunzi, 1992; von Clausewitz, 1962a, 1962b), the second 
wave is composed of efforts 
by consultants (notably the Boston Consulting Group) to prescribe strategic behaviour (Henderson, 
1979), and the third wave consists of more systematic study to uncover 'research contingencies' - essentially which strategies 
work best where - 
finally gives the prescriptive side of the strategic management field the viability it so badly needs (Porter, 
1980). 
it has been argued (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) that there are at least three themes which seem to be most consequential for 
strategic management: strategic vision, startup, and 
turnaround. 
s it might seem ironical, for example, that one of the most 
important findings for strategy-making - on the role of the mute right 
hemisphere of the human brain in the processes of visual perception as it relates to synthesis -comes not from cognitive 
psychology but 
from physiology (Sperry, 1974). 
6 For example, strategic initiatives can emerge and develop lower down in the organizational hierarchy and are then championed 
or given impetus by the middle management who seek 
the approval of the top management (Bower, 1970). 
it has been argued (Weick, 1979), for example, that, because all understanding originates in reflection and looking backward', 
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organizations learn by acting first, then finding out what happens, and then making sense of that in retrospect, and finally 
retaining the behaviours which seem desirable. 
The non-purely-economic ways can include, for example, both clandestine arrangements to subvert competition (such as 
establishing cartels or monopoly) and cooperative arrangements which have the same effect (such as joint ventures or strategic 
alliances). 
9 Here `organizational culture' represents the `organization's mind' with regard to shared beliefs, typically reflected in traditions 
and habits as well as more tangible manifestations such as stories, symbols, credos and the like which are prevailing in an 
organization; and 'organizational ideology' stands for a strong set of beliefs shared passionately by the members of a specific 
organization which distinguish itself from all other organizations (Schein, 1985; Mintzberg, 1990). For example, McDonald's 
organizational ideology is associated with an almost fetish belief in efficient service and cleanliness. 
10 For example, using the well-known variation-selection-retention model (Weick, 1979) but with different foci, Aldrich and 
Peffer (1976) draw a passive conclusion that organizations as members of the populations, are born, find ecological niches, and 
eventually die, but only those organizations which fit the environment will survive in the long run. This well justifies the 
argument that 'even the largest and most powerful organizations fail to survive over 
long periods' (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
" By Goold's (1980) 'punctuated equilibrium', organizations' life remains a story of intricate branching and wandering with 
momentary survivors adapting to change local environments, and thus strategy-making appears, at 
least in ecological terms, to 
be fast, cataclysmic rather than gradual full of 'sudden appearance' and `fully formed'. 
12 It has been argued (Mintzberg, 1990) that what distinguishes strategy making from others in management lies in its very focus 
on strategic choices - how to find them, where to find them, how to create them when they cannot be found, and how to exploit 
them. 
" Among the best known typology of organizations is Mile and Snow's (1978) description of prospectors, defenders, analyzers 
and reactors. 
" For example, the debates about the relationship between strategy and structure (e. g. Chandler, 1962; Hall and Saias, 1980; 
Mintzberg, 1990b) have been causing increased confusions: between the 'structure follows strategy' maxim (Chandler, 1962), 
and 'strategy follows structure' notion (Hall and 
Saias, 1980), comes Mintzberg's (1990b) assertion that that strategy and 
structure remain inextricably reciprocal so that 
`strategy may follow structure and structure may follow strategy'. The real solid 
contribution lies in, perhaps, the enriched vocabulary: 
for instance, Chandler (1962) has developed his famous theory of strategy 
and structure in a sequence of four 
distinct stages - accumulating resources, rationalizing the use of resources, continued growth, 
and rationalizing the use of expanded resources. 
" It has been argued (Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991) it is the preoccupation with controlled performance that sets 
organizations apart from other forms of social arrangement, although social sciences 
have never found it easy to define just what 
constitutes an organization. 
16 Evidence suggests that the Chinese started to control their organizational activities by means of accounting 2000 years ago and 
most organizations at the time were specialized 
into three major departments: accounting, safety and security, and production. 
" Mongomery, J. (1832) The Theory and Practice of Cotton Spinning, Glasgow: J. Niven, Jr. 
18 Gantt's (1919) and Taylor's (1967) attempt to internalization of goals as both a motivating and as a control device obsolete the 
premise that internal commitment to goals reduces the need 
for external control devices. 
"The very control devices having potential for increased efficiency carry within them their own self-destruct mechanisms. 
20 However, it has been argued that both the institutionalization and individualization of control can give rise to dysfunctional 
consequences for the human and the organization. 
21 This is because cybernation resulted from advancing technologies will make possible a greater emphasis on external control 
devices, but human values decree internalization of goals and self-control. 
22 Post-modernity originally means, among other things, randomness, anarchy and fragmentation (Clegg, 1990). 
23 Modern control concepts (e. g. systems) can also pose their great threat precisely in their potential as a means for extending the 
control of man over man. 
24 An organization can rely on a belief system to communicate core values such as collective pride in engineering 
quality financial success, responsibility or 
integrity; these inspirational beliefs can be offset by clear boundaries such as 
imposed limitations on actions which might jeopardize the organization's belief; more control can be gained through the use of a 
variety of diagnostic controls such as objectives, 
budgets and profit plans; control can focuses attention on the strategic 
uncertainties which need to 
be monitored such as the organization's reputations. 
25 Thompson (1967) argues that efficiency and effectiveness can only be discussed relative to a bounded system and purpose, as 
the product of interwoven social 
interaction by its nature, tends to be unbounded. Take survival - perhaps the minimum overall 
goal most organizations exhibit ever-increasing commitment 
to achieve, for example, remaining in existence is essential, but it 
can not be sustained without effectiveness and efficiency: organizations 
do not record positive outcomes (e. g. Net Present Value) 
will struggle and eventually 
born out themselves, and organizations do not record high efficiency (Return On Investment) will 
be squeezed out by the more efficient competitors. 
26 For example, the specific purpose-oriented goal states can 
be reflected by Etzioni's (1975) classification of organizational 
goals (stated or actual) 
involving (a) order goals, (b) economic goals, and (c) culture goals, or by Eisenstadt's (1958) 
classification of goals 
in bureaucratic organizations involving (a) socio-political, (b) economic, and (cultural) goals. 
27 For example, the effectiveness specific path constraints can 
be reflected by specific outcome-oriented goal states in relation to 
both objective-attainment and learning 
factors of organizational effectiveness. There can be four specific goal states each of 
which can involve several 
factorial variables (Butler et al, 1993): namely (a) the definition state which contains consequentiality 
due to (i) failure and (ii) fit with regard to business strategies, uncertainty in terms of (iii) rarity and (iv) performance, and 
disagreements in terms of (v) personality and (vi) project objectives; (b) the strategy state which contains computation in terms 
of (vii) rate of return and 
(viii) reported profit, judgment in terms of (ix) personnel, (x) image, and (xi) judgment, negotiation in 
terms of (xii) overall negotiation, and inspiration 
in terms of (xiii) overall inspiration; (c) influence in terms of (ivx) internality 
and (vx) externality, and 
(d) timing in terms of (vix) deliberation. 
28 For example, the efficiency specific path constraints can be reflected by specific process-oriented goal states in accordance 
with Emerson's 
(1913) twelve principles of efficiency, which contain (i) 'clearly defined ideals' aimed to reduce 
intraorganizational conflicts, vagueness, uncertainty and aimlessness, (ii) `common sense' aimed to exhort members of an 
14-100 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
organization to take a larger view of problems and their relationships, (iii) `competent counsel' aimed to build competent human 
resources, (iv) 'discipline' aimed to provide obedience and adherence to organizational rules, (v) 'fair deal' aimed to establish a 
system of justice and fairness in all dealings with the resources, (vi) 'reliable, immediate, accurate, and permanent records' 
aimed to facilitate the information and accounting systems, (vii) 'dispatching' aimed at planning and routing of work, (viii) 
standards and schedules' involving methods and time for tasks, (ix) 'standardized conditions', (x) `written standard practice 
instructions', (xi) `standardized operations', and (xii)'efficiency rewards' or incentive plans. 
29 The control space can be represented by either Hopwood's (1974) typology of control in organizations (i. e. administrative, 
social and self controls) or by Dalton and Lawrence's (1971) terminology of control (i. e. organizational, informal and individual 
controls); and control states can be reflected by (i) value premises of behaviour such as training, recruitment, selection and 
information disclosure, (ii) output consequences influenced by means such as budgets, MBO, and piecework, (iii) how tasks are 
performed in terms of rules and procedures, (iv) informal socialization such as group norms, and (v) internalization such as 
personal motives. 
30 Cybernetic control assumes that control is exercised from outside rather than inside the control system. 
" It has been argued that there are four necessary control conditions (Tocher, 1976,1970): namely, (a) the existence of an 
objective which is desired, (b) a means of measuring process outputs in terms of the objective, (c) the ability to forecast the 
effect of potential control actions, and (d) the ability to take actions to reduce 
deviations from the objective. 
32 It seems that steps 1,2 and 3 form an open-loop control by which no adjustments are made to actions once the sequence of 
intended acts is underway; while steps 1,2,3,4 and 5 form a closed-loop control by which adjustments can be made to actions 
along the sequence of intended acts. 
" Step N stands for the last step by which desired outputs are to be satisfactorily achieved. 
"A comparison of strengths and weaknesses of both feedforward and feedback control reveals (Cushing, 1982) that feedback 
control tends to be more economic and easier to 
implement but allows variations to exist for as long as it takes to detect and 
correct them; feedforward control tends to be more efficient although 
it does depend critically for its effectiveness on the 
predictability of future process outputs. 
'S It has been argued (Berry et al, 1995) that the `soft' systems has most to offer to the study of management control. 
36 For example, Boulding (1956) advocates that systems may be arranged in a hierarchy derived from an inherent distinction of 
complexity: namely, (a) static frameworks, (b) 
dynamic systems with predetermined motions, (c) closed loop control or 
cybernetic systems, (d) homeostatic systems such as 
biological cells, (e) the living plant, (f) animals, (g) human beings, (h) 
organizations, and (i) transcendental systems. 
31 The social aspects of control, in the light of social systems, can involve 'personnel control', action control, and /or results 
control, the latter of which represents an approach which 
holds members of an organization accountable for achieving particular 
results and then rewards them 
for their achievement. 
35 However, Hopwood's (1974) classification is not the only one; similar typologies of control in the organizational context can 
include that of Dalton and Lawrence's (1971) which contains organizational, informal and individual controls. 
39 This is because, as argued by Ouchi (1979), goal congruence through rules, procedures, or output control can be difficult to 
achieve especially when outputs are unmeansurable 
in any meaningful sense and when tasks are unpredictable. Thus, hidden 
forms of administrative control focusing on the basic value premises which surround members' behaviour can prove to be more 
appropriate than methods obtrusively congruent with actual 
behaviour or the outcomes of that behaviour. 
'0 For example, some control packages (such as 'scientific management' - i. e. gathering workers together in one place, setting 
performance standards, 
dictating work times, using personal supervision to ensure diligence, and the enforcement of rules 
against distractions like talking, smoking and 
drinking), which are used by superiors in an attempt to disseminate or transmit 
cultures through consciously 
designed, planned strategy so as to regulate and inculcate particular systems of belief and means in 
subordinates, can actually entail all three 
types of control. 
" It has been argued (Ouchi, 1980) that social control through the informal transmission of particular values, beliefs, attitudes 
and expectations is not 
just exercised 'horizontally' among hierarchical peers - it can also occur 'vertically' between 
hierarchical superiors and subordinates. 
42 However, training and culture can be well linked in that, for example, training may be seen as socialization processes instilling 
organizational culture 
into a new recruit. 
" Blau and Schoenherr (1971) argue that management can achieve control by use of such obtrusive mechanisms like 
bureaucratic hierarchy of authority, explicit rules and regulations, traditional incentives and machine pacing that the recipients of 
control can actually feel that they 
have been controlled; management can also achieve insidious control by designing controls in 
ways (e. g. the use of expert power, selective recruitment and 
the allocation of resources) that make them unobtrusive as well as 
apparently neutral. 
" Laboratory evidence suggests that there is a positive correlation between the use of sanctions (such as warnings and dismissals) 
and unit (or departmental) performance 
(O'Reilly and Weitz, 1980). 
"S For instance, research evidence seems consistent with the social facilitation prediction that computer aided surveillance 
decreases organizational performance on more sophisticated tasks while it can increase performance on very simple tasks (Aiello 
and Svec, 1993). 
'6 Salancik (1977) argues that, no choice means no implication of the behaviour for individuals' beliefs and perceptions, that 
pulicness makes 
it harder for the individuals to deny having done the action and thus binds individuals and their choices made 
more closely together, and that explicitness means 
that behaviours are more committing to the extent they have a clear, logical 
relationship to subsequent 
behaviours and attitudes. 
" Empirical research on commitment, which is most often associated with some kind of organizational or individual pathology 
(i. e. some error in decision-making) such as escalation 
to failing course of action and seduction by cults (Barker, 1984), seems to 
appeal for building organizational commitment as safeguards 
for voluntary turnover, desirable performance, and organizational 
citizenship (O'Reilly and 
Chatman, 1986,1996; Shore and Wayne, 1993). For example, through recruiting the potentially 
controlled the controllers may 
further cement their own attachment to the organization through the activity of proselytizing 
(Barker, 1984; Galanter, 1989; O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996). 
48 For example, effective socialization (referring to the systematic means by which organizations bring the potentially controlled 
into their culture) can be accomplished through a seven step process (Pascale, 1985) which consists of (i) careful selection of 
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entry-level candidates, (ii) humility-inducing experiences in the first months on the task, (iii) thorough training through expose 
in the field to the organizations' operations and individuals who exemplify the organizations' values, (iv) paying close attention 
to systems measuring operational results and rewarding individual performance, (v) strict adherence to the organizations' core 
values, (vi) developing reinforcing folklore, stories and legends that validate the organizations' culture and its aims and that 
interpret history in ways consistent with its values, and (vii) building consistent role models and consistent traits associated with 
those recognized as on the fast track. The socialization can be achieved by means of six tactics (van Maanen and Schein, 1979) 
as being depicted along a bipolar continuum involving (i) collective vs individual (are new comer grouped together or handled 
individually? ), (ii) formal vs informal (are the new comers separated from the rest of the organization or not? ), (iii) sequential vs 
random (is there a fixed sequence of steps required to assume a new task role? ), (iv) fixed vs variable (is there a specified 
timetable for the socialization process? ), (v) serial vs disjunctive (is the new member socialized by an experienced member? ), 
and (vi) investiture vs divesture (are the newcomers' identity and personal characteristics affirmed or stripped away? ). 
" Ebers (1995) has developed a typology of organizational cultures which entails legitimate culture based upon ideological 
pressures for conformity, efficient culture based upon social and material sanctioning, traditional culture based upon 
internalization, and utilitarian culture based upon calculations of consequences. 
so For example, it has been argued (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1986) that, although commitment remains one important mechanism 
through which strong cultures may be built, the concept of culture incorporates more than simply commitment, covering from 
symbols, languages, ideologies, rituals, and myths (Pettigrew, 
1979). 
S' O'Reilly and Chatman (1996) identify four mechanisms through which organizations can attempt to manage culture: (i) 
systems of participation of decision-making 
in that the provision of a feeling of making choice enhances individuals' 
commitment to the organization and the decision-made 
(Walton, 1985), (ii) dispatch of signals about what is important and 
valued (Pffeff, 1981), (iii) shared social 
information - informational influence (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955), and (iv) shaping 
behaviour through reward systems such as recognition of achievements, awards and tour visits from charismatic leaders (Biggart, 
1989). 
52 Cultural control can become superior to external control because cultural control comes from the internalization of values and 
from peer enforcement and is thus able to overcome some problems 
inherent in external control (Kunda, 1992): for example, 
external control normally requires 
foresights on what behaviours or outcomes are important and are to be rewarded, and this 
foresight can become impossible due to task complexity and unanticipated circumstances; relying external rewards and sanctions 
requires supervisorial effort or surveillance, and this reliance can 
be both costly and counterproductive; and external controls 
tend to evoke psychological reactance particularly when such controls are 
fist introduced into a control situation, and this 
reactance can result in individuals' 
feeling of losing freedoms. 
53 For example, Meindl et al (1985), in their study of the romance of 
leadership- an elevated belief in the efficacy of leaders and 
leader behaviour, propose that there will be more interest in leadership when economic conditions are worse and extreme 
performance outcomes are more 
likely to result in attributions of leadership effect. 
5' For example, Eccles and Nohria (1992) compare the 
language of Jack Welch, CEO of GE , who led GE through an important 
transformation, with that of Roger Smith, 
CEO of GM, who is generally acknowledged not to have helped GM become better at 
competing in the automobile 
industry. They find that the GE's CEO's language conveys 'an imaginative vision of the future, a 
realistic portrayal of the present, and a selective 
depiction of the past which can serve as a contrast to the future', while that of 
the GM's CEO externalizes 
GM's problems and never provides enough detail to his vision of building a 21st century 
corporation to inspire actions. 
ss Significantly control is rarely considered as being an endogenous feature of economic systems; In fact, control in main stream 
economics has been traditionally seen as something exercised 
from outside rather than inside the economic systems. 
56 In literature, there are two versions of contractual theory - agency theory and transaction cost theory (Seal, 1993): from a 
systemic perspective, the agency vision views 
an economy as a network of interlocking contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
while the transaction cost vision sees 
the economy as a mixture of 'markets and hierarchies' (Williamson, 1975). However, one 
theoretical interpretation of the push 
for marketization is that the agency approach has triumphed over that transactions cost 
approach (Seal, 1995). 
s' It has been held that agency relationship is universal 
(Ross, 1973) and 'exists in all organizations and in all cooperative 
efforts- at every level of management 
in firms' (Jense and Meckling, 1976). 
58 It has been held (Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1983) that there can 
be two major types of contract, namely behaviour contract and 
outcome contract, with 
both designed to ensure that the principals' and agents' efforts are unanimously directed at achieving 
outcomes and behaviour which are consistent 
with the interests of wealth-maximizing owners. However, behaviour contract 
typically links the agent's 
(normally fixed) remuneration to their performance of the responsibilities and duties specified for the 
agent; while outcome contract 
typically links the agent's (normally non-fixed) remuneration to external indicators such as share 
price performance. 
S' Cultures are seen (Schein, 1985) as patterns of basic assumptions; 
ideologies remain expressible through special languages, 
organizational stories, rituals and ceremonies, 
sagas, and physical arrangements such as dress, and begin to emerge as 
organizations establish 
itself and their actions become diffused with values (Mintzberg, 1983); and shared values consist of 
openness, trust and creativity 
(French and Bell, 1973). 
60 Integration regards cultures as integrating mechanism with an emphasis on 
harmony, homogenization, and consensus and 
indicates that integration through controlling or managing cultures gives rise to 
increased managerial control; differentiation 
acknowledges that organizational 
cultures reflect a variety of values and beliefs typical of most contemporary, complex 
organizations, and 
implies that because of the multicultural nature managerial control through manipulating cultures can be 
nearly impossible to achieve; ambiguity 
emphasizes on consensus, co-operation, harmony and denial of ambiguity, and implies 
that managerial control can 
be achieved through spontaneously arising social control. 
61 For example, cultural control can 
be achieved through socialization by means of staff selection, apprenticeship, and staff 
training, although the process of which can 
be tenuous. 
62 `Organization development' originated 
from Lewin's (1951) and Roger's (1951) work, was once part of the liberal agenda of 
the Fifties and Sixties which 
later incorporated work humanization and declined in the late Seventies. However, it still finds a 
prominent place 
in some organizations' human-resource management functions. 
63 In fact, Bennis (1966) argues that the only way that changes organizations is cultural changes because organizational 
14-102 
Chapter 14 On Strategic Control Of Investment 
hindrances to humans' capacity for growth need to be unblocked if organizations are to be healthy and effective (Argiris, 1964). 
" However, it also makes sense that ideologies once developed can remain very difficult to change if particular ideologies are 
not that which is needed (Clark, 1972). 
6s Taylor (1967) acknowledges that workforce needs to be clearly separated in the interests of efficiency, and thus the legitimate 
function of control becomes necessary for the controllers to handle the complex tasks of achieving effectiveness. 
" The controllers in a capitalist organization, according to Marx (1973), cannot rely on the willing cooperation, commitment and 
loyalty of the potentially controlled, but turn to exploitative forces. This is because (Braverman, 1974) that, inequalities of power 
in organizations, lead to inequalities of other resources, increase the chances of resistance to management, and eventually give 
rise to conflicts between the two class which beget themselves perpetually in the capitalist system; and this need of the 
controllers to maintain a disciplined workforce results in a continuing process of control which, per se, becomes perpetually 
refined and intensified. 
67 It has been supported by modem management theorists (e. g. Miller, 1963) that, in any organizational life cycle, an 
organization can exercise control in a more personalized fashion especially in the entrepreneurial phase, then control becomes 
less personal as the organization grows, and finally 'office' fashion tends to prevail over the personal. This, perhaps, justifies 
why large-scale capitalistic organizations such as those market-driven but subject to government regulation, need stable, strict, 
intensive, and calculative management. 
68 It is also acknowledged (Weber, 1958) that authority, in reality, may be legitimated on a combination of rational-legal, 
traditional and charismatic authority. 
69 This is because that, rational-legal authority best provides a basis for continuity of administration, it remains reasonably 
rational in that leadership is chosen on the basis of competence with respect to duty performance, it supplies the controllers with 
legal means for exercising authority, and all authority are clearly defined and carefully delimited to the functions necessary to 
achieve the organizational objectives (Weber, 1958). 
Other elements of Weber's bureaucratic control include (Henderson and Parson, 1947): (a) officials of varying ranks are 
appointed rather than elected, (e) the controllers are not an owner of the unit being administrated, and (f) the controllers work for 
fixed salaries. 
" Underlying the functionalist approach to power related control is the reification of notions that organizations are harmonious, 
consensual phenomena existing for the pursuit of common purposes and that there is no inherent conflicts of interest between the 
controllers and the controlled (Fox, 1974) 
72 The pluralist approach to power has received severe attack from theorists having a radical fame of reference (e. g. Brown, 1978; 
Clegg, 1979; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974) who insist that the persistence of marked inequalities in the distribution 
of material and symbolic power inevitably results in situations in which the controllers impose their will on the controlled whose 
interests can be inherently antagonistic to and ultimately irreconcilable with those of the controllers. 
" However, this is not a complete picture of power resources. More relevantly, Batstone's (1978) overview of power resources 
identifies four sources of power which can be used to reassert control in organizations, namely (i) the extent to which 
organizational members have skills which cannot be replaced easily, (ii), the extent to which organizational members occupy a 
position in the production / service process which is crucial to that process, (iii), the ease with which organizational members 
can disrupt the production / service process, and (iv) the extent to which organizational members can create or cope with 
uncertainty in the production / service process. To illustrate this matter, for example, one can argue that power can derive from 
control over information and/ or uncertainty (Pettigrew, 1973), from technical abilities to, say, rectify mechanical breakdowns 
(Crozier, 1964), from doing favours for others (Wade et al, 1990) such as contracts which pay off executives if they lose their 
job because of a change in control of the corporation, from self-perpetuation through the effective use of the resources so 
acquired (Boeker, 1989), from informal structure such as 
individuals' centrality in social networks (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993), 
from provision of resource (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974), from personal characteristics such as the articulate, sensitive, socially 
adept, competent, and popular (Allen et al, 
1979). 
" However, Hickson et al's (1971) underlining assumption that there is consensus over interests and goals within each segment 
has received attack for its failure to recognize the impact of internal hierarchical relationships on organizational members' 
behaviour in an organizational segments (Marchington, 1979). 
75 For example, there exist occasions where individual members' or groups' action exerts control by supporting the non- 
decision-making process such as excluding items from the agenda of formal meetings and rubber-stamping in the formal 
meeting critical organizational 
decisions informally pre-made by some elites (Schattschneider, 1960). 
76 For instance, the operation of any administrative controls may weave into the organizational members' consciousness 
concepts of the status quo as, 
in some sense, inevitable and thus rational so that organizational members can become entrapped 
in a 'psychic prison' (Morgan, 1986), which takes the interests vested in that status quo as legitimate rather than threatening 
(Fay, 1975). 
" Managerial prerogative follows the maxim that 'management must manage' in that the controllers (e. g. owners or managers) 
have control over their own assets, they are supported by the statutory law of organizational responsibility, and the argument that 
it is in everyone's economic interest that controllers who are chosen for their merits should be left free to control as they think 
best. 
78 Managerial ideology, according to McGivering et al (1969), refers to a set of beliefs which management seeks to propagate in 
order to inspire acceptance and approval of managerial autonomy 
by the general public and / or by specific groups of 
organizational members. 
For example, Willis's (1977) empirical study suggests that people can become trapped and disempowered by their very 
rebellion such as counter-cultural values or opposition to authority in their earlier days, because, those counter-moves, partially 
but nearly unavoidably lead to further entrenchment in terms of qualifications favourably required by the society, and eventually 
contribute to the painless transition of those with counter-cultural values into less desirable work, thus forming the attitudes of 
the then counter-cultural towards the work and, perhaps, even the celebration of the work over other contemptible but unrealistic 
work. 
eo it has been noted that waiting is a form of investment and increases the value of the object being sought in that 'the subjective 
value of the gain is therefore given not only 
by the objective value of the service but also by the amount of time invested in its 
attainment' (Schwartz, 
1974). 
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" Eight dimensions of influence have been extracted to understand influence tactics and they include assertiveness, ingratiation, 
rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, blocking, and coalitions (Kipnis et al, 1980), and evidence shows that, the 
higher the status of the target person (superior, peers, or subordinate) the greater the reliance on rationality tactics (e. g. writing a 
memo, using logic, or making a plan), that the lower the status of the target person, the greater the reliance on assertiveness, that 
exchange is most frequently used among peers, that personal assistance prompts the use of ingratiation while efforts to improve 
a target individual's performance tend to rely on assertiveness and rationality, and that some behavioural tactics such as the use 
of ingratiation, assertiveness, exchange, and coalition with others significantly relate to perceptions of power (Kipnis et al, 1980). 
Moreover, Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) has identified four types of influence styles used by subordinates on their superiors to 
affect salaries, evaluations, tension, stress and the suchlike: (i) shotgun typified by those who tend to use all of the influence 
strategies almost indiscriminately, and are particularly high on the use of assertiveness, (ii) ingratiator typified by those who 
score high on friendliness and have average scores on the other scales, (iii) bystander typified by those who score low on their 
use of all of the influence strategies, and (iv) tactician typified by those who score high on the reason or rationality strategy and 
have average scores on the other scales. It has been found (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1988) that those who employ the tactician 
strategy earn more than those using other strategies and the shotgun style tends to 
be associated with stress and tension. 
82 It has been argued that both expressed positive emotions and expressed negative emotion can serve as tools of social influence 
in that `stimuli that are presented before, during, or after a given stimulus shape its meaning' (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991). For 
example, expressed emotions such as anger, irritation, and mild disapproval can serve very well as tools of negative 
reinforcement. Moreover, Rafaeli and Sutton (1991) have identified 
five emotional contrast strategies which can be employed as 
tools of social influence, namely, (i) the sequential good in contrast to the bad, (ii) the simultaneous good in contrast to the bad, 
(iii) one person playing both the good and the gad, (iv) the good in contrast to the hypothetical bad, and (v) the good n contrast 
to the expectations of the bad. It is reported (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1991) that there are three workable mechanisms which can 
effect the amplification of expressed emotion 
by means of emotional contrast strategies: (i) when there is a contrast, the 
experience may occur of accentuated anxiety 
in response to the bad and of the accentuated relief in response to the good; (ii) the 
contrast may accentuate the targets' perceptions that the good are 
kind and helpful, and the targets tend to feel pressure to 
reciprocate the kindness by complying with the wishes of the good; and 
(iii) accentuated feelings of relief in response to the 
good can lead target people to develop trust 
in the good. 
81 Gargiulo (1993) finds that organizational members may tend to build ties of interpersonal obligation with people who directly 
affect their performance in the organization, and that, when such 
direct ties can not be built, because of interpersonal friction or 
fundamental differences about policy, effective organizational members can use a two step process in which they build co-optive 
relations with others who could affect the 
behaviour of the person on whom they depended. 
" For example, opportunity costs (i. e. the costs of alternative forgone), which remains much less vivid than out-of-pocket costs, 
are normally not given enough weight 
in negotiation (Northcraft and Neaale, 1986). 
 For example, Kramer et al's (1993) study supports that control negotiators, when accountable to constituents who monitor 
their performance, are more likely to engage in noncooperative behaviour 
during the negotiation process, partly because 
accountability to constituents 
induces concern for appearing strong by refusing to make concessions (Tetlock, 1985). 
86 For example, Odiorne (1966) argues that management situations are too complex for precise principles and propositions which 
would yield a `general theory' 
(Frederick, 1963) because successful decision-makers are all too busy existing to spend much 
time on theories which would explain their success, leaving principles there uncovered nor described. 
"' For Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), the word environment incorporates triple meanings: it means the market which, in business 
terms, corresponds to the sales / services or the marketing 
/ servicing subsystem of the organization; it means the technic- 
economic environment which corresponds 
to the production / service operations subsystem of the organization; it also means the 
scientific environment which corresponds 
to the R&D subsystem. Further, they have proposed three characteristics of these 
environments: the rate of change 
in conditions, the certainty of information available, and the time span of feedback of results on 
decisions made or action taken. 
8 For Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), integration refers to the coordination or achieving unity of effort. 
" There are obviously some variables other than strategy, size, technology and environment, which can affect the structure of 
control in organizations, and an example of 
this goes to culture (e. g. Emmanuel et al., 1992). 
90 However, not all theories of organizational structure are contingent: for example, the M-form hypothesis that the 
multidivisional structure 
is more efficient than either a holding company or a functional structure (U-form), can be confirmed in 
organizations large and small 
(Williamson, 1975), predicts that the advantages of the M-form remain largely non-contingent 
(Pfeffer, 1997). To illustrate this, consider the problems of commitment to unprofitable lines of investment in organizations, the 
multidivisional form 
helps control organizations' escalation of commitment by separating the resource allocation function which 
is performed at headquarters, 
from the operational management concerning operational efficiency which is located in the 
divisions. 
" Organizational ecology investigates the role of selection processes (Singh and Lumsden, 1990): it studies populations of 
organizations with the 
individual organization as the unit of observation, and views that changes in organizational populations 
arise largely through the processes of organizational 
birth and death as contrasted with the adaptation of individual organizations. 
92 The Darwinist thoughts renowned by `struggle for existence' and `survival of the fittest' (Darwin, 1859) may well explain the 
`robber barons' phenomenon (an analogy to the 
feudal lords who built castles along the Rhine River (Germany) in order to exact 
tolls from whoever passes 
by) that entrepreneurs may behave in socially irresponsible ways such like bribery of legislation, 
`watering stock', stock manipulation, and conspiracy. 
However, it has also been argued that the unsavory practices could have 
been initiated by other motivations such 
like gaining economies of scale (Chandler, 1984) as contrasted to cutthroat competition 
(in the case of Rockefeller who conspired with the railroads in the late 19" century) or bargaining with corrupt legislation 
(Becker, 1943). 
93 It is believed that human nature pre-determines that, human beings tend to resist change except when they are dissatisfied 
(Ridley, 1998). 
" For example, some events are simply random. This perhaps explain why so many executives, who engage themselves in 
turning around a factory 
bleeding red with absolute self-confidence, are still learning that there exist many factors outside their 
control that they could not conquer. 
95 It is believed (Wittgenstein, 1958) that examinations of the reasons for deviations remain the route of suggesting necessary 
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modifications. 
% For example, house (1971) claims that (a) directive behaviour may become advisable when the controlled are having difficulty 
completing assigned tasks, (b) supportive behaviours are often beneficial when the controlled are experiencing high levels of 
stress, (c) participative behaviours can become particularly useful when support of a decision is required from the controlled, 
and (d) achievement-oriented behaviours can be promising when those controlled with high capabilities are bored from having 
too few challenges. 
" For example, Fayol (1949) argues that, provided 'the work is simple', a foreman is capable of handling 20-30 workers. Fayol 
(1949) actually proposes his scalar growth process on the basis of 15 workers to a foreman and a ratio of 4 supervisors to every 
other supervisor, and this progression enables that the number of levels in an organization can be kept to a minimum. 
98 For example, it has been argued (Ridley, 1998) that there is a liner relationship between the brain size and troup size of social 
primates and this implies (Wright, 1994) that, given human being's brain size, the maximum number of people with varying 
interlocking relationships that can be enrolled in any organization is 150 (Pinker, 1997; Semler, 1995). This perhaps partially 
explains why so many modern organizations with an employment of far over 150 people are struggling with the tendency of 
people to break off into cliques, or of functions, departments or even teams to come into conflicts with one another (Nicholson, 
1998). 
To illustrate, Graicunas's (1937) direct single relationships, from an open systems vantage point, can be reflected by either a 
`line' relationship, a 'staff' or 'lateral' relationship, a `functional' relationship, or an `authority' relationship (Urwick, 1974; 
Huczynski and Buchanan, 1992). 
10° That is, the number of the total relationships a controller has with his or her potentially controlled at a certain hierarchical N 
level, equal to N*(2 /2+N-1), whereas N stands for the number of the controlled, K stands for the number of hierarchical levels 
required or expected, and M represents the total number of bottom line workers of whom each of lowest ranked supervisor is in 
charge. The total number of the workers needed amounts to M*N(K-1), the total number of hierarchical controllers totals E 
N(Ki 1), and the number of employees totals E N(Ki-1) + M*N(K-1) 
101 However, Graicunas (1937) notes that exceptions to this argument are permissable in the case of routine work at lower 
organizational levels (e. g. shop floor) where the controlled work relatively independently of each other, where the controller 
have less complex responsibilities, or where the controlled have little contact with others. 
102 In terms of measures of performance, the financial ones can include profit ratios such as return on investment (net profit 
before tax divided by total assets) and gross profit margin (the difference between sale revenue and cost of goods sold divided 
by sales revenues), liquidity ratios such as current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) and quick ratio (the 
difference between current assets and inventory divided by current liabilities), leverage ratios such as debt-to-assets ratios (total 
debts divided by total assets) and times-covered ratio (profit before interest and tax divided by total interest charges), and 
activity ratios such as inventory turnover (cost of good sold divided by inventory) and days sales outstanding (account receivable 
divided by the total sale and then times 300). 
103 In a sense, it can be argued that Child's (1984) model of control process can be regarded as a functionally operationalized 
version of that of Davis (1951). 
101 Otley and Berry (1980) believes that a cybernetic model of this kind (i. e. Figure 14-24) can be possibly used to analyze such 
organizational phenomena as administrative, social and self controls, although it best fits for the administrative controls. 
105 However, immortality can remain far beyond reach in reality. For example, in human history, very few organizations have 
survived more than half a century. 
Evidence shows that many organizations develop, mature, saturate and die in accordance with 
route of their cultures, leadership, and competitive advantages. 
106 This is because organizations operate in a closed system (i. e. a self-contained system which is not affected by changes that 
occur in the external environment) can 
fail to acquire inputs and eventually experience `entropy' due to ignoring the external 
environment (Thompson, 1967). 
The downfall of Qing Empire, the last Chinese dynasty, in the 201h century remains a typical 
example of this entropy due to the closedness of 
its foreign and domestic policies. 
107 It has been argued (Becker and Neuhauser, 1975) that the procedures which the principal can specify can be divided into two 
categories: those concerned with production/service activities and those concerned with visibility of consequences. Production / 
service procedures are those which are 
directly related to the production / service process and directly facilitate the manufacture 
of good and the provision of services 
by the organization; typical examples of these include operating speed of the 
production/service machinery, and the number of work 
hours per week. Visibility-of- consequences procedures are those which 
are designed primarily to make the principal aware of 
the degree to which his or her organization is meeting its objectives; and 
typical examples of these include the one that calls 
for a weekly compilation of cost reports and for sending them to the 
headquarters. 
ios It is argued (Jones et al, 1998) that there are at least six sources which have potential for conflicts: (a) overlapping authority 
which refers to situations where two or more controllers, 
departments, or functions claim authority for the same activities or 
tasks; (b) task interdependencies which refer to situations where some organizational members are dependent on other's 
contributions to complete the tasks; 
(c) incompatible evaluation or reward systems which refer to situations where the evaluation 
or reward systems become obsolete or 
inappropriate for current practices, (d) scarce resources, (e) incompatible goals and time 
horizons, and (f) status inconsistencies which refer to the situations where some individuals, groups, teams or departments 
within an organization are more 
highly regarded than others in the organization. As regards the variety of organizational 
conflicts, there are 
four basic types: (a) interpersonal conflict which exists between individual members of an organization 
because of differing goals or values, (b) intragroup conflict which arise within a group, team, or function, (c) intergroup conflict 
which occurs between groups, teams, 
department, and (d) interorganizational conflict which arise across organizations. 
109 Integration simply assumes that the whole is a configuration greater than the sum of the parts, even though the action of 
integration may not be visible or practically possible in every case. Moreover, integration can be more possible than people 
realize in that people can, as they 
do in practice, create events in order to make things better and this creative experience can 
make integration happen more possibly than what is normally perceived. 
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15. The Epilogue: The Philosophic Controllership 
"The inherent preference of organization are clarity, certainty, and perfection; but the 
inherent nature of human relationships involve ambiguity, uncertainty and imperfection; 
and thus, how one honours, balances and integrates the needs of both is the real trick of 
management " 
Pascale and Athos, 1982, The Art of Japanese Management 
15.1 Introduction 
This final part of the thesis aims to reflect the research dialectically before it turns into the next 
round of 8Cs. It aims to establish a link between the style of strategic control and the 
worldviews of each investment decision-maker. Structure-wise, it first provides a critical review 
of the, research, then offers some historical reflections on theories of investment and 
organizational commitment in decision-making, and finally gives a portrait of differing 
philosophic controllership. 
15.2 Conclusions and recommendations to the research 
There is little point in conducting research unless one can rely on the quality of the findings it 
generates. To ensure quality the research must be carefully planned and the methods used must 
be both productive and reliable. Thoroughness is important in order to avoid overlooking 
important aspects of the problem but one also needs to draw the line somewhere for one cannot 
afford to devote unlimited amounts of resources to the research. 
This study has completed one round of the research cycle featuring conceiving, contriving, 
controlling, co-ordinating, calibrating, conducting, collecting, and concentering. However, when 
this researcher pulls the plug, he realizes that, just like the Chinese boxes game, everything re- 
starts again, with acquired experience and/or 
knowledge being stored in people's memory, in 
textbooks, or in computerized files, and with new experience and/or knowledge being further 
accumulated in the next round, 
despite the fact that the researcher or practitioner may be 
different, the research or practice space may be different, and the research or practice time may 
be different (Figure 15-1). 
In summary, the researcher reviewed the 
literature and found that the existing literature is 
discrete and inconsistent. The literature was synthesised via meta-analysis and it was found that 
the explanatory power of existing mechanisms explaining escalating commitment is not 
influential. The researcher investigated an entrapped investment via a longitudinal case study 
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and found that the escalating process is cyclical and dynamic partly due to the interweaving 
nature of investment decision-makers' conflicting perceived utilities of an investment. The 
researcher investigated de-escalation practices via two field experiments and found that 
previously established de-escalation mechanisms require re-examination. The researcher 
investigated the strategic control practices via interviews and found that more emphases need to 
be placed on the conceptualization and operationalization stages of an strategic control 
programme. The researcher restructured the theories on investment decision-making, 
organizational commitment and strategic control of investment and found that more empirical 
work needs to be done. 
Figure 15-1: The new Chinese boxes game: the generalized space-time for researchers and practitioners 
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However, as a direct result of the research, the researcher has re-discovered several critical 
principles of learning which 
have all too often been overlooked in the past, and among them are 
(a) learning happens most effectively in the process of encountering real situations, (b) real 
situations demand the 
integration of multiple disciplines and skills, and (c) generalization of 
learning happens through the interplay of theory and practice, and (d) the challenge to learning 
lies in knowing the underlying concepts and competencies which will not be bound either to the 
current issues or to the specific 
details of its past. 
As to recommendations for the future (please see Q12-1 to Q12-15 in Chapter 12, Q13-1 to 
Q13-20 in Chapter 13, and Q14-1 to Q14-36 in Chapter 14 for detail), it seems that, in general, 
future practice should focus on the effective management of investments in a way which 
integrates differing rationalities in the full organizational context; that future practice should 
address the dynamics of organizational commitment 
in the decision-making process in a broader 
way which covers perspectives of, inter alia, psychological, political, operational, economic, 
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environmental, social, cultural, and institutional; and that future practice should emphasize both 
external and internal strategic control factors inherent in the decision-making process in a 
manner which echoes the principle of unity. Meanwhile it also seems plausible that future 
research should include a new research inquiry system or a more comprehensive research 
framework (e. g. general systems methodological framework), new research techniques in both 
the laboratory (e. g. virtual reality) and in real world settings (e. g. longitudinal observation), and 
new research dimensions (e. g. cross-cultural comparative studies). 
15.3 Reflections on theories of investment 
It can be held that every theory of commitment escalation, commitment de-escalation, and 
strategic control is at most just a model of the expanding world of investment, which itself is 
just a model of the universe or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the 
model to observations that we make. It can also be held that, at least from Popper's (1959) point 
of view, any of the escalation, de-escalation, and strategic control theories exist only in 
academics' or practitioners' minds and do not have any other reality, so that such theories are 
only provisional in the sense that they are only hypotheses and can never be proven - no matter 
how many times the results of observations, experiments and surveys agree with them - and that 
one can never be sure that the next time the results will not contradict the theories - one can 
disprove a theory by finding even a single observation which disagrees with the predictions of 
the theory. ' 
Therefore, a good theory of strategic control of investments must satisfy two requirements: it 
has to accurately prescribe a large class of observations on the basis of a model that contains 
only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predictions about the results of future 
observations. It turns out to be very 
difficult to devise such a theory to prescribe investment 
decision-making in the marketplace in one go. The approach most often adopted, as did by this 
researcher in this study, 
is to separate the problem into parts or break the problem up into bits 
and invent a number of partial theories, with each of these partial theories describing and 
predicting a certain limited class of observations and neglecting the effects of other quantities or 
representing them by simple sets of numbers. 
Thus, most theories are fated to fade away, and it is just a matter of time. For example, as far as 
this researcher remembers, in a 300 page thick advanced economics textbook which describes 
dozens of economic theories on investment decision-making, only four of them are "good" 
theories which directly relate to investment decision-making: (a) people face trade-offs, (b) 
people respond to 
incentives, (c) people incur costs for what they get, and (d) rational people act 
to margins. These four theories are in fact economic principles which each enjoy philosophic 
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foundations, and what this tells is that good strategic control of investments must be 
philosophically rooted. 
15.4 Reflections on organizational commitment in decision-making 
In Western society it is customary for practitioners and academics, politicians and economists, 
scientists and artists alike to answer, with a shrug or an appeal to vaguely recalled religious 
precepts, such questions as why do previously successful organizations, groups or individuals 
often fail or how is it, if there was order earlier, that there is chaos later? This is because, 
although equidistant from atoms and stars, people inevitably confine themselves to the 
limitations of human understanding and are not willing or able to expand their exploratory 
horizons to embrace the very small and the very large. 
One view which can be superficially held is that organizational commitment actually acts as 
both an expansion and a contraction of organizational strategies and the theories underlying 
them (Figure 15-2). Thus, escalation and de-escalation of commitment actually reflect the call of 
time, the only resource which humans can use but never conquer. For example, one has to wait 
to see whether an escalation or de-escalation of commitment is good or bad in that only time 
really tells. 
Obviously organizational commitment is a very large concept which can cover over a hundred 
meanings. However, these is a small part of it which seems missing in most if not all of the 
organizational commitment studies. 
That is, to which sub-concept or rationality does 
organizational commitment really refer 
in the decision-making process'? These sub-concepts or 
rationalities can range 
from too simple to mention to too complicated to realize. To hilt it 
differently, to exert effective strategic control over an investment, one can almost always match 
the investment decision-makers' control style with a certain kind of philosophically-rooted 
control stereotypes. 
Figure 15-2: Commitment as expansion and contraction 
Motion 
C 
cc I.. " 
Time 
Self 
The Epilogue: The Philosophic Controllership 
ý'. 
ýý 
d' C- vý - --ý Space 
Others 
15-4 
Chapter 15 The Epilogue: The Philosophic Controllership 
15.5 Reflections on strategic control of investments: philosophic controllership 
Believe it or not, investment decision-makers often end up with a certain kind of philosophic 
control without knowing or being known. Investment successes happen as they do in the world 
of investments, not only because investment decision-makers planned well, and implemented 
well, but also because they controlled well. Therefore, it seems plausible to link practical control 
styles of investment decision-makers with varying philosophic visions of investments so as to 
help investment decision-makers to reach a better position or to re-position themselves 
according to the ever-changing investment environments. There are arguably 16 philosophically 
rooted stereotypes of investment controllership which are briefly illustrated below. 
The Aristotle vision of investments - the organization-oriented controllership: It is 
imaginable for some investment decision-makers to think that their investments are comparably 
stationary, so that stakeholders of investments (e. g. employees, the management, the suppliers, 
the shareholders, the governing bodies, the competitors, and the customers) all move in circular 
orbits about the organizations. It 
is arguable that in some circumstances stakeholders of an 
investment do move in smaller circles attached to their respective organizations. Thus, 
organization-oriented controllership 
dictates that commitment be directed at the so-called fixed 
stars-like organization. This suggests that existing 
investments always stay in the same positions 
relative to each other 
in the organizations even if they rotate together across the marketplace. 
The Copernicus vision of investments - the customer-oriented controllership: It is also 
imaginable for some investment decision-makers to think that the customers of an investment's 
products or services are comparably stationary so that 
investments and other competing 
organizational activities move 
in a circular or elliptical orbits around the customers. The 
customer-oriented controllership 
dictates that organizational commitment be directed at the 
customers. This also suggests that customers are the central 
focus of investment, and small 
satellite-like organizations or networks, 
the governing bodies, the management, the employees, 
the'suppliers, and the financiers, all orbit around them. 
The Newton vision of investments - the profit-oriented controllership: It can be argued, that 
all investments attract each other 
in making profits and thus can not remain essentially 
motionless but compete 
head to head. The profit-oriented controllership dictates organizational 
commitment 
be directed at profit-maximization. This suggests that the employees, the 
management, shareholders, governing bodies, competitors, suppliers and customers of any 
investments are all dynamically competing with each other for profits so that the marketplace is 
to a great extent under perfect competition. However, this may mean that investments might all 
fall-together (economic recession) at some point when there is only a finite number of 
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investments distributed over a finite region of the marketplace, and that this collapse would not 
happen if there was an infinite number of investments distributed more or less uniformly over an 
infinite marketplace. This also implies that whenever an investment is not acted on by any force 
it can keep on moving in a straight line at the same speed, and that an organization may 
accelerate or change its speed at a rate which is proportional to the force. 
The Hubble vision of investments - the global-oriented controllership: One could reason 
that a static marketplace would soon start to contract under the influence of prof t-mAing-sunk 
cost gravity. But supposing instead the marketplace is expanding and it is expanding fairly 
slowly, the force of profit would cause it eventually to stop expanding and then to start 
contracting. If it is expanding at more than a certain critical rate, profit would never 
be strong 
enough to stop it, and the market would continue to expand 
forever. Firms have a built-in 
tendency to expand their commitment towards investments, and this could be made to balance 
exactly the attraction of profit-making 
luring all organizations. Wherever one looks, the 
marketplace is expanding. Distant 
investments are moving rapidly away from the investments in 
which the organizations are currently engaged. 
This suggests that markets are expanding 
globally and thus strategic control should 
be directed at the globalizationized expanding of the 
marketplace. 
The Maxwell vision of investments - the speed-oriented controllership: Organizational 
commitment towards 
investments can travel fast and this combined force of physical and 
psychological activity could 
travel at a fixed speed, like ripples on a pond. This suggests that 
effective controllership 
in any organization means timely management of crises and corrective 
surgeries, otherwise 
it can become too late for organizations to learn or to take corrective actions. 
The Einstein vision of investments - the quantification-oriented controllership: No 
investment can grow or evolve at a speed over a limit which applies to all organizations. This 
indicates that all investment activities can be measured. Profit is not a force like other forces, but 
is a consequence of the 
fact that space-time is not flat but curved. Investments are not made to 
move on curved orbits 
by a force called profit; instead, they follow the nearest thing to a straight 
path in a curved space which 
is called a geodesic - the shortest or longest path between two 
nearby points. 
This suggests profit is not the ultimate purpose but an immediate end and 
sequentially means towards 
the ultimate purpose of the investment. 
The Laplace vision of investments - the determinism- oriented controllership: The success 
of economic theories, particularly 
the theory of profit maximisation, can give rise to the illusion 
that the marketplace 
is completely deterministic so that there should be a set of scientific laws 
which would allow people 
to predict everything which would happen in the marketplace if these 
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people knew the complete state of the marketplace at one time, and that there are similar laws 
governing everything else including investment behaviour. For example, the idea of the 
deterministic controllership can mean that, if investment decision-makers know the positions 
and the growth rate of their own organization and its major competitors at one time, then they 
can calculate, the state of the organizational commitment of the organization in the specific 
market at any other time. 
The Feynman vision of investments: - the sum-over histories-oriented controllership: 
People or organizations are not supposed to have a single history or path in space-time, and nor 
do investments, as they would in a non-quantum theory. Investments and their decision-makers 
are supposed to go from A to B by every possible path, and along each path they are associated 
with two numbers: one represents the size and the other represents the position in the cycle (i. e. 
whether it is at a crest or a trough). The probability of going from A to B is found by adding up 
the probabilities for all the paths. In general, however, if one compares a set of neighbouring 
paths, the phases or positions in the cycle will differ greatly. 
The Heisenberg vision of investments - the uncertainty-oriented controllership: Humans 
certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the present state of the 
marketplace precisely, although some might claim that there is a set of laws which determines 
events completely for some supernatural 
being who could observe the present state of the 
marketplace without disturbing it. The uncertainty controllership dictates that organizational 
commitment be directed at employing the principle of economy known as Occam's razor and 
cutting out all the features of the theory that cannot 
be observed. This introduces an 
unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness 
into investment decision-making. 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle remains a fundamental, inescapable property of the world of 
investments. 
The Pauli vision of investments - the exclusion-oriented controllership: The exclusion 
controllership suggests that two similar 
investments cannot exist in the same state. They cannot 
have both the same market position and the same growth rate, within the limits given by the 
uncertainty principle. This explains that the reasons why 
identical competitors can co-exist lies 
in the fact that they have different growth rates even if they have nearly the same position. 
The Dirac vision of investments - the anti-self -oriented controllership: The anti-self 
controllership implies that every 
investment has an anti-investment with which it can annihilate 
itself or others. There could be anti-worlds, anti-organizations, and anti-people. Worlds, 
organizations, people, and 
investments would vanish in a great flash of light if they shake hands 
with their anti-self. However, the good news 
is that there seem to be many more investments 
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than anti-investments, more organizations than anti-organizations. 
The Symmetry T vision of investments - the anti-T -oriented controllership: The symmetry 
T suggests that if the direction of commitment is the same to all investments and anti- 
investments, the system should go back to what it was at earlier times, i. e. the laws are the same 
in the forward and backward directions of time. However, as time runs forward the marketplace 
expands and if it ran backward the marketplace would be contracting. 
The Michell vision of investments - the cycle -oriented controllership: An investment which 
is sufficiently massive and compact would have such a strong profitability field that any 
commitment could not escape. This suggests that any outbound commitment emitted from the 
organization would be dragged back by the organization's profitability attraction before it could 
get very far: the black holes of investments. An investment is a bit like a balloon - there is a 
balance between the pressure of the air inside (market penetration, competitive advantage, etc. ) 
which tries to make the balloon expand, and the tension in the rubber (e. g. dividends, welfare, 
work conditions) which is trying to make the balloon contract; the investment will remain stable 
like this for a long time with self-generated levity heat to balance its down-dragged profitability 
attraction until the investments runs out of its fuels. Paradoxically, the more fuel an organization 
starts off with, the sooner it runs out. 
The Chandrasekhar vision of investments - the limit -oriented controllership: When an 
investments runs out of fuel it starts to cool off and so to contract. When the investment 
becomes smaller, people and business units get very near each other and, therefore, according to 
the exclusion principle, must have very different growth rates, and this makes the investment 
expand. The investment can therefore maintain 
itself at a constant radius by a balance between 
the attraction of objectivity and the repulsion arising from the exclusion principle just as earlier 
in its profitability gravity was balanced by the levity heat generated by its own fuels. If the mass 
of an investment is less than the 
limit it can eventually stop contracting and settle down to a 
possible final state as a `white 
dwarf; if the mass of an investment is above the limit it might 
have a big problem when it comes to the end of its fuel - it may explode or investment decision- 
makers may have to attempt to throw off enough mass to reduce its mass below the limit and so 
avoid catastrophic profitability 
/ goal attainment collapse. 
The Hawking vision of investments - the principle -oriented controllership: If investment 
decision-makers do believe that the marketplace is not arbitrary but is governed by definite laws, 
they ultimately have to combine the partial theories into a complete unified theory which 
describes everything in the marketplace. The principle controllership can be considered as based 
upon Darwin's principle of natural selection, which implies that some investments decision- 
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makers, due to variations in their genetic material and 
upbringing, might be better able than 
others to draw the right conclusions about the marketplace and to act accordingly so that such 
investment decision-makers - having survival advantage conveyed by intelligence and scientific 
discovery - will be more likely to survive and reproduce and so their pattern of behaviour and 
thought will come to dominate for a certain period of time. 
The Guth vision of investments - the inflation -oriented controllership: Investments might 
go through a period of very rapid expansion which is said to be inflationary, as they expand they 
would cool and organizational commitment will go down. Eventually there would be what is 
called a phase transition. It is like freezing water when 
it is cooled down. In quantum theory 
particles can be created out of energy in the form of particles / antiparticles pairs. But where 
does the energy for organizational commitment come from? The answer is that the total energy 
of the universe is exactly zero, and presumably, commitment to the 
future is positive energy and 
commitment to present is negative energy. 
15.6 Conclusion 
It can be held that every investment decision-maker 
is a philosophic controller. He or she can be 
organization-oriented, customer oriented, profit-oriented, global-oriented, speed-oriented, 
quantification-oriented, 
determinism-oriented, sum-over-histories-oriented, uncertainty-oriented, 
exclusion-oriented, anti-self-oriented, anti-T-oriented, cycle-oriented, 
limit-oriented, principle- 
oriented, or inflation-oriented. 
The critical question is whether he or she knew which one he or 
she was when he or she committed 
the organization's resources to a chosen investment and 
whether the stereotype 
he or she exhibited matched what was required for the decision situation. 
Thus, by examining the decision situation, analyzing opportunities and threats, balancing 
different rationalities, integrating different conflicting utilities, and matching what is demanded 
with what can be supplied, the 
investment decision-maker should be able to become a 
competent philosophic 
Chinese boxes game player in the investment decision-making process. 
7 For example, the results of the 
de-escalation study conducted by this researcher did not support the theory that sunk cost 
effects lead to escalation of 
commitment (Arkers & ßlumer, , 
1985). 
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A Sample of Interviews 
A pilot study in China 
Appendix A 
Case company Da in Junwon Textiles. 
Nature of study Semi-structured interviews 
Time Morning & Afternoon, 3,5 Nov. 1996 
Place Junwon's Office Building & Golden Triangle Restaurant, Da in 
Interviewer Q. Zhang. 
Interviewees Mr. J Duan, President; Mr. L. Xu. Managing Director; Mr. J. P. Zhou, vice 
president 
Access Agreed before hand; supported by Professor Tang, one of my most intimate cx- 
bosses, who chairs DPA at this moment. 
Note Additional help from Ms Gong, MS. Kang, Ms. Xing and Mr. Wang, Mr. Shi; 
Mr Zhu; Ms Tu, etc. 
Background 
Daqing Junwon Textiles is a joint venture between WPS, China and Junwon, Korea. It 
was set up in 1986 with an initial investment totaled $2 million. It is the biggest textile 
company in Northern China, the richest industrial region in China. It has two workshops 
each of which exceeds 3200 square meters. Its products have been sold all over the world. 
Professor Q. Tang, Chairman & President of WPS had chaired the board of directors from 
1986 to 1995, with Mr Liang - Chairman of Junwon, Korea - as vice Chairman. Mr Duan 
who was the managing director of Daqing Junwon from 1986 to 1995 succeeded Prof. Q. 
Tang in 1995. 
Daqing Junwon enjoys its most advanced textile design and manufacturing technology but 
suffers continuing financial losses year after year. Two presidents (one Korean and one 
Chinese) of Da Qing Junwon have been removed as a result from the post since its 
existence. Mr. L. Xu, with a very good track record took over its presidency in 1994. 
Interview in process: prelude 
The joint venture has experienced 3 different periods since its existence. The researcher 
has been fortunate to have the opportunity to work along with his team to consult on its 
businesses during each period. 
First, in 1989 the researcher was urgently called by Professor Q. Tang who Chaired WPS 
where the researcher chaired the management division which functionally monitored 
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Daqing Junwon, to lead a team of 9 experts of a vast diversity to examine its strategy and 
diagnose the company's business routine. It was proposed that (a) the venture should be 
receive further financial leverage to support what was then called a new thing, and (b) the 
venture should diversify its business so as to become financially self-reliant. 
Second, in 1993 the researcher, as his first official assignment after his MBA study abroad, 
was nominated by the Chairman & President of WPS to undertake a research based 
consultation on Daqing Junwon's performance. It was proposed that (a) the venture's 
management should be strengthened and (b) the venture should stretch its resources to 
emphasize its marketing operations (distribution channels & oversees promotions); or 
otherwise, (c) the venture should be sold or. simply privatized, and (d) the joint venture 
should be cooperatively and financially ended. 
Third, in late 1996 the researcher was commissioned by WPS to act as the principal 
consultant and later the co-runner of the joint venture to revitalize the venture. It was 
proposed that (a) the venture should be functionally and financially re-organized (i. e. 
merge or privatization), and/or (b) the venture should be market-orientated and focus on 
its, core businesses (existing or potential), or otherwise, (c) the venture should be 
completely abandoned. 
The researcher has acquainted Professor Tang, ex-chairman, Mr. Duan, chairman and ex- 
managing director, Mr. Xu, president, and Mr. J. Zhou, ex-president for nearly 14 years. 
Interview in process: introduction 
With personal advice in mind from Professor Q. Tang and lessons learnt from Riskcare 
(UK) and CNAS (PRC) days ago, The researcher approached Daqing Junwon friendly and 
diplomatically. 
The researcher did a brief introduction on his doctoral research in the UK. His 
interviewees are all informed that his research concerns strategic control over investments 
and is about escalating commitment, de-escalation strategy and strategic control in the 
investment decision-making process. 
The researcher was widely welcomed, fully supported and open to all data required and in 
return was sincerely invited to consult on its business and participate in its operations. 
a2 
Interview in process: questions and answers 
Q1. You are all pioneers in promoting new things in northern China and both have 
actually witnessed Daqing Junwon's existence. What's your hope for the existing 
business? How should it look like in future near or far? 
A. Healthy and profitable and makes people happy who work here. 
Q2. Shall we say that Daqing Junwon's business at the moment is not quite healthy or 
unprofitable or does not make all people happy? 
A. It is not very healthy. We have lots of people who want to resign or leave. 
You can not make all people happy, can you? 
Q3. By `unhealthy', does it mean that the firm has incurable problems or that it does 
not fit? 
A. Oh, the textile section records losses every year while other services wipe the 
red tape. The firm has lost its attractiveness for quite a long time. 
Q4. What do you mean for `quite a long time'? Some people joked it was attractive 
only before it was implemented. Does that indicate anything - e. g. the project 
should not be started from the very beginning.? 
A. We do not think so. It has been nasty for a very long time, but not that long. 
Q5. It can be very helpful if I can have your annual records for both textiles and 
services. I am sure none of you will mind, will you? 
A. Not really. As soon as you are willing to help us through, Ms Kong will be at 
your disposal. 
Q6. Did Daqing Junwon conduct economic appraisal before the investment was 
decided? 
A. Yes, we had everything before the decision was made? 
Q7. What had you had? Can you list as more as possible? 
A. Sure. We had a proposal covering market research which was conducted by 
the Korean, a feasibility report by both the Korean and us, a schedule for 
implementation. 
Q8. Does Daqing Junwon have and/or use financial models of investment appraisal 
which help guide the organizational control of the then on-going venture? 
A. We don't really know. 
Q9. I know few companies in China have management accountants, how about Daqing 
Junwon? 
A. We kept our own eyes on as many things as possible and that's it. 
Q10. Does that mean that the existing accounting system is inappropriate? 
A. We would say so. The accounting system is keep changing for our 
accountants are forced to have study leave every year. 
Q11. Does Daqing Junwon realistically analyze the cost incurred against budget when 
the project is running? 
A. Yes. But most times we need to spend up to the budget otherwise we arc 
risking of losing future funds. 
Q12. Do managers at Daqing Junwon all know what's exactly going on in relation to the 
venture. 
A. Not always. 
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Q 13. Are you suggesting that you, or at least not all of you, are not open to 
unambiguous feedback? Can you give me an example. 
A. Since the Korean company in Korea does the trading and we receive orders 
from their headquarters. We sometimes even do not know that the more we 
have manufactured the more loss we are going to gain. That is, we have 
control over manufacturing but have given up control over sales. 
Q14. Which do you think is failing, the joint venture or the project itself, or both? 
A. We would say both. The project declines faster than the joint venture. 
Q15. Is WPS still as fond of the project as it was when implementing the project? How 
about you? 
A. WPS treats it as an experiment, but we want a successful story for our staff. 
Q16. Does Daqing Junwon re-evaluate the project during and after the implementation 
of the project? Who are actually doing this? 
A. Yes. Our corporate economists and WPS's group accountants and group 
auditors. 
Q17. Is this approach effective? Why? 
A. Not really. Outsiders can do a better job. Because not every insider speaks his 
whole mind. Besides insiders can be obsessed with current difficulties or short 
term success. 
Q18. Do you all know entrapment or escalating commitment and how do you view it? 
A. Our corporate culture demands commitment. The Chinese proverb tells 
`persistence is victory'. It will be unfortunate to justify the means by the end. 
If you look at the world dialectically you would agree that things can be 
turned around naturally or dramatically. 
Q19. Do you infer that decision-makers at Daqing Junwon do not always behave in an 
economically rational way when making sequential decisions? Is that because it is 
impossible? Or what? 
A. We had tried our best. Sometimes we do not have enough time or are unable 
to think economically about costs and profits. Prediction does not always 
work. 
Q20. Are you suggesting that the environment tends to be uncontrollable? 
A. Exactly. Things changes quickly. 
Q21. Is it also due to the complexity of business or the uncertainty of future events. 
A. Yes. It's interesting, isn't it? 
Q22. Management theorists suggest that some other factors also prevent decision- 
makers from behaving economically: the human ego, the project itself, 
organizational structure, and market competition. Will you agree that all these 
applies to Daqing Junwon? Which are the most important factors? 
A. Do doctors always treat patients economically. Doctors who spend most time 
thinking about themselves when undertaking a surgery can not be well 
regarded. What can happen is that different profit centres may pursue their 
own course of action regardless of others. We think organizational structure 
and market competition are most important factors which hampers Daqing 
Junwon's performance. 
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Q23. Can you catalogue those managers who tend to escalate commitment in entrapping 
situations? 
A. The more aspiration one has for achievement the more likely he is to over- 
commit himself to a chosen course of action. People who see task as duty will 
commit more than those who see task as a routine. 
Q24. Do people at Daqing Junwon revise their beliefs, value systems along with the 
success or failure of project. 
A. Human beings learn from experience and failure. But belief and value systems 
are too vague or too big for us. You can discuss this with Ms Tu, the party 
secretary at Daqing Junwon. 
Q25. Do decision-makers at Daqing Junwon emphasize the prospects of the project 
before making sequential decisions? Any other factors which matter a lot? 
A. We certainly ration a decision prospectively. That is the way to leave past 
regrets behind you. Working opportunity for every staff is also important for 
we can not afford to let our staff do nothing but chat. 
Q26. Am I right that Daqing Junwon are more care of staff than capital? 
A. Definitely. 
Q27. Does Daqing Junwon think that it can remain competitive in the marketplace? 
A. Nobody can win them all. If you can not gain in this market (e. g. textile) you 
can possibly gain in other markets (e. g. services). 
Q28. In the West there is a theory called Agency Theory which pertains that managers 
may act in their own self-interest at the expense of the sponsors of the project. 
Does this apply to Daqing Junwon. 
A. Yes. It is somewhat more obvious for joint ventures like Daqing Junwon. But 
in the other side of the shield, investing companies may have muti-purposes to 
set up joint ventures as an alliance does not necessarily indicate a cooperative 
synergy resulted from genuine necessity. 
Q29. How will Daqing Junwon solve its own problem if both investing partners are 
assumed to value the joint venture as a hostage to fortune? 
A. More dialogues lead to more communication which leads to more sharing of 
information and more understanding of business, and all this gives rise to more 
cooperation. 
Q30. Does Daqing Junwon's promotion, reward, or penalty system encourage short- 
term performince? 
A. Yes. It is still a winner takes all society. However reward and penalty arc not 
well balanced. 
Q31. Does Daqing Junwon have contingent incentive systems which align the interests 
of the alleged agents and principals (e. g. project managers vs. senior executives; 
the management team vs. sponsors of the project)? 
A. No. It is an interesting idea. Can you advice? 
Q32. Does Daqing Junwon feel escalating commitment always unhealthy? Should it be 
cured and how? What has Daqing Junwon done? Were them successful? If not, 
why? 
A. It is unhealthy especially when you cannot do anything about it. Sonic 
escalation should be stopped and some should not be stopped. In terms of 
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cures for escalating commitment Daqing Junwon has tried various remedies 
which include (a) distancing responsibility to performance, (b) encouraging 
criticism and self-criticism among staff, (c) seeking outsiders to help diagnose 
the business, (d) fastening information flow, and (e) facilitating organizational 
learning. It does not seem to be extremely successful because what is 
demanded at the root of all these cures is a firm's operational strength by 
which it can exploit the markets. For example, we can make profits via service 
operations contracted to the local economy; but we failed to market our own 
branded product to other corners of the world for our goods are sold under 
others' name. We simply do not enjoys full decision-making power. We took 
it for granted that someone is coming to us to buy our quality products. 
Another important reason is that we do not have state policy leverage in 
import and export operations. 
Q33. Is textile industry more prone to escalating commitment comparing to other 
industries? 
A. Not a clue. But we guess intensive competition drives people to risk their 
investments and technology intensive industries are prone to escalation. 
Q34. Daqing Junwon is a small-sized joint venture. If it were bigger in terms of financial 
input would it be more prone to escalating commitment? 
A. Do not know. We have doubts about it. 
Q35. How about situations where more people got involved in decision-making? 
A. It is a double-edged sword. With more people participating in the decision- 
making, the firm will have more chance of achieving harmony but it can 
meantime have more useful debates. 
Q36. Did the overturning of the Korean appointed president lead Daqing Junwon to 
better off? Why? 
A. No. It was beating around the bush. It calmed Daqing Junwon but it did not 
prevent problems. 
Q37. Has Daqing Junwon ever considered bifurcating decision procedures? 
A. Yes. We did so. As a result our services operations outperforms textiles 
products. But the textile problem remains unsolved. 
Q38. Does Daqing Junwon permit excuses, de-binding or scapegoating for failing 
investments? 
A. Yes. As the Chairman of WPS commented before long that a firm may afford 
to lose aui investment but cannot afford to lose its knowledge men. 
Q39. Should a firm support failure, and why? 
A. Yes. Profitable investments never runs smooth in a competitive world. 
Therefore to support failure is to support success. Organizational learning 
becomes priority for most firms nowadays. 
Q40. Has Daqing Junwon brought forward phase-out costs? Why? 
A. Decision-makers have maintained wary of costs of withdrawal. However, a 
firm has to take risks in a business world. 
Q41. Has Daqing Junwon been de-institutionalized? If so, was it easy? 
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A. Yes. WPS treats Daqing Junwon as an experiment aiming to procure 
knowledge of strategic alliance and expand its business horizon. It is 
justifiable at the corporate level but not at the business level. 
Q42. How is Daqing Junwon's investment strategy formulated? 
A. It is based upon elite's vision to stretch the firm's skills and resources to first 
explore and then exploit the marketplace. 
Q43. In Daqing Junwon, is enough attention paid to the control process of the 
investment? 
A. We have TQM. A posh word, isn't it? We do not think we have enough 
control over the joint business. 
Q44. Can you list some of the mechanisms used in Daqing Junwon to secure effective 
control over investments? 
A. We employed following methods during the process: (a) setting upper and 
lower limits for decision-makers to stick to, (b) presenting monthly progress 
report and undertaking half a year re-assessment, (c) publicize evaluation 
results to employees WPS's employees, and (d) combining outsiders' and 
inner quality circles' consultation. 
Q45. Consider Daqing Junwon, how can it exercise strategic control over investments? 
What are the message Daqing Junwon can deliver? 
A. Daqing Junwon should have been better if it had monitored the validity of 
assumptions previously imposed during the selection and implementation of 
the project (e. g. the operational issues such as free access to Junwon's global 
distribution channels), had identified the causes of discrepancies between 
actual and anticipated outcomes in the implementation process (e. g. state 
limitations and marketing dilemmas), and had monitored the investment 
decision-making process in a broad way (e. g. the acquisition of first hand 
information on the progress of investment). The message Daqing Junwon can 
deliver is that one ought to take a systems view to approach strategic control 
over investment decision-making process for it has to be examined in a full 
organizational context covering strategy, operation, economics, finance, work 
psychology, technology, ideology, and business culture, etc. 
Research review: some propositions 
Escalation 
Propositionl : Chinese corporate culture is in favor of escalation of commitment 
Proposition2: Decision-makers whose leadership is task oriented tend to escalate than 
those who are relationship oriented. 
Proposition3: Escalating commitment tends to loom large when market competition 
becomes increasing intensive. 
Proposition4: Escalating commitment is more likely to occur in projects involving more 
than one investor (such as joint ventures). 
Proposition5: The less decision-making power a firm has the more likely the firm is to 
escalate commitment to its chosen course of action. 
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